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PREFACE 
This dissertation is a study of the German Catholic Center Party trom the 
November Revolution 1918 to the adoption of the Weimar Constitution, August 
1919. It attempts to determine the effectiveness of political Catholici8Dl in 
helping to solve the problems of the chaotic conditions after the German 
Revolution ot 1918 which witnessed the overthrow of the empire, thrones, aray, 
and dynasties. Besides examining the socio-econoaic composition ot the Party, 
this study endeavors to delineate the Party's ideology and program in adjusting 
to the new revolutionar.y conditions as an active member in the Weillar Coalition 
government. The focal point ot consideratiOD in this study is the role of the 
Center in formula tin, the three major tasks lUldertaken 'bT the National Assembly': 
na_ly, the creation of a legal government, the conclusion of the peace nego-
tiations, and the framiDg ot a democratic constitution tor the German Republic. 
Necessar117 involved in this triple action of the Party are the internal con-
flicts within it, which are given as much con.ideration as available source. 
warrant. 
Since mo.t of the intoraation i. drawn frca German sources , it wa. nec-
e •• ary tor the writer of thi. dissertation to make her own translations. 
Throughout the dissertation, theretore, unless otherwise indicated, all trans-
lations are the author's own. 
Very special thanks are due to Dr. Raymond H. Schmandt for his kindness 
and invaluable assistance in helping make this project a reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Germany in the fall of 1918 presented a woeful picture of frustration and 
unsuccessful offensives on the front and hunger, hardship, and general dissat-
isfaction at home. Four long years of fighting had left the people weary and 
discontentedJ defeatism and radical agitation were evident everywhere. Hence, 
it was not surprising that the November Revolution with its abdication of the 
Kaiser, the toppling of thrones allover Germany, and the establishment of the 
Republic, was effected with relative ease. Democracy had been prescribed as 
the solvent for all Germany's problelllS--better days beckoned just beyond the 
democratic horizon. But the new governaent was socialistic, workers' and sol-
diers' councils held the reign. The political situation was precarious. To 
bring order out of chaos, a lational Constituent Assembly was demanded to guar-
antee a truly democratic government for the German people. Under such cireUII-
stances, old political parties revamped their programs and new parties were 
fomed in order to adjust to the JIlOre recent political, 8ocial, and economic 
conditions. Along with all the others, the Catholic Center Party sought to 
.. rshal its members behind its revised political directives and prepared to 
play its role in the formation of the new democratic government. 
The energetic part played by the Center in the establishment of the 
Weimar Republic cannot be understood without some knowledge of its past history 
Bnd basic ideology. The Center Party of 1918 was no apprentice in the polit-
I1.cal sphere. It had been educated and tested by almost fitty years ot struggle. 
1 
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rounded in 1870 by a group ot Catholic 11leJlbers ot the ?russian Landt8g who were 
concerned about the consequences tor Catholici8lll and political and cultural 
pollcies, the Party sought to defend the constitutional rights of German 
Catholics. The following year it expanded its aims to include representatives 
to the first Reichetag of the newly organised German Reich.l 
CODling as a response to cert.ain specific and uniQ.ue teatures ot German 
deYelopment, the Center Party retlected a political Catbollcism which had been 
active in Germany since the time ot Joseph G3rres in the l820-s. Called to 
lFor a comprehensive and detailed history ot the Center Party, see Karl 
Bachem, Vor schichte Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentruma artei, 
9 yols. K I • • chem, 92 - 32. e most recent history ot the 
Party is the excellent work by Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrum!p!rtei 1917-
1923 (Dllsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1966). (Work on this dissertation was well 
on its way betore the publication ot Morseyls book.) A briet study ot the po-
litical structure ot the ~rty is given in Friederich Dessauer, Das Zentrum 
(Berlin: Pan-Verlagagesellschatt, 1931), Joset Joos, Die tilitiacbe Ideenwelt 
des Zentrums (Karlsruhe: G. Braum, 1928), and Johannes Sc utt, Die dedschen 
latholiken und die zentruJl8~rtei (Kolna J. P. Bachem, 1928). OEIier a1llpa-
ihetIc hIstories are karlbbeIm, Geschichte der cbristlichen Parteien in 
Deutschland (Mllnchen. Kasel-Verlag, 1953) J LUdWIg Bergstrlsser, GesciiIchte der 
iCntlschen Parteien in Deutschland (5th ed., Manchen: G. Olsog, 1955) KarlA. 
hUlte, ed. NatIonale lr'biit: Dis Zentrum und sein Wirken in der Deutschen 
R;:lik (Berlliit Wilhelm Andermann, 1929), Martin Spahn, Das deutsche Zentrum 
( hen: Kirchhe1ll'sche, Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906), HanlS Broermann and Karl 
Grobbel, Unterm Zentrumsbannerl Dokulllente sur Zei eschichte (Berlinl Weckruf' 
Verlag, 192 ,Woltgang Treue, Deutsche Partei ro raDIU 9 1-19$6 (03ttingen. 
Munsterscbmidt-Verlag, 19$6). ced ev s ven y gar Alexander, 
"Church and Society in Germany," Church and Societ I Catholic Social and Po-
litical Tho ht and Movement 178 - , ed. Jose • oody ew York, Arts, 
., 3 and R 0 Morsel", "D e Deutsche ZentrUJUparte1, It Das End. der 
Parteien, ed. Erich Matthias and Rudoll Morsey- (Dliaseldorla Droste VerIig, 
1960). Also usetul is Edward J. Dunne, "The German Center Party in &Dpire and 
Republic, A Study in the Crisis ot Deaocracy,1I (unpublished Ph.D. dissertat.1.tm, 
Dept. ot History, Georgetown University, 1950). The toll owing guides are help-
ful. Georg Schreiber, "Eine Dbersicht sur Literatur der Zentrumspartei t{h. die 
Jahre 1914-1923" Die Politik des Deutachen Reiches,Politisch8s Jabrbuch I 
M.-Gladbach, Volksvere1nner18g, 1925) J Bruno Gebhardt, Handbuch der Deutschen 
Geschichte (III, IV, 8th ed.) Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1959) and bah1mann-
¥;ll!l~:¥.enkunde der deutschen Geschichte (9th ed., Leipsigl K. F. koehler, 
"" 3 
" Munioh in 1827 a8 profes80r of history, J08eph oarres had became the inspira-
tion for a group ot Catholio intellectuals and politioians whioh developed or-
" ganiBed Catholic political action ill Germany. Gorr •• ' puphlet, "Athana'iUIJ," 
written in protest against the 1mpri80lllllent of the Archbi8hop ot Cologne, vas 
the great clarion call for political equalit7 of Catholic. and tor the freedom 
ot the Catholic Church. The idea8 expre8sed in thia publica tion provided. a 
!IOdel for the adjustment of traditional Catholiciam. to modem political and 
social conditions. 
These same policies were further developed by a group ot southern Qel"llUlD 
Catholic democrats active in the Frankfurt Assembly ot 1848. Theee men organ-
ized a union called the Piusverein which advocated along with its Easedeutech 
policy the protection of the autonoay of the German states against an7 strong 
centralization movement which might threaten the position ot the Catholic 
Church in Germany. The group chose as its slogan, "Freiheit del' Kirche im 
Staatel .. 2 
Ot special importance tor the later development ot the Center Party was 
the work of a loosely organized group ot Ca tholic parliamentarians in the 
PrUIJsian Landtag. In 18$2, HeJ'll8lUl von Mallinckrodt3 and the Reich.n.berger 
2,A survey of the ll-ckground and formation of the Center Party can be 
to~d in Ludwig Bergstra88er, Studien zur Vorgeschichte del' Zentrum8partei 
(TUbingenr J. C. B. Mohr, 1910). 
-llermann von Mallinckrodt (1821-1874) attended the univer8ities of Berlin 
and Bonn. After practicing law tr<* 1842-1848, he entered the Prussian Landtag 
in 18$2 and served there until 1863. He was elected to the Diet of the North 
German Conrederation in 1866, but returned to the Pruasian LRndtag in 1868. He 
beoa_ the head ot the Center Part7 in the PrWJsian Landtag and the Raich.tsg 
in 1870. As a brilliant parliamentarian he bitterly opposed anti-clerioal leg-
i~tion untU his untime17 death in the midst ot the Kulturkampt. See otto 
Plout, Hermann von Mallinclcrodt. Die Geachichte aeinea Leben. (Freiburg-ia-
Breisgaul Herder, 1901). 
brothers" August and Peter,,4 who were to become the co-founders ot the Center 
Part,., fOl'lll8d a Catholic faction (Katholischen Frakt1on) to tight tor the pro-
tection of the Catholic Church against the interterence ot state sovereignty. 
Such aotivation tended to characteri.e the party as being predCJllinantly a con-
t ••• ional group. This, however, was not the wish of the leaders who strewe to 
live their taction a purely political rather than a cantessional character. 
Accordingly, they stres.ed political goals for the psrt7 and changed ita name 
111 18,9, to the "Faction of the Center" (Fraktion des Zent.rume) which signified 
the place they occupied in the cha.ber. Despite their efforts" the transtorma-
tion troa a confessional to a political faction was not entirely successful. 
Moreover" the less.ning ot Church-5tate tensions as well .s the political dis-
unity of the representatives brought this precursor ot the Center Party to an 
inauspicious end. 
After the election ot 1866" the Catholic faction as such ceased to exist. 
Thus, the interlude between 1867-1870, allowed time for serious retlection and 
concentration of effort on the part ot Catholic parliamentarians. Already the 
dark, threatening clouds on the political horizon warned ot a coming great con-
fiict tor the Catholics in Germany. In 1866, the outcome ot the Austro-Prussian 
war, the exclusion of Catholic Austria from the Germanic Contederation, lett 
the Catholics ot South Ge1"Jl8ny at the mercy of the predominantly Protestant 
Horth German Contederation. The avowed anti-clericalism ot both the National 
4August Reichensberger (1808-189,) studied at Bonn, Heidelberg, and 
Berlin. From 1848-188, he was an active parliamentarian in the Frankfurt 
Assembly! Prussian Landtag, Prussian Herrenhaus (18.$1-1863)" and the Reichstag 
(1871-18t:t4). His brother Peter (181$-1892) studied at Bonn and Heidelberg. 
L1ke August he was an author and parliamentarian in the Reichstag from 1871 
untU his death. 5ee Ludwig Pastor" August Reichensberger, 2 vols. (Freiburg-
1a-Breisgau; Herder, 1899). 
Liberals and the ProgressiYe parties alarmed the Catholics regarding' their po-
sition in the new Reich and _de thea eepeciall7 teartul of state control of 
education. The need for a "Catholic tront" or at least tor an organised stand 
against these encroachments vas evident. Leaders ot the old Center taction re-
sponded to the emergene,.. by issuing a call tor the tonaation ot a new Catholic 
party". In October, 1870, atter seyeral months ot discussion, the group pub-
lished the so-called Soest Program which they later adopted as the plattorm tor 
the new party. 
Beginning wi tb the slogan, "For Truth, Justice, and Liberty, It the progru 
listed nine basic prinCiples. 
1. Presenation ot the independence and the rights of the Church 
2. Pari ty of all recognised religious denOllinations 
). Opposition to civil marriages 
4. Confessional schools 
S. Creation ot a Bundesstaat, with autonam)" ot the separate 
states 
6. Decentralization ot ada1nistration 
7. Reduction of expenditures and equal distribution of the 
tax burden 
8. Haraon1zing ot the interests ot capital with those ot the 
landowners and ot both ot these with the interests ot 
labor b7 aeans ot the support ot a stlll'd7 II1ddle class 
9. Freedam tor all attempts to solve the social problelU that 
do not deYiate fram the law, and legislatiye elimination 
of those evils which threatenr:<to bring about the lIOnl and 
ph;ysical ruin ot the workers.~ 
This program indicated the part)"'s desire ot not .erel;y defending the rights oj 
SWdwi~ Bergstrl.ser, Dar poli tische JCa thollsi_us I Dokuaente seiner 
F'.r1tw1cklung (M&chen: Drei Hasken Verag, 1§2j) 11, 27-28. 
p 
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the German Catholics, but of Heting also the political, social, and' economic 
needs of its constituenta~ The basic principles of the Soest Program remained 
in torce as the Catholic plattora. 
The new Center Party was not to contine ita activities to Prussia alone. 
Ita _bers were detendned to gain representation in the Imperial Reichatag 
which was to haft ita first session in the spring of 18n. ,An appeal was .. de 
to the general electorate. The votes ot the southem states were easily gained 
because of their tear tor the tate of the Church in the newly-established 
Protestant eap1re. In areas where the religious issue bad no appeal, the 
Center advocates were able to win votes by stressing the tear of oyer-
centralisation in Berlin and the cOlllpl.ete sinking of the nationality ot the 
nr101l8 states into that ot a united Qel"lll8DY. As a result, the Catholic and 
particularist poliCies were united, an<! so "ultruontanes,· Poles, Guelphs, and 
later the French ot A1Ace-Lorraine, in tact, flYery opponent ot nationali_ . 
helped the Center on to victory at the polls in the election ot March, 1871. 
It was not, however, until the end ot March that the party was formally organ-
i.ed at a Meting in Berlin called tor that purpose. 
The tirst election under the Soest Progr811l was a great auecess tor the 
Center or Constitutional Party (Vertassqspartei), as it was also named. 
Sixty-three delegates representing 18.6% ot the entire vote entered the 
Reichstag carrying the Center's banner. Under the able leadership of the 
Hanoverian Ludwig Windthoret, the Center was to beccae a tormidable political 
iutruaent in the bands ot i te clear-sighted, detera1ned Mabere. 6 
6 Ludwig Windthorst (1812-1891) studied at G8ttingen and Heidelberg. 
nectecl president of the .econd chamber ot the Hanoverian legislature in 18,1, 
he lett this position two years later when he was appointed Minister ot Justice 
111 the cabinet ot George V. He held this new position until 1866 when he wa. 
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No sooner had the new Center Party taken ita place in the Reiohsteg, when 
B1PSrck launched his oftens1:ve. In his opinion, the part.icularin of the 
catholic Church and ita identification with separatist currents within the 
Reioh jeopardized the newly' won German un1 ty and exposed the empire to the 
danger of COII.plete disintegration. Bi8ll8rck's lulturltaapt or his war against 
the catholic ad"f'8rsaries began with the removal of the special division tor 
Catholios in the Pruas1an Ministr,y of aeligioUB Atfairs.7 Then csae penal laws 
a,aiJ18t priests preaching the inviolability ot the rights of the Church. The 
suppression of the Jesuits was the next calam t:r. The climax ot th1a escalating 
penteoution was reaohed with the prcaulgation of the anti-Catholic ·Ma,. aws,· 
introduced by the Pruasian Minister ot Religious AffairS, Adalbert 'alk. These 
laws virtuall,. crippled Catholic education in Germany and wiped out all reuin-
iDe guarantees ot the Pruasian Constitution ot 18;0 which bad sateguarded the 
Catholic Church aocording to the principle ot fta tree Church in a tree Ste te •• 
Through the decade ot the 1870' s the Center played the role ot a strong 
opposition part,. in the Re1ohetag. Fighting diligentl,. to keep the Church 
elected to the Pruasian andtag and to the Reichetag ot the North Gerun 
Contederation. Atter the death ot Mallinckrodt in 1674 he became the leader 
ot the .Center in the Reichstag and reuined head ot the party untU his death. 
l .. ster political strategist, he vas one ot the tiercest opponents ot B1smarok 
in the Reichstag. Windthorst vas adept in the management ot .en, an excellent 
~lIdge ot.character and one ot the b!st parl1aaentar;r debaters or his t1ae. See 
~rd Husgen, Ludwig Windthorst (181111 J. P. Bache., 1911). 
7 .. s yet there is no reall;y thorough and fully satiafacto17 work on the 
lKulturkulpt. A hand,. SUlllll8r;y ot the latest publications can be found in the 
!critical review by Rudolf LUl, "Dar ltulturk_pt in Deutschland. Bemerkungen 
!au eiDer neuen Darstellung," in .. en UDd. ,orschR!en aus 1tal1en1schen ~rchlven unci Bibl1otheken, ~I (Hb1iiienl li.eyer terLg, 1963), 
~_. 571.-)Yl.. Th1s renew is severely critical ot the lateat work: by Erich 
~ba1dt-'olkmar, Dar Kulturkaapt in Deutschland, 1871-1890. (G8ttingeDI ~uater.Chm1dt-Verla" 1963'. 
IIJI_---------------:l 8 
tree from state dOlllination, the Centri.ts systeaatically attacked every piece 
ot anti-clerical legislation discussed in the Reichstag. Government successes 
vere purchased at the price of a bitter parliamentary struggl.. Neverthele.s, 
tile Kulturkampf enabled the Center to eaerg. trem the conflict the best-dis-
oiplined, the MOst powerfully organized, and the strongest single party in 
Oel'lUUlY. Moreover, the conflict served to make Catholics in Oel'll8ny realise 
eTen .ore the need for such a party, for it was evident that the Center's 
W.ltanschauung cut across class barrien, making it literally a party for the 
.. s.... Since 18n the Center had deYeloped a Catholic pres. with Oeraania, 
pUbli.hed in Berlin, a. ita otticial organ, and other similar publicati0D8 for 
the Rhineland and the South. 8 Eaerging trCII the struggle of the lCulturlauapt 
and aided by the new freedOil of assembly, press, and suttrage, the Center be-
e ... a regular popular party even employing popular .logau. Such a d ..... lop-
aent was understandable since political Catholicism, as .xemplified by the 
C.ntrists, was basically in cont01'llity with the fundamental idea. ot a 
delllOCratic-liberal treedc:a in political and cultural life. 
Because ot the party structure and i tat principl.s the Center soon at-
tained, and alwayB kept, the position ot strategic center between the parties 
ot the Right and Lett. Un11lce JJlO8t other partie. ot the German Reich.tag, the 
cOlllposition of the Center Party followed ideological rather than .ocial or 
class lines. It _braced people tre. all walks of lite. Included in ita 
"8other iIlportant Catholic newspapers were the ICSlnische VOlks.eit~1 
~esttal1scher MerJcur in Mllnater, Sehles18che Volks.eng in lr.al8u, Maler ~ournall Asr:er Postzeitungl Der BBdlseher Beobachter in Karlsruhe, Das 
uteche Vo b tt iii Stuttgart. In 1871 there wa. a total ot 126 C.nt:rI'it 
newspapers W1.th a total circulation ot 322,000, by 1912 this had increased to 
446 papers and 2,624,900 circulation. See Bach .. , ZentrUIIspartei, III,lSS. 
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..,mership were great landowners and lowly peaaants, industrial magnates and 
tactory workers, bankers, shopkeepers, protessional men, and arti8an8. Under 
the un1f'71DI yet loose bond ot religious attachment, it cCRb1ned se""ng17 di-
vergent streaDlS ot ccmservatism, llberalism, and radical social retorm. Span-
ning the cross-currents of ideas and social forces, it purposely shunned any 
extreae and doctrinaire positions. To meet the needa of such a diversified 
representation, neoeaaity d8llAnded a tlexible socio-econoaic policy. COIlse-
quently, the Party freely applied the baaic principles ot the Soast ProgrUl, 
adjusted them to changing ideaa of the t1Dlea, and thus realistically and oon-
tinuously redetined its own position. Because of auch a course ot action, the 
Center at taes was denounced b1 ita opponents as an 'WUIcrupulous, unpr1Do1pled 
opportunistic power group. 
As the deeade ot the 1870's drew to an end, it bee ... apparent that the 
lulturkampf was deereaaing in strength and 1 t se_ed as it the strained re-
lationship between Biaarck and the Center Party might be 1mproved. The gov-
e1'DMnt's change tr<ma tree trade to proteotion in 1879 had oost Biaarck the 
support ot the Naticmal Liberala. Such a tranaition was greeted favorably by 
the Centrists who represented, -one others, large agrarian interests eager to 
have their tara products protected by tarift legislation. other tactors also 
tended to eaae the tension between the Centrists and Bismarck. The German 
alliance with Catholic Austria on the one hand, and the strong anti-olerioal 
pollcies of republioan rrance on the other compelled the Center Party to SlJR)Ort 
Bi8lllarck's toreign policy. WhUe ai_ret had at first feared the sooial de-
mands ot the Center, he now began to see their usefulness in sucoesstull.7 wean-
iDe away many of the working claases trOll the acre hated socialist aovement. 
Furthel'llore, sinoe Bi8ll8l"Ok planned no further extension of cent.ralised ..,--+-,. 
10 
.inCe the Church que.tion va. no longer a matter ot strong controYers,., and 
.ince it was po.sible to grant reasonable concessions to Catholic worker., the 
Iron Chancellor was now w11l1ng to cooperate wi tb the Center Party in the 
.icbatag. 
The Centrists capitalized on this change ot attitudes and labored un-
ceasingly in the 1880'. to raoye the obnoxioWl lulturkalllpt legi.lation. Bit 
b7 bit, they were able to obtain the rtrris10n at manY' at the anti-clerical 
lavs. Although the German govemaent kept the anti-Jesuit laws and retained 
the right to .upem •• Catholic education and to approve clerical appointaentll, 
oonditions had generally iaproved by 1887. From this t1lle onward the Center 
uuall7 tollowed a cons.native course, becOJDing staunch supporters ot the 
Reich!s program except in polici •• which contlicted with the 8oe.t Program. 
Ilotvi tb.tanding, Bismarck retained. his JJd..tru8t ot the Centrists and took care 
Il ..... r to be in the po.i tion ot being depend.nt upon their eupport. 
58"f'ertheles., during the Wilhel.m1an epoch and al.o later, the Center c_ 
w achieve precisely th. position vhi.ch li8ll8rek teareel. The greater the in-
cr.... in the r.presentation ot the Social Democrats, the grea ter bee_ the 
iaportanoe ot the Center Party as the holder ot the balance ot power in the 
Reichatag. Betw.en l89S and 1906, the Center was the chiet support of the ill-
penal government, and £rca 1907 onward there was never a pernment _jori t7 
1d. thout the Center. With ita fairly stable repres.nta tion ot about one hundred 
depuUe. and its veU-disciplined party organbaUon, the Center bee ... the 
poll tical arbiter ot OermaD7. 
It was only' 10glc8l that the Center should tollow a middle oourse, haYing 
.e it did .uoh a close mutual interaction ot political and .ocial Ca'thol1oin. 
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!be equalising of social interests between the property owners and the prop-
8l'1i71ess, and the equalisation of political interests between the strong and 
the .. ak, (protecting ainority- groups), helped to give the Center a certain 
elaaticity- and adaptability. In the field of social legislation the Party- made 
a positive contribution. Throughout its h1stor,y the Centrists worked indefati-
pb17 toward the atta1mn.ent of social ideals. They- were a vi tal factor keeping 
betore the 878s of QeruD7 the Catholic idea ot social justice and social char-
ity. Social retoN was an important plank in the Party program 1'roJIl 18n 
omrard. In 1876 • social plank in the Party's prograa included provisions tor 
a Sunday- holiday, regulation of the yearB and tel'll8 ot an apprenticeship, pro-
tection of factory workers, l.iJIl1tation ot hours of work for 'W01Il8n, l.1aiting and 
protection of ohild labor and the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to 
settle disputes between labor and capital. Later, part:Qr due to ita s0010-
econOJllic progrUl ot 1894, the Center was able to achieve protective legislation 
tor the workers and social insurance sch ... s, protective trade leg1.lat.ion and 
fiscal polleiea which attempted to regulate an equitable balance between the 
interesta ot induatr,y and agriculture.9 While advocating more labor legisla-
tion, the Center alwa;ya rauined bitterly hoatile to sociali_. 
In tult111ing ita responsibilities and duties towards all cla.ses ot 
people, the Center turthered legislation that protected such minority groupe 
a. the Poles and the oitisens of Aleace-Lorraine. In mUter,y .nd colonial 
policie. the Party- took a crt tical poSition, positive on principle but alwa78 
S70r SOll18 of the party's socio-econcm1c programs, see Wolf' gang Treue, 
Deutsche parteiPrniramme, 1861-1956. A helpful survey of the histar,y of the 
~enteri s aoclal a econcale poliCIes is given in Lorellll Zach, 2g Jahre ZentJ.wi 
¥trtaChafts-und Sosialpolitik 1m Reichatag. 1871-1921 (Berlinreraanla, §21). . ... 
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trJ'iDI to llmit a1litari_ and imperialism. Thi. position .t Umes o.used the 
center to sutter the los. ot its parl.1am.ntary 1ntluenc., as in 1884, 1893, and 
1907 but u.ually not to any grea t degree .10 Pur.uing polici.. ot the middle 
otten c.used violent tensions within the Center Party. On the whole the larg.r 
PrUB81an taction was usually more conservative in 1 ts outlook than th. 81IUlU.r 
nuab.r ot democraticall)" inclined nan-Prusi.n. of H •••• , Baden, .nd wlrttembe1g. 
Despite the Party's well-disoiplined organi •• tion, the.e int.rnal con-
tllcts were otten reflected in the C.ntri.ts' .ttitudes. Id.oloaio.ll)" its 
aabership was united and r.ady to taoe any •••• ult upon the treedc. ot the 
Church. This v.s the source ot ita .trength during th. Kulturkaapt. But on 
polit1cal _tters th.r. w.re sharp divergenc.s witb1n the Party. rus beoame 
.pparent .specially in the period between th. turn ot the century .nd the out-
bre.k ot the war. At times there were strained relations between the Centr1ats 
111 the Raichetag .nd those in the Catholic Workers Associations and the 
Chrietian Trade UniOl18. 
During the reign ot WUlia II the leadership ot the party vas e •• en-
Uall)" cODServative. The Party was in the hand. ot a group ot Catholic civil 
serYant. who adopted a .taUllOh attitude in support ot the e:rlsting political 
.ituation in Geruny. The Center'. alignaent with the goverment and the righ'-
!viDe partie. was traoeable to its tear ot the rapidly grovilll populari t)" ot the 
Social Democratic Part)" in Germany. Bureaucrats, landowner., clergymen, and 
prote.sional men .upplied the political id.a. and leadership ot the Catholio 
oOlllllmity. Suspioious ot the restle •• prol.tarian element 1n the Party, the 
lo,or an excellent cov.rage ot this period, see John K. Zeender, "The 
German Center Part.y and the Growth ot Gerun .. tional Power, 1890-1906" (un-
published Ph.D, dissertation, Dept. ot H1story, Yale University, 19S2). 
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leadere along with the Oerman hierarchy believed tha t the Ca tholic minority and 
the Church would sutfer if the semi-absoll1te monarchy' would ever be replaced bJ 
a deaocratic state similar to England or France. Unwilling, therefore, to work 
with the left-wing parties for the democratbation of Germany, the Center con-
tinued to support the aonarchy and its older parliamentary allies. 
It wa. not surprising that a progressive and democraticallT inclined 
liberal faction should .. rge within the Party. The complaoent attitude of 
the oonservative "old guard" irked this newer faotion. The leadership of the 
liberal faotion was ass.ed by a younc energetio politician trCD Wtlrttemberg, 
Matthias Erl!lberger.ll B7 1907 he had becCllA8 one of the most coneplouoUB ..... 
bers of his Party. .As head of the left-wing faction he wanted to draw the 
Center closer to the more progressive politioal groups. 
This ag1 tation coinoided also with an increased tendency to convert the 
Party into more than a confes.ional organiBation and to open its doors to _.-
ber. of other religious groups. The Oerman Christian Trade Union had been able 
to establish an interconfe.sional basi. tor its organiution by 1899. In at-
tempting to do the .ue, the Center hoped to oTercOlU prevalent anti-Catholic 
passions and make i tselt IIOre aoceptable in the aeiobatag. The contrcwers,. 
came to a head as a result ot the publication ot an important article by a 
Centrist member, Julius Bach_, which appeared in March 1906 entitled, "We 
llttatthias Enberger (1875-1921) entered the Reichstag as its youngest 
member in 1903 atter a dist1Dgu1shed oareer as a journalist, pamphleteer and 
organiler of Catholic lay institutions. He was also one ot the founders ot 
the German Christian Trade Union DlOV'eaent in the 1890'.. He served as Genaan 
Peaoe Commissioner in 1918, 8S a delegate to the National Assembly (1919-1920), 
and as Minister ot Finance (1919-1921). He was assassinated at Oriesbach, 
Germany, in 1921. See Klaus Epstein, Matthias Irsberger and the DU ... ot 
Oerman Democracl (Princetone Princeton UillTer.ity Pre.s, 19$9). 
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MlIIt Get OI1t of the Tovar.·12 Bacha, publisher of the ,alnische Volka.eitg 
and a leading repre8entative of the progressive social views, argued that al-
though the Center Party had 1ta origin in religious issues, it was really not 
.-ant to be a reUgioua party. Be quoted one of the founders of the part,., 
!Iall1DCkrodt, as eapbasising this s_ point in the Reich8tag in 1872. Bacha 
waated the Party to return to the tounders' original intentions of hanne an 
iIltercontessional part;y. ae proposed that the Center collaborate with 
Protestant groups. He further suggested that the Center along with the 
Christian Trade Unions throw i te support vherever teaslble to non-Ca'tbol1cs 
running tor ottioe. 
A heated dlscuas10n on th18 question developed within Catholic circles, 
beooaing 110re intense as it became 1nvolved in a s1allar controver87 a.ong in-
teUectuals concerning Modern1a and Integrall_. The Modernlsts tavored 
closer cooperation between Catholic and non-Catholic torces ot lIOdern culture. 
The Integral1ats, on the other hand, rejected all non-Catholic culture and 
took special pride in asserting the existence ot speclf1call;r Catholic prin-
clples to govern aU areas of aotivlt,.. Although Modemi .. was espoused b,. a 
very limited group of GeZ'II8D intellectuals, the German Integral1ata ot Berlin 
chose to consider all Catholics who favored close cooperation with non-Cathol.1ca 
in political or econaa1c questions as Modemlsts at heart. This struck di-
J"ect17 at the Center's at'tepte 1;0 rid 1tself of its contessional character. 
tenaiona broke forth in a veh ... nt RiChtUlllsstrelt (athe 'Where aN we 
going" controversY") between the conte.sional sector wi th its centers in 
11wlr mLsen aus da Turm henns. The coaplete text 1. reprinted in 
~g Bergs trls ser , ber 'PontIsche la tholl.l_us: Dokulllente seiner Entvicklum 
(MuncheJu Drei Masken Verlag, 192.3) II, 332-341. 
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Trier-Berlin-Breslau, and the non-contessional sector which drew its strength 
" " rrc- the Party's toUowing in Cologne-Munchen-Qladbaoh. '1'he Kolner Richtg 
led by the two Bachems, Karl and Julius, and Hermann Carda una , and the K"ol.n1scbl 
volka.eitugg, as well .a the Chrutian Trade Uniona in M.-OJ.adbach under the 
leadel'llh1p ot Frans Bitlle, August Pieper, and Heinrich Brauns vere attacked by 
the Berliner Richtg headed by Count Hana von Opperadortt, Frana Bitter, and 
BeJ"lUDll Roeren and baoked b7 the Catholio Workers' Asaociation operating under 
the innuence ot the aristocratic and clerical direction ot Karl von SaviP7, 
HeiDrich FourneU, and Paul neiacher. The Berliner Riohtg aocused the 
,Sln1aohe R1chtung ot advocating the supplanting ot Catholic organisations by 
-super-oonfeaaional" and general Chriatian institutions.13 The bulk at German 
Catholici8D1 a8 well as almost all the Centriat leaders were on the side of 
Colople from the beginning, but tor a whUe Berlin appeared to posseas the 
better Vatican connections besides the support of the German hierarch7. 
The unity ot the Party waa undoubtedly strained by the bitter internal 
oontro"ray. The Zentrumastreit, aa it waa also called, caused the Centrists 
to take inventory ot their Party' 8 accc.apliahllents and to re-evaluate the pur-
poee ot its existence. The Berlin group, hostile to aU non-Catholic oulture, 
luiated that the Center ahould be a purely Catholic party, not -re17 an inte,.. 
oontessional Christian one. The interoontes8ional trade unions advocated by 
the progressive wing vere also opposed by this strictly conservative wing be-
cause such unions would be liable to corrupt the faith ot the Catholio .. bel'll. 
fbe Berliners desired the close cler10al sup8rv'iaion ot all Catholio lay 
lL . 
-For an interesting but alao one-aided account ot the 0 ontroversy, see 
Bach., Zentruupart.ei, VII, chapters iii-iv. Alao helpful 18 John I. Zeender, 
"Qe:naan Catholios and the Concept ot an Intercontessional Part7, 1900-1922, n 
Journal ot Central European Attairs. XXIII (196)-1964), 424-439. 
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organizat10ns and denounced 8!l7 type at cooperation between Catholics aDd 
Protestants. This view was vlgoroU8ly' oppoeed by the secreta17-general at the 
folksYere1n, August Pieper, and the Centrist leaders, Franz Hitze and Karl 
-
friaborn. Erzberger, in his critici_ at the Berliners, asserted theT were 
st.raiDing Catholic principles beyond the breaking point bT deanding a spao1t-
ioa117 Catholic answer to everr probla.14 • cCllbined Reich and P1'l18sian 
CCJIIII1ttee tor the Center Party tinall7 resolyed the dispute on JloYember 28, 
1909, by tormally declaring that the Center Party was political, not 01er.l.cal.1S 
Both Roaren and Count yon Oppersdortt were expelled trca the Party in 1912 wheJ:I 
they retuaed to accept the Party's verdict.16 
Although the Party did not actually split as a result ot 1ts intenua1 
struggle, it nevertheles8 8uttered in the election ot 1912. Dusatistaction 
UlODI the Berliners over the resultra at the R1chtg88treit on the one band, 
and the unpopularity aaong urban Catholic workers ot the Party's conservatiye 
~zbergar at tir8t espoused the Berlin cauae but later, because ot 1ts 
doctrinaire poe1tion, he renounced it and ca .. out in support at the Cologne 
group. He 1I8S 1rritated by' the whole controver8yand deplored the bickering 
within the party's ranks ae a danger to ite unity. 
1"rh1s did not really end the Zentrwu8treit. it beCUle acute again in 
1914. '!'heodor Wacker, the Baden Centrist leader, was censored in Rome tor hia 
article, "Zentrua und kircblichen Autoritlt" which upheld the independence ot 
the part,. in political utters. Although the censorship was later withdrawn 
and Wacker's pos1tion accepted by Rolle, the incident tended to reopen the con-
VOTers,. over the conless10nal character. 
~ .. 1 survey ot the Zentruaastre1t oan be tound in Ludwig Bergstnsser, 
"Del" I1ss ia ZentruutlU'lll," Itadalso'e allttar, nV(lov_ber, 1910), 241-246. 
eee also Ernst Deuerlein, "Verliiit una &,ebnis des Zentruuetre1tee {1906-
1909)," Stimac del" Ze1t, CUI (Ha7, 19S5h 10)-126. For Enberger'l role in 
the Itruji18, see naus Epetein, "Enberger's Poaition in the ZentruJR.streit 
Betore World War I," Catholic Historical Review, XLIV (April, 19$8), 1-16. 
Enberger's own views on the coiif'ueloiiil lieue oan be tound in the Engllah 
translation, Enberger, The German centre-part!_ Studies in P011tioe~ EcO!Di!! 
and Apologetics (I. .. tard .. , International Car ollc Publishing co., 1 n). 
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course on the other, cost the Canter a serious loss ot Totes.17 The Socialist 
dctOl'7 at the polla in 1912, which saw the Social Democrats replaoe the 
center as the strongest party in the Reichstag, WAS undoubtedly due in SOJU 
.. sure to the Catholic workers' votes. Not that the center was re.iss in its 
oonoern tor social retorJlJ the faot was, the Reiohstag and Pruasian Center 
delegations oontained only a tew labor ... bers, whereas the rural areas were 
aore strongly represented than their Catholic populations warranted. Due to 
bard competition with the Social Democratic trade unions, Catholic labor lead-
era began to question plutocratiC suffrage in PrU8Sia, indirect taxation, and 
other oonservative polioiea. 
A t the SUle time the naren .. s of these proble.. intensified an alread,. 
existing criais in leadership in the Party. The election ot Baron Georg 
HertJ.ing as parl1aaenta17 leader ot the Center had teaporaril,. resolved the 
orisis in 1908.18 His tame a8 a noted soholar and sk1lltul concUiator and 
lCllla-tille ... ber ot the Part,. bad plaoated the discontented. Atter his resig-
nation in 1912 to becOlie Minister President ot BaTaria, the prob1n again 
became acute. The new parliuenta17 leader, Peter Spahn, though of Rhenish 
origin, had an e.sentially 81'Jlpathetio Tiew ot Pruasian institutions because 
17The retuma of the election ot 1912 gave the Center 91 seata in the 
Re10hstag in cc:.parison to the lOS seata held in 1907. The Social Democrats 
gained 110 aeats in 1912 as ccapared to the 43 .eats held in 1907. 
18Qeorg von Hertling (1843-1919) studied at Minster, Munich, and Berlin, 
and taught philoeophy at Bonn and Munich. He served a. a _.ber ot the 
Reichatag from 187S-189O and in 1896. He was leader of the part)" from 1909 
untU he became president ot the Bavarian llin1atry in 1912. During World War!, 
he replaced Michaelia a8 chancellor ot the Reich, resigning in late 1918. See 
Bans liaele, "Hertling,· Hochland, X (September, 1913), 7$O-75S and Karl 
Bach8ll, "Hertling,. Deutsche. Biographisches Jahrbuch, 1917-1920, II (1925), 
416-42S. 
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of his lang service in the Pruasian judic1ar,y.19 He tavored the Right and de-
.u-ed to bring cooaervative Catholici.m and conaervative Protestantiea closer 
together. WhUe Spabn rerued to sponsor polioie. which would weaken the exist,-
1DI monarchical, aristocratic and tederal !nati tutiOJlB, he waa by no .. ana a 
statio oonltervative. Yet, neither could he f01'llulate a policy which would reo-
CllCile the social and political upirationa ot the .. ssea with the existing 
cClRStitution ot the German atate •• 
Ditterence. in polioie. and per.onality separated Spabn trom the youthful 
Ersberpr. Tbe latter, aooustomed to the aore democratio institutions ot 
.outhern Germany, telt that the uniyersal tide ot democracy would eyentuall7 
neap awa7 the resistance ot the _anarchies and ar1stocracT, but he reali.ed 
.ut h1a Party and the nation vere not read7 tor deaocratic gOV'erllMnt. He 
directed hia eftorta, therefore, toward the formation ot a ooalition with the 
liberal parties to achieye liberal political and constitutional retorms. For 
a time just prior to the tint World War he succeeded so well in winning the 
.upport of enough .aderate conservative. that he 8W\Ulg his Party aWlT froa ita 
\nditional opposition to direct taxe., and associated it with the liberal 
parties in a progrd ot tax rat01'll. Although the majority ot the Centrists 
tavored the ... sure there vas deep resenaent dong the .old guard, It such as 
SUon Yon Hertling, Peter Spahn, Count von Galen, and Adolt Gr8'ber. lionethe-
le •• , they bad to concede that detinite prOlre •• ive and d_ocratic el81llent. 
wra gradually assUlll1.ng greater importance in the ParV. 
19Peter Spabn (1846-192,) a. a Doctor ot Law combined hi. judicial dutie. 
wi tb. parliaaentary work. He .erved a. a._bel' ot the Prusaian Landtag trCll 
1882-1909 and the Reichatag (1884-]917). He waa the Pruaaian Miniater ot Justice 
tre. 1917-1918. From 1912-1917 he va. the official party leader. He was 
elected aa a delegate to the National Aa.amb1y, 1919-1920, and to the Reiohatag 
ot the Weimar RepubliC, 1920-192,. See Bach_, Zentruapartei, VI, 146-147. 
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The outbreak of the war in 1914 found the Center forcing its divergent 
:S.nteresta into the background in order to present a comaon front an val" issues. 
'Dle slow, hesi tent progress the Part,. had made in veering to the Lett in the 
two ,..ars prior to the war was delayed b,. the Burctrieden which imposed a check 
aa dOlUlstic reforaa. Parliaaentar1ani8ll, the Prus8ian electoral system and 
social retorm.s were not seriousl,. discussed .. again untU 1917. Tb.e Centrist 
leaders, eager to daOllsvate the patriotism of German Catholicism, agreed with 
the Reich government a. to the cause of the war, the Han. to win it, and the 
policies to follow upon victor;y. 20 
As the war was prolonged with no imaedia te end in view, pri va tions which 
bad been keenly felt on the home front were ag~V8ted b,. the British blockade. 
Political tension. became apparent deep! te the ottioial Burg!rieden, for war 
weariness was definitelT exacting its toll b,. 1916. A oonvoveny over the 
war aims caused auch Mction in the Reichltag. Annexationiat war as. were 
espoused b,. all the political parties except the Social Democrats. In the 
first two years ot the "aI", the Center satisfied itself with general stateaente 
about the necessity of anne.xatiOll8 c0Jllll.8ll8urab1e to Gel'll8llT'. sacritice and 
future security needs. Even Ersberger at first was a. arelent an anneDtion1st 
a. 8117. Later, however, as he gained a truer perspective ot the international 
Situation, he beca.e politically more mature and more critical in judgunt. 
Graduall,. he retreated from hi. extrue annexation1st views ta1d.ng with hill the 
liberal Centrists. The _jori t,. of the Party, nevertheless, supported Spahn 
and his demands tor annexations. 
2Oror an account ot the Center Part,.'s internal strife pl"lor to and d~ 
World War I, see John lc. Zeender, "The Genaan Center Party' during World War I. 
An Internal study," Catholic Historical Review, XLII (Janua17, 19S7)1 4h1-468. 
A180 helpful is Bruce tr;;, "Eri68rger and oerman Politics, 1914-192 ," (un-
publi8hed Ph.D. dis8ertation, Dept.. of Hist.ory, Stantord University, 19)4). 
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But by 1916 dissatisfaction with the cODaenative type of Centrists' 
leadership again began exerting itself. lot only Enberger's daocratic wing, 
bUt also the Volkaverein, a Catholic lay' organisation under Centrist direotion, 
s. ".11 ss the Christian Trade Un101U1 voiced ori tioi8118 about the exoes.ive 
a,"rian infiuences in the Party and began agitating tor social and politioal 
reforms. This gravitating toward the Left by the liberal wing was Viewed with 
lanl by the Centriat conservative leadership. The atheia, the anti .. 
].ericali", the lUterialistie .ooiali_ of the Social Deocrats bad alva,. 
en strongly oppoeed by the Center. Oollaboration with the unreliable Soc1al 
IDe!lIOOrau was tantamount to denial of Catholic principles. But under the 
.in of high prices and taul ty pro'Yi.ioniDg of the var 1Wars, the Cathollo 
bor representatives no longer accepted the the.is that the Social Daoorata 
re unreliable. 'l'h18 daooratic element wanted the Center to collaborate with 
e Social De_ocrats in its demands for suftrage reforms in Prussia. Viewed in 
light of the "treaendoua sacritice all Oermane were 1Ulk1n& tor the ratherlaD:\ 
e Prua.1an three-cla.8 s)'8tea of votinc va. tound vantine.21 Oerman .oldiers 
workers wanted a _ore equitable taxation and voting Il7lltem. Ersberpr's 
ral wiDg succeeded in auater1nc enough Centrists to concert with the Left 
demanding suffrage reforma and in foraula ting a peace polioy. Enberger and 
21.&.ceording to the three-class system the political voting power of an 
iv1dual was detel'Jllined by his taxes, that 1s, acoording to his inCOll8 and 
roperty. Josef Joos, the Centrist liberal writer, later reported, nThe aver-
ge man, who was everywhere undervalued, disdained, and slighted and yet called 
to render the same services in the field and at hOlle, suddenly ceased to 
ccept this and regarded electoral retol'll in Pruasia s111P17 as the expression 
t the appreciation of the plain aan ••• a Joos also referred to the 0PP061-
ion of the Catholic hierarchy to electoral reforms. Cited in Ralph aaswell 
ts, Fall ot the aenun lapire, 1914-1918 (California: Stanford University 
8.S, 1932), II, 275-276. 
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h18 asaociatea on the Lett intended to identi17 the Re1chatag and the naUon 
with "a peace ot understanding and compromiae." Then too, in order to create 
a better impreaaion on the democra tic AUies, Enberger and the lett-1finc 
partiea planned that the govermaent should buIled1ately introduce equal suftrage 
in Prussia. 
The ottshoot of thi8 whole IlOV8Jllent vas the tuous "July Peaoe Resolutiaa." 
propoaad by Ersberger to the Reichetag in 1917. .87 thi8 tt.lR. he had become the 
IIOst influential JleJIlber in his part7 and was recognised, albeit reluctantl7, by 
the "old guard" as the lUldiaputed leader ot the Part7. Spahn had reBiped !rca 
the Part7 to become the Pruasian Minister ot Juettce, but he had ad'rleed the 
other conservative. to go along with the Parv'e new Polle7. True to ita opera-
tional pattern, the Center .. a body took a realistic view ot the political 
.i\uation and, theretore, 101811;r supported the peace resolution. 
'!'he events ot July precipitated a cri818 in the gOV'el'lllent wh1ch re8ulted 
lin • change ot chancellor. '!'he July Resolution itself was stillborn, a ncta 
Dt the new Chancellor Michaelis' qualified acceptanoe. Opportune viotories 
Iloag the tront boosted sagging OeNan moral.J the pressure ~ Jdlitar;y BUCoess 
~ oonservati .. were at work. The high-sounding phrases ot the peace Nsolu-
~CIIl vere tor gotten a8 the Right claored tor a victorious peace. The early 
~ucce8ses ot the ottensives in the West in the first Ilontha of 1918 8peeded up 
~. toro.s ot erosion in the Center Party. Th. oODServati,.. wing apin .... ted 
~taelt tor a nctorious peaoe. Moderate canservatives bepn Joining toroes 
jr1th extreme conservatives at the expense ot ErBberger's democrats. 
Events in the last tew months ot the val' brought about a sudden reversal 
~ th1a con8ervative trend. As tailures along the trent mounted and popular 
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di •• ati.taction at home beeame more radical, the pa rUes ot the Lett becUl8 
bOlder in their democratic demands. Th1a mov_ent .trengthened ErBberger" 
liberal wing which was in a,apath;y with the political demands ot the utt. The 
Fopi tioua IlOJUnt had 00Jll8 to broaden the base o:t the Party in order to turn it 
lIO%'e in the direction 01' a liberal and democratic policY' and to cooperate 
.. rei the.e ends with other democratic groups. Thus the ba.ia waa laid tor 
the Centrist ooali tion with the Socialiats and other republican groupe during 
the Weiur period. 
Aa one SU1"Ye18 the alllo.t halt-centur;y hieto17 01' the Center PartY' eme 
oannot help concluding that ba.icallT it r .. ined cODservative. In crucial 
decisionl bet.en conaervative and liberal elements the Center tended to tip 
the lealel in tavor ot the tONer. !hie vaa 10 e. lone 8. the landed. arlltoc-
ra01' and large industrialists provided the leadership tor the Part;y. Once the 
urban population, espeoiall;y the workerl, began to exert theallelve. through 
their labor organiutiona and labor leader., the conaervative leadership vas 
ohallenged. and a Jlovaaent toward the Lett began slOlfly to appear. Its ascend-
ancy wal long and laborioWlJ conservatism was reluctant to give wa1'. Though 
Enberger had gained a position 01' leader.hip in the Party by the 8UJIUIler ot 
1918, bi. position was tenuOWIJ be .bad still to cope with strong opposition. 
True, Catholici .. was a COllllllCXl denOllinator tor the Center Party, but 
apart fr01ll that, there waa no unifying ele.ent in the Party's heterogenous 
locio-eeonClllic .tructure. Divi.ions .ere within the social clas.e., not 'be-
tween th8lll. In Baden, wlrtteJlberg, and sOlle part. 01' Bavaria, the local clergy; 
peasants, and lower middle ola.. were strong supporters at the peace mov_ent 
and democratic retorm, _Ue in other parts ot !avaria the leader. were lapi-
cioWi of Ersberger'l centralising tendenciel. In Rhineland and Weltphalia 
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the peasants were organized under aristocratic leadership and supported con-
servatives policies. The Catholic Workers Association favored Erllberger's 
total program. Some of his defenders like Wilhelm Marx, later WeiJl8r chan-
cellor, and Johann Mesberta, the labor leader and deputy, were closely attached 
to the volksverein. But Adam Stegerwald,22 the leader of the Christian trade-
1IDiona, whUe acquieSCing in the liberal social policies, was a aupporter of a 
s'tl'ODl monarchy and critical of parliaaentary retol'll.. 
Such was the c0lllp1ex structure of the Center Party aa Germany stood on 
the briDle of aili tary collapse at the end of the 8UJIIIIler of' 1918. banta alaost 
bqoad control were propelling the Center Party along with the rest of 0eJ'11&D.7 
t .. rd major political changes which would nec.ssi tate realigDlllenta and re-
Taping ot the Center's progra. Tensions within the ParV were to be further 
iIIOre.sed by the iJaportBnt decisions to be faced in the c c.aing JIODtbs. 
22Adam Stegerwald (1874-1945) was a champion ot Sooial Catholicia and a 
leader in labor IIOV8Jl8llta. He vas one or the founders of the Christian Trade 
11Di0lUl and was elected the national chairman in 1921. In 1699 he also rounded 
the Central Union of Christian Carpenters. Later he was chosen international 
. secretary of the Christian Workers .ssooiation. He serred as a delegate in the 
Pruasian Herrenhaua (1917-1918,) the National A8Semb17 (1919-1920), and the 
Reichetag (1920). He was Minister of COIIIlerce for the Reich (1928-1930) and 
Minister of Labor (1932). He was elected chairman of the Center in 1929. See 
J(<>ter Deutll, Adall StageNalda Oewerkschafter. Politiker. Minister. 1874-1945 
loIn I Bond-Verlag, 1952). 
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CHAPTER I 
PARTY ACTIVITY BE1.WEFJl REVOLUTICB AND E.I..ECTION DAY 
During the JIOnths of OCt.ober and Noveaber 1918, Gel"lll8n)" experienced 
acaentoua changea in the struct.ure of her govermaent.. Alread7 at the end of 
\he summer Ililltary diaaster, deteaUsa, 800ial unrest, famine and general 
cUaeontent had precipitated the popular rejecUon of the old.. Biaarckian auWo-
"e7 and 11111 tarisa. !he Allied threats to retuae to deal with the Reich so 
10Dg 8a it retained a .ea1aut.ocraUc reg1M were effective. The ma8ae8 were 
CCIIltinUing to agitate for a .ore deaocratic govel"Dlll8nt, and political leadera, 
reflecting the will of the people, were iaportuning the Eaperor tor action. 
iaJl II had responded to the.e preaaures b7 appointing Prince Max of Baden 
a. Chancellor, entrusting to bill the difficult task of introducing d8JlOCratic 
retol'!l8 into Geraany and opening peace negotiations with the Allies. 
In an address toIthe Relohetag on October 22, 1918, Prince Max outlined 
h1a proposal for a cOIl8titutional change.l According17, CI'l October 28, 1918, 
• law vas passed _anding the old BiaIIlarckian Constitution and -tins the 
chancellor fully re8ponsible to the Reichatag. 2 By the end of October 1918 
er & Co., 1 , 
2Law ot October 28, 1918, as cited ibid., p. )67. 
-
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t;be German empire bad bee converted into a const.i tut.ional monarch7. For the 
t.1r1t t.1me in German histor7 a goveraaent had been made responsible to the 
people's representat.ive.. fbis assumpt.ion ot power by the I18jorit7 1n the 
Reicbet.ag, though it. tailed to arrest the social and economic ills at German7, 
brought. about. the tall of the old arist.ocrat.ic regime and ushered in a parlia. 
aentary system. 
The Center Part.7' a role in the promot.ion at the constit.utional retorms 
".s reluctant. fro. the outset. Having auccuabed t.o pressure and haying grudg-
ingl7 supported the .. jon tx in the Reichstag for these reloru, it bad neyer-
theless ceaaeles817 protested and warned that these torme ot liberal parlia-
~nta17 goyernaent. were alien to German tradition and to German na tional 
character. Proud at ita tradit1.onaliaa and its coneernt.i_ and conri.nced ot 
the soundness ot the federal struct.ure ot the Reich, the Party detended the 
HOUle at Hohen.ollem with 8 seal coraparable to that at the Pruasian Conaerva-
tiye part7.3 
As late as June 30, 1918, the Center's Reich caa1tt.ee had published a 
IPrograJll to meet. the "new tillea" wh10h _r had created. It bad pledged anew ita 
10181t7 to the tederal character ot the oonstitution, a strong JIlonarch7, and 
Meiner kratt.vollen Volksvertret.ung. n4 The sent.iaental idealizat.ion ot the 
~arch7 which the Center asaociated with German national character and tradi-
jt1ca played a _jor role in i t.a poll tical theory. All branches ot the Party 
It.vored the retention ot t.he monarchy' and believed t.hat ita tall would represent. 
3tIax1Jl11ian Pteitter, Zentrua und neue Zeit. (Flugschritt.en dar Deutschen 
~ent.rmupart.ei, /Il, Berlinl neceilher 5, 1918), p. 9. 
4·Prograa ot the Center Part.7, June 30, 1918," 8. cited in Sachem, 
~ent.ruupart.ei. VIII, 363-)66. 
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the destruction ot Genu.n social cohesiveness. EYen Enberger prior to the 
reYOlution had been no exception to thia posi tion.s As one ot the Reich's 
JI1,nisters he consistently rejected propoeals by the Rational Liberals that the 
raperor be urged to abdicate. Krzberger SUlll1Urized his objections to such pro-
poeals 111 a letter to the Papal N\UlCio. Archbishop Pacelli, on October 31, 1918: 
The considerations spealdng againet an abdication at this aoaent 
are that the present governing _jorit7 would be serious17 shaken, 
that there would be ditt1culties about a new oath ot loyalty tor 
the al'll)"J and tha t the throne would presumably pass to the oldest 
son ot the Crown Prince. • • • the abdication would weaken Germany 
b7 leading to deep internal triction. 'or these reasons I share 
the view ot all the meJlbers ot the goyeroment that. an abdicatioD 
would at this moment hal'lll, not help, Germany.6 
A more explicit declaratiCll ot 10yalt7 va8 printed in a leading editorial 
ot a Centrist newspaper, M{lnatersche Anzeicer, on Nov_ber 1, 1918, "hich 
stated: 
The loyal praiaes Cot the Hen-enhausJ tor the aonarchT and d7-
nast7 tind a V8r7 lively echo throughout the land, especially 
vi th our Center Party whose monarchical tr&di tion even in thiB 
time ot deJlOCraC7 undergoes no change. 'or us, the .anarch,. i. 
the embodiment ot Gerun l1I1it7, and the difficult daTI through 
which we pus cannot _ke us waver in our position toward the 
dynasty. The question whether the .. peror and king will abdi-
cate concerns the whole population in a high defl1"8e, not so auch 
that they wish such a step, but rather because they tear it. It 
the Social Democrats a. the principle opponents ot monarchy 
should deaand its el1m.ination, then they stand alone in their 
requests. 7 
Spoor indications ot Ersberger's 10yalt7 to the monarchy, see Matthias 
Enberger, Erlebn1.sse 1m Weltkrie, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1920), 
pp. )8, 50, 207, 226, 2fij:2LL, 25 , 337. 
~berger to .Archbiahop Pacelli, October 31, 1918, as cited in Epstein, 
Matthias Fzsbe er, pp. 267-268. 
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jnother group favorable to the Center which also evidenced this loyalty to the 
Kaiser was the Catholic WCIIl8n'S League ot Germany. Ita chairladY', Hedwig 
nranateld,8 sent a petition dated NoveJibar 2, to the Chancellor in the nue 
ot 120,000 .8JIlbera ot her organization begging that all attacks upon the Kaiser 
and hiS dynasty "be etreetively and unflinchingly repulsed. n9 
During the historic tirst week ot Nov_ber, while the reYolut10D817 Jlove-
aent was gathering J101lentUlll and the Social n.tocrata were pressuring tor the 
eaperor's abdication, the Center Party still continued stolidly to back the 
aonarchy. In Cologne on November 2, the Centrists were told by Fa ther Bertra. 
Kestert, one ot their leading spokesmen, that the Center should be Icnown as a 
"convinced supporter ot a Jlonarchical systea" and should prove i taelt "a strong 
IChristian, national, and social party with God, tor the _peror and the R8i1.tl.nlO 
CD Nove.ber " three days later, Ad .. Stegerwa1d addressed a large assembly ot 
Centrists at Hamm. and extolled the glories ot the Geraan _peror: 
001' political naivete can assert that it the emperor goes, we 
will receive a better peace. The king is an eamest, aature 
aan I something we certainly cannot say about the Crawn Prince. 
Or does one thiDk he is able to replace the emperor with the 
eleven-year-old son of the Crown Prince? 1'hat would invol ... e 
an 1lIparial regencY'. • • • In that hour wherein we erect a re-
public in the Reich and place a president at ita head, then 
will the union ot the Reich vanish. • • • For centuries our 
ancestors have tought tor the Kaiseridee. We aut certainlY' 
be a sorry people it we are to give up with one blow all these 
8aedw1g Dranete1d (1871-192,) was a school teacher and writer. In 1912 
~he becaJll8 active in teminine move .. nta for 80cial betterment and took ewer the 
~eadersh1p of the Catholic WOllen's League. In 19~9 she was elected as a Cmtnst 
~.legate to the National Asseably. She contributed articles to YIlrious joU1"nlli5 
~ wrote Die Chr1stJ.1che Frau. 
9Cited in Schulte, Mtlnstersche Chron1k, p. 2. 
lOc1ted ibid, p. 4. 
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tradi tions ot the past. The emperor forms the rallying point, the 
focal unit for the German people.ll 
UntU the day betore the revolution the consemtiTe Centrists adhering 
to the advice ot their Catholic hierarchy had maintained "an unshakable loyalty 
to the emperor and the princes, our monarchs by the grace ot God. ,,12 Yet, even 
while they were attelllpting to preserve the old monarchical system in the tace 
ot 1nBurrection, a lett-wing Centrist paper, the Schlesische Volkszeitun,s, was 
announcing: "The Center now supports the opinion that the abdication ot the 
nperor is the only possible reliet trOll the difficult circlllstances.Hl) 
By Bovember 8, it had become apparent even to staunch supporters of the 
IlO1l8rcby that the aaperor's poSition was precarious. In a Centrist Reicbatag 
cOllll1ttee .. eting beld that day in Berlin, a proposal tor the abdication of 
Willi.. II was discussed. Chairman Adolf Or8berlh and nca1nal part7 leader 
larl Tr1mbornlS both voted against the proposal, asserting that there waa no 
llcited ibid., pp. 11-12. 
-
l2'or the episcopal letter ot Bowaber 8 1918, signed by all the arch-
bishopa andbishopa ot German7, aee Schulte, M&n;teracbe Chronik, p. )1. 
l.3xO'VeJIlber 8, 1918. as ci ted ~. 
lhAdolf Gr8be!' (16Sh-1919) was edueated at the universities of !!bingen, 
~ipzig, and Strasaburg. After serrlDg in a judicial capaci t7 in the prorincial 
~ourta ot Bereshei1l and Saulgard, he beeame director ot the provincial courts 
~t Hall, Regansburg and HeUbrorm. Appointed chairman of the WL-ttellberg ~enter taction in 1694, he retained this position throughout bia lite, aaaUlld.ng 
las well the national chairmanship of the party in 1917. He also aerved as a 
_ber ot the Reichstag (1887-1918) and ot the second chamber of the wlrttellberg 
iLandtag (1889-1919). He was appointed minister in Prince Max's cabinet (1918) 
land in the Weimar cabinet (1919). As chairman of the Center taction in the 
lI.tiona1 Assembly (1919) b. was a zealous advocate ot Christian education and 
".presented the party in the constitutional cama1ttee on the section ot "Church 
~ School." 
lSlarl Tr1mbom (18$4-1921) was a Cologne lawyer who received hi8 &duea-
~ion at the universitie8 ot Leipsig, Mnnchen, and Stras8burg. Se was a member 
P' 
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-political necessity tor such an action.n16 But the Reichstsg's pre~ident, 
Centrist Konstantin Fehrenbach,17 taking 8 more realistic view, announced to 
the committee: "I am under theimpres8ion that we debate something which per-
haps around four o'clock [today] will no longer be important.a18 In Fehrenbach's 
opinion, there was no alternative, the emperor would abdicate. Yet it he did 
not, "totally difterent question. [would] come under discussion. u19 On the 
following day, not only CentriBts but all Germans were compelled to tace those 
"totally different questions." 
Weeks earlier, Prince Max alal'll8d by the deterioration of political con-
dit.1.ons, had requested the emperor to abdicate that Oenumy might be saved troll 
ot the Pruss1an Landtag and the Reichstag tr«a 1896-1918. ae was appointed to 
the Ministry ot the Interior 1n Prince Max's cabinet in 1918. From. 1914-1921 
he served as cbairlll8n of the Volksverein and as chairman ot the Rhenish Center 
Party trOll 1919 untU hiB death in 1921. In 1919 he was elected to the National 
Assembly and diatinguished himselt as an expert parliuentarian in the discus-
sion on conatitutiOlUll _tters. See Hermann CardaUD8, .Karl Triaborn (M.-Gladbach, 
Volksvereins.Ver1ag, 1922); also Karl Bach_, "Trimborn," Deutsches Biograph-
iaches Jahrbuch 1921, III (Stuttgart, 1927), pp. 263-26$. 
16cited in Rudolf Horsey, 1IDie deutache ZentrUl1spartei Zw1achen 1000eaber-
Rnolution unci We1aar liationa1vers.-l.ung,· in Dona WesValiea, ad. by Johannes 
Bauermann (Hnnater, . Aschendorttache Ver1agsbuchhand1ung, 1963) I p. 2bo. Moreey 
gives a detailed account ot the act,irlt,ies durina the aont,ha ot Jov_bar and 
December, 1918, drawiDg upon auch unpublished _terial frca the state archives 
at, Cologne. (Most reterence. frca Morser in thia chapter are trOll thi8 article, 
although Morsey's Die Deutsche Zentrwupartei 1917-1923, Sec. II, Chap. I, con-
tains sia1l.ar intol!'ll8t1on.) 
17Konstantln Fehrenbach (18$2-1926) attended the University ot Freiburg. 
ae beeam. a _bar of the Reichstag in 1903 and ita president in 1918. Later 
he vas also elected president ot the National Aas_bly. FrOlll 1920-1921 he •• 
appointed chancellor ot the Weimar Republic and participated in the conterence8 
With the A111e8 at Spa (1920) and London (1921). Later he served as chairman 
ot the Centrist. lett-ving in the Raichetag (1924-1926). 
l~orsey, uZentruupartei," p. 241. 
19Ibid. 
-
)0 
anarchy. Wear:y ot war and hungr:y tor peace, the populaoe vas aenai U ve to the 
iJlplication ot the Allies that the presence ot Will.iaa II vas iJapeding peace 
negotiations. Ho definite plana tor a popular insurrectJ.on had been toJ'llUlated; 
nevertheless a revolutJ.onar:y apin t had been toaented a. a reault ot a wide-
apread mood ot deapair brought on by the IIdlita17 collapae.20 Only an incident 
waa needed and thia waa provided GIl October 28 when the sailors mutinied at 
l1el. FrOlll ICiel the inaurrection spread rapidly along the coast to B_burg, 
sr_en, and Lllbeck. Within a week alaost e'9'817 oity in the Geraan .-pin had 
vi tnessed socialist rioting and the establishment ot soldiera t and workers' 
OOUDeils aa new toru ot local gOV'enaent. By November 7 the revolution bad 
reached Brumndck and then Munich. In Bavaria a republio was proclaimed vi th 
the lett-wing Socialist lurt Eisner a. preaident. Berlin vas next to suceumb 
to atrikea and insurrectJ.ona. 21 
Prince Max repeated his wam1nga ot 1apending danger in an ettort to saYe 
the Hohen.oUem dynasty, but William II retuaed to be aoved. On Rov_ber 9, 
1918, theretore, to preaerve Berlin and Germany trom turther cbaoa, Prince Max 
ec.peUed by necesaity announced the abdication ot the emperor and banded the 
re1M ot government weI' to the Social »-oerat Friedrich Eben.22 tet, neith 
"·-~----------------------------------------------=)l' 
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Prince Max nor Ebert vas thinking in tel'lllS of ending the monarchy. It was 
Philipp Scheidemann, another leader of the Social Democrats, who decided t.be 
issue on his own 1n1t.iative. In the afternoon ot lIovember 9, he greeted an 
ass .. bl)" of insurrectionists outside the Ministry headquarters vi tb the proc-
laUtion ot a Oerun Republic. 24 
Germans everywhere were surprised and stunned. The 18l.n18che Zei tunC. a 
leading newspaper tor the right-wing of the lIational Liberals soon to become tb 
German People's Party, referred to the incident a. a "BlitBschlag" which had 
-jolted" the people and lett them "paral;ymed.-25 A Centrist paper in the 
Rbineland, ,SlniscM Volk •• eitS, described the happening. a. being "ot mon-
strous and incalculable sip1t1cance.1t26 Another national Centrist newspaper 
printed in Berlin expressed regret but said it was an event which had become 
-inevitable" as the revolutionary agitation increased in intensit)".27 The 
aperor' 8 hesi tanc)" had cost hi. both throne and dyna.t)". 
2~en the Social Democrats tavored a constitutionalllonarch)" similar to 
IDgland. Bach., Zentrum!J!rtei, VIII, 2$0. 
24seheidemann's proclamation vas: "The old and rot ten--the lIOnarchy--has 
been broken down. Long live the newl Long live the German Republicl- Philipp 
Scheid8llUlnn, MellOirs ot a Social DellOCrat, trans. by J. E. Michell (l.ondonc 
Hodder and Stroughton, 1929), II, 582. This is a variant ot the original a. 
published in the VoesiSCM Zeitung, November 9, 1918, cited in Ernst Rudolf 
Huber, Dokuaente Bur Deutsche Verf .. sungsgeachichte, III (Berlin, W. Kchl"--r 
Verlag, 1960), pp. 1-2. 
, 25.wo'VUlber 9, 1918, 11049, evening ed! tion. Sinee each edition is iden-
tified by a new nuaber, further reterence. will carry only the date and edition 
lhaber. All article. are trOll tront page unle •• otherwi.e deSignated. 
24iovelllber 9, 1918, #886. Hereafter cited as KV. 
-
27 Germania I Zei tung f'llr das deutsche Volk, 1I0vember 9, 1918, '529. 
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With a revolution perpetrated, the Iaiser overthrown, and a republic pro-
cla1laed, the Center, 11ke aU of Germany's political partie8, now faced the 
que8tion of ita own statue. Long identified a. a champion of the .onarchy, it 
.. a altogether alien to republican tenets. The traditions of its Christian 
we1 tanscbauung were repugnant to a 80cialist republic. But Germany was in a 
chaotic condition} _ediats steps had to be taken to preserve order. Centrist 
leaders could not afford the lUltUZ')" of be".UiDg their ow uncertain position. 
!bey bad not favored the insurrection; they had not perpetrated the courae of 
.wents.28 They deplored and would continue to deplore a state ot atrairs which 
111 their opinion wa. ccapletely unnecessary.29 MeaDllhUe, however, they de-
cided temporarily to accept the tait accompli, to cooperate with the new 
regille,lO and to work energetically "to preaerve peace and order.,,3l 
28"licht das Zentl"Ull hat dan Thron verassen, 80ndern del' laiaer hat aein 
Volk varlassen." Joset Schofer, Politi.che Briele 4ber das alte und das neue 
Zantrum (Frieburg-iJIl-Brelsgaul Heraer' Co., 1922), p. 22. It the naflonal 
'Pirtil tag" of the Center Party on January 19, 1920, the Baden Minister of 
Finance, Joseph Wirth, noted. "The thrones were not overthrown becausa ,.. were 
UIlf'aithtul} they were ruined on accomt of the policy which the supporter. of 
the thronea exercised." atticial Report, a. cited in Morsey, Zentruaapartei 
1917-1923, p. 81. 
29An editorial queriedc "War das DotweDdig?" and responded in the nega-
tiv. by taking each ot the October retorma and showing how these ret01'll8 had al-
ready proYided tor a d.ocratio g«emmant. See !!I NOYeaber lO, 1918, 1944. A con-
densed lona ot thia article appeared in the MLstersohe Anseiger on December 1, 
19181 "War die Revolution notwend1g, ua den kU1tan81&U8 zu beaeit1.geD?, lein! 
~ das Volk hatte die Regierung bereita in Hlnden. 'War die Revolution not-
wend.1g, _ die kaiserliche Gewalt d_ Volk81d.Uen zu unterstellen? leinl Dann 
die kaiserl1ehe Gewalt war dem Vollc8w11len bereita unteratellt. War die Revo-
lution nowendig, UIIl di. Aunt\chae de. Iapital1_u au bekimpten? '.1Id Denn 
•• war gl.lte Ausieht vorhanden, dieaen lCalllpt aut gesets11ehea Wege ertolgreich 
durchsu!lhren." ,Cited in Schulte, MlU1ster.che Chronik, p. 19$. 
30tt1'be Centrist leader. diligently and courageously strove to prevent 
worse occurrences and to prelerve the sorely tried Fatherland troa anarchy. It 
Karl Schulte, "Werden und Wirken in del' deutschen Republlk," in Nationale 
Arbeit, p. 29. 
31 Pfeirfer, Zentrum, p. 17. 
(kle ot the first re8pOllsibili ties of the new gOY 
whet Germany would do about. the difficult al'lliat.ice con tions. 
£../ 
following the abdicat.ion ot the emperor a aeet.ing ot the ":a.XWtN:;&,;UUIIID~ 
retarie. ot state under the direction ot the new chancellor, Friedrich Ebert., 
resolved to accept the amatice teraa in order to avoid a capitula tion ot the 
a ray. Centriats GrBber and Trimborn both participated in the aeasion and then, 
atter baving accepted the .ajorit,.. view, resigned as state secretar1e •• 32 
Fehrenbach, who aa president or the Reichstag vas alao presant, lett 1maedia 
atter in deep distress and returned to hiB home in Baden. Here he addressed a 
etinC ot his Centrist colleagues and de.1ectedl7 cQllcluded his speech with the 
remark I "1inia Germaniae. a33 
The overthrow ot the old regime also caused the dissolution of the 
1chstag elected in 1912 ending at the same time the tenure for the Reicbatag 
taction ot the Center Party as well as that of the individual Landtag tactions. 
This lett the Part,.. leaderless and without direction. Technically, the Centr1at 
tional caudttee wbich had .. t several tilles during the war could not be re-
onvenad in order to elect a governing group tor the Part.,... This put the 
anter Party in a precarious poei tion. lor the next few da78 'the tn meJlbers 
t the Centrist Reich' a committee who were still in Berlin raained quiet and 
eetaingly impervious to 'the calls ot the press tor action • .3h State coa.1tteea, 
3~oraq, "Zentruupartei," pp. 244-245, IV, November 12, 1918, #894, 
oted that Tr1mborn "atter one month as Minister ot the Interior" had resigned 
nd retumed to the Rhineland. 
33Joset Schoter, Mit der alten Fahne in der neue Zeit (Freiburg-ilIl-
isgau: Herder &: Co., 1926), p. 103; Sachem, Zentrumsertei, VIII, 439 • 
.3hSer1iner TaSlatt, lovember 12, 1918, #580, ae1"ll'lania, November 12, 
918, 1529, tv, 10 er 13, 1918, 1897. 
-
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tor their part, iIIlpatient at receiving no diracti vea froll the Center' a national 
c~ittee, acted on their own initiative, sOlle holding back in sUence, others 
participating vigorously in their local proviaional governaents. Thus in Upper 
Sileaia where the Center, under the new title ot ·Catholic People'a Party," 
teared for its territorial integrity because ot t.he unfavorable armiatice 
1;81"118, a certain pol1tical reserYe was lIIlintained. 35 But in ¥dIrttaberg as 
well as in Hesse, a Centriat was included in each ot the new provisional gOT-
ermaents. 36 Sillilarly, in Karlsruhe as early' as HOYember lO, two leading rep-
resentatives at the Baden Center, Joseph Wirth and Gustav Trunk, joined the 
prOYisional government in order to help check the Revolutionastura. Their 
action was endorsed on the tollowing day by a large majority ot the Center's 
central collDli twe ot Baden, and Archbishop ThOll8s Harber ot Freiburg also gave 
h1a apprOV'al. 37 By joining with the majority parties, the Centrists in Baden, 
Besse, and wtlrttemberg de facto continued the kind ot coalition government. set 
up on a national plane within Prussia in 1917. 
Preparations to enter the local gCJl'ernment at Cologne were also being 
arranged. At an assembly' ot Centrists, the local chairman ot the Party, 'ather 
Bertrall lastert, told his hurers they must be willJ.ng to enter into coopera-
tion with the new govenuaent in order to insure -peace and order. nJ8 Kastert 
daaanded the right tor the Center Party to eJlPress its principles and poei tion 
)SMorsey, nZentrumsparte1," p. 246. 
39Hesse's representative was Otto von Bretano di TramessoJ Wdrttambergts 
representative was Johann von K1ene. Ibid., p. 24SJ Bachell, ZentruJllsparte1, 
VIII,419. -
37Schoter, ,22 • .2.!1., pp. 104-106; Bachell, Zentrwup!rtei, VIII, 421. 
38!!" NOV'eaber ll, 1918, #889. 
p 
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"clearly and distinctly," insisting that all "popular groups" should cooperate 
"1mDlediatelyt' in forming workers' and soldiers' councils and committees ot 
publio safety. The Rhenish Centrists at thie t1lle gave no indication ot accept-
ing a republlc J theT s till had hopes ot obtaining "democracy" wi thin the 
.tructure ot a lIonarchical goverDlllent. At all eventa, they demanded that this 
decision should be left to a National Conetituent AssellblT.39 
to On the local scene, the Center's cCDllittees tor the lIloSt part retrained 
trOll .. king any major readjustments to the Party's structure or prograll, hoping 
that detinite directives would eventually come trom. the national cOlllUll1ttee. 
!heir news organs, nonetheless, continued to pressure tor bI1Ilediate action. 
The tcBln1sche Volks.eitg demanded the convocation ot a "Parteitag" and urged 
the Center "to get on board now • • • to publish its goals and no longer lag 
behind the develo}.'a8nu • • • to declare in explic1 t teru what our task 111 
and to detera1ne what the party 1s to do.,,40 Dortm.und's TremoDia wrote that 
they ava1 ted a progr8JI trClll competent leaders "not the day atter tcaorrow, but 
today. aU 
In South Gel'll8n)" the Bavarian Centrists struck out on their own. In the 
8u.mer ot 1916 indications ot a cleavage between the Bavarian Centrists and the 
PrwlI.ian Centrists had already been evident. Bavarian suspic10ns ot the lett-
lwing lIov_ant 1d.thin the Party were strengthened by such r8lUrks ot Enberger 
1a8a "Links 1st das Leben und rechts 1st der Tod •• 42 The conflict between the 
39rbid., November 11, 1918, 1887. 
-
4Orrom the editOrial, "Zentrua an Bardl", 1I000elllber lS, 1918, #901. 
4lcited in Mors87, "Zentrumspartei," p. 246. 
42Karl Schwend, Barern Zwischen Monarchie unci Diktatur (M'lInchens Richard 
Pflaum, 1954), p. S9. 
Berlin Centrists and the Bavarian Centrists bee ... aore pronolJllCed atter the 
october parliamentary" retorma. Consel"V'ative CatholiciSDl looked askance at the 
center's consorting with the traditional eneaies ot Catholicism. Also a long 
tradi tion ot suspicion ot the Horth tended to stir up separatist currents which 
were never too tar trOll the surtace. The revolution in Bavaria and ita sepa-
ratist movement had indeed receiftd the 8anction ot the Bavarian Centrists. 
!'1fo ot the party _bera, in tact, vere innted to partiCipate in the new pro-
T1Bional gOV8l'D1Bent: Dr. Georg Heim, director ot the Bavarian Pea8anta Union 
and Dr. Sebastian Sehlittenbau.er.43 But the Bavarian Centrists distrusted the 
revolutionists. 'fo preserve Itsecurit)" ot persons, propert)", and democratic 
solidarity," Dr. Schlittenbauer recommended "the tormation ot a new Christian 
puty based on deaocratic principles. It41&. He and Dr. Heila, the leader ot the 
Bavarian Center Party, called a Centri8t aeeting at Regenaburg on November 12, 
1918, to form the "Bayer1Bche Volkspartei.,,4S He1a pointed out to his "old 
friends ot the Center" that the BaYarian People's Party was not _rely a change 
ill the nute ot the Party but a completely new independent organi.ation open to 
all countrymen, "catholics and Protestant Christians" alike. "All who support 
phriatian culture as opposed to the all-devastating and corrosive uterialislt 
~t unite with us," he said.46 A cClllUllittee camprising tormer Bavarian 
43see Buchheim, aeschichte der Christlichen Parteien, p. 341. 
44cited in Schwand, ~. S:!., p. S9. 
4Sauchhe1ll, Chriatlichen Partei8ll, p. 348. 
46Quoted in Buchbe1m, Chriatlichen Parteien, p. 349. Hia appeals did not 
.0 unheeded. Two t8JllOU8 Protestant leaders, Protessor Otto trOll the UniveraitT 
lOt Munich and Baron von Pechaann, the well-known apokeaan tor P'rench Lutherans, 
jlDawered the 8U11man •• 
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Centrists drafted a new program at Munich on November IS and published it 
officiallT three days later.47 
The program of the Bavarian People'" Party recognized the revolutiOl'l as 
an "accepted fact. a But the Party did not agree in principle with the manner 
in vhich the republic had been created. They aspired to bring about changes 
onlY by legal .eans. Therefore, they demanded the calling of a Constituent 
.. tional AsseMbly elected by universal BUttrese to provide for a parliamentary 
'JBte., end desired 1.JIlportant que,tions to be decided by direct referendum. 
Other provisions, aore tradi Uonal to the Center, requested the Maintaining of 
a Christian Wel tanechauung, the sateguarding of marria ge and the foUy, and 
the guaranteeing of Chri,tian education and contessional schools. In the 800-
nClllic area it recCllDJ88nded pronnons tound in previous Centrist programs: ad-
justaent ot interest 1J"0UpS, protection of property, the curtailment of the 
"abusea" of capitalism, and as an appeal to the peasants, "healthy agrarian 
reforma." In the seventh and last provision, indicative of Bavarian aniaosity 
against Pruasian hege.ony, 48 theT d .. nded "a union of German states on a 
federal basis with no single state predGtllinating •••• The present far-reach1n@ 
federal, economic, and fiscal political dependence of Bavaria on the over-
powering North aust under all circUllStances end."49 
lewa of the Bavarian cleavage was conspicuously slow in reaching both 
West Germany and Berlin and vas accepted by the Center Party "north of the 
47Ibid., p. 3S0. 
-
48c:me sentence in \hi, section states. "Wir haben es satt, f{1r die 
Zukuntt von Berlin aus bi' ins kleinate regiert au werden." Uraachen und 
Polgen, Ill, 202. 
49The complete program is printed in ibid., Ill, 200-202. 
-
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Main" with "sincere regret."SO Tbe Centrist there suspected Bavarian 
"sonderb~derlei"Sl and "strong particularist tendencies," and perhaps an 
attellpt on the part of the Bavarians to win over to their cause the German 
Auatrillns in order to erect a Itstrong opponent to North Germany" (-Sdlwergew1cht 
pgen Norddeutscbland"). S2 However, due to the turbu1eDC)" of the da)", the 
Centrists in Berlin and Cologne sa" no po8sibilit)" or tntluencing the decision 
of the Bavarian8. Unable to check the movement, the Centri8t leadership acqui-
e8ced to the forution ot the Bavarian People's Part)".S) But Berlin head-
quarters allowed the Bavarian8 no UluaiOlUl a8 to the fUture role they would 
play within the Center Party.Sb 
The revolutioDal"1' situatiCll1 in Berlin hindered the Centrist Reicbatag 
.-bers 1n their etforts to tol"llUlate any t:.ed1ate plans.SS 001)" six _ber. 
r_1ned in Berlin: Martin Fa8sbender, Johann G1eaberts, Bartholoaiua Ko •• ann, 
)laxi.ilian Pfeift'er, Albrecht Frhr. von Rechenberg, and EDgen Schifter.56 
The.e .. n felt the ab.ence of a dc:ainant figure. The leaders ot the Part)" who 
SO!!" lovember 19, 1918, 1912. 
Slaermania, 10'fU'lber 19, 1918, 1541. 
S2secker-Arnsberg to A. Stegerwa1d, lovellber 19, 1918, cited in Morse)", 
Zentrumspartei 1911-192J, p. 88. 
S)!!, lovelll'ber 19, 1918, 1912J Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 261. 
S40n Dec_ber 18, 1918, the Secretary-general Max1Jdlian Pfeitfer wrote 
to brother Anton, Secretary-general of the Bavarian People's Part)", that the 
BVP "ould be allowed "absolutely no influence" in the National Assembly. Cited 
in Horsey, Zent~rtei 1911-l92J, p. 88. 
SSnu. to strike8, insurrection, and 8treet .t1ght1ng the session of the 
Re1cbatag was suspended on November 8, 1918, and many members returned home. 
56pfeiffer, Zentrua, p. 18. 
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bad serTed as Reich officials in Prince Max's government were not available. 
With GrBber exhausted and ill and Trimborn and Fehrenbach disgusted with events 
1n the capital, all had returned to their hae states.S7 Enberger, the one 
centrist who could have provided the necessarT leadership, was at COI8piegne 
acUnc ae the German Al'Iliet1ce COIRIIlis8ioner, but due to arrive back at Berlin 
.bonly. The six Centrist Reichetag _lIbere awaited Ersberger's arrival. How-
ever, in order to placate the local c..uttees that wera pressuring the Center's 
headquarters at Berlin for direction and Qenlightenaent or the electorate,·SB 
the six cCllDllittee _Babers forDlulated a publio declaration on NO'f'amber 12, 1918. 
In it the7 insisted that the old Re1chstag was the "only unal tared rauin1.ng 
representation of the German people" whose authorit7 ·ought not be dmdi:d:lIbed:.'9 
P\lbllshed the following da7, the proclamation, addreesed to the "electors in 
city and country," atter noting that most of the Centrist _embers had left 
Berlin, ContinUedl 
Those members still present in Berlin tum to the people and de-
clarel We solemnl7 demand respect and equall t7 of rights tor our 
principles. We a.sume the right ot treedOil of speeoh and the 
right of assemb17. In the decisive "OIIent of balloting, the 
Center Party will call on all who acknowledge ita prinCiples. 
But today it 18 nec .... ry' to work for peace, security, and order 
in the land •••• We beg our Party friends everywhere. Delib-
erate on the circUJUtancest Prepare for the electionl Prepare 
and instruct the womenL 
Help preserve order and public aecurt t7 that we may all have 
bread and sustenance' 
S7Morse7, "Zentrumspartei," p. 242. 
S8!!. Ioyember 13, 1918, /)897J Germania, November 14, 1918, #S:33. 
S9Fteiffer. Zentrum, p. 18. 
-W.tch tor the directions ot the Pa~·. instructionsl 
[Dated a ] Berlin, Ioyaber 13, 1918. 
[Signed: ] Members of the Center taction ot the German Reichetag. 
Dr. Fassbender, Olesberte, lCos8JUDn, Dr. Pteifter, Dr. freiheIT 
von Rechenberg, Schitter.OO 
'l'his constituted the prelude to the first steps toward Party reorganization. 
Party friend. fra. various econam1c and 80ci.l organizations and ... bers ot 
the Catholic pre.. hastened to the assistance ot the six-membered Centrist 
cClDJllittee.6l 
40 
Prussian Centrists on the sa.. day aade a eiDlUar appeal to "all other 
PruSaian triends" atatin, that the cri.is of the hour demanded that eye170M 
-'Should do all in hi. power to keep peace and order, to prevent the shedding 
ot Ilore blood and to end taaine.-62 Party .. bers were asked to cooperate in 
strengthening the partT to Het the new crisi •• 63 
A second general maniteato exhorted all people---laborers, farmers, 
office workers, city dwellers, civil servanta, teachers"--to concentrate their 
ettorts tor a united tront against the disorder ot the day. The party d4D)uncei 
class rule and the turn of events in the capital. -Berlin is not Germany •••• 
The ideas esabodied in the Center's slogan, I Truth, Justice, and Freeda.L I will 
not dle in tortT-eight hours. The German people are not to be dictated to by 
anyone. TheT should voice their own opinions and declare themselves. The 
6Olbid., pp. 20-21J printed also in Germania, Bovember 13, 1918, #532J 
!!., Novemb8r 14, 1918, 1898. 
6l1CV, Joveaber 15, 1918, 1901, Pfeitter, Zentrua, p. 17. 
-
62oermania, November 13, 1918, 1532, !!, lh:wnber 14, 1916, 1898. 
631bid. 
-
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a.rtD8Il people want. peace. Diaun1 ty will bring disorder, tamine, and dis1nte-
grat1on.,,64 Germans were warned that. to accept Dolshed_ meant abrogating 
tbeir rights. All cit.isena were urged to unite and demand the convocation ot 
a .ational Assembly. Until such a group existed, the party declared, it. would 
recognise only the Reichstag .s the sovereign power in Ge1'lUl17. 6S 
This was the state of attairs to which Enberger returned in the late 
afternoon of Wednesday, November 13, 1918.66 He was stunned by the transtorms-
tiOl1 which had overta~en his country and alal'll8d at the lack of law and order 
in the capital. 67 After report1ng to the provi.ional govermaent concerning the 
a1'll1st1ce tel'll8, Enberger attended ... eting on Hovember ll& of all the Centrist 
~ers in the area.68 Tbia Party caucus decided to 8et up a steering cc:a-
~ttee selected tZ'OJl the group to help in Norientin, the Center Party. '!'he 
~ClIIDittee consisted of three _IIbersl MaxiJdlian pteifter69 !rom. the aeichatag 
taction, Rudolf Wildermann froa the Prus.ian Landtag taction, and the director 
64aerman1a, November lS, 1918, IS26, p. 2J !!, November lS, 1918, #901. 
6SKV, November lS, 1918, 1901J pteUtar, Zentrum, p. 18. 
-~zberg8r, Erlebn1ss8, p. 340. PteUfer, Zentrua, p. 17, has Enberger 
larriving on Friday, Rovember lS. Thi. i. obY1ouali incorrect Since Enberger 
.... present in Berlin for a Centrist caucus on Hoveaber 14, see Erlebn1sse, 
p. )40. 
67Ibid• While at COIlpiegne Enberger heard ruaors ot a revolution in 
Germany and wondered which government he represented--the l)Ip1re or the 
Republic. Ibid., p. 33S. 
-
68lbid., p. 340. 
-6~ax1a11iall Pteitfer (1875-1926) studied at the qniveraities of Berlin~ ~idelber and Mt!richei1l In 190) he bec... secreta17 or the -Ltbra17 of BUi.berg 
!ana cU8~!.n in 1910. He was appointed archivist at the State Archives at ~unlch in 1912. Fro. 1907 .. 1918 he was a member ot the Relchatag. He served 
~~1 general secretary of the Center trOll 1918-1920 when he va. appointed German 
~b.8sador to Vionna. 
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ot the Zentrums-Parlaments-lorrespondenz, Franz Fortmann.10 On the following 
daY as the caucus continued ita discussion, Ersberger proposed a reorganization 
of the national struct~ ot the Party. To achieve greater cohenveness with1l1 
the Center, he suggested establishing a general secretariat with headquarters 
at Berlin. The proposal was well received and the ofticers were selected. 
HaXimUian Pfeiffer, an old friend and fellow worker of Erzberger, val 8A'>Q1nted 
the Party's national treasurer. Other _bers ot the central Party bureauc-
racy included the ... bers of the newly-created steering cCllDll1ttee.1l 
The establiehllent ot a general-secretariat fulfilled an oft-repeated 
desire of the Center Party and was welcoud by all the a_bars ot the Part,. 
who now looked to it a8 the "anillated focal POint of Centrist pol1cies.n12 
The secretariat did not disappoint ita Party members. IDaediate1y, it set. 
about its task of "enlightening the electoraten b,. organizing a speakers' 
bureau, preparing courses in political education and issuing paapbleta and 
short articles. Henceforth all ca.paip material and general maniteatoes were 
to be issued through this department.7) 
The Center Party, now ·ccae on board," saw for itselt what other partie. 
were already doing to reTamp their progr8lU to adjust to the new situation. 
With great rapidity the old aonarchical ele.ents were abandoning tormer plat-
torms, reorganizing thease1Tes (in some cases adopting a new name), and ad-
vocating d_ocratic measures for preserrlng the state fro. anarchy. The old 
10!!., lovember 16, 1918, 1904. 
11Ibid• 
-
72aermania, November 20, 1916, 154). 
7)BacheJll, Zentruupartei, VIII, 25)-254. 
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conserVlltive Party ot Prussia and GermaIlY' was in the process of joining with 
Free Conservatives, Pan-Germans, and a majority of the Junker class to form 
the German National People'. Party. Right-wing member. of the f'01"IIler National 
Liberal party, long known a8 the champion ot liberalism, nov bee ... the German 
People'. Party, while their left-wing opponents were uniting with the Progntssi1a 
People's Party to tom the German Democratic Party. Only the Majority Social 
t)eJIOCrat8 and the Independents retained their old party nalles and plattonu.74 
The reorganization ot the national Party structure accomplished at the 
Center caucus of Nov8llber 14 .. 15 in Berlin created an impreSSion of' party ac-
ti'rity which was gratefully acknowledged a. a s)'lIptcm ot a "new awakened 
. energr.,,75 Nonetheless, thi. activity created an illusion of major policy 
readjustments which ·at that time were not torthcoming. An indication ot this 
is seen in the six manitestoes published by the General secretariat between 
November 15 and Decellber 2, 1918. Five ot these declarations were addressed 
to various social groupsJ "to the workers, soldiers, and saUon of the 
Center"; 76 "to the like-minded people ot Austria" J 77 "to the atticials, teach-
ers, and emploPes"178 "to the citilens and tarmers ot the German Fatherland"J79 
74,After the Independents lett the coati tion governm.ent ot the Council of 
Peoplee- COIDJlieeare on December 27, 1918, the Majority Socialists preterred to 
be called Social Democrats (SPD). 
75!!, November 15, 1918, 190). 
76Gemania , November 15, 1918, 11537, !!., NOYember 16, 1918, 1904. 
77Germania, November 16, 1918, #538. 
78Ibid., November 20, 1918, 1543. 
79Ibid., Noyember 26, 1918, #551. 
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and "to the German academic youth. ,,80 A sixth statement was ent.i tled "Peace 
and Breadl,,81 Yet, each proposition WAS a stereotyped appeal, an expression ot 
d181l87 at the ditficulties ot the tiDl8s, an assurance tha .. the Par,Y' would help. 
There were vague promises ot "new things to come," ot rejecting "the reaction 
ot the Right and the terror ot the Lett," ot "driving out anarchy," ot litting 
"the hunger blockade,· ot demanding "the return ot war prisoners," but. there 
was no definite program, no conatructive political reform, no down-to-earth 
plan tor the future. Only 1n the last statement addressed to the academic 
youth was there an indication of something positive, and that merely in con-
nection with changing the name "Zentrum" to toster 1ntercontessional partici-
pation.82 
Nevertheless , agitation for reform was evident. A t a Centrist assembly 
in Trier on November 17 the director ot the local Centrist organization, 
" Christian Stock, repeated queries he had been hearing c onceming the Center. 
-where is the Center? Doe. it sleep? Is it already dead or buried?,,6) 
.. Stock had but t.o look around to find hie answer. Humerous well ... attended 
Centrist Metings were held throughout the nation. Karlsruhe witnessed a 
large Centrist assembly on November 16. Bb A t another held in Cologne the 
6Orbid., December 2, 1918, #$62. 
-81 Ibid., November 24, 1918, 15b9. 'l'b.e c c:aplete set of proclamations is 
given in-pfiitter, Zentrua, pp. 26-40. 
82rus one was signed: "Dar Genera1sekretlr der Deutschen Zentruupartei 
(Christlich. Volkspartei), Dr. Pteiffer, M. d. R." ~., p. 40. Germania, 
December 2, 1918, 6592. 
8lrrierische Landeszeitung, November 18, 1918, 127), as Cited in Morsey, 
"Zentrumapartei," p. 2G8. 
8u.chem, Zen~rtei, VIII, 442. 
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tollowing day over 3000 persons attended, while a similar gathering met 
H 86 
simultaneously in Munster. There were several distinguishing teatures which 
.. de these meetings ditterent frOIl previous Centrist gatherings. For the tirst 
tiIle wOllen speakera came to the tore.87 Then too, with the exception ot Otto 
yon Bretano di TI'8JIl8ZZ0 in Wi8sbaden and Frhr. von R8chenberg in Berlin, there 
was a noticeable absence ot repre'sent8tives ot the nobility and ot the .. bere 
ot the agrarian-conservative wing within the Center Party.88 Th18 absence had 
a positive etfect on the growth ot dClllinance of the left-oriented taction of 
the Center Party begun in 1917. 
The purpose ot the Centrist assemblies and caucuses was to determine the 
future polleies for the Part;y. A sense ot urgenc;y engendered b;y the pending 
elections goaded fI'18ry political party on as it formulated t.he kind ot plat.tol"1l 
it hoped would attract the voter. Of the several progralllB proposed by.arious 
local Centrist tactions and Catholic organizations, none vas so crucial in 
-awakening the Center" as the program drafted in the middle ot November b;y 
'ather Heinrich Brauns, the spiritual director ot the Volkavere1n.89 Convinced 
85!,!, Nov_ber 18, 1918, 11909, Geraania, Nov_ber 19, 1918, 1542. 
86Germania, November 19, 1918, #542. Schulte, MHnstersche Chronlk, 
pp. 119-120. 
87In Karlsruhe, Clara Siebert. in Cologne, Christine Teutsch and Minna 
Bachea-Sieger, as cited in Horsey, Zentrum8partel 1917-1923, p. 93. 
88Ibid _.
89He1nr1eh Brauns (1868-1939) studied theology at the University ot Bonn 
and at Cologne and econades at Bonn and Freiburg. In 1890 he was appointed 
chaplain in Rrete1d and later vicar in Borbeck. He was director ot the Central 
Oftice ot the "Volksverein" frOll 1900-1920 and general director frOll 1920-193). 
He was elected as a delegate to the National Assembly (1919) and to the Reichst4t 
(1920). From 1920-1928 he served in the Reich's cabinet as Minister ot t.bor. 
See Joseph Sehllitt, "Brauns," in Staatslexilcon, 6 &d. II, (February, 1958), 
~. 161-166. 
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~t the future success ot the Center Party lay in its ability to emerge as 
quickly as possible trCD its "tower," Brauns su"taitted to the leaders ot the 
Party a plan tor the reorganization of partY' structure and platform. His pro-
graJll W8S so constructed a8 to appeal to liberal and de.ocratic eleMntll a8 well 
.s to the 1Il0re coneenative aristocratic groups. The plan called for a widelY' 
d_ocratic and 1Dtercontessional party. It suggested that the name "Zentrum" 
be dropped 80 that Prote8tants would not hesitate to seek membership. It ot-
tered social reforms to keep the usses trOll siding wi tb. the Sociali8ts J yet 
at the same time it held tast to the Christian principles 80 8S not to alienate 
the clergy. It proposed the restoration of the monarchY', but conceded that 
IUCh a measure rested with the decision ot the National Assembly. FinallY', 
the plan called for a ftGrossdeutschland" which would include Austria.9° 
Brauns' plan was the first to offer a definite proposal for the future 
part)" structure. The Berlin caucus of NO't'ember 14-1.5 avoided taking anY' deti-
nite stand and merely confined itself to discussing the daily political and 
econClllie problema without oftering posi ti ve solutiollll. Brauns' prop08a18 did 
Dot come under di8cussion bY' the Berlin group. 
Braun8' prOP08ed draft, however, did find a receptive audience among his 
left-wing colleague8 ot the Rhineland. There the Centrists, dependent upon 
the vote8 of the indu8trial area8,were eager for an 1Jamediate constructive 
IProgram to retain their hold on the Catholic laborers who were being wooed by 
80cialist propaganda. Progressive labor leaders took the initiative to call 
~ Centri8t meeting to discuss plans tor a prelimi.n.ary program. aathered at 
iDu18berg on November 16, thi8 energetiC group, with an almost unanimous vote 
9°Braun8 to Wilhelm Marx, November 13, 1918, State Archive8 ot Cologne, 
as cited in Morsey, "Zentrumspartei," pp. 248-249. 
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accepted Braun8' program. The proposal tor the restoration ot the monarchy, 
lUJWever, was rejected de.pite strong opposition to the contraI7J this question 
vas to be lett to the lational Assembl,. to decide.92 
em November 16, a coaaitte. ot twelve Centr18ts9.3 appointed by the 
DuiSberg aS8emblT outlined a twent,.-one point program to serve as the basis 
tor discW!lsiOll at a general meeting ot the Center Part.,.. 94 'J.'wo days later the 
~ln1sche Vollisait.unl publi8hed th1e program. under the heading, "The Cente1'-
the Free German People's Part.,.lu--indicat.ing s proposed new name tor the 
Party.9S The article emphasised the Center's fundamental opposition to the 
Socialists and impressed upon its readers that this dratt represented a changed 
platform adapted to the anew tae8. It The program set torth a plan ot Christian 
social policY' ("Sos1alpolit1k"), oftered "safet,. and securitT' to all who pra-
tes8ed a positive faith in Clod, demanded the "pre.er'f'ationottheBundesstaaten,· 
and prop08ed t.be introductiOD of "proportional and women's .utfrage rights. ,,96 
91:o,id., p. 250. Morsel" derives JIlUCh ot his material concerning this move-
Mnt .from the unpublished M_o1rs of Wilhelm Marx found in the state archives 
ot Cologne. 
92lbid. Mor8e,. cited. letter ot the Rhenish labor secreta17, Johannes 
Beckerlu--;;rt. bas been vel7 d1f'.f1cult for .e to convince our trade unionist8 
• • • the t the JIOD8"h,. belongs to the pa st ... 
9.3Ibid. Among the members were r. 1. Bacheil, I. Hoeber, J. Kuckho.ft, 
A. Rings, B. Kastert, P. Schlack, and J. Becker. 
94!!, Bovember 21, 1918, 11917, indicates that the group wanted to be able 
to present. the electorate with "something completel,. nev. a A gener.l meeting 
_s held in Berlin on the same day that this dratt program was printed. It. is 
doubt.tul it this program was used a8 a ba8is tor discus8ion at the Part.y' 8 
Berlin 8es8ion. See Ibid., November 25, 1918, 1928. 
-
9.5vov8lllber 20, 1918, #915. J. Becker here proposed the new t1tle "Freie 
deutsche Volliparte1" t.o ind1cate the Party's conversion to a "progre8sive and 
intercontesaional party.a 
96Ibid• 
-
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Vraf'ted as they were by Centrists who were attuned to the sent1aente ot the 
working classes, the twenty-one pointe carried a definite appeal to the labor 
classes. Such policies as assistance in the building of homes, the legal con-
!iscation ot large estates, "with remuneration," and the dissolving ot entails, 
rstlected the Party's concem with socio-economio attairs. In the cultural 
area, there were promises ot resistance to any illegal or forceful change ot 
Lburch-State relations.91 But nothing was said about the Grossdeutschland 
proposal, Dor about a positive program tor the mitigation of the war debts or 
the political reorganisation ot the country-. 
A further explanation of the Rhinelandera' KalDer pJJne was published 
the next day (November 21). Rerlewing the Party's history and traditiOns, and 
emphasizing the Center's integrity, declaring that it bad always acted in the 
public interest and would continue to do so, the article pointed out thatsocial 
retorms could not be adequately provided by' Catholics who were not sooial-
l11nded. In conclwsian, it extended an appeal to the Bavarian Centrists to 
unite with the Rhineland group: 
We beg our Bavarian friends not to retuee their consent to 
the Rhineland proposals, to accept the proposed dratt of the Party's 
1l8JIle, "Free German People's Party, It as their own, and to examine 
the well-intentioned provisional program. All this will be simple 
as soon as the printed matter, etc., ot the Party i8 cirCulated in 
Bavaria and has done ita work.98 
The Rbineland Centrists had not acted without a certain stratag... It 
was their hope that the hasty coapUation and publicatiCX1 ot the provisional 
progr8ll would catch the Center otf-guard and dissolve with one revolutionary 
etroke the former conserva ti va direction ot the Party. The leaders also hoped 
97Ibid • 
-
98lbid •• Novellber 21, 1918, 1917. 
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to prevent the workera from drilling into the camp of the SPD. To this end it 
.-pla.yed the practice nov popular in bourgeoia political campaigna ot incorpo-
rating "deutsche" or "Volkaparteitl in the part;y title.99 
But the impetuolUl and unprecedented act of the left-oriented Rllinelanderl 
tailed ita .rk. Far trClll disSipating the power ot the cOllsenatives, the 
program mobilised a strong reaction within the Parv. For seae, the "strong 
.,ve1ISent to the lett" was the cause ot downright resentment. lOO The left-wing 
".a wamed that auch precipitate Botint7 could lead to the dissolution ot in-
dividual state organizations and jeopardize the unit;y ot the entire Center.10l 
til the sa.e da;y that the "Cologne Plan" waa published, siJIilar ideas came 
under acrutill7 in another quarter, tor an otficial Part7 caucus under the cba~ 
IW18hip ot Enberger had been arranged in Berlin to diacus the Centr1sta' new 
party program. Present at this gathering were varioue Retchstag Centriata, 
Part;y _bers trom the Pruaian Landtag, directora ot the Rhineland and Wea""':' 
phalian tactiona, repreaentativea of the Center'. neve organs, delegatea trom 
the Chriatian Workers' ASSOCiation, the Volkeverein,th.e Farmere' Union, and 
even fraa the Central Council of the Catholic WOllen's League. l02 The asaembled 
... bere discussed what the7 called the "two big probleu ot the dar': The in-
evi. tabili t7 ot another ICul turk_pt should the govemaent succUlllb to a prole-
tarian dlctatorehip, and the threat ot anarch7 in the disturbances inatigated 
99"Deutsche Volkapartei, h "Deutschnationale Volkapartei," "Deutsche 
Demokratische Partei," and "Bayrische Volkspartei." 
looIn a communication "aus Mittelatandskreiaen," ICV, November 2S, 1918, 
1944. -
l°lxarl Hoeber, ibid., November 21, 1918, #917. 
-
102, report ot the .eeting of November 20 was printed in Gel'lllania, IIS44 on 
the aaBle da7. 
~-. ------------~ so 
'b1 the Bolshevist groups. The Centrists agreed that. unleas the new Party were 
adapted and made rele'Y8nt to present situations, it would remain yain and in-
" etfectual. Like the Kolner GruW!t the Berlin assemblage considered propos.ls 
to bre.k asunder once and for all t.he traditional confessional framework ot the 
Center Party and to rearrange it into an interconfessional Christian _jori t)" 
party. Unwittingly, they aet their approval on a ujor portion of Cologne's 
provisional draft by' 81Ibod)"ing mall)" ot the same ideas in their prellminerT 
program.10) 
Dr. Pfelffel' published the results of the meeting in the form ot a proc-
laJRation on the same da)" (November 20). In the proclamation which told of the 
Party' 21 adjustment to the r8volutionar)" ai tuation, he set torth the ideals ot 
the new temporary' platforml 
The World War and the Revolution have ru1ned the old Germany, 
In storm and stre8s will a new one be born. It shall be a free 
social republic in whioh all Germans, all olasses and ranks, aU 
citizens without distinction of reliefs and membership of party 
can be contented. To create this new Germany is the taak of the 
whole nation, not of one part)" dictatorship. All parties want. 
and lIlU8t. join in it. But. to do ao all old parties require an 
internal and external renewal. 
A new Center tRust. and will endure the change ot t.hese days. 
Public beliet in a deJllocratic republic, opposition to the rule 
ot the upper classes" order in freedom, open renunciat.ion of 
__ oni. and uterialin of our day, fostering of ideal values, 
making the people and the nation financially .ound: the.e are 
the tundauntal principles ot i t.& renewal 8S a Christian-
deaocratic People's Party. 
103xv. ''Die Reform des Zentrums," November 2), 1918, 6924, indicated that. 
a compariiOn between the two progra1ll8 (Berlin and Cologne) would lead one to 
believe that tbey had used "identical models." Money, Zentrumspartei 1917-
~~ pp. 104-10$, notes that neither group was aware of what. the other was 
I~o.a.ug. He citea a letter of Brauns' which said that after he had returned home 
trom the Duiaburg conference on November 19, he had received a notice to hurr,y 
to Berlin. Brauns reached the capital on N01Vember 2$ and stayed over the next 
few days to confer with the Center's leaders. Cited. ibid., p. 10$. 
-
All social claases, IIl8n and women, who protess these prin-
ciples and would join up vi th these slogans in the eleCtion tor 
the National Assembly should accept the new Center. The Center 
dare not go under. It must continue on with new gOllls and a 
wider foundation. It 1I1U8t lead to newer heights.104 
51 
The statement was followed by certain "guiding principles" tormed by the 
assembly pertinent to the two major areas ot toreign and domestic policies. 
'aong the important provisions were demands tor a ·switt conclusion ot a world 
peace," "regulat.tonot intemational relations on lasting justice instead ot 
torce, n "creation ot a league ot natiens with equal rights tor small and large 
nations," "international regulations and protection ot the rights ot workers," 
"substitution ot private capitalistic monopoly" by local cooperatives, "main-
tenance ot contessional "Volksschulen," "retention ot parental rights" in edu-
cation, and "treedaa ot religious orders and congregations.1I10' The cultural 
.ection ot the guiding pr1nciplu gave evidence ot the Party's new concern tor 
all Christian grOl1.pa. Clly in two ot theae cultural and religious proposals 
did it Jl8ke specific reterence to Catholics.l06 It l.tt no doubt ot ita earnest 
wish to open ita doors to aU Christian d8nmnationa. 
<&l the whole the Berlin proposals were more moderate than the Cologne 
dratt. While the latter called tor a cOliplete Party reorganization, the 
lObsee the P'l.;Hchritten by Pteitter, Zentrua, pp. 41-46 tor the cOllplete 
proclamation alongth the " Leitsltse, • Also printed in Oermania, November 20, 
1918, 1544; !!, November 22, 1918, 1919. The latter paper indicated that it 
subscribed to the pointe and anticipated the accomplishment ot a cOlllbined pro-
gram ot all Centrist tactions in the near future. This was just two dav. atter 
i "" ~-t had printed the Kolner Plane. 
l°'xbid. 
-
1065ec • I, point 6 (foreign policies): "Vol1kOlllllene, durch vSlkerrecht-
1iche B{kgschattern g8sicherte Unabhangigkeit des HeUigen Stuhles." Sec. II, 
C, point 6 (cultural pollcies), "Freiheit ••• der katholischen Orden und 
Kongregationen." Ibid., pp. 42, 4,. 
-
,.--
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" tormer's "Lei tsa tse " proposed a renewal of the old Center--"Chr1stlich-
d_olaatiscbe Volkspart.ei." They would change tbe name but retain much ot the 
Center's program ot June, 1918. The two drafts were similar in that neither 
made reference to an otticial Party plan tar the future poll tical structure ot 
Qermany. The lIOOial economic suggestions were also s1JDilar with the exception 
that the Berlin plan contained no mention ot dissolving entails, nor ot legal 
contiscation ot large properties. There was some variance alao in the treat-
ment of war profitsl the Cologne plan d_aming their confiscation, the Berlin 
proposals aildl;y requesting the "strongea' tiacal assea8ll8nts.·107 
Tbe publication of the aore "lett-oriented" Cologne plan and the aright-
~riented" Berlin proposals created wideapread discussion in Centrist circl.a. 
Catholic public opinion, reflecting the diversified viewa ot tbe heterogenous 
Centrist g:toups, varied trom total agre8Jl8nt on the need of renovation, to 
partial or complete di8agreement on the manner and extent ot retormation. In 
small local Centrist .eetings in Rhineland, Berlin, and Wfirttemberg, st.olid 
conservatives who lIDtU now had maintained an oainoua silence began to prOlllOte 
their ideas despite the fact that their positioo had been greatly undermined b;y 
the events ot November 9 and the power balance within the Party upset. This 
cODservative w1n& resented the attempts to break the ZentrUll8tUnl, and wamed 
against abandoning the old Party name,loB and the sudden desertion ot tidelity 
to the old monarchical structure.109 
.. 
107 lIBerliner Lei tal tse ": " • • • sch:rtste steuerllche Erfassung der 
hoben Einkoalen und Veraagens, besonders der lriegagew1nne ••• It Ibid., p.4S; 
IIVA If ----Aolner EDtwurtH : "Schirfate Errassung der hohen EinlcCDllleD, der grossen 
Verm~gen und des unYerdienten Vera8genazuwachaea. Einziebung sller Kriegs-
gew1nne." ltV. November 20, 1918, 191$. 
-
l06See Karl Hoeber in !,!, November 2$, 1918, 11927. 
l09~t Salm-Reifferscheidt to Wilhela Marx, November 18 J 1918 J cited 
iF 
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Apparently no two Centrist groupa supported identical platforms. Lack of 
Party cooperation was bewailed while each group waited for the other to conform 
on November 26, for example, a provincial meeting of the Westphalian Centrist 
c(lll1lllittee aet at HaBlll to discuss a provisional prograa. The call1littee issued 
• aaniteato to the local cORIunity in which it called upon ita constituents "to 
work together for the maintenance of order by rejecting eve17 type ot narrow-
minded Party rule. 1I It demanded the "ereotion ot local cOlllll1tteea of satety" 
which would accurately present the picture of the econc:JBic, protessional, and 
political conditions in city and community. "We have the obligation to cooper-
ate [it stated]. We a180 have the right to be heard •••• We frankly declare 
ourselves tor a democratic republic. nllO In the Berlin directives this group 
recognized a ba.is for a "clear and final program." They did, however, object 
to dropping the name "Zentrua, II but they were willing to add the naae lIQrJst1.ich-
d8llOlcratische V olkspartei, " in order to encourage other Christians to join the 
party.lll 
'ar different was the outlook of the 11 ttle group which met in Cologne 
on the toll owing day, Nov_ber 27. Representing the c O1l8ervative middle class 
interests within the Part,.. (HOrtaausschus. ,Sln der Vereinigung sur Wahrung 
der Intereseen des Mittelstandes innerbalb der Zentrumspartei"), this smaller 
group edUci.ad what they termed a "privately drafted" program which had origi-
nated in a cOlllllittee that had tailed to include the representatives of middle 
ela8s interests. In a special program repre8enting its awn Tested interests, 
-
in Morsey, Zentrumepartei 1917-1923, p. 107. 
110clted in Schulte, Mtlnstersche Chronik, p. 166. 
lllIbid., p. 167. 
-
, 
------------------------------------------~~ 
it demanded that the "treatment" ot economic lite be based on "Christian aoral 
principle.," and it declared that Ha fundamental beliet in the monarchy" vas 
"a conscientious duty." In thiS 18 tter propo.i tion, it enjoyed the support ot 
the Rhineland aristocratic wing ot the Center Party which also criticized the 
"abandonment" ot the IlOnarchy .112 
In direct contrast to this conservative approach vas the policy espoused 
" by the traditionally democratic Wurttemberg Center taction termed "adapting 
oneselt to the changed circwutances." Meeting likewise on November 27, this 
group considered the reestablishment ot the monarchy as impossible, and spoke 
out clearly tor a"democratic-republican 8tate structure.,,113 Similarly, the 
Baden Centrists gave their approval tQ the precedent set by Berlin in reject-
ing a monarchical form ot govem.ent. Meeting in Karlsruhe the Baden Centrists 
rejected the otter ot • cOlibined list (8Ustenverb1ndungll) with the conserva-
tive. and retained the "name and banner" of the center.l14 
Q1e ot the most contrOYeraial questions discussed b7 various local com-
II1.ttee8 was the change of Party name. Despite repeated efforts 011 the part of 
the Center's democratic wing to broaden the membership to include non-Cathol1cs, 
the Party tenaciously clung to its contessional characteristics and to the 
name which identitied it 8S • Catholic Party. Yet not Catholio concerns alone, 
Ibut the religious, social, and educational interests ot the entire German 
phriatian population vere threatened by the Socialist regime. It was the time 
itor Protestanta and Catholics both. to unite in a common tront against the 
112Cited in Horsey, "Zentrumspartei," p. 2$4. 
113KV, Hovember 28, 1918, 11937. 
-
llbschoter, Mit dar alten Fab.ne, pp. 113, 11$, 119-120. 
, 
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dangers ot atheistic materiali8Jl1 and anarchy. It the confessional connotation 
ot "Zentrum" hindered Christian unity, it was to be expected that Centrists 
would change the name to something more acceptable. 
Among the various suggestions tor name-changing oftered by Centrists, 
shades of conservatism or liberali8Jl1 could be detected. Berlin's national 
e()lllldttee, for instance, preferred dropping the old name and assuming the title 
"Cbristliche Volkspartei." According to the Cologne plan "Freie deutsehe 
Volkspartei" could be added to the old name--but temporarily. Once the con-
stituents had become adequately instructed, ttZentrua" could be dropped vithout 
opposition.US Westphalian Centrists adYocated the retention of the old name 
with the added title, "Christlich-demokra\1sche Vol1cspartei," whUe some ot 
the more liberally inclined Baden Centrists tavored "Christlieh-sosiale 
Volkspartei. nU6 The minority conservative element still clung to the name 
ot Center.ll7 And sOllle,like the Karlsruhe Centr1ats, thought the name 
"Christlieh-somialen Volkspartei" would perhaps bring "momentary" success, 
but in the long run lIight pose a danger to ideological rigidi ty ~ehaul1che 
Geschlossenheit").ll8 
ll5Op1ni0l'l8 varied in the Cologne conterence ot November 18. Wilhelm 
Marx thought it important that the old name be retained. J. Becker was ot the 
op101on that "Zentrum" should be dropped as soon as the electorate became 
familiar with the new nallle. He wrote to Stegerwald, Erzberger, Brauns, Joos, 
Gronowski, lAnsing, and Bell to win their support for this proposal. See 
Morsey, "Zentruaspartei," p. 2S1. 
ll6Ibid., p. 25S. 
-
ll7Dr. Martin Fassbender severely criticized this attitude in his aoving 
detense for the name "Christlieh. Volkspartei." See Germania, November 28, 
1918, IS56, p. 2. 
118Schofer, OPe cit., p. 120. 
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Besides emphasizing the interconfessional character of the Party, 
Centrist leaders were also stressing "democratic party life" which was to domi-
nate "more strongly" in the future. At a Centrist rally in Cologne in the 
first week of December, Karl Trimborn pointed this out to an assembly ot over 
S,OOO people. He referred to the revolution as a "national misfortune" which 
"aggravated the arrangement ot the armistice" and caused "much internal dis-
order. ,,119 The Centrist leader favored the idea ot a "greater Germany" with 
the inclusion of Austria and the maintenance of the Reich's unity. He admitted 
that the Center had traditionally been a staunch supporter of the monarchy 
which served as a strong bond of unity for the Reich. But under the present 
circumstances the erection of a republic was perhaps the "most correct, most 
expedient, and most imperative necessity •••• Loyalty to the monarchy is no 
longer an obligatory principle in our program ••• [he stated.] It the 
National Assembly decides for a republic, then we have to recognize the will ot 
the people. 1I128 Wilhelm Marx121 addressing the overflow crowd in an adjoining 
room expressed similar sentiments and prophesied a "great tuture" for the 
"Chrlstlieh-demokratischen Volkspartei" based on the Berlin "Leitsltze."122 
119xv, December 5, 1918, #957. 
-
120Ibid • 
-
l2lwilhelm Marx (1863-1946) studied jurisprudence at the University ot 
Bonn and became a lawyer in 1684. He was appointed economic councillor in 
1904 and judge ot the <';ourt of Appeals in Cologne (1906) and in DUsseldort 
(1907). He served as a meMber of the Prussian Landtag (1899), the Raichetag 
(1910-1918), and the National Assembly (1919-l920). He was chosen president 
of the Center Party (1921-1923) and two years later succeeded Gustav Stresemann 
as chancellor of the Reich (1923-1924J 1926J 1927-1928). He retired trom 
political leadership when the Center was weakened in the election of May, 1928. 
l22!!, December 5, 1918, #957. 
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This reversal of one of the major tenets of the Party's program of June 1918, 
waS indicati VB of a significant change in Rhineland sentiments and showed the 
growing strength of republican acceptance. 
As the month of Wovember drew to a close the Center leaders faced the 
still unsolved problem of party solidarity. How were they to combine the 
various proposals of local committees to formulate a national program accept-
able to all members? Moreover, how were the various interest groups to be 
reconciled to a democratic interconfessional party? Another problem contront-
ing the leaders was that of finding a sui table program dealing with Church-
State relations and Christian cultural principles which would meet the approval 
of the Ge~n Catholic hierarchy.123 
The problem ot how to hold the Center Party together or at least how to 
prevent their members fram drifting into other political caaps became more 
acute as various parties made their bid for public support. Ole such party 
attempting to lure the discontent.d aristocratic conservative Centrists into 
124 its camp was the newly created German National People's Party (DNVP). This 
party, founded on November 22, 1918, combined elements from the old Conserva-
tive Party, Free Conservatives, Pan-Germans, and a majority of the Junker 
class. Organized to protect the interests of the conservative aristocracy 
123In 8 letter written by Bishop Karl J. Schulte of Paderborn to Dr. 
Pfeiffer on November 23, 1918, the bishop agreed "on the whole to the Berlin 
principles" but wished that "the requirement of freedom ot instruction be 
more strongly protected." Cited in Horsey, "Zentruaspartei," p. 2gS. 
124For an excellent study of this party, .ee lArwis Hertzmann, DNVP: 
Ri..Kht-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic 1918-1924 (Uncol.n: UniversIty 
of Nebraska Press, 1963). 
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against the attacks of the bourgeois liberals, the DNVP posed 8S a respectable 
Jdddle class party,12$ and hoped to unite naU good citizens" in defense 
ageinet the "dangers of locia11sm" and the "indignit1'" of the Republic.126 
Broad appeals aimed at the anti-revolutionists in the German People's Parv 
and the Center Party were made during the election campaign,127 but at the 
t1Jle were not too successful. Most Centrists, regardless of their reelings 
towards the revolution, preferred to await the decisions of the National 
~ssembly.128 
The solution to Party solidarity was prO'lided, surprisingly enough, not 
from within the Pany, but rather from a force outside. On Nov8lllber 13, the 
revolutionary govemment appointed the Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann 
("Zehn-Gebot-Hofflllann") a8 Minister of Culture.129 His appointment portended 
trouble for future Church-5tate relations and for the 8y8telll of contessional 
12$In one of the Party' 8 appeals published in East Prus8ia it stated: 
"Such persons may all the more easily oCllle to the DNVP without damaging the 
honor of their old partybeoause the Nationalist organi;ation is not, like the 
I1IP, an old party with a new name, but it is a ccapletely new Partir •••• The 
DNV'P i8 not the old Conservative Parv. It does not wish to be that, nor can 
it be." Edward Beckmann, "St&Uung nehmen'" in Ostpreussische Zeitung, 
December 10, 1918, as cited ~.,' p. 44. 
l26PRiChtl1nien der Deutschnationalen Volk.partei vam 27. Dezember 1918," 
al cited in Ursaohen und 'olgen, III, 205-206. 
l27Hertsmann, E!!!, p. 43. 
128The DNVP continued to woo the discontented Right wing of the Center 
Party after the January election. In midsummer of 1919 Germania complained 
about the efforts being exerted br the DNVP to win Catholic 8Upport for their 
political program, and to join their Party. See Germania, July 4, 1919, 1298. 
129aoftmannt s appointment was criticized as a "tasteless afterthought of 
history" (ltgeschmackloser Treppen1d. ttl der Weltgeschichte"), KV, November 14, 
1918, 1/899. -
,---------------------------. 
,9 
SChools in Germany.130 
A fanatical atheist, Hoffmann immediately promulgated a Socialist anti-
clerical program. Two of his decrees, published on November 27 and 29, re-
spectively, abolished clerical supe~ision in the "Volksschule," forbade the 
teaching of religion, and nullified such practices as prayer before and after 
claeses, pupil attendance at religious services, and observance of religious 
holidays--cherished concessions which had been granted to confessional schools 
by the old regille.1Jl The Catholic reaction was immediate; protests broke out 
everywhere.132 Bishops resented the "de-Ghristianizing ot schools."13) But 
there was lIore to come. Government subsidies to the Church, it was learned, 
were to be suspended after April 1, 1919. Secularl,at1on of Church and convent 
property would obvtously tollow. All were appalled at the "irreligious 
achievement" of the revolution and feared the establishment of a proletarian 
dictatorship. The specter of a "new Kulturkampf" 10Cll'led darkly.134 
l)O"Heute stehen vir von der brennenden Sorge, welChes die Lage der 
katholischen Kirche im neuen Deutschland sein vird." Germania, November 1" 
191B, #,3,. 
l3l.rhe two decrees are cited in Max1Jdlian Pfeiffer, K!JIPf UIl die 
heillssten GiterL (nugschr1tten der Deutschen ZentrUD18parteia '15, Berlin: January 9, 1919), pp. 12-11. 
1 32Germania , November 2B, 1918, 1,56; November 29, 1918, 15,8; November 1): 
1918, 1559. 
133Cardinal von Hartmann, Archbishop ot Cologne, in 8 protest written on 
December 16, 1918, as cited in Pfeiffer, Kampf, p. 21. 
134In a "flaming protest published December 20, 1918, Cardinal Hartmann 
and the Prussian bishops lashed out against the dangers of the socialistic 
materia11sm of the day: "Jetst kOl1llllt ein Kul turlcaapf von noch viel schl.1mmerer 
Art." ~., pp. 23-33. 
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Catholics and Protestants alike resented Socialist attempts to secularize 
education. 135 Together they staged interdenaainational demonstrations against 
the obnoxious decrees. l36 In Berlin a special interdenominat.ional cODlJlittee was 
eatablished to tight a common cause against the "1Il8terialiam" ot the day.131 
Aaong outspoken cri tics ot Hot.f1lann t s lepsls ti<m, the Center Party 
.toad out as t.he stalwart detender ot Christian culture and education. Begin-
ning in the middle ot November and continuing beyond the January election 
campaign, the Party waged a tireless and, at times, vitriolic battle against 
the Socialist anti-clerical program. A undate published by the PrU8sian 
Center £actiOl1l 38 was only the tirst ot many such bitter protests to be permed 
by Centrists against the "rape ot Catholics and Protestants" through the 
"Jakobinermassregeln" ot Adolt Hotfaann.139 The Socialist Minister ot Culture 
tt 
vas abused and insulted cneve17 side. He was cond.ned a. a "Kultursch8dlin,,," 
as an "illiterate person ••• bristllDa with anitch tor dictatorialpower.,,140 
l3S,or a report ot the discussioo held by the Protestant High COIl8istory, 
see ibid., pp. 44-45. 
-
136Joseph Selbst, Vicar-general ot Mainz wrote: "Catholic and Protestant 
brethren rose up as one un •••• Prell nUileroue _s.ive assemblies one could 
hear a cry ot protest and a stol'll ot oppoei tion which swept oyer the land like 
a natural catastrophe and in the chaos ot revolution Berlin itselt could not 
be lett unheard." Cited in Morsw,r, "Zentrumapartei," p. 257. 
137Pteitter, KalfPt, p. 55; Geraania, NOVeMber lS, 1918, 1535, spoke of 
a "mobUization of a religious strength." 
138!!. November 19, 1918, 1912. 
139Ibid., November 25, 1918, #928. 
-
140"Mann obne Bildung • • • gestachelt von diktatoriscbem Macbtikitzel." 
Ibid. Tbe Munster protessor Johann P1enge protested "a. a scholarly Socialist" 
toE'bert against the "sudden frenzy of power exhibited by Hotr_nn" whose 
~n the K8lnische Volkszeitung he was depicted as • big-aouthed, illiterate 
atheist of Berlin, 8 cyniC, an evil scum tram Berlin's quagmire, a gushing 
water-spout before an imposing bu1ld1ng, an intellectual Ther8ites. nl41 
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An uninterrupted wave of protest stemming fro. individuals, frca Catholic 
organizations, and trail Protestants added ita weight to the cultural and re-
ligious demands of the eenter.142 Capitalising upon the religious issue, the 
Centrist leadere combined the various socio-econaa1c groups within the Party 
into a cOJlllon front with the de tense ot (;hriltian education a. a unitying 
cc:anon den01llinator. The publication ot the anU-clerical decrees, furthermore, 
gave the Party a suitable slogan tor the colling election campaign for the 
National Asseably--one that could be used to attract both Catholics and 
Protestants alike.143 
The incessant protests against Hottann gained their end. ay the a1ddle 
or December, his co-worker in the Ministry ot Culture, Konrad Haenisch, was 
appointment had been "a continuous historic disgrace tor the Socialists. tJ 
Cited in Schulte, MGnsterache Chronik, p. 132. 
ft l4l"Gro.s8Chnautzig~r, ungebildeter Berliner Gottesleugner, wider-
wartiger Zyniker, Ible Blu\e aUB Berliner Grossltadtstrumpt, grinsender Wasser-
apeiher vor einem Monuaentalgeblude, geistiger tneraites," December 11, 1918, 
#988, also cited in Schulte, JlLlswrache Chronik, p. 289. 
14200 November 27 Protessor Georg Schreiber spoke to a Centrist assembly 
about the "Catholic c:;:1:8is" and the dangers of separation ot Cburcb and State. 
A protest signed by one thousand un and women ot Cologne concerning the re-
ligious question vas sent to Ebert by the Center Party on Dec_her 4. lAtter 
the reading of Ebert's reply at another large gathering of Centrists at 
MUnster tended to increase the antagoniSJll againat government policies. C1 ted 
~., pp. lBO, 206, 262-26$. 
143A few 1I01'1ths later bas spoke ot the "revolutionary flirtation" 
which expo.ed the "cultural aiu" ot the SPI) and shook t.he "cbri8t.licbe Volles-
8eele" and rai8ed the caapa1gn to a "battle of ideale." Cited in Mor8ey, 
ftZentruaBpart.1," p. 2$B. 
62 
forced to confesa that Hot.t'lllann t a policies had been "shipwrecked." "A hasty 
separation ot State and Church by a .ere decree • • • [he stated] would lead, 
in lilY opinion, to disastroue political consequences," theretare, the govern-
lIlent would have "to tolerate" the interest. of Christianity in PrUSS1a.1h4 
Under pressure ot public opinion Haeniach cancelled de tacto HoffMann's edict: 
of November 29 concerning the abolition of religious instructions, declaring it 
tilegal siDce it had not been published in the "prescribed fDa •• 145 Cb 
January 4, 1919, Hottaann d1sguetedly reaigned his otfice. The united ettorts 
ot German Catholics and Protestants _rehalled b,. the atreng foroe ot the 
Center had scored a ncto1'7.146 
But it waa not the voice of religion sole17 1IIhich called a halt to 
political tyranny. Nor for that IRatter were the pending elections the decisive 
factor in the withdrawal of the recent administrative decre... The warning 
note that had aet the SocialUt aovermaent quaking waa a _11 c17 out of the 
West. Identitied by German Nationalists as Centrist-inspired, "Loa von Berlin" 
became a rallying s10pn that echoed throuah the land.147 Rhineland citisens 
144Ibid• 
-
14'Publ1c decree ot December 26, 1918, aee Pfeifter, Kaapf, pp. 59-60. 
~rman1a published an edi tor1al, flEln Ert'olg der chriatlichen 1irotest, " 
IDecember 2B, 1918, 1604, aee alao Berliner Tasebla~l, January 5, 1919, 118. 
146Pteilter warned that the atruule had just begtm. The Socialist anti-
lelerlcal proaraJll indicated the trend of ita aeculari8IB and IUterlali81llJ worae 
thinga would happen if the Socialists should win • majority in the ccaing 
!election. See Pteiller, K!!p:!, p. 60. 
147 Alread7 on Dec_ber 17 Profeaaor Plenge warned Haenisch I "You are not 
Iware ot the unner by which the • Los von Berlin, t f aelbatlndiges Rheinland-
Nestta1en' have received an echo here. PrecticalIT the whole responaibility 
tor it talla on the Pr'ue.ian Miniatry ot Culture... Cited in Schulte, 
~Un.tersche Chronik, p. 235. 
~--------------~ 
148 
were dete1"ll1ned to create a new republic of Prussia's westem provinces. 
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Too long had they been irked by Pru.aia's unsympathetic dOlllination over the. 
They had watched the unsettled events of November and the chaotic situation 
brought about by strikes and Spartacist notings. They had endured the preseno 
ot allied occupation troops. They had li'V8d in tear of partial annexation ot 
Rhenish terri t01"7 by France. .ow they were cringing under the laah of a new : 
ICulturka1llpf. No 1IOIlder that even hitherto 10,..1 Rhenish people began to favor 
separation from Prussia. R8henish law for Rhenish land" ("Rheinisches Recht 
f{ho Rheinisches Land" )149 bee ... the motto of a reactiClll8r;y Jloveaent against 
the undemocratic and "irresponsible" government of Berl1n.150 With Red dicta-
torship ot "the worthless 'r.ssetreaden' intruder, Kurt Eianer of Bavaria," 
threatening on the one ,hand and the "rule ot Berlin d ... gocuean on the other, 
Rhenish Centrists desired a new Beich fOl'll8tion with a separate republic for 
tbe Rhineland area (Pfalll, Heasen-Naasau, Rhineland and Westphalia) based on 
a "nev free Gemany." "fraue ,_ Reich, los von BerlinL "151 
Press reaction to the movement was naturally divided. A tew Centrist 
publlcatiOl1IJ aupported the idea,152 other larger daillie8 were highly akep-
153 tical. The "Centrist" label had been tagged on the Movement by newsaen 
148 
,!!, Dec_bel' 5, 1918, 11957. 
149 Ibid., December 4, 1918, #953. 
-150 
"We will not dance to the tune ot Berlin," Tremonia, December 6, 1918, 
# 337, a8 cited in Horsey, "Zentrumapartei," p. 259. 
151 IV, Deceaber 4, 1918, 1953. This separati8t 1l0000ent wa. not anti-
Gerun but s1mply anti-Pruasian. 
152 " For SOll8 of these ca.nents, see Schulte, Munster.cbe Chronik, pp. 233-
.. 
153 235. 
The ICHlniache Zeit.unsr. December 6. 1918. 1ll2~. criticiF.AtI t.h. 
II" 
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who might JIlore correctly have identitied it vith two fellov-editors. EaplO)'ing 
the slogan, "Weg mit Berlin,1t Karl Hoeber and Father Joset Froberger, editors 
ot the KGlnische Volksseitung, had lashed out in their papers against the 
dictatorship of ainority groups and the utooilshness of the Spartacists ... l54 
It was their paper which bad originated the idea of dividing Germany into tour 
republics arranged in such a pattern as to break the doainant position ot 
Prussia and recon8truct the Beich on a "tederal d_ocratic ba&18 ... l55 At 8 
meeting in Cologne on December 4, called tor thepurpoee ot acquainting 
Cologne's citizens with the proposed "Berliner Leitsltze" and other proposed 
reforms ot the Center Party, Karl Roeber read the resolution demanding a new 
division of the Reich to a large assembly ot Centrists. The response vas over-
whela1ng.1S6 At the same .eeting, Father Kastert eagerq endorsed the resolu-
tion, declaring that it carried the sanction ot the Archbishop ot Cologne, and 
underscoring the tact that ita d8ll18nds were not the Centrists! alone but the 
157 desire ot all people in the Rhineland. 
ft 
arrangement as "imprac tical" and "unacceptable." The Tagl1che Rundachau called 
it "clerical partioularism". Vordrte accused the Centrists or creatiiig a "pri-
vate dcaain ot clerical backwardne8s ft J 0.,..ni8 warned ot the "danger to the 
unity ot the Reich in these chaotic times". the Telegraphen Union doubted 
whether the movement represented the "general vill ot the Rhenish-Westphalian 
people." All articles as cited in illS,., pp. 215-217. 
154 December 6, 1918, #959. 
l55Ibid., December 12, 1918, /I 976, Schulte, MUnstersehe Chron1k, p. 264 
baa a aap-orthe proposed reconatruction ot the Reich. 
.. lS6"Stnrmischer~ s1ch starker und starker wiederholender Beitall, Hat und 
1'Ueherschvenken. Die Auveaenden erbeben aich von lhren Platzen. Kin velt-
" . ge8chichtlicher Augenblick, der tur iBaer 1m Gedichtnis hatten wird." IV, 
December 5, 1918, 11957. -
157 An otticial of M.:htster cOlllllenting on this remark, said that he doubted 
jP 
6, 
But the spark enkindled by Hoeber and Froberger and fanned to a blaze by 
Rhineland separatists was not destined to tlare up 80 brightly again. Tbough 
Rhenish Centrists fought and expounded, other political parties refused to 
become involved. Grossly exaggerated was the K8lnische Yolks.eitune's asser-
tion that the movement had been accepted wi th "enthusiastic agreement by all 
parties •nl,8 Even within the Center there had bean little encouragement.l ,9 
When the inhabitants of Westphalia agitated for an independent Ku-Bepublic, 
and siDdlar mOV'ements ot separatist minorities tollowed, support for the 
Rhenish-Westphalian mO'l'eJIlent grew even weaker. Serious-minded Centrists began 
to question the adnsabili ty of the whole separatist program. The Mlnsterschs 
Anseiger on December 8, warned against a flhasty decision, ,,160 and two days 
later Adolt Schlledding, a Mt1nster Centrist, reintorced this admonition by 
lpeaking out vigorously against any iJlmediate Los von Berlin mov .. ent.161 Like 
lentiments were expressed at Haa on Dec_bel" 11 by Karl Herold, the chairman 
whether the Bilhop of M6.nster would be ot the same opinion. Cited in Schulte, 
MGnstersche Chronik, p. 222. Later the IV, Dec_bel" 12, 1918, 1976, explained 
that the resolution represented the wishe. ot individual Centrists and was not 
• movement ot the Center Party. For this reason, neither Trimborn nor JII.arx as 
leaders ot the Party had c011lllented on the resolution. At a Rhenish Centrist 
Partei rl an Septeaber 16, 1919, Father Brauns re.phasized thia when he j)OIiite out,"in the name ot the Party directors," that the Rhineland movement 
hac! not 'been staged by the Psrty but expressed the wishes ot individuals. 
Reports aa cited in Monsey, Zentrumsp!rtei 1917-122~, p. 122. 
l~orsey, "Zentrumapartei,. p. 262. 
"l59No reterencea were made to such proposals in the various discussion 
aeetings 'formulating programs tor the Center's new platrom. The future state 
structure was to be decided by the National A.sembly. 
160Cited in Schulte, M«nstersche ~hronik, p. 246 • 
......--...- -. . 
161Ibid., pp. 2,4-2,8. 
-
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at the Westphalian Centrist cOllllll1ttee. He cOUllselled his com.panions to remain 
aloot, declaring that such a decision ought to be made by the National Alsembl¥ 
not by one party.162 Stegerwald and F..rsberger were also Itrong in their oppo-
sition to~,the leparatist movement. grzberger in particular lavored a strong 
centralization at power and had little sympathy with any particularist senti-
ments--a view that was in contradistinction to that ot !lOst ot his tellow 
Centrists. S1.m1lar teelings were entertained b7 Hans Bell, a Centrist Reiche-
tag member trom D{1sseldort who, on necember 1), withdrew his support troa the 
movement and joined the opposition.163 
That 8 .. e ileaellber 1) vas made noteworth7 by the conYocation ot a general 
.eeting at Elbeteld, under the auspices at the Prussian govemaent, tor the 
purposes at investigating and settling separatists' contentions. Important 
otticials at the Rhenish province. were present, as well as the repreeentative. 
ot local coaumties, political partie., and the press. Tr 1lllborn as Centri.t 
representative in explaining his position repudiAted the KBln1sche Volks-
.eitung'l whole idea ot leparation, and said that Berlin'. m18l1l8nageaent had , 
164 
alienated the Welt. He noted, turthermore, that with France striving to w1n 
Rhenish Catholic slllpathy tor an Anschluss, the formation of a separate 
Rhenish-We.tphalian republic was simply an alternative to foreign annexation. 
The mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, called the s eparatiet proposal "the 
162.!2!i., pp. 266-267. 
163Ibid., p. 273. 
164 Tr1.mborn remarked tha t in Trier, people were saying, "We would ra ther 
be French, than bow to Hottmann. II Ibid. 
F 
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greateat atupiditya ever heard ot, and pointed out that the proposal bad neTer 
been wholeheartedly accepted by the Center Party.16S 
The Elberteld conterence sounded the death knell to the Rhenish republic 
DlO'lement tor the mCllent, although the K&lnische Volkszeituns continued to 
publiC i.e it. Enberger, Gr6ber, and a Centrist leader trCII MUnster, Karl 
Herold, repeated their condemnations ot the Los von Berlin plans at the 
166 
national Centrist convention held in Frankfurt on December 30. But TriJlborn 
and Wilhelm Marx as leaders ot the Rhenish Centrists had already buried the 
usue when on signing the Party's general election manitesto on December 28, 
they conti1"ll8d publicly: "The Reich's unity IlUSt under all circwutances be 
maint.iined.n167 
The Berlin Centrist leadership had neither sanctioned the separatist 
movement nor become inyolved in the controversy.. Its e,tforts had been con-
can'trated rather on the business ot constructing a new Party plattOl"l'l and on 
joining with the Church in ita bitter campaign against the Prussian reYolu-
tionary Kulturpolitik. l68 In these intereats, Berlin Centrists had joined 
wi th Rhenish-We.tphalians in a series ot coaaittee meetings during the Ilonth 
16SIbid., pp. 271-274. 
-166 !!" January 2, 1919, #3, Germani!, January 2, 1919, #2. 
167The Loa yon Berlin issue was to be resurrected again atter the 
Rational Assembly cOllV'ened: In Westphalia the idea ot a separate Ems-Republic 
never really died and WIlS a cause ot _barras_ent to the Centrist leadership 
during the election campaign. See Schulte, Mtinstersche Chrontk, pp. 293, 303, 
308-314, 319-322. 
168 On November 23 Bishop Karl Joseph Schulte of Paderborn tearing tuture 
Conflicts tor the Church over cultural-political attaire, requested secrep17-
general Pteitter to see that the Center enter boltlly into the tra,. with "ruck-
~1~~8 katholischar Flrbung," as cited in Morse,., Zentruupartei in 19l7-192l, 
68 
of December att.empting to reeolve' the dirterences between the two groups. AffA' 
169 four weeks of "difficult transactions" a 8et of new policie8 bad gradually 
evolved combining the main pOints of both programe .110 The.e were then sub-
111 lIitted on December 20 to the national c<DRittae tor tinal approval. The 
committee held a conference at Frankfurt on December 30 under the direction 
of the Party leader, Adolf Graber. Among the thirtY-8ix leading members of 
the Party present were I Enberger, Karl Herold, Richard MGller-Fulda, Fflrst 
lAwenstain, Graf Pra8chaa, K. Vorl Savigny, M. Pfeifter, L. Gerstenberger, 
o. von Bretano, and F. X. Bach_. Representatives of the Catholic Women's 
League of Germany, Hedwig Dransfeld and Mra. Hesaberger, a180 atteD.decl.112 
After a careful 8tudy of the preliminary prograa, the coadttee sanctioned it 
a. the new Party plattorm for the coming election CaMpaign.113 
The prOVisional character of the new Party directives and it. emphasis 
on "new principle8" hinted at basiC changes in the Party's policies which 
actually were not presented. True, acceptance of the republic,114 the Party's 
169BaCh., Zentruup!rte1a, VIII, 263. 
110'01" a coverage of sOlle of the topiCS diBCuased, aee Maximilian 
Pfeiffer, Zentrla und politische Neuordnung (Flyachriften del" Deutachen 
Zen'trulupartei. 12, Berlin: December, 19l1:J). 
11lgv, December 2G, 1919, 1991. 
-
112Bachea ZentrumBpartei VIII 263. , _ a' , 
113The new progr8ll, authorised by Graber, was publi.hed in KV, January 2, 
1919, 14, Germania, January 2, 1919, 12. -
11~e "torturous question" of the re8toration of the monarchy was ex-
c~uded trOll the di8cua81ona at Frankturt and frca the Party program. The 
Wurtteaberg CentriSts, however, had definitely declared that a restoration of 
the monarchy ftS "apo.sible." See Bach .. , ZentruJuE!rte!, VIII, 264. 
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.trong empha.is on democracy, and its demands tor a more centra11,ed Reich 
evidenced a reversal ot 80.e of the tenets of the previous July program.17S 
aut beside this, there was 11 ttle changed in the basic Center Party's prin-
176 
ciple.. The "new" Party platform contained provisions culled trom various 
tormer progralU nas well as some new proposals, resulting £rea the last veeks 
ot discussion ... 177 The platform was divided into three parts. There were 
various provisions concerning the tormation of a .new political constitution, 
a section on foreign policies, and a long caulogue of domestic procedures 
covering cultural, social, eccmoaic, and tinancia4, policiea. An introduction 
in the tont ot a manifesto (signed by Gr&ber) .t.ated that the goal ot the PartT 
vall to atrive in a true Christian spirit to attain lIocial justice tor all. The 
revised plattorm recognised the new deaocracy, but attacked class rule, mater-
178 iali_, ma1Dlloni8Jll, and anarchy. 
Concerning the poll tical reorganisation ot Germany, it advocated three 
.. aeura.. Firat, acknowledging that the new republic vas to be d_ocrat1c and 
17S " The new program called tor ''Wahrung der Reichs.inheit, Stirkung des 
Reich.gedankes" while at the .... tiM it a.ked tor the "Erhaltung des bundes-
staatlichen Charakters des Reichs sum Schutz der Eigenart der deutechen -
Stlllllll8. If See "Lei taltae der Deutechen Zutl!UDl8partei vea nezember 1916," in 
Urs.chen und Fo1~, III, 197. 
176At the ,800M Paneita at Berlin on January 16, 1922, EmU Ritter 
\old the assembled Can ta, t Uii' the directives ot July 1918 and the program 
~OPol!l8d by the WGst. German and Berlin groups were combined into an otticia1 
election prograa. Report aa oited in Morae,.., Zentrumsparte1 1917-1923, p. 129. 
177Same ideas ot the Jesuit Heinrich Pe.ch's doctrine ot Chriatian 
. SoliCSar1811l vere proposed a. an alternative to the evils ot capitaliSJll and 
sociali8ll. See He1nr1ch PeSCh, licht kCIIJI\IDist18Cher, 8Ond-ern ehri.tJ.1cher 
§..osiali8lBusl (ngschrltten .dar Zentrumsp!rtei IIi, Berlin: DeceJllber 23, 1~8). 
178"Le1tsltze der Deut.schan Zentrullspartei (Christliehe Volkspartei) 
van 30. Dezamber 1918," in Ura.chen und Fotlan, III, 196. 
,.. 
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Dot socialist, it required that a new constitution tor the Reich and the 
~esstaat;en be iJIIaediately framed. Furthermore, it called tor the iDnediate 
-J'8Iftoyal ot the National Ass-blT to a naater place than Berlin," and the sta-
tioning of a volunteer guard to insure the safety ot the new Assembly's pro-
ceedings. Second, it insisted that the unity and federal character ot the 
Reich be Dlaint&ined. "The .ettle.ent ot defensive and toreign poliCies is to 
be reserved to the Reich whUe the settlement of Church and school 18 resened 
to the Bundesstaaten. Third, it asked tor universal euttra .. with proportional 
representation; popularly elected gcwermaents in states and the nation; aTail-
abili ty ot all oltices in the federal government and in municipalities to 
people ot all classes J and the adoption ot a bill of rights guaranteeing to 
all citizens, "regardless ot political and religious atfiliations," treed(Jll of 
speech, press, and aasembly.179 
In regard to foreign policies, the platform deliberately incorporated 
lany ot the idea8 of WUson'. Fourteen Points. The Center wanted the "1.mIae-
date conclusion ot a prel.illl1nary peace and the agre.ent and reconciliation 
~t all people." A8 a deterrent to future war, it called for nthe e8tablish-
Ilent and execution ot an international law tounded on Christian principles 
and the reali.ation that permanent peace cOllld be achieved U ba8ed on mutual 
recognition of states rather than on the foree ot power." It desired nthe 
creation ot a league ot nations with equal recognition ot both large and ... 11 
ltate.," with obligatory arbitration, disa:rmament, and abolition of secret 
treaties. Other provisiOll8 m.rely reiterated traditional Centrists demands: 
179Cited in Ursachen und FOlgen, III, 197. 
, 
--------------------------------------------------
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"the protection of national and rellgious Ilinorities" in all nations, economic 
treed om ot development and treed01ll ot the aeas, international regulation or 
labor legislation and insurance lawa, popular education for the understanding 
ot toreign questiona, and tinaU,., the .. intenance of a German colonial 
empire.180 The third section of the Center's plattora covenad internal or 
domestic pollcies. Here, again, the program proposed policies si.lllUar to ita 
previous demandsl "the maintenance and strengtbR&ng of cultural and or reli-
giOUS exereiaes with cooperation between Church and State, and "the protection 
and strengthening ot the religious character ot marriage and of the tuU,.." 
Besides thiS, it advocated a campaign tor the suppression ot iaaoral art and 
literature, adequate rel.1gious instruction tor all SChools a. well a. the main-
tenance of the "confessional publ10 school," Ita tree career for the advance. 
Mnt of the talenta" of people trom all walks of lite, and equalit7 ot oppor-
, tuni t,. tor aU women.181 
In economic and social aftairs, the Part,. insisted upon the _tnt8nance 
of the right ot private property, but at the .8118 tille it championed the 
development of national economy in the service ot social juatice.182 It 
180Ibid., pp. 197-198. COlIDIlenting on the Party's desire to maintain a 
colonial empire, Leo Schwering in an article, "Zentrua und Aussenpolitik," 
published in Germania, 'ebru&r7 7, 1919, (J61, noted that the Party thereby 
.howed itself not only "sensitive" to "national" interest. but was also "far-
Sighted" and "opt1m1stic." ' 
181 Ibid., pp. 198-199. 
-
182Th18 was based on one ot Pesch'. ideas which was incorporated in 
article 241 nGeordneter Autbau Vollt8V1rtachaft ill Dienat del' sos1&len 
Gerechtigkeit und des a.ae1nwohla aut Orundlage del' produktiven Arbsit. 
Grunds't,l1che Erhaltung del' aut pera8nl1ch_ Eigentua beruhenden, nach d_ 
SolidaritKtsprinsip dea Oesa.twohl del' a.sellschatt untergeordneten Privat-
wirtllchaft. n ill!!., p. 199. 
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d.-nded the effect! ve care of all the wounded as well as the support of vet-
.rans of the 1mr. Regarding financial affaira, the Party sought to win the 
.upport of the bourgeois group by circlmlVenting the flight of capital abroad, 
by preYenting depreciation in the value of war loans, and by adVocating that 
taxes be apportioned according to each citizen' a abUity to p8y.183 
Armed with the new Party plattorm, the "Christliehe Volkspartei" a. the 
Center was now called184 entered the election cupaign tor the National .A.ss .. -
b17. A flood of CaJllpa1gn .. terial--posters, circulars, manifestoes, news 
articles, pamphlets-issued tro. the general .ecretariat in Berlin to rouse 
the interest of the new claas of votere created by the revolutionary govern-
.. nt.18S For the tiret t1ae inLtbe hi.tory of Germany, WOMn would exercise 
183lbid• 
-
l84Atter ll\1Ch di8Cusaion concerning a cnange of name. tor the Party the 
Frankfurt conterence on Dec_er 30 adopted the name ·Cbri.tl1che Volkspartei" 
a8 the official name in order to indicate the interconte.slonal character ot 
the Part,.. Bach .. , zentruufirtei, VIII, 264. A tew days betore, Peter Spahn 
at a Party conference at lier. Iii had protested changing the old Dame, but agreed 
to acquiesce it "wider circlea It wi thin the Party would demand it. Oermania, 
Dec_bar 20, 1918, IS94.. The DaIle "Zentrua" was never really relinquiahed. 
aince it 1I8S al .. ,.. prin'ted in parentheses behind "Christliche Volkspartei." 
Shortl,. atter the January election, "Cbr18Uiehe Volkapartel" 1188 abandoned and 
the Party reverted to the old t1 Ue of nZentrwa. It 
l85The general-secretariat iasued a aeriea of nugachr1tten to explain 
the Center" vi81ll on the caapaign issues. The first two hi kaxtmuian Pfeif-
ter, ZentruDl unci neue Zeit and Zentrusa lIIld politische Neuordnunl, gave the P 
Party's opinion ol the revolution and ita stand on the present political situ-
ation. The third by Alexander von Brandt, Staat und K1rche, reviewed the 
Center' a traditional stand on Church-State reliUona and showed that the Part,. 
Iti11 did not favor a separation of Church and State. The fourth b7 Heinrich 
Peach, Nicht kClllllunistischv, soodern chriatJ..1cher Sosialismual developed a 
aOCio-econODdc theory Which recOiii1.ed the dignIty of man, harmonized freedom 
~th authority, and a1_d at a maxUtUlll distribution ot private property. It 
favored the id.a of collective farming and cooperatives. The last three publi-
cations, K~t um die h.~sten Ontet by Maximilian Pfeiffer, Revolution und 
Kultur b7 rtIli Fsaabe er, and tier Kampf um die Schul. by AdoU Oottwald, 
Idealt with the rel1gioua cantlict in the schoolS and c18r1tied the issues. 
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the right ot sutfrage, tor in the can1ng election of the National Asl8JUbly to 
be held on January 19, not only men, but all women twenty years ot age or older 
would be entitled to cat their ballota. The Center Party, though tradition-
allT againat VCIIIn auttrage, lost no t1ae in sol1citing feminine votes.186 
Poeters were geared to awaken v01IIInly sentiment, particularly the maternal in-
sttnct.187 Oermania frequently referred to the responsiblli~ of women to be 
wen-informed on political questions and urged them to take part in patriotic 
and political actirlty. It was hoped that the 1ntluence of women would en-
188 
noble and enrich the political lite ot the nation.Ever;y woman interested 
"in the ve1ghty questions of the hOM and tamily, the school and tiducation, law 
and char1~, work and protes.ional activity" vas urged to vote.189 Mi.s 
Bblert, a speaker tor the Catholic WOMB'S Union, in an ardent appeal to the 
WOMn at the Party's big election raUl" on January 1, 1919, told the wcaen lito 
give back to the world Chriat1an t81 th, Christian standards, and Christian 
Cbarity."19O 
186.Alread7 on NOV8Dlber 16 Felis Porsch, the Prwssian Centriat leader, 
proposed the Domination of WOllen Jielegatea at a Brealau meeting. See Germania, 
November 20, 1918, 1S43. Two days later at a Cologne assembly, the Centrist 
executive ccaa1ttee made a prori,aion tor the "organization ot women 'Voters,· 
lV, November 18, 1918, 1/909. At. Centrist gathering on December 1, the .m-
~era were told "to exert untiring recruiting etforts" in winning the women's 
votes. Cited in Schulte, Mtinatersche Chronik, p. 16. 
187 "Starke FraueDberzan werden tlber schwachen Mhnenrillen" J "Die Uen_ 
~l die U3bel" for reproductions ot sDdlar posters, Bee Helltron, ope cit., I, 
r"YQ-168. 
186Decellber 13, 1918, 1481. '1'h1s Bee idea VIS expreBsed by the Jesuit 
lPeter Lippert, "Der Zua del' frauen, n Stilllaen del' Zeit, XCVI (December, 1918} , 
~P. 394-402. 
189 Germania, November 1" 1918, #436. 
190 
Ibid., January 2, 1919, #2, p. h. 
The tremendous crowd which at.tended the Center's rally at the Zirkwt 
BuSch in Berlin on January 1 was a good. indication ot the support. the Party 
was receiYing.191 Dr. Pteitter, who welcomed the large gathering, stressed 
74 
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the seriousneS8 ot the U.8 and the neces8i t.y tor upholding Party solidari tJ' 
'!'be keynote address was giyen by Dr. Anton Hane, the direct.or of the Techni-
cians' Union, who emphaaized the need tor 80Cial and econOll1c retorm. While 
encouraging .ploye88 and employers to unite their interests and JlUtually re-
spect. each other' a righta, he noted that the Party 1I8S concerned that provi-
aions be _de tor adequate wages and decent. standards ot living. The Party, 
he aaid, retained lts policy ot recognition ot personal ownel'8hip ot propert.y, 
but whUe private initiative was to be encouraged, priYate monopolies were to 
be replaced by co_unal adDd.nistrst.ion. The ideal ot a socialist. state, he 
pointed out, "is the equitable d1atrlbution of goods. 1I ae stressed, there-
tore, the Party' 8 need to gi'V'e more cOD8iderat.ic.m to social and econOlldc ra-
tOl'lll8 in order to ottset. the talse proa1ses ot the SociaUst.e. To win in 
the coming election, he concluded, the Party must "enter into a new modem 
ISoz1alpolit1k. , ,,193 
The whole tone ot the rally centered on an open attack ot Socialism. 
Both Catholic and Protestant speakers told the interdenOlldnational aS88mbly 
to unite torces in an at.tack againat t.he enemy of Christianity. Dr. Carl 
Sonnenschein urged all to demand the hlstoric rights ot the Church, Jed 
19~e rally was the greatest. the Center had ever experienced. Over 
20,000 people attended indoors and another 40,000 heard the speeches broedcast 
in the Luaterten. ~. J !!., January 2, 1919, 113. 
192Ibid• 
193Ibid• 
-
p 
-~--------------------------------------------------------------------, 75 
religious organizations, tor, if the Social D81IIocrata were to win the election, 
the degeneration ot Germany would tollow. Religion and Christian ideala, he 
told his audience, would be 8uppre88ed by the radioal Soc iali St8 • "The new 
Center wants freedom ot religion, the right to regulate culture, the guarantee 
ot rreedOlft ot oonscience, freedom ot education, and religious instruction in 
all schoo18--elementRr,y and secondar,y.,,194 
In the seyeral short addres8es given by clergyaen, God-tearing men ot 
all denOlll1nationa were adviaed ot the necessity ot providing a united front 
against a co_on toe. Dr. Carl Sonnenschein's tears ot a tuture sociali8t 
state were echoed by Dr. Karl Dunkmann, a Protestant theologian and university 
protes8or. He reterred to the November Revolution a8 a "scourge ot God," and 
encouraged Cathollca and ProteStant8 to atand un1\ed in thi8 tiM of crisi. 
againat the SocialiBt threat to the religious interests ot all Chriatian •• 
rather Bernhard Lichtenberg, speaking tor the Catholics, voiced the same ideas. 
He underscored the iJlportance ot the1'8lig1ous iS8ue in the forthcolling election 
In a rather florid 8peech, interrupted by frequent applause, Dr. Theodor 
Haecker, a Lutheran pastor, eaphasized the importance of joining torces in the 
attack on religion and culture. "We do not intend to change our ideas. we 
have charity tor all our brethren. We would reach over high fences to shake 
hands with our brethren •••• We need to be united on our battletront against 
bold, endless, insane paganilml. ,,19$ Other speakers had siaUar Mssagea to 
give. Each 8IIlpha8izad the fact that Party solidarity and unity of all faith8 
~------------------------~ 76 
were necessary concomitants tor sateguarding Christian ideals and br.ald.n& the 
.trength ot the Social Deaocra ts. 
At the conclusion ot the rally, the entire ga thering--approxiJu tely 
.1Xty thousand persons-poured out into the street and, amid the waving ot 
banDers and singing ot religious and patriotic songs, marched toward the 
196 Ministry or Culture to protest against Hotf'unn's policies. Although the 
demonstrators did not succeed in obtaining a personal confrontation with 
Hottmann, the impact or their cruaading sp'...rit oould not bave been lost upon 
their opponents. The Socialists were torced to reoogni •• that the new Center 
("Christliehe Volkapartei") was s cmething to be reckoned wi t11e 
SilIlilar rallies and daonetrations were held on a amall.r acale in local 
areas. At Braslau the Party solgans railed agai.nat the "Reds· and the "cbaoe" 
ot the times.197 Several rallies held at Cologne protested the "atheistic 
policiesnl98 ot the Berlin governnaent and called. tor both "active and passive 
resistance. "199 Reviewing the policies ot the Socialists, the Cologne Cen-
trists lashed out against the and in contrast lauded the policies ot the 
"Christlich. Volkspartei. n2OO The archdiocesan union ot Catholic Workers' 
and Apprentices' Associations pledged the support ot all its lUIlbers to the 
"Christlieh. Volkapartei. n20l 
196neacriptive accounts ot this d _onstration are tound in Berliner 
Tageblatt, January 2, 1919, #3, KV, January 4, 1919, 119, January 5, 1919, #l2J 
'freJllonla, January 4, 1919 .. 14, r81erred to the d8llonstration as a "true 
crusade." 
197Gel"Jll8nia, Noveaber 21, 1918, IS$4. 
196!!, December 27, 1918, ,1013. 
199Ibid., December 28, 1918, #101S. 
200 
ft, Ibid., January 4, 1919, Ill. 
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FrClll aU side. the Party received tremendous support. Hottmann's radical 
KulturpolitiJc brought out the Catholic hierarchy' in .full support ot the CenteJII 
-
In an otticial declaration, trOll1 the Archbishop ot Cologne, Cardinal Felix 
Hartmann, the Catholic. were told to support the "Christliche Volkspartei" 
in its struggle against the "godle.s eftorts" ot tne Socialists.202 Other 
bishops tr<lll Trier, Paderbom, MGnster, Osnabrtlc~ and HUdeshe1m joined with 
Cardinal Har_nn in issuing a pastoral letter in January to allthe umbers 
ot their fiocks condemning the "enemy ot Christendca--SOCial1sa" which was 
"attempting to bring the di.orders at the day into Catholic districts.,,203 
Bishop Adolt Bertr.. ot Breslau warned against a new Kul turlcampt led by the 
Socialists and torbade any "Anechluss" with the Socialist parties. 204 
The election c_pa1gn was the same one-sided attair as the New Year'. 
nay rally and s1Jrllar rallies had been. Instead ot taking a wide view ot the 
Situation, the C@IJlter narrowly lft'elled ita oppoa1tion against the Social n.o. 
crats whether they were Majority 80cialists or Independents.20, Practically 
ignoring other poll tical partie., the Center singled out the SPD a. the "only 
~ ot the German people," and the perpet.rators ot the revolution.206 The 
202 Ibid., JanUAry 1, 1919, fl. 
-
2°lxbid., JlIluary 21, 1919, 113l. Genaania, January 13, 1919, 1120. cited 
also in SChUIte, Mbterache Chron1k, pp. 69, 100. 
204aenn.ania, January 23, 1916, 1126. 
20Swtule the lett-wing ot the Center JIlight have tavored .ome ot the 
social retOl'lll ideas ot the Majority SOCialists, Centrists on the whole were 
suspicious ot socialistic philosophy. 
20~, January 16, 1919, 148. 
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cr.Y was "gegen Klassenverhetzung und Anarchie.,,207 Germanials Januar,r issues 
carried a number of articles highly cn tical or the Social Democrats· prograa. 
One editorial called the Socialists the Center's "arch-en8D17" because theT 
wanted a strong socialiat state, abolition or religion, and state ownership of 
property and the means ot production. The Center, Qermania pointed out, de-
.ired equality tor all states and recognition or states rights, the .. inte-
nance and strengthening or Christian oulture and education, as well a8 treedcm 
or conscienoe and religious t.oleration. It wanted also to help the tarmer and 
208 protect the laborer. 
To bolster its arguaenta about the irreligious and anti-Christian at.-
titudes or the Socialists, GefUBia printed a special article entitled, "What 
the Social Deaoora ts SaT about Themselve .... 209 Pointing to S01l8 irreligious 
activities and attitudes or the Minister or Culture, the article noted that 
these were typical or the inherent polioies ot atheistic sooiali... It 
quoted such sta tements or their leaders as, "To be a Sooialist is to be anti-
Christian," and K&utsky's clai., "Above all else I have represented the opin-
~on that everT religion should be opposed." Babel was quoted a. saying, 
~ 210 
"ChristianitT and Sociali .. are 8S opposed as fire and water." A later 
207'or other anti-socialist slogans, see Schulte, Mflnatersche Chronik, 
PP. 15), 16), 167, 170; Heilrron, Ope cit., I, 154-168. 
208January 7, 1919, 110, p. 2. 
209January 9, 1919, 114, p. 2. 
210 
Ibid. 
-
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editorial asked, "Can a Catholic Be a Social n.oorat?" Replying in the n8la"", 
tive, it used Bebel'a statement as its proot.211 
In the week prior to the election a whole series ot short articles wa8 
publi8hed in Germania explaining clearly and concisely the major planke in 
the Center's plattorm and contrasting them wit.h t.hose ot t.he Social Demo-
orats.212 The tinal article in the series appearing on the eve ot elect.ion 
sUllJl118rl.zed in bold print what. the C81ter con.idered the most important ques-
tions to be decided on the morrow's election. They were listed under three 
headings, state politics, culture, and economics. The tirst cboice was 
Germany as a democratic republic or a classle8s society under a proletariat 
dictatorship. The alt.ernative tor the second ohoice was a Christ.ian German,. 
or a Germany mastered b;y a modem pagan authorl ty which would suppress 
Christian belieta. Finall7, the voter was to decide whether he would "uphold 
the highest principle. in mainuining the right ot pri va te property, fl or 
choose 'ired socialiSJll which would lead quickly' to the elimination ot personal 
propert.y and t.o CODIIluni8ll.,,213 
It was a hard.tought campaign--a battle between Christianity and athe-
istic Soeiali8lll.Isaues rather than personalitie. had been stre.sed. A. 
the copaign oame to an end there could be no doubt as to what. the Center 
("Christliche Volkspartei") stood tor. Having aS8Ull8d leadership in the 
2llo.rmania, Januar;y 13, 1919, 1120, p. 2. 
212Ibid., Januar,y 12, 1919, #17, p. 2, January 13, 1919, 1120, p. 2. 
January J.li';l919, 121, supplement; January 15, 1919, 123, supplement, 
January 16, 1919, 125, supplement; January 18, 1919, 130. 
213Ibid., January 18, 1919, 130. 
-
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crusade against 5ociali8ll, the Center had merited tor itseU the backing ot 
tbree important religious groups. First ot all, it had won the wholehearted 
support ot the Oerman Catholic hierarchy and the heade ot the various Catholic 
.ssociations. Secondly,by converting to an intereontessional body, the Center 
Party had gained the tavor ot several Protestant grOUps.214 ene suoh group, 
the ~Bund christlicher Deaokraten-Evangelisoher Zweigverein des Zentruma," 
tounded in Berlin under the leadership ot the Protestant pastor Johannes 
aaeoker21$ worked with the Center because it alone ftunder the chaotic condi-
tions" ottered fta political abode."216 The Jews were the third religious group 
bound in friendship to the Center Party. en January $, 1919, at a large al-
semb1y in Cologne, Rabbi Schettelowi tz .poke public17 in tavor of the Center'l 
Fogram and encouraged all Jews to vote tor it because the Party guaranteed 
fta democratic and locial prograDl based on equal rights and justice tor all 
1 "217 peop e. 
In the course of the two months since the November 9 upheaval, the 
Center Party, whil~ retaining the basic principle. of the old Soest program, 
had revolutionized it. political theories. But its social and economic prin-
ciples remained the Pille. Hence, it renected the Revolution ot November 
214 A manitesto ot January 7, 1919, signed by "evangelical supporters" 
hailed the cooperation betw.en the two great Christian conte •• ions in the "'war" 
against Soc1a11_ and pledged support to the Center Party in its political 
work. See Johannes Linneborn, "Die K1rschenpol1t1k des tantrums," in Nationale 
Arhe1t, p. 198. 
21$ Haecker founded this organization with the cooperation ot Professor 
.rl D1mlau.nn, !mo von Rehbinder, and the banker, Albert R. Weidner. 
216 r:;, January 18, 1919, 1150. 
-
2l7schulte, M4nstersche Chronit, p. 210. 
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only in the single area ot politics. It had abandoned the monarchy and entered 
the campaign a. a supporter of a democratic republic. 1.8 a defender ot 
Christian ideals, it had fought ~ith the old banner in the new times."2l8 
By capitalizing upon the religious issue the Party had managed to submerge 
local difterences and to present a united tront. But the image was deceiving. 
Party unanimity did not actually exist. The conservative wing, content tor 
the time being to raain in the background, awaited p08t-election develop-
ments. The Center had been forced out of its "tower"; time would tell whether 
it was equipped to meet the challenge ot a new era. 
2l.B Schofer, Mit der alten Fahne in die neue Zeit. 
~----------------~ 
CHAPrF.R II 
ELECTION TO THE NATI<JIAL ASSEUBLY 
ANALYSIS OF CENTRIST RETURNS AND AT'l'.ITUDES 
In the minds of most Germans, it was the National A8sembq alone which 
oould achieve the political stability for which the nation yearned. To it, 
therefore, all or Gel'DlarlY looked for the restoration of the religious, eco-
nomic, social, and politioal equilibrium so woef'ulq upset by' the recent 
upheaval. BUt hope for the future was not without misgiving, for there 
still remained the orucial decision of the German electorate which would 
determine whether the National Assably would be democratic or socialistic J 
whether, therefore, the revolution would be restrioted to the politioal 
area only, or be extended to the social and economic areas ... well. 
Germany waited anxiously for the election of this National AS8_bll'. 
l'he promise to convene suoh an assembly had been made on the tirst dq or 
the Revolution. When, however, no turther steps were takBn in the matter, 
the Genter Party united its demands with other cOD8e1"V'ative and bourgeois 
liberal parties, rem1.nding the revolutionary government ot its promiaes. In 
a reply to a letter ot Cardinal Hartmann of Cologne expressing conoem over 
the revolutionary government. a anti-clerical program, Enberger wrote on 
November 21, 1918, pledging the Center'a support to tight Hoftmann'a schemes. 
Erzberger pointed out, though, that this oould be done only atter a Constitumt. 
Assembly had restored 801118 kind ot order to political lite I "The deoisive 
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task ot the moment is to secure a bourgeoill majority for the National Assembly. 
jtbis goal can be at ta1ned if the bourgeois strata ot the population pull them-
,elves together. n1 Erzberger Wormed the Cardinal that he 'Was: pressing the 
goVernment to call for early elections. In fact, Ebert'8 promise to do 80 
had been the prerequisite of Erxberger's willingnes8 to continue as Armistice 
COmmissioner under the Socialist government.2 on Novaber 30, 1918, the 
councU of .People' 8 Commissars issued an edict providing tor the election 
ot a constitutional National Assembq, but it, too, failed to spec1fy' 'When 
~he election should take place. TIro more lIBeks of 'Waiting followed. At 
!last on December 16, the announcanent was made that the election would be 
!beld in the first month of the nenr year; nanely, on January 19, 1919.3 
voting procedure, though pro'V'ided in the Novanber 30 edict, was trace-
lable to an earlier law enacted on August 2, 1918.4 According to this pro-
cedure, Oel"lll8llY wa divided into thirty"-eeven electoral districts. Each 
lParty in the district 'Wa to present a general ticket with its list ot dele-
.ates. Electors voted tor the general party ticket, not tor individuals. 
lIn other 'Words, a ticket could not be split. In area where a party's con-
.,tituenC)" was small, parties of' s1ml1 ar political background or parties who 
lErzberger to Cardinal Hartmann~ November 21, 1918, replying to a 
~etter dated November 18 as cited in Epstein, Matthias ErJSberger, p. 286. 
2Ersberger, Erlebnisse, p. 304. 
3HeUtron, Die deutsche Nationalvers8Jl'llllung, I, 105. The election 'Was 
~el.ayed due to the reluc'tiiiCe or thi Iiidipeiid4iit Socialists who did not favor 
Ian early ela ction. . 
4rhe edict of November JO, 1918, as cited ibid., I, 105-109; also in 
Y'rsachen unci Folgc, III, 239-242. -
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supported similar platforms were allOlf'ed to unite and present a common list.' 
A total of 4.33 deputies wae ,to be elected-one deputy for every lSo,ooo per-
sons,6 Distribution of seats was based on proportional representation, whose 
basic purpose was to allow each political party a percentage of votes. 7 
The important process of drawing up the list of candidates in each 
electoral district was entrusted b.1 the respective parties to their local 
party canmittees. All trades, professions, and classes were represented. 
The center Party, moreover, demanded that nominees on its ticket be active 
registered lIBDlbers capable of carrying through the election campaign in 
their districts. Much of the C8Dlpaign material-manifestoes, slogans, post-
ers, pamphlets-cama from the general secretariat in Berlin. (Prior to the 
war this had been transacted by the Centrist local board of col8issioners.) 
It was up to the local nominees to disseminate campaign literature and to 
speak at Party rallies in their vicinity. 8 
Under the proportional representation system in QerJDanY', loyalty was to 
the Party, not to the candidate. Rarely did the voter knOW' the candidates 
'])1 the Hanovel'ian electoral district the Center ("christliche VOlka-
parteitl) and the Qermm Hanoverian Party ("])eutsoh-hamoverschen Partein) 
combined their candidates on a common ticket. Bach_, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 
267. 
6])1 the end only 421 deputies were elected since the twelve deputies pro-
vided for Alsace-Lorraine were not allOlf'8d to participate. Heilfron, Die 
cieutsche NationalversUBlung, I, 110. -
7For an explanation of the havoc wrought by proportional representation 
on the Weimar RepJ.blic, see Ferdinand A. Hemens, Europe Between Democ~ 
and Anarchy (Notre DamB, Indiana: University of Notlrs D8iie press, 19S1~ 
ChaPter IV: 
8Palll Prange, "Die organisation der Zentrumspartei," in National. 
Arbeit, pp. 44S-4.S8. . 
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liSted on the ticket. Indeed, as one German citiHn referring to this election 
~ .. ked, "Fortunate W88 the vater who knew the f'ace of' the leader of' the 
ticket to which he gave his vote.n9 Usually, the DlOSt inf'luent1al party 
.. bers were placed at the top of' the 118t to assure their election. '!'hue 
Jlatth1a8 Ersberger, who because of' his duties _ German Peace COIIIJIl1ssioner 
..... not able to participate actively in the National ABsav.bly' campaign, was 
88sured ot his election b.Y being placed second on the ilrttemberg ticket~lO 
As election ~ drew near, f'inal ef'f'orts were exerted by all parties to 
gain supporters f'or their political progrue. Fear ot an .. t1-chr1stian 
socialist regime had impelled Catholics and other bourgeois Christian groupe: 
to work untiringly' to curb the growing power ot the Socialists and prevent 
thea f'ram. ga1n1ng a maJ ority of' seats in the National Ass_bly. 11 
A f'a1rl,y reliable barometric reading ot the political strength of' the 
Qerman electora.te "as 1nd1cated in the NSults of' the various elections tor 
local constituent assemblies held in the _eka just prev10UB to the national. 
election. The January 5 election held in Badm, f'or example, of'f'ered a good. 
omen f'or the center Party. In that area the Centrists gained the largest. 
number of' seata-39 out of' 107. Close behind were the Majority Social 
Democrats with 36 seats. lext were the Danocrats with 25 aeats, and t1nal.lT 
9&rich Eyck, A H1sto~ of' the Weimar Republic, trans. by Harlan P. Hanson 
and Robert G. L. waite. (camridgel Harvard unIversIty Press, 1962), I, 70. 
lOEpetein, ~nberger, p. 287. 
llUl Socialists were looked upon as "einsigen Feind" ot the German 
people arid the cause of' the chaotic revolution.ary times. lV, Janua17 18, 
1919, #48. --
~ 
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the Qerman Nationals with merely 7 seats. The Independent Socialists alone 
taUed to score a single gain.12 Similarly, ~he January 12 election for the" 
Bavarian Landtag proved a victoX"1 for the Bavarian People'. Part:y, the CentriB 
counterpart in Bavaria. At this election, the Centrists were able to obtain 
66 of the 180 seats.13 Likniee in Trih-ttemberg's election held on the s_e 
d&.r, the results were encouraging, tor the Centrists emerged as the third 
strongest party, winning 31 of the 150 mandates-an increase of tive more 
_.bars over the last election held in 1912.14 
Although the prospects for prevent.tna a Socialist majorit:y in the Na-
tional Assembly seead bright, no one could predict the outcome of the natio 
election with any accuracy. The extension of suffrage to wanen and the lower-
1ng of the voting age to tnnt:y had increased the electorate to such an enent 
that results ore utterly unpredictable. Jleverthe1eas, with the passing of 
the grave uncertainties of the immediate post-revolution weeks, Centrist 
leaders recovered some of their self-confidence as they found themaelves 
12Schoter, Mit der alten Fahne in die neue Zeit, pp. 124-125. The 
author, one of the energetic B&diii Centi'1St 18id8rs, referred to the election 
campaign as "the mOBt fatiguing task" of his lite. 
13I1ors8)", "Zentrumspartei," p. 269. There is a discrepancy between 
Morsey·s figures and thOBe given in Bachem, ZentruJll8parte1, vm, 405. Morse)" 
lists 66 BVP deputies elected in the Bavarian election iii contrast to the 58 
listed b7 Bach_. Morse:y's figures correspond to those listed in Zeitschritt 
des :hrnriaChen Statistiachen Landesamts, II (1919), 247, as cited 111 
Ursac en una toigen, III, 120. 
14KorBe:y, "Zentrumspartei," p. 269) Bacha, VIII, 422. The Prusaian 
electoral. retume of JanuaI7 26 ore equally rewarding with the Centrist 
gaining the seoond higheat returns-85 out of 401 seats, MOrBe:y, p. 270. 
Here again Bache.'s figures are slightly di.fferentJ he lists 88 seats for 
the Centrists. See Bachem, VIII, 384. Ureachen und Folgen, III, 92, lists 
86 Centrists ale cted in Prussia. 
.. 
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receiving considerable backing from the local elections. 
The cJ.r)", clear day ot January 19, 1919, enabled over 30,.500,000 German 
JD8n and wanen to go to the polls and vote in the national elections. LaIr 
and order were generally lII1intained, though a tew minor diBturbances in the 
form of street-tighting and demonstrations occurred at Berlin, HlJIIlburg, the 
RUhr, and Cassel. The Spartacists, contra17 to expectations, made no con-
certed etforts to impede the election.lS Against the advice of Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht, the radicals had threatened to ba.ycott the elections, 
but later abandoned their project. Thus the day passed 111. thout serious in-
cident in an;y sector of the countr,y .16 
Notwithstanding, teverish activity exerted b7 campaign coDlD1ttee .. bers 
was evidenced everywhere. On the way to the polls 'VOters were either 1I'B¥la1d 
and harangued by poUtical .. alots or burdened nth campaign literature. One 
e,ye-witness left this desoription: 
The voters were overwhelmed with handbills. Every fence, every 
empty shop 1I'1ndow, evel)" street corner was plaster6d with c&Dlpaign 
posters. One party excited.l¥ ripped down the notices ot another, 
or pasted ewer them in such a t88hion 88 to distort the original 
message. .All political passions were exerted, using group gather-
ings, as their special. meana of rendezvous. In the street, on the 
comers, wherever groups clustered, passionate speeches were de-
livered, especial. 11' b,r the Spartacists who used this occasion to 
bring their ideas to the people.17 
lSRalph Haswell lJ1ts, The German Revolution 1918-1919; Stanford 
UniversrMi Series: H1etPil' Econom.{ca, iihd POlliicil scienoe, I (stantord., 
'O'8111'o : unIversity ss, !922), p. lOb 
16ri1lhelm Ziegler, Die dautsche Nationalversammlung 1919/1920 und 1hr 
Verfassungswerk (Berlin: zen'tra~verJ.ag, ~~J2), p. 2D. 
17Perdinand Runkel, Die deutsche Revolution (Leipsig, 1919), p. 231, 
cited ibid., 29-30. 
-
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Not since the election ot the French National Assembly in 1811 had Europeans 
wi tnessed such an exciting election. 
With the exception of the religioua issue there was Uttle basic d1tter-
ence in the avowed political plattorms; all denounced anarchy and championed 
democracy. Nevertheless, the oontroversy over Christianity and "atheistic" 
socialism led by the Centrists was strong enough to turn the tide aa:y trom 
a socialist victo17. With 82.7% ot the eligible Germans voting, the election 
returns were as indicated in Table I.18 
TABLE I 
ELECTION RETURNS FOR '!'HE NATIO!{AL ASSElIBL'I, 1919 
Number 
ot votes Fer cent 
Party (approx.) Kandatea VotiPg 
Majority Socialists 1l,509,loo 163 31.9% 
Centristsa 5,980,200 91 19.7% 
Democratic Party (DDP) 5,64].,800 75 18.~ 
National ists (mwp) 3,121,500 44 10 • .3% 
Independent Socialists 2,)17,)00 22 7.6'/. 
People's Party (DVP) 1,345,600 19 4.4% 
1I:1acellaneoUB 484,800 7 1.5% 
Arh1B group inoluded the eighteen members ot the Bavarian People'S 
Party, the eight members ot the Catholic People's Party in Upper SUesi., 
and the two I8Dlbers ot the Hanoverian People's Party elected on the 
Centrist ticlmt. 
l&rbe tigures n listed in Table I are taken .from Wilhelm Mollllll8en, Deutsche 
Partei~amJIIB (UUnchen: Isar Verlag, 1960) I, 194.. They are the aarna _ 
those a 1D Ursachen und Fol&m, III, Appendix I. Not all authors give 
the same figures tor the center and SPD. Horsey, zentrumspartei 1917-192.3, 
p. 147, lists 89 Centrists and 165 BPO (p. 147). Treue, DSUtiche Pii"tilpro-
graJIIIIIB 1861-1956, p. )89, gives 91 Centrists and 165 SPD} Koppel 8. PIh8on, 
iiOdem Germany. Its Historr and Civilization (New ... York: Macmillan Co., 19(4) 
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The eleotion figures provided an interesting oomment&l7 on the politioal 
picture of the German nation. BasicalJ,y, it seemed, the people were in agree-
ment with the political developments that had. taken place since November. The 
centrists were seen to have achieved their :1mmediate goal: prevention of a 
Socialist majOrity.19 The Majority- Socialists were still making the best 
showing; yet thaT laoked a sufficient number of seats to control the National 
AssembJ,y. (Even with the 22 seats held by the Independents, the Socialist 
parties together had. won onlT 185 seatsl) It w .. obvious, too, that only' a 
d.iminishing part ot the electorate favored the idea of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat and a system of soviets. Just as clearly was it evident that the 
people were reluctant to retum to monarchy. onJ,y 44 seats had been won b,y 
the Nationatists-the outright advooates of royalty, and to the People's 
Party, whioh proposed keeping the royalty question open, only 19 seats had 
gone. As it stood, the National. Assembly represented neither the old ruling 
class, nor big business, nor the extreme revolutionaries; its major emphasis 
rather was on middle olass interests, with a leaning in the direction of d_-
ocratio socialism. nIts oenter of gravity was just lett of oenter.n20 
Appendix B, gives the same figures as Treue. Those listing 91 delegates for 
the Centrist returns are including two members of the German Hanoverian Party 
that were eleoted on a combined list with the Centrists. Those charts which 
list 165 SPO are including two sm deputies elected by soldiers on the 
eastem front who were not included in electoral districts. 
19Baohem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 212-213, placed great emphasis on the 
role the Center PBrty played in hindering a Socialist majority-_ 
2OLou1s L. Synder, The Weimar Republic I A History of Germ~ tran Ebert !2 Hitler (Princeton, New JersOTI b. van Nostrand Co., mo., ~), p. 35. 
, 
-----------------------------------------. 90 
It was awarent that the Center Party WBe to retain its traditional 
pivotal position in German politics} hence, the Centrists had grounds tor-
rejoicing over their election retums. Furthermore, considering the tact 
that the inhabitants ot the territories ot !lsace-Lorra1ne, Eupen, ~meqy, 
st. Vith, the Saar area, as well as the other recently lost German eastem 
areas ot Upper S11esia, Posen, and West Prussia were not allolred to vote and 
that some ot these areas contained strong Centrist back1ng, the Center Party 
had done exoeptionall.y well.21 It had emerged trom the tirst national elec-
toral ordeal ot the new democratic state as an important political tactor. 
Its 91 seats in the National Assembly made it second only to the llajor1tr 
social Democrats. In reviewing the Centrists' gains both in the local. 88 
well as the national elections, German1.a telt just1tied in reterring to the 
Party as "a strengthened victor" <"gestlrkter Sieger"). 22 Once betore, it 
is true, in the 1912 Reichstag election, the Center also held 91 seats) how-
ever, it must be remembered that the electorate then included people trom 
densely Catholic rural areas which were los t to Germany in 1919.23 N8V'8rthe-
less, as the Centrist news organ cOllUll8nted, the election showed that the .Partir 
had. the support ot "the truest and JIlOst reliable electoraten 1Ih1ch had managed 
to procure for it "a favorable representation.n24 
21Bachem, Zentl"Wll8partei, IX, $04. 
22Januar,r 28, 1919, 143. 
23,or a comparison of the voting strength of the 1912 and 1919 election, 
see )(omJIIaen, Deutsche Parteiprogramma, p. 794J 'l'reue, Parteiprogruute, p. )89. 
2laoerman1a, January 2), 1919, #3$. 
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Whether Centrist attempts to break trom the party's confessional 
character had st1"9ngly aftected the election is quite doubtful. While credit 
for the enlargement ot the electorate could be ascribed to the newrpolicy, 
non-catholic gains were not truly noticeable in any marked degree except 
perhaps in Berlin.25 The catholic8 in Germany represented only 29.5% ot the 
whole Qerman population. or these, 62.8% had voted for the center.26 Thus, 
regardless ot its brave endeavors to co_ out ot its "tower," the center 
still remained largely a party ot catholics.27 Even among its representa-
tives in the National AssemblY, all but three delegates were C&tholics.28 
25Bache., Zentrumsp!lrtei, VIII, 279. Bachem drew his statistics trom 
HUlger's Handbuch dir veH'usunggebenden Deutachen NationalTers8DlllU!i' 1919. 
26Johannes Schauft, Die deutschen ICatholiken und die Zentrumspartei 
(K8ln: J. P. Bachem, 1928), p. 10. ThiS author iii<Hcated iii liiS studi that 
in the subsequent Reichstag elections ot 1920 and. 1924 there was a decided 
decline in the Oatholic vota tor the Oenter. In 1920, the center had carried 
60 • .3%1 in 1924 it polled only 56.4%. A breakdown ot the 1919 C&Jtholic Tote 
in some ot the _jor states is as tollon: 
Prussia; 
58.1% tor center 
17.8% tor the Right 
24.1% tor the Lett 
Baden 
60.5% tor center 
15.6% tor the Right 
Bavaria 
44% tor BVP (Centrists) 
16.6% tor the Right 
.39.4% tor the )'Jitt 
23.9% tor the Lett, ~., 112-11.3. 
~teJllberg 
71.9% tor Center 
13.9% for the Right 
14.2% for the Lett 
27He1nrich strietler, Deutsche Wahlen in BUdern unci Zahlens Eine 
soziogratische Studie Gber die RelcbStagwih1en dir We1iirer Repubi1k 
(Dtl8seldortl Wende-Verlag, 1946), p. 49, iiidicates that 85% of the Cathol.ic 
vote came from Aachen, Trier, Scmraben, Oberbayem, Niederbayem, Oberptals, 
Konstans, and. Ob8rschlesien. In Trier, Konstanz, Donaukreis and Freiburg 
the centrist backing W88 proportionately stronser than in the predominantly 
industrial area ot Dftsseldort, Stidwestfalen, ~l.n, and Wiesbaden. . 
2&rbe non-Qatholics were Heinrich Lang.-ost, Hanoverian, Johann Richter 
trom Ptals, and Alexander Schneider trom Untertranlcen. See Table IV tor the 
religion ot each 1I8lb8r. 
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On the other hand, the center Party did benefit from woman suffrage. At 
least 10% of the Party's gains was: due to women voters. 29 In certain areas, 
70% of the Centrist votes had come fromwomen.30 It is a fact that women, 
eager to use their newly gained suffrage privilege, were a vital force in the 
January eleotions. One study indicated that of the number of eligible voters 
who actually voted, 83% were women while 82.4% were men. Of the twenty-year-
old males only 59.6% voted, whereas ot the young women 80.5% ot the same age 
cast their votes. Among electors between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-
five years, 70% of the men and 80.9% ot the women voted. Among those put 
twenty-tive years, the percentage was more evenly matohed with 84.8% men and 
82.6% women voting)l The teminine impact was also seen in the number ot 
women entered on the various party tickets. 'fhirty-nine women were elected 
delegates; ot these, six belonged to the Center Party.32 
In surveying the relative strength ot the Centrists in the electoral 
districts as tound in 'fable II, one finds that in nine ot the thirty-seven 
districts the Center Party carried the highest number ot votes.33 Centrist 
( 
29Schauft, OPe Cit., p. 102. This study shows that the percentage of 
WOJllen voters was hiiher in proportion to the stress placed on religious or 
patriotic ideas. 
30sa0hem, ZentruJllBpartei, VIII, 271. In some areas wOllen and m.en voted 
separately. 
31Rene Brunet, La Constitution Allemande du 11 Aout 1919 (Paris: Pa;yot, 
1921), pp. 140-141. 
32'l'be Cen triBt women elected were: Hedwig Dransfeld, directress ot the 
Catholic Women's League; Agnes Neuhaus, widow of a goverrant ofticial and 
social worker for w~ard girls; J.laria Schmitz, high school teacher; Christine 
Teusch, teacher and chairlady of the women workers' seoretariat ot the 
Christian Workers' Association; Helene Weber, high school teacher; and Uarie 
Zettler, county secretary of the Bavarian State Assooiation tor the catholic 
Women's League. 
33stat1stics on Table II are compiled from. charts given in Heilfron, 
fABLE II 
El&'YIc. RUULtS I'<R MfI (lU.1. jSSj)WLY • .wruARY'~ 191~ ACCCIUllJIG TO DIS'l'RICTS 
Cenw 
(~ 
People'. 
p .. 
c;e".,. 
JlaUa.l 
Peopl.·. 
Par\'r 
(NaUoaal.-
~n.J IIIYP) 
0. .... 
Peopl.·. 
ParV (Dvp) 
HaD- MIlD- MaD-Yo" .. date. Yote. date. Vote. date. 
1) iaa't fro\uI81a • • • • • • • •• 92.523 1 
2) we" Pruaata • • • • • • • •• 79.041 1 
3~ c~~ ot Berl1D • • • • • • • • 5e,053 1 
4 PO\..- (1-1). • • • • • • • • 1'-872 0 
5 PoUdIa (loa.). • • • ~ • • • • aa.158 0 
'J I'I'WIIttlr\ - Oller • • • • • •• 10. 554 0 7 P-.a1a • • • • • • • • •• ",810 0 
8 PoaeD • • • • • • • • • • • 3~640 1 
91 Bre. al8U. . • • • • • • • • • • 187.339 2 10 OppelD • • • • • • • • • • • 321.l 4b 8 
11 Li.SB1ts • • • • • • • • • • sa.640 1 
12 lfa&debtrS" AIIhalt • • • • • • 12.899 0 
13 Muaeb\S"& • • • • • • • • •• &.571 0 
14) S~lfte1a-LUbe.. • • •• ,,107 0 
15~ Auneb aDd O~ • • • • • • Ias.Oll 2 
16 Hanov .... H11da_~ illa.bura. ~* 270.776t 4 
17 1'IUuW. IUDden S~a. Lippe • • 418.017 6 
18) JrD~S • • • • • • • • • • 328.8181 5 
19) H ........ ..-u • • • • • • • .. • • 187.579 I 
20) dla aad ....... • • • • • _ ~ " . 57t.212 • 211 hbl .... 8DIl M.. '. . . ~ ." . ' • !-~ -. 475,261 I 22 dl.M1dePt (~Q5). ; -. ~ ': \.~" . - ~-_"' ;".'~ . _._ 4 
23 JIualdDPf (6-12) •• • ..• • . ~.~;;: ..... 2M 7 
.... .-- c > (. " '&!NL7-1r ill 
.. ~ ~.ad S~ . -: .• -. ;:':" • • -i> . __ .... __ .. 
25) Nl .. 1"ba¥8I"A and Oberptala • • • • 27",7gcjr. 5 261 Ober. Mittel. and tmt ... t...... . . . 320.566k 5 
27 PfBla • • • • • • • • • • • 124.207K 2 
28 S&XGQJ 1-9) • • • • • • • • • 16.477 0 
29 S~ ~lo.14} • • • • • • • • 3,199 0 
30 S~ (15-23) • • • • • • • • a.627 0 
31
1 
32) ~& • • • • • •• • 303. 096 4 
31 B~ • • • • • • • • • • • 381e135 5 
34 Hu.-n • • • • • • • • • • • nO.853 2 
35 M.akl.tnra-s.....u. MMkle-.. 
108.032 2 
127.411 3 
lOa.720 1 
109.047 1 
117.647 2 
11,,141 2 
1~145 3 
110.502 5 
137.595 2 
47.516 1 
77.ee7 1 
72.583 1 
76.797 1 
61.819 1 
12.167 0 
32.313 0 
86.009 1 
U7.095 I 
106.078 1 
..on 0 
17._ 0 
1:48 ..... 42 
41.015 0 
-
-88.352 1 
120.283 2 
72, 055 1 
U 7.074 1 
78.976 1 
43.369 0 
S1iI'e11ts. .ad LObeek. • • • • . ' 
16) ft1I1r1DalaP .ad nWiber .f ..u.r .,..... 55,748 
58.115 1 
o 176,187 2 
17) ........ ~ IDIl dUe. • • • • 12.116 
Asoo1al R.t .... Parv 
o I -15.994 0 
11- 6.661 0 
llWle051 0 
tIcall ... catboUe People'. FV1r 
C!callecl Old Soo1al DIIIOOPa't. 
"SlIible • .-Ho1ne1Jl PeMc\ IIDd ........ 0.0 .... 
eo.- BaDoftI'iM rvv 
fCc.b.1aM 11" of c.ter aad 08 .... ~ ParV 
~. ,.. ..... ~- o.--~ftI"bNId) 
~ .. .u-..soe1al ,.... 
vaued CbI"1aUa ~  Par1r 
12e194 1 
158,508 3 
61.876 1 
65.476 1 
95e621 1 
lle037 0 
88.102 1 
54.88.3 3 
• 
2,,701 0 
11.831 0 
62.950 1 
68.974 1 
106.671 1 
~102 1 
64e45 1 
aa.4n 1 . 
. -
-66.584 1 
129.7. 1 
30. 358 0 
228.467 3 
-97.157 1 
-
7le349 1 
1ge1a, 0 
• • 
80.016 1 
QeraIan 
DeMor&Ue 
~~ 
soo1al 
~at. 
(sPD) 
ll*penderd 
Soo1aUa"t. 
(USDP) other 
,... HAD- "-- 1'1-.. 
Yote. cia.. vne. ciaw. vote.... yne. _ •• 
17lel08 I 
177.555 2 
uo.I51 2 
186.218 2 
132.869 2 
17",716 2 
72.266 I 
139.188 2 
45,780 1 
152.805 2 
21 ... 016 a 
161.272 2 
219.51' I 
130.732 2 
lIiOe624 2 
96.930 1 
115,692 1 
23Oe132 a 
l4e000 1 
~.IOI I ua.w. I , 
41,' .... 0 
-
59.417 1 
167.898 2 
177.447 2 
188. 875 3 
3lle961 4 
226e836 3 
124.202 2 
115.700 2 
*-984 4 
I ~56e056 2 
11- ~757 1 
419,201 7 
161,075 4 
404.604 5 
313,04' 5 
117.i67 I 
301.651 4 
331.521 5 
Sle2'7 2 
432.001 6 
216.970 5 
286.855 4 
491.740 7 
109.0510 1 
370.384 5 
149.304 2 
535,215 7 
303e440 .. 
479.021 7 
...a.ua 7 
217.114 I 
lISe.7 1 
244.044 I 
188.021 I 
.2.1S1 • 
142.71S 2 
415,25a S 
170.21S 2 
465.06'i 7 
128.094 2 
518.955 a 
470.2Qoi 7 
366e824 5 
289.211 4 
222.4. I 
.7,056 5 
447,111 6 
45,872 0 
28,189 0 
306.672 4 
128.859 1 
138.007 1 
4.215 0 
15,403 0 
208 0 
32.517 0 
42 0 
24.905 0 
~,,~1 5 
27.301 0 
22.848 0 
82.556 1 
21.040 0 
59.952 0 
42.980 0 
5e806 0 
• 
177.160 2 
5,.,.1 1 
....614 0 
2.513 0 
6~,348 1 
7.229 0 
4Ii.976 0 
2IB.858 I 
56.OM 0 
3D.a7l 0 
• • 
12.6. 0 
251.7S4 a 
8le527 1 
4Sa 0 
• 
• 
• 
- . 
57.9lad 1 
1S.545. 0 
56.158& 1 
66th 0 
• 
- . 
- -• 
1,2.1131 ; 
n.'l'" 0 
64QD 0 
l02.28gO 2 
107.00"- 1 
-
- -182.50gl) 2 
10.901' 0 
. -
6a.uoe 1 
.tc~ Un of .... Uoaal1na mel Peeple'. p~ kCatieca Banri_ Peeple'. ,...... 
1BawrleD~" PtrV 
~ Meldle P-v .ad IlaUcmal Liberal. 
~ddl .. al ... PU'1IJ 
~- ........... ~-Pwar\'MIIbePs C1U&eu'. I'e&aaDQ ad WiDI ....... 
Cftukl ..... Ylllaal \WeD 
1-
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strongholds were located in the west, south, and southwestern parts ot 
n • Ge~s MUnster (District 17), Koln (District 20), Trier (District 21), the 
two districts (22-23) cClllprising Dusseldorf, Baden (District 33), Oberbayern 
(District 24), and Niederbayem (District 25). There as well as in Oppeln 
(District 10) in Upper Sfiesia the Party had made "astonishing progress.n34 
But, on the whole, the east and northeastem Protestant sections with their 
small Catholic population lacked Centrist representation. In contrast, "red 
Berlin" tor the first time in the party's h1stor;y had elected a Centrist dele-
gate: Maximilian Pfeiffer. Karl Sonnenschien reporting on this happy inciden 
in the K6ln1sche Volkazeitung enUll18rated three reasons which accounted tor this 
victor;y: first, the change in attitude toward the Center in "Protestant 
circles"; second, the "emotional evolvement" (ttget!h1smBssige Herausarbeitung") 
of its anti-capitalistio and Christian demooratio motives"; and lastly, "the 
awakening of the youthful, academic Catholio intelligenoe_,,35 
Another important faotor in Centrist gains, and one which would vitally 
affect Centrist trends in the future, was the abolition of the Prussian three-
class system of voting. This innovation allowing for a stronger industrial 
electorate bore fruit particularly in the Catholic industrial areas of 
n8.aseldort, uIlnster, Cologne, and Trier. The new type of representation 
brc:ught about by the increase ot delegat.es from this class of oonstituents 
is more readily seen when one compares the socio-economic representation of 
the Center Party for the 1912 Reichstag election with that of the 1919 
NationalversaJllDl'5, I, 169-194. 
34saohem, Zentrumsplrtei, VIII, p. 271. 
35 January 24, 1919, #69. 
,. 
election for the National Assembly as given in Table 111.36 
TABLE III 
OCCUPATIONAL BRF..AKDO'lN OF CENTRISTS DELEGATFS 
Occupations 1912 1919 
Landed proprietors 16 2 
Small farmers 4 5 
Government employees 20 20 
Clergy 13 10 
Artisans 1 5 
Writers and journalists 3 4 
Professional men and women 15 11 
Labor representatives 8 25 
Businessmen 10 J 
Jliaoellaneous 1 6 
To obtain a definite classification of the entire socio-economio repre-
sentation of the Center Party is difficult due to mwriad factors involved in 
such a stu~. Table III does attempt, however, to give an occupational break-
down of the delegates, but it is important to note that there is considerable 
overlapping since only the principal occupation of the delegates is the crite-
ria for this delineation. (Most clergymen were also newspaper editors or 
leaders of various Catholic societies; labor leaders were also journalists, or 
vice versa.) on the ohart, moreover, government offioials .... re frequently 
engaged in the lJIgal and juridical departments of the Reioh and state govem-
menta. School employees are listed as professional men or woll8n, artisans 
36rhe statistics for the 1912 election are taken from Bruce Brad1'ord Frye, 
"Matthias Erzberger and German Politics, 1914-1921" unpublished Ph. D. disser-
tation (Stanford University, 1953), p. 46. Those for 1919 are f01'll8d from the 
biographioal sketches given in Heilfron, Die deutsohe NationalversammJung, II, 
APPendix, 1-52. 
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denote self-employed skilled craftsmen; small farmers are those who actively 
farmed their own property.37 
For a turther breakdown or overlapping of occupations, see Table IV, 
Which also indicates the age and religious affiliation of each Centrist. 
As the tables indicate, the gradual growth of the liberal le/t-wing fac-
tion and the steady democratization of the Center Party which had slowly de-
veloped during the war years bore fru.1 t in the change-over of the Centrist rep-
resentation in the 1919 election •. Many of the local Centrist colIllittees in 
arranging the PartY's electoral ticket, seemed to have reshurned some of the 
former Reich&tag members and substituted a group of younger, more democratic 
and liberal.ly inclined Centrists for the older more conservative members .38 
As a result, the number of landed proprietors traditional.ly known for their 
consel"lative aristocratic outlook.as drastically reduced from the sixteen 
members of 1912 to t1ro meJlbers in the 1919 election. The industrial. busi-
nessmen of the Rhineland district also received a reduction in their repre-
sentatives. These two groups constituted a large part of the right-w1ng 
faction or centrist leadership prior to the revolution. 'the decrease in 
their strength was indicative of the shifting to the left which was to be 
37J(orsey, zentl"Ulll8~rtei 1911-1923, p. 1.56, has a more definitive occu-
pational breakdOiii whIc aRiers slightly frail Table III. The IV, Februar,y 8, 
1919, 1108, lists the delegates to the National. Assembly acoordIiig to 
professions in a more definitive manner also but the listing is not complete 
for the Centr1st delegates. 
38At the local meeting of the Rhenish centrists in Cologne On Jamar,r 8, 
1919, Brauns and Stegerwald demanded that the center nominate candidates who 
would ind1oa"~ a "sharper separation" from the old right-w1nged elements in 
the Party. "Allas, was in <ler Vergangenheit naoh rechts vorbelutet 1st, 
muss herausl" Unpublished Papers or Bachem, as cited 10 Mprsey, 
Zentrumspartei !911-19tJ, p. mo. 
De1egatea 
TABl.E JY 
CENTRISTS ELECTDD TO T;{E NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1919 
FOl"'JIIel" 
Re1chs-
tag ReU-
JLember Age gion District Occupation 
Allekott.e, Joseph - Sl Cath. 21. Koblens Of't1c1a1. postal secretary 
Andre., Jaa. - 40 cath. 31/32 wlJrttemberg Labor secretary; newspaperman 
Astor, Jakob X 51 cat.h. 21. Koblenz lIel"chant 
Becker, Johannaa X 44 oath. lB. Arnaberg Labor union secretary. editor BeckerS Josef - 43 cath. 19. Hesse Secre~ ot construction unionJ editor 
Bell, obiiiiies X 50 oath: 23. bllBiie1dOH' iiiiiI8 lor ReiCh 
Ber~ '1'heodor - SO oath. 23. nllsael.dorf Manufacturer 
Beyerle, Konrad - 45 oath. 26.o,U,&U'nterf'ranken Universi.ty protes sor; historian 
Blank, Lorenza -,6 cath. 16. HpD9'er Labor secretary 
Blum, Johannes - 61 oath. 20. Koln Farmer in Kreteld 
l1oli, EUg8ii X 31 bith. 31732 5'tteiiib8i=g GOVernment Ofi'iClil 
~ " BraUDa, Heinrich - ;J4. cath. 20. KOln Cleric; director of ('ternan volksverein 
von Brentano di 
Tremeszo, otto - 63 oath. 34. Hesse llinisterial d1toectcr 
Bitta, Joseph - 62 Oath. 10. Oppeln Privy Councillor in Breslau 
Burlaget Eduard X 61 oath. 15. Am-ich Council for ~c~t of' Justice 
colihOrn, rterman6 I 65 tiith. rti. Hanover taiid8d propr . 
Dies, carl X 42 Cath. 33. Baden Farmer 
Dransteld, Hedlr1g 48 oath. 23. nG.ssel.dorr Writer, Chair~ of Cat.h. Women's League 
Erhardt, Frans - 38 oath. 10. Oppeln Trade union secretary =' Jo~ 37 Cath. 33. Baden Labor association secre~ 
gar ,th1ii X 43 caE J17)2 'WiftIt.eiilb8rg Stite secretaii'J iriiIS'E commISsioner 
Fandck, Wilhelm - "cath. 20. ~ln Mayor in Aachen 
Fehrenbach, Konstantin I 67 Oath. 33. Baden J..a.1r1erJ councillor 
Fleischer, paul X 4, oath. 1. East Berlin Union secret.ary 
Frerker, Wilhelm I 60 Oath. 17. Mllnster Pensioneer, former master baker ~ 
...----------_., 
TABLE IV--Continued 
Delegates 
Former 
Reichs-
tag 
Member Age 
Reli-
gion District 
Gerstenberger,morius X 54 Cath. 26.0,M,&Unterfranken 
Gasberts, Johann X 54 Cath. 22. D~seldorf 
GUsing, Anton - 4.3 Cath. 18. Arnsberg 
Gr8ber, Adolf X 6S Cath. .31/32 w«rttemberg 
Grunau. August - 39 Cath. 9. Brealau 
H.gemann~ Joseph - 43 Cath. -- 15. Aurich 
Hebel, Benedik\ X 5.3 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria 
Hea, Georg X 53 Cattl. 25. Lower Bavaria 
Herold, Karl X 70 Cath. 17. Mnnster tit Minden 
Herschel. Johannes 43 Cath. 10. Oppeln 
Hitie; Franz - -X 67 Catb.-2).Dnsselaoi"f' 
Hofmann, Hermann - 3B Cat;h. 27. Pfalz 
Imbusch, Heinrich - 40 Cath. 16. Arnsberg 
Irl, Martin X 59 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria 
Jaud ..... Josef 40 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria 
1 Jo08-; JOS-8t- -- - uO- Cath.--~l.nDnsse1.dorr 
Kaas, Ludwig - 37 Cattl. 21. Koblenz 
Koch, Johann - 45 Cath. 17. Mllnster 
Kossmann, Bartholomew X 35 Cath. 21. Koblenz 
Kreutz .. Franz - 49 C~~_. 17. M&1ster 
ltubetzko~ Joeepti-----;;-- -Iili~-C.it.h. 10. Oppeln 
Langwost, Heinricha 44 Luth. 16. Hanover 
lsgendre, Peter 52 Cath. 21. Koblenz 
lAsicht, Johann X So Cath. 26.0.M.&Unterfranken 
Lens1llg.. Felix - __ ._59 __ ~ath. __ 2.1. Ddsseldorf Marx, Vlllhelil-- ----1 -- - 56 Cath.- 22.00sseldorf 
Mausbach, Josef .sa Cath. 17. M&ster 
Maxen, Wilhelm - 51 Cath. 16. Hanover 
Mayer, Wilhelm X 44 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria 
Occupation 
Cleric; editor 
Labor secretary 
Labor secretary 
State Secretary 
Trade-union secreta.rr 
Labor secretary 
Cleric; cathedral dean 
Association director of Bavarian center 
Count)" econOll1ic councillor 
Lawyer 
Cleric;-uriiversity professor; labor laacer 
High School teacher 
Union official and editor 
Master painter 
Blacksmith 
A utliorandecB.t6r 
Cleric; Professor in Trier 
Post office supervisor 
Labor secretary 
Railroad conductor 
Carpenter 
Editor 
Director of Association of Trier 
Cleric; cathedral dean 
Farmer 
Pri:vycouncillor- ot-TUstice 
Cleric; cathedral prior; university professor 
Cleric J School inspec tor 
Legal adviser '0 co 
.~ 
TABlE IV--Cont.inued 
Former 
Reichs-
'tag Reli-
Delegates Member Age gion District. Occupat.ion 
X 67 Catha 19. Hesse-Nassau Penaioneer and manufacturer 
X 58 Catha " Merchant and mayor 20. loln 
-
64 Cath. 18. Amaberg \,lidow of county court official; social worker 
-
46 Cath. 21. Koblenz Farmer 
Catha 21. Koblenz Editor . labor leader 
-
39 Catha 11. Leignitz Cleric; Count.y secretal'7 of Vollcsverein 
X 43 Catha 3. City of Berlin Secret.ar,y-general ot Center Party 
-
)6 Catha 9. Breslau President of Labor Exchange 
52 Catha 18. Arnsberg Rector; chairman of Catholic Teachers Union 
X 44 Lutb. 27. Pfalz Tax ins ctor 
2 Catha • Posen Trade-union secret.ary 
X 59 Catha 25. Lower Bavaria Baker 
X 49 Catha 17. Htlnat.er " Minden Trade-union chairman 
X 54 Catha 25. Lower Bavaria Labor"secretal'7; author 
4 Catha 22. ntlsseldort Associate director of Consumers Union 
X 3 Catha 3 • Hessen vy c\)uncillor; Dr. jure 
-
44 Catha 21. Koblenz High school t.eacher 
36 Prot. 26.0,M,&Untertranken County Court secretary 
36 Cat.h. 2. West Prussia Labor secre'tal'7 
4 Catha 19. Hesse Teacher--intermediate schools 
39 ath. 2. iper Bavaria La or-un on secretary 
X 72 Catha 20. Koln and Aachen Prussian minister ot justice 
47 Cat.h. 25. Lower ~avaria Farmer 
44 Cat.h. " General secretal'7 of Christian Trade Union 20. loln 
X 61 Cat.h. 10. 0 In Farmer 
Catha 10. Oppeln Rector at Mys owitz; teacher atseminal'7 
55 Catha 25. Lower Bavaria Lawyer; councillor 
" 
- re Catha 2g. loln Labor-union secret.ary Catha 2 .O,M,&Untertranken Labor assoc. secretary; union chairman; \() longshoreman \() 
---~ -
., 
tABLE IV--Con~inued 
Former 
Reichs-
tag ReI i-
Delegates Member Age gion District Occupation 
-
Tr1mborn, Karl X 64 Cath. « Royal-Privy councillor 20. Koln and Aachen 
Uli taka, Karl 
-
4S Cath. 10. ~peln Cleric; pastor at Batisbom-Altendorf 
Weber, Helene 
-
37 Cath. 22. DUsseldorf High sChool teacher 
Wieber, Franz 
-
60 Cath. 23. Dllsseldorf Union chairman 
Wirtha Jos!Eh X J9 Cath. 3J. Baden Professor in Freiburs 
Zawadzki, Konstantin 
-
32 Cath. 1O.Oppeln Master carpenter 
Zehnter, Johann X 67 Ca~h. 33. Baden President of Court of Appeals 
Zettler, Maria 
-
33 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria County secretary of Catholic Women's Union 
.. 
~ember of the German Hanoverian Party 
~ember of the German Hanoverian Par~y; RHosp1tiBnt" of the Center 
.... 
0 
0 
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an important faotor in subsequent Centrist po1ioies in the first year ot the 
weimar period. 
on the other hand, the threefold inorease in labor representation heralded 
a stronger liberal trend within the Party leadership whioh likewise would have 
its impact, espeoially on the PartY's deoision to enter into a ooalition with 
the sooial1sts and the Demoorats. AmOng the labor representatives were ener-
getio leaders who were not averse to oooperating with the Social Democrats. 
During the last two years of the war, men like A. Or8ber, M. Erzberger, .. 
Joseph Wirth,39 Wilhelm Karx, Johann Oiesberts,40 and Eugen Bo1z had in-
dicated in the Reichstag their 1ert-wing tendencies and their acceptance ot 
some of the milder social and liberal reforms of the )Iaj ority Social Democrats 
and other democratio parties.41 Moreover, A. orSber, M. Erzberger, and K. 
Trimborn as ministers in the cabinet ot the previous government of Prinoe Vax 
39 Joseph Wirth (1819-19$6) was eduoated at the University of Freiburg; 
later in 1908 he returned to teaoh at the university. Wirth W88 elected to 
the Reichstag in 1914 and to the National Assembly in 1919. He succeeded 
M. Erzberger 88 minister of finance in )(arch 1920. Wirth also 88SUllOd leader-
ship of the 1eft....tng faction of the Center atter Ersberger's death. In 
May 1921 Wirth beoame chanoellor with an avowed policy of the fulfillment of 
the obligations of the Versailles Treaty. Beoause of increased opposition 
to the policy of f'ulfillment, he was forced to resign on October 22, 1921, 
but resumed oftice four ~ later. Unable to oarry out the neoessary finan-
oial measures to stop the depreciat10n of the mark, Wirth resigned as chan-
cellor in November 1922. From 1929-1930 he served as minister for the 
provinces occupied by the Allies. In 1930 he beoame minister of the interior 
but retired in October 1931. After Hitler CaD18 to power he went to Paris and 
afterward to SWitserland. 
40Johann Giesberts (1865-1938) was elected the first Centrist labor "p. 
resentative in the Reichstag in 1905 • Fran 1892-1916 he also served 88 city 
represctative in Mflnchen-G1adbach, and in the Prussian Lancitag from 1906-1918. 
In 1919 he was elected to the National Assembly. He W88 appointed a Reich 
minister in 1919 serving a8 under-secretary in the Economic Counoi1 until 1922. 
USee the Introduction to this paper, pp. 23-24. 
p 
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had alreaqy demonstrated that collaboration with the Social Democrats and the 
Democrats was possible. 
For the most part, the Centrist delegates were comparatively young men 
and women eager to employ their talents in reconstructing QermaD1'. While ages 
among them ranged from thirty years (Christine Teusch) to seventy-two years 
(Peter Spahn), over half the representatives were nevertheless under fifty 
years 0.1' age. Approximately sixteen per cent 0.1' the members were in their 
thirties; thirty-three per cent were in their forties (mostly in the early 
forties); thirty per cent in their fifties; eighteen per cent in their sixties. 
Only two members were in their early seventies. 42 All Centrist delegates 
whether entering the national political arena for the first tia or returning 
as veteran parliamentarians displapd a sincere interest in and a uholy 
enthusiasm" for their work in the "spirit of Windhorst. uLU 
The party was fortunate in its retention of delegates who were exper-
ienced parliamentarians. At l&ast thirty-seven members had previously served 
in the Reichstag while thirty others had served in their state Landtag, SCllle 
serving in both political bodies at the same time. Many of the old-time 
vigorous Centrist leaders were among this group: M. Ersberger, K. Fehren~ach, 
Johann Giesberts, A. orSber, Karl Herold, Frans Hit .. , Richard Mfluer-Fulda, 
Peter Spahn, and K. Trimbom. others entering national politics for the first 
time and soon to become leacl1ng figures in the Party were Karl Beyerle, 
Heinrich Brauns, Joseph Ersing, Josef Joos, Ludwig Kaas, Josef Kausbacb, Aciaa 
Stegerwald, and Karl utizka. 
42See Table IV, pp. 98-101, for the various ages 0.1' the delegates. 
43nr. Wilhelm Jlaxen, "Enthusiasm for Work, It Gerrnania, February 6, 1919, 
JL60-.1 P. 2. 
jP 
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The Center faction in the National Assembly undoubtedly was, a hetero-. 
geneous group, but hardly ineffectual because of a lack of hanogeneity. As the 
subsequent events in the Nat~onal Assembly were soon to demonstrate, Centrists 
motivated by their Christian Woltanschauung were not to shirk responsibility 
in assuming some of the herculean tasks that were to confront the constituent 
assembly. In the arduous and lengthT debates and discussions facing the con-
stitutional committees and subcommittees the center would manifest its best 
strength and energy. 
Despite the increased liberal representation in the centrist National 
A.ssemblJr delegation, the Party remained basically a middle clus party. This 
was especiall.y apparent in the nUDlber of government officials, clerios, and 
professional men and "<Den found among the Centrist deputies. These along 
with farmers, artisans, and self-employed businesslIBn favored a democratio 
government which would protect their vested interests. This middle 01u8 
gl'Ol1p formed the backbone of the Party and acted u a moderating influenoe 
on the extrel'/l8s within the Party. Indeed one of the strengths of the Partyls 
election program had been its traditional,bourgeois attitude toward the re-
tention of' private property and the maintenance of an economic system based 
on social justioe. The moderatelJr oonservatiye group in its rs.nkB would con-
tinue to champion the Partyls fundamental principles conceming the mainten-
ance of a Christian Weltanschauung, the safeguarding of marriage and the 
fam1ly, the retention of Christian education in the public schools, and 
confessional private schools. 
Although the middle class, like the aristocratio landolmers and wealt~ 
industrialists, .... re staunch supporters of the monarchy prior to the Revolu-
104 
the "changed circumstances" and the advantage which such change would bring. 
The labor leader stegerwald who was sympathetic to this middle clus political 
mentality, typified about-face from monarchy to the acceptance of the republio 
in a statement mde at the end of 1918: "Today we mow that the old order 
does not allow for the attainment of the proper welfare of all. Therefore, 
we determinedly oross the threshold and enter upon the new order ... 44 
It had been difficult for all Centrists to accept the November Revolu-
tion. Like true realists, however, they had squarely faoed the tact that the 
situation in Garmany at the end of World War I was grim and that there YfU no 
easy or painless wtq out of it. Order had to be restored and a new structure 
for the state developed) peace terms had to be achieved and the nation'. eoon-
~ rebuilt. As the Baden centrist spokesman Father Jo.er Sohofer indioated, 
many Centrists oame to • ee their duty as: "Rettung des Staatsordnung, Rettung 
" des Reiohes, Rettung des Volkes, Ablrehr dar Anarohia, .Abwehr des Burger-
krieges • ,,45 Cooperation with the government majority was deemed a, "historio 
neoessity.tt46 
But the middle ol88s Centrists were suspioious of the Social Democrats 
and the direotion they might take in the new government. Germania, reflecting 
their concern, printed an article entitled, nThe M1ddle Class and the National 
44nHeute wissen wir, <lass die alte ordnung una das wahre Vo1kswohl nioht 
erreichen 11ess. Darwa treten wir entsch10ssen auf' dan Boden der neuen 
Ordnung.tt Cited in 1)eutz, .Adam stegerwald, p. 75. The au-thor oalls Steger-
wald a nReal-politikertt who was abii "to oast aside his emotional adherence 
to the paet and mobilize every power in mastering the difficult times." 
45J1it der alten Fahne, p. 120. 
46suchheim, Geschichte der Christlichen Parteien, p. 327, conaidered the 
Centrist decision a "progressive step." 
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Elections.u47 The article voiced a tear for the continued existence or the 
middle class. It pointed out that the Erf\1rt program of the Socialists called 
for the el1m.1nation of the bourgeois gralp. The Socialists had weloomed the 
war beoause it supported their theory that war, coming as a result of the cap.. 
italistic d6'lelopnents, would cause the disappearance of the small industries. 
NOW' it ..... teared that the Social1sta intended to utilise the economic unrest 
after the war to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It .... iJapera-
tive, therefore, in the opinion of GeI1l8ll1.&, that the Center Party 88&W1le .. 
positive role in the new governJl8nt and strive to prevent such a catastrophe 
from d6'leloptng.46 
The po8aib1l1ty ot forming a ooalition government became obvious, when, 
atter the publication or the eleotion results, the absence of a one-party 
majority in the National As.embly became apparent. The Majority Socialists 
had won a majority in ~ a third of the thirty-seven districts; the b0ur-
geois parties or non-Soc 1alists had. control of two-thirds of the electoral dis-
tricts.49 The period of exclusive Socialist control of attaira came to • end. 
Quick to grasp at least some remnant of political existence the lIajority 
Socialists then extended an invitation to the Independent Socialists to join 
nth them in !ol1Ding a government on the oondition that they accept parl.1a-
mentary democracy and renounce any attempt at a coup d'etat. This ofter was 
rejected by the Independent Soc1al1sts. The llajority Socialists were, there-
47 January 21, 1919, #33. 
46lbid. 
49sachem, ZentrumsIJiLrtei, VIII, 272. The Social Democrats got 13, 779,0CJ0 
vote. while the non:s6c£aIiS~s gained 16,465,000. 
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fore, compelled to invite the center Party and the Democrats to join with them 
in establishing a government for Qe~. 
Such W88 the situation when the Centrist delegates 118t at Weimar in a 
.Party caucus on Febru.ary 5 to formulate its program and elect officers to 
carry on the business in the National. Assembl¥. At Ermberger1s suggestion, 
Adolf orSber, the previous chairman of the Reich's Centrist committee and 
faction leader, was elected as the first chairman and director of the Center 
Party. Elected as vice-cbairt1en were Karl Tr1mbom of Oologne and Wilhelm 
Mayer of Upper Bavaria. When A. Stegerwald, general.-secretar,y or the Christian 
Trade Union, was snggested as a nominee for the post of third vice-chairman, 
Ersberger vetoed him because of his wartime chauvinism and close association 
with the industrialist Walter Rathenau. Instead, Johannes Becker of Arnsberg 
was elacted.50 All four chairmen had been previous members of the Reiohstag. 
With the election of the labor :representative Johannes Becker Qermania saw 
not only a continuation of the faction leadership as :regards the "Oktober-
Pol1tik," but a strengthening also of the intention to advance resolutel¥ on 
, "jenem. Wege. ,,51 
At another Party cauous held on February 18, the board of directors of 
the Oenter Party was extended further by including more or the lett-oriented, 
social progressive wing into the Party leadership. Of' the thirteen board _-
bel'S not less than ten had alre~ belonged to the previOlls Reichstag, eight 
or them were representatives or the Christian Trade Union, and two were 
5Ofteport or the Center meeting or February 5, 1919, in Ersberger Papers, 
cited in Epstein, Ersberger, p. 287. 
5lpebruar;y 8, 1919, #64. 
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priests. The new board members included: Joset Becker from Nassau, chairman ot 
the Christian Workers Association Oarte1 of Greater Berlin, Father Brauns, 
Erzberger, Giesberts, Father Ritze, Jfartin Irl, master painter trom Upper Bava-
ria, Karl Schirmer, author and labor secretary trom I,oIrer Bavaria, and Steger-
wa1d. Older Party leaders also on the board were Bell, Herold, JIarx, v:Iuer-
FUlda, and P. Spahn.52 The inclusion of several m_bers of the Bavarian 
People' s Party53 among the Party chairmen and on the board ot directors indica-
ted the reestablishment of rapprochement between the Center Party and Bvp.54 
One or the most serious problems tacing the centrist delegates at the 
first Party Caucus of February 5-6 was to decide whether or not they should 
accept the invitation of the Social Democrats md enter into a coalition 
governraent with them and the DaRoorats. The Oentrists understood tully the 
significance ot such a coalition and the 1m.portant respona ibil1ty which the 
n_ government would have to assume both in foreign and domestic attain. The 
decision of entering into such a coalition with the Lett W88 a weighty and 
momentous one and was, theretore, carefully Yiewed from all angles by the 
delegates. On the one hand, it meant aligning themselves; w.lth their tradi-
tional enemies. Not that this was iIlpossibleJ such a condition had alread7 
existed since July, 1917. But the election c_paign had stressed so torce-
!ully the difference between the Centrist Christian Weltanschauung and "athe-
istic" Jlarxist socialism ot the SPD that cooperation with them at this JaOment 
52u, Februar;y 18, 1919, 11.38. No wallen delegates wre included in the 
board or directora. 
53wllhelm Mayer, Martin Irl, and Karl Schirmer. 
5l&oerm.ania, February 8, 1919, #63, praised the reestabl.1.tsbment of an 
"Einheitslron't." 
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seemed illogical. and :impossible. For this reason, S0JB8 of the representatives 
of catholic 1I0rleers' Association favored a coalition' with the Right.55 On the 
other hand, a majoritY' of delegates felt that in view of the seri0U8nes. ot 
the t1m.es and especially ot the foreign situation, the PartY' could not afford 
to be n.-d by emotional.1slD.. The times demanded a strong united government, 
not a weale divided one. A fairly workable govenaent could be achieved it the 
center joined with the 8P1) and the Democrats) a stronger majority could be 
attained with such a coalition. The decision 1..,. with the center.56 
It took two <Js.ys of serious, soul-searching deliberation before the 
Party could arrive at a decision, and then it W88 not unan1mou8.57 One ot the 
most energetic JD8mbera strongly in favor of a coalition with the Lett was 
Enberger. He felt that it was imperative for the Centrists to collaborate 
with the 8P1), not thereby to assist them in carrying through their own wishes, 
but rather to hinder them from striTing atter too extreme a program.58 He 
hoped that the )(ajoritY' Socialists would be properly' t_d by the1r bourgeois 
coalition partners, and so he resisted the new idea of forming an ant1-
Soc1al1st coalition extending from the Nationalists to the Democrats. The 
Center PartY' had more to gain by cooperating I'll th the government than by' 
joining the opposi tion.59 Ersberger's view was supported b7 IIJ8ll7 of the 
55Josef Nausbach, Kulturfragen in der l)eutschen VerfsssUDg: E1ne 
Erklarung wichtiger VerfusU1lgsartikil (Aladbach: volkivere1ii-verlag, 1920), 
p. O. 
56!!, February 6, 1919, #103. 
57Germa.niat February 8, 1919, 163. 
58snberger l s argument at the PartY' caucus, February 5-6, 1919, as cited 
in Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 273) !!, February 8, 1919, 1108. 
S9nachelD., Zentrumspartei, VIII, 274-275. Later, Jlausbach pointed out that 
~----------------~ 
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older JIl8IIlbere of the Party 88 well as the newl1'-e1eoted academioians. 60 
Atter a "lengthy' d1soussion"61 the oauous voted sixt;y-four to five, over 
the opposition of some Bavarians, to enter into the ooalition govel'mlllnt with 
the I.ett.62 Cooperation with the new govemment W88 looked upon as a "re-
sponsibllity to the tatherland" ("vaterllndisohe Pfl1ohtM),6) as a "civic 
duty.,,64 The decision W88 not an easy one. Nevertheless, the Oeqter had 
agreed with "schweren Hersen .. 6,5 to place under "all circumstances and regard-
less or its cost, the interest of the fatherland above the interest ot the 
Part 1'"66 and so, entered into the coalition government with the 8m and the 
Democrats. 
As a waming, however, to his fellow Centrist deputies before the actual 
oonvening ot the new ooalition govemment, Ersberger urged them all to be to 
the center oou1d .erve its country more protitabl1' and best achieve the 
PartY'. cultural and religious ideals by' joining the 'coalition gove:mnent. lV, 
February 27, 1919, 116)J ll.arch 10, 191.9, 1193. -
60nUnpublished Memoirs ot wilhelm Marx," cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei 
1917-1923, p. 168. 
61£rzberger, Erlebn1sse, p. )67. 
62Ibid. Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 276, stated that nine-tenths ot t 
Centrisi'i'Voted tor oollabOrat1Oii. The Bavarian extremist, Georg Heim, how-
ever, was adamant in his opposition. 
63Albert tauscher, "Der Arbeit an der W'e1llarer vertassung," in Nationale 
Arbe1t, p. 1,58. 
6l4oermania, February 8, 1919, 1163. 
6.5 Ibid. 
-
66JohannesBeU at the Rhenish Centrist "Parte1tag" Septellber lS, 1919, 
Report, as cited in Morsey, Zentrtlll8partei 1917-1923, p. 169. 
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in coalition bargaining. They were to insist upon a program of three points: 
tirst, the creation ot an &l"!Q' that could break any resistance that the 
Soldiers' and Workers' Oouncils might otter to the Constituent Assembly; 
second, a constitution under which the rights of the Catholic Church 1fOUl.d be 
-" 
safeguarded; and third, the preservation of the federal structure ot Germ&l17 
:in opposition to the Soc1al18t and Democratic demand, headed by Preuss, tor 
the unitar,y-centralized state.67 
Once the decision to enter a coalition government had bean reached, 
Party leaders telt obliged to justif)" the Center's position to its supporters. 
During the month ot Febl"'ll8l".Y, theretore, a series of articles appeared :in 
Oemania, designed to accustom readers to the idea that, regardless of diver-
gent phUosophies, cooperation between the Social De.ocrats and the Oenter was 
necessar,y to obtain a workable govemment.68 Oermania explained how the Centel 
had worked with the Socialists during the war in seeking peace, but at the SUM! 
time had consistently and successtull1' avo1dad. siding with the Socialists in 
anything that would have compromised basic party principles. 69 Admission and 
defense of the great ideas of Christianity, Germania stated, had never yet 
67Erzberger Papers, as cited in Epstein, ErzbeR' p. 287. Oemania 
February 9, 1919, 1o;, referred to a tour-po1n~ pro which the C8ntriit 
offered as prerequisite for entering into the coalition goverpntl "protec-
tion of our cultural heritage" ("SchUtz unserer kultureUen outertf)J gua;rantaa 
of private property; protection against radical socialism) and maintenance of 
the tederal character ot the Reich. 
66rebruary 8, 1919, 1/64, p. 2. Buchhe1m, Oeschichte der christlichen 
Parteien, p. 324, noted that what the two parties when actIi'ii ilone had been 
umrm1rig to concede to each other, they were now willing to caapromise. The 
liberalism of the ".Paulskirche" beC8Jll8 prominent again :in the establishment 
of the Yle1mar Coalition. 
69oarmania, February 22, 1919, 168, p. 2. 
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shamed a party or a people despite the prejudice exerted against them, nor 
in this coalition had the Center ever contemplated a denial at its principles. 
It would seek as much as possible to take anything of value fran socialism 
(certain social reforms); nevertheless, it lIOuld continue to fight the evils 
of socialism. The article concluded by pointing to the successful leadership 
role taken by the Center Party and the Catholic press against the atheistic 
policies at Hoffmann and Haenisch.70 
Perhaps the most accurate public stateJDBnt for the acceptance of the 
Revolution as well as the Centrist collaboration with the parties at the Left 
was voiced by the Party chairman on the fioor of the National. Assembly on 
February 13, 1919. ar8ber, speald.ng for the center Party, stated that the 
members of his Party could not recognize the Revolution 88 being either an 
inner necessity or a boon to the developnent of political conditions in 
GerJllallY. He thought that the reforms ot Prince !laX in October, 1918, had 
achieved all that was required, and that a republic was not essential for a 
guarantee of democratic rights. centrists, he said, would take their stand 
on the basis of existing facts and recognize the full consequence of each 
situation. For the present, he conceded, the democratic republic was "the 
only possible vehicle with Which to get out of the chaos ot the revolution."71 
Cooperation among the majority parties was now the sole and necessary movement 
to solve the difficult problems tacing Germ.a.ny. 
Justification of these Centrist policies prompted Erzberger to write a 
70Ibid., Feb~ar.r 23, 1919, 189, p. 2. 
-
, 
71Verhandlungen der Vertassunggebenden Deutschen NationalversammlU!!i. 
Stenograph1sche Ber1Chte (Berllii: Druck una: verllij der Norad8utschen 
DUChdl"Ucbrei una VerJOags-Anstalt, 1919), CCCXIVI, 53-54 (micro-card). 
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lengthy' letter to his friend, Archbishop Paoelli, on February 24, 1919. In 
the letter Erzberger enumerated the reasons whioh impelled the Party to ohose 
a position of partioipation in the new government rather than that of 
opposition. 
The Center is predes~1ned by its entire history to be a party 
of positive work rather than negative opposition. It cannot refuse 
to undertake responsible work for the Fatherland in the present 
period of difficulty. The speoific reasons [diotating coalition 
with the Socialists] were the following: foreign polioy oonsidera-
tions require Center participation in the governing coalition. Its 
_ participation will impress all the enemy states with the stability 
of the German goverrllllltnt, as it will be supported by more than 75 
per cent of the National Assemly. Our enemies oannot impose new 
burdens upon us on the plea that the German government is not 
strong enough to guarantee the implementation of its pledges. I 
have been informed by English sources that the entry of the center 
into the government will have oonsiderable influence upon the 
oourse of the peace negotiations. , 
To this must be added that t.he Center can do nothing to 
champion the rights of the Holy See at the peace conferenoe if it 
is not a partioipant in the government. 
The danestio reasons are the following I The Cabinet would 
stand on very precarious foundations if the Center were in opposi-
tion. Partisan struggles would inorease in vigor, and the oountry 
would not quiet down. • • • The National Msanbq would soon be 
reduced to impotence and the nation would beoome viotim to anarchy. 
The entry of the Center into the government has, on the other hand, 
alreacV" yielded good results. 72 
In conoluding his letter Erzberger pointed out that in its present position, 
the Center oould Pl"event great harm to the Church and that the Party would 
do its best "to oontinue to champion the rights of the Church and the 
confessional schools in the coming constitutional debates.ft7J 
Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the Center Party to justify its 
72Erllberger to Pacelli, February 24, 1919, as cited in Epstein, Matthias 
Erzberger, p. 288. 
7JIbid., p. 289. 
decision to enter into the coalition government, the fact that the center, 
traditional opponent of social1sm, should condescend to consort with the 
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Jlajority Socialists and liberal DelOOcrats in such a political union caused 
surprise and alarm. An article in a conservative catholic publication 
referred to the Weimar Coalition as a npolitische Wischehe mit Hlresie.n74 
yet the months to come would indeed reveal the wisdom of' such a step. In the 
policy-making decisions facing the new government, the Center leadership 
would certainly eJatrt its innuence and fulfill its responsibility. 
74Petrus Blltter, March 11, 1919, #24, p. 189, cited in Morse,y, 
Zentrumspartei 1911-1923, p. 172. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CENTER PARTY IN THE WEDIAR COALITION 
PROBLEIf> OF THE F£ACE NEGOTIATIONS 
February 6, 1919, was set as the date r or the opening of the National 
Assembly which was to meet not at Berlin but at Weimar. The capital City, 
disturbed by the unrest consequent upon Communist and Spartacist strikes 
and street-fighting, was considered unsafe for the convention, and bourgeois 
parties had demanded that it be held elsewhere.l Berlin, moreover, was the 
embodiment of Prussian hegemony which JDB.nY parts of' southern and western 
Gerrna.ny had resisted when they sounded the cry-, "Los von Berl1n."2 The 
choice of' Weimar from among such other possible locations as ~th, 
Ntlmberg, and Jena, seemed altogether appropriate to those who felt that 
the new republican Germany might take inspiration from this cultural center, 
home of the classical tradition of Goethe and SchUler) 
lThe Centrists made this one of the planks in their campaign program. 
2Representatives from the governments of Bavaria, wUrttemberg, Baden, 
and Hesse met at stuttgart on December 21-28 to demand that the National 
Assembly convene at a place other than Bar lin. They' repeated this demand 
again on January 9, 1919, see Ziegler, NationalversanmalW!i' p. 21. 
3An article in the IV, January 22, 1919, #59, indicated that Weimar 
was selected onl.¥ after a -rong verbal battle waged by the PrU8sian govern-
ment. The paper noted jubilantly that the rejection of Berlin was a major 
success in the Los von Berlin movement. 
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At 3:15 on the appointed day, the newly elected Centrist delegates 
assembled along with the other delegates in Weimar's National Theater amid 
great pomp and ceremony. The historic building itself was decorated in hol1datr 
arrq. Within the assembly room, "fresh garlands of laurel and spruce inter-
spersed with sprlq8 of carnations and 1111es of the valley added a festive 
touch in keeping with the exultant mood of the auspicious occasion." 4 
The Centrists listened with rapt attention as the lfajority SOCialist 
Friedrich Ebert delivered the open1Dg speech. .After first welcoming the 
delegates to the constituent assembly, he set the tone tor the work of the 
assembly by announcing: 
We have done forever with the old kings and princes by the grace 
ot God. (Lolld applause on the Lett; hisses on the Right; renewed 
loud applause on the Left; cries from the Right, "Wait''') [sic] 
We deny no one his sentimental memories, but as surely 88 tJiIi 
National Assembly baa a great republican majority, so surely is 
the old God-given dependence abolished forever. The German people 
is free, remains free, am governs itself for all the future •••• 
We have lost the war; this is not the consequence ot the revolu-
tion • • • it was the Imperial government ot Prince )(aX of Baden 
which began the armistice which made us deienseless. • • • The 
revolution declines the responsibility tor the misery into which 
the evils of the old autocracy, and the arrogance of the military 
threw the German people.5 
He went on to protest the "unheard. otn and "ruthless" armistice terms. His 
denouncellElnt of the expulsion ot Germans from Alsace and of the 800,000 
German prisoners ot war still held in captivity won a "tumultUOUB" reaction 
trom the Centrist section in the Assembly. 6 Ebert. s concluding advice that 
4Ibid., February 7, 1919, 11105. 
-
5Verhandlungen, Februar,y 6, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1. 
6Ibid., p. 2. 
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all move torward in the spirit or the Weimar philosophers and poets toward 
the erection of a government of justice and truth likBwise received a strong 
affirmation from the Center.7 
Wilhelm Plannkuch, a Majority Socialist delegate, voiced the opinion ot 
the delegates in praising the democratic sentiments expressed by Ebert. "The 
National Assembly is not only a ~bol ot German democracy, it is the German 
democracy itself, n said ptannkuch; and he added a ... arning: "He who will not 
recognize this, who seeles to belittle its zthority [the National Assembly J, 
insults the majesty and the freedom ot the German people} he is an enemy ot 
the German democracy, a counter-revolutionar,y.n8 To this statement not only 
the Socialists, but also the Centrists gave a vehement hsehr richtigs,,9 
After simi) ar patriotic expostulations by various members, the assembly 
settled down to the business betore it-that or erecting a provisional govern-
mant to stabilize the political, social, and economio conditione ot Germany. 
The work or the first few dqs involved the business of e18cting the presiding 
officers of the National Assembly. Principal nominees for president ot the 
National Assembly oftered by the major parties .... rea Konetantin Fehrenbach by 
the Center and Eduard David proposed by the Majority Socialists. lO When the 
votes ... ere tallied the Majority Socialist Eduard David was elected with a vote 
7Ib1cl., p. J. 
8Ibid., p. 4. 
9Ibid. 
lOconrad Haussmann was nominated by the l)eJlX)(lrats and Herman A. 
Dietrioh by the National people's Party. 
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of 314 out of the 399 cast. The other nominees were elected &8 vice-presi-
dents b.Y acclamation vote upon the proposal of the centrist G~ber.ll 
Next on the agenda were tho proposal and discussion on the provisional. 
constitution which was to serve as the source of legal 8Ilthority pending con-
struction and adoption of a new democratic constitution. Accordingly, on 
February 8, 1919, Hugo Preuss, an academic authority on constitutional law 
and a member of the Democratic Party, presented a provisional draft for the 
consideration of the National Assembly. The plan called for a division ot 
power among four departments of the Reich: the constituent National Assembly, 
a state Committee, the Reich's president, and the Reich's ministry. To each 
was delegated specific duties. The National .Assembly was given the right to 
draw up a permanent constitution and to vote for "other· urgent laws for the 
Reich" with the consent of the state Committee. The State Committee, made 
up of a designated number of representatives from the individual German 
states, was to administer justice and to collaborate with the National Aesembll' 
in passing legislation.12 To the president was'given the power to nominate 
his chancellor who in tum 'Was to Iiloose a cabinet of ministers. The entire 
provisional program was to becOOle effective imDBd1ately upon its adoption.l.) 
Preuss' provisional draft 'Was elaborately debated and amended in the 
National Assembly during the next two sessions and formally adopted on 
llIbid., FeblUar;y 1, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1-10. 
-
12trhis committee of states was similar in some respects to the old 
Bundesrat, but differed fundamentally as to the matter of authority. See 
Brunet, La Constitution .Allemande, p. $1. 
l.3Verhandlungen, February 8, 1919, CCClXVI, 12-14. 
~ 
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Febnary 10, 1919.14 The ),fajority Socialists had intended a unified and oen-
tralized Reich to include Austria; what was achieved was a deoentralised 
federation of republics. Particularism, strongly evident in the case of Bava-
ra,lS proved too deep~ ingrained, and the Gel"Jll8l'1 Reioh 11'&8 onoe again re-
vealed 88 a loose federation ot jealously individualistio states. Prussia 1"8-
tained its leadership in the States Committee with safeguards against domina-
tion, while Bavaria, Yrllrttemberg, and Baden reserved their special right by 
deola ration. 16 
The provisional. draft reoeived the support ot all msni:.lere ot the Center 
Party except the Bavarian representatives. Gr8ber as the Centrist faotion 
leader tried to gloss over this disagreement in the Party's views by pointing 
out to the delegates ot the National Assemb~ on February 8, "For us the most 
sign1tioant aotion at this lIOlD8nt is to eJCP8dite as quiokly as possible the 
oonversion from a revolutionary, lawless state of affairs to an orderly, legal 
situationrl1 But Germania, U8Ual~ rather moderate in its oritioism, was 
oaustic in reprimanding the Bavarian People t s Party and asked if they were 
trying to be "more popish than the Pope" in wieting upon maintaining their 
sptoial state privileges.18 Thus, alre~ in the very beginning of the 
14lbid., February 10, 1919, CCCXXVI, 20-3's. 
l'sIbid., p. 21. George Heim as spokesman for the Bavarian People
'
s 
Party ('Ciiil:'r1&ts) declared against the oentralizing provisions in the draft 
and demanded the retention of his state IS privileges. 
16Ibid., p. 20. See Praeger's proposal on "Sonderreohte." Ebert tried 
to impress upon all the "provisional character" ot the dratt in order to 
obtain its speedy acceptance. 
11~., p. 26. 
lS,ebruary ll, 1919, 168; XV, February ll, 1919, Ill6, p. 2, criticized 
this action on the part of the l'Jivarian Centrists and demanded an explanation 
for their negative position. 
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National Assembl1 friction was evident among the Centrist delegates--a 
situation which waste be further accentuated as various issues were proposed. 
Once the provisional constitution was 1egalq adopted, Phil:i.pp Scheide-
mann as spokesman for the People' 8 Commissars turned the rudder o.r the ship of 
state over to the constituent National AssemblY.19 The new government had 
taken its first major step out of the revolutionary chaos. "We are no longer 
a revolutionary goverment, but an orderlY, legal administration," Germania 
commented. 20 
In accordance with the provisional constitution, the National Assembly 
elected Friedrioh Ebert president of the new government by a vote of 271 to 
379.21 His office as head of the cabinet was then left vacant and a new prima 
minister W88 to be named. As ohancellor of the new government, Ebert chose 
his right-hand man, A1ilipp Scheidemann, to form a ministry with representa-
ti ves from the Center Party and the German Democratic Party. 
Plans concerning the arrangeJl8nt of a cabinet had been discussed almost 
immediately after the two bourgeois parties on February 5 agreed. to enter a 
coalition with the Majority Socialists.22 OriginallY, there were to have been 
eight ministers taken fran the Majority Socialists and four members selected 
from each of the two other parties.23 But neither the Centrists nor the 
l~ince the National Assembl1 is in session and the provisional oonstitu-
tion is adopted, the historic mission whioh had been entrusted to us as a pre-
visional. govemment is terminated. We retum the powers which we have 
received .from the Revolution into the hancl8 or the National Assembly," 
Verhandlungen, February 10, 1919, CCCXXVI, 36. 
20february 11, 1919, 1/66. 
21verhandlungen, February 11, 1919, CCCXIVI, 40. 
. 22Centrist views concerning this decision were discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
23KV, February 11, 1919, 1/117. 
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Democrats were in favor of allowing the Majority Socialists max:imum representa-
tion in the cabinet in addition to such key positions as president of the 
Reich, chancellor, and president of the National Assembly. The center Party. 
espeCially, felt that it was being deprived of a fair share of the spoils ot 
rlctor,y.24 F1nally, atter ttlengt~ discussions and vacillations" ("Schwanlen") 
with the SPD, a compromise was reached whereby Dr. David's place as presiclalt 
of the National_Assembly was vacated by offering him a post in the cabinet, 25 
thus allowing for a re-election for the presidency of the National Assembly 
and clearing the wSf for the eleotion of the Centrist nominee on February 14. 2~ 
The formation ot the government m1n1stry aroused much speoulation in the 
daily press. An unofficial m1n1sterial list circulated on February 8 carried 
the names of four Oentr1sts-Erzberger, Richard Jdluer from Fulda. stegerwald, 
and Bell--a.s possible m1n1stry heads. 27 Stegerwald' s name was listed at the 
suggestion of the SPD. But he refused to accept a position.28 Later, it waa 
reported that Karl Herold was asked to head the newly-oreated K1n1stry ot Foods 
Johannes Becker of Amsberg to be undersecretary in the Labor Ministry, and 
Johannes Herschel to be undersecretary in the Economic lI1n1stry. 29 Herold, 
24Ibid. S. also Scheidemann, MeJOOirs, II, 360. 
2$KV, February 11, 1919, IU8} Germania, February 9, 1919, 16$, indicated 
that, arthe time, the Centrists were hlddIiig tor either the presidency of the 
National Assembly or the presidency of the government. 
26rehrenbach was elected with 29$ of the 334 votes caSt. Verhandlungen, 
Februar,y 14, 1919, CCCIXVI, 6$. 
27Germa.n1a, February 9, 1919, #6$. 
28Ib1d., February 13, 1919, 1172. Stegerwald noted, "I was or1g1na1ly 
named aB1'6'stmaster-General, later as IIin1ster of Foods, and finally as a 
State Secretary for the Labor Ministry. But I refUsed. Adam stegerwald, A.us 
Meinen Leben, p. 15, as cited in JIora.,., Zentrumspart,ei 1917-1923, p. 170.-
29Ibid., February 12, 1919, 169. 
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however, alao refused the government post; this left the Party without a suit-
able nominee to head the Uinistry of Foods.JO The Oenter was compensated by 
the promotion of Bell from a minor poet in the Colonial Office to the head of 
that m1n1str,y.Jl 
When the cabinet was f1nal~ constituted it included three members of the! 
Oenter out ot a total of sixteen ministers. '!'he Center's representatives were 
Matthias Erzberger as minister without portfolio, Johannes Bell as oolonial 
Minister, and the trade-union leader, Johann Giesberts, as P08tmaster-GeneraJ.} 
Despite denunciatory speeches from both Right and Left, the cabinet received 
a vote of confidence.JJ 
The center could find cause for genuine rejoicing when Scheid.emann 
armounced the aims of the new coalition govemment, since the aims coincided 
quite closely with those of the Center Party. For example, the govem.ment 
was determined to work for peace in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen Points. 
It tavored the admission ot Germany to the League of Nations, and supported 
such resolutions as the disarmament of all nations, compulsor,y arbitration of 
international disputes. It looked forward to the restoration of Germaqy's 
colonial territories, and the immediate repatriation or German prisoners. 
other goals which the new government hoped to achieve concerned a democratic 
JOIbid.,. February 13, 1919, #72. 
JlIbid. 
32Besides the Oentrists, the coalition ministry consisted of eight 
Majority Social ists, four Democrats, and Oount Brockdorfr-Rantzau, a man 
Wi thout J,:arty afti1iations • 
.3.3Verhandlungen, February 1.3, 1919, OOOXXVI, 42-43. 
~, collective bargaining, freedom of speech, press, religion, learning, 
art, and educational opportunities for all Gemans.J4 
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The Centrists were pleased with the program and offered their whole-
hearted support.J5 As spokeSI:l8ll for the Center Party, orSber indicated this 
in his speech aclmowledging the cooperation of the Party in the coalition 
government.J6 He noted that the chief responsibility of parliament toward the 
achievement of a regulated and productive state of affairs was the attainment 
of "peace and order" ("Friede und Ordnung") and of "bread and work" (nBrot und 
Arbeittt ). The Center favored the government's views on an immediate peace, 
the retum of war prisoners, self-determination, Wilson's Fourteen PointsJ but 
it denounced the armistice pr'ovisions conoerning French annexation of the Saar 
region and the trial of war cr1minals. Or8ber welcomed the idea of inoorpora-
ting "funclamBntal rights" into the constitution; nevertheless, he insisted 
emphatically that regulation of Church-8tate affairs should be left to the 
individual states. He critioized severel1' revolutionary symptoms concerning 
Church-8tate relationships and warned that they augured no good.J7 
34Ibid., pp. 44-49. 
35Germania, February 14, 1919, #74, pledged its support to Scheidemann's 
program. 
36It is or8ber not Enberger, who emerges as the dominant figure of the 
Center Party in the National Assembl1' and provides the principal leadership 
for the Party's domestic policies. Erzberger at this period is preoccupied 
wi th the negotiations and implementation of the sucoessive armistioe 
agreements and devotes little time to the constitutional ~estions being 
discU8sed at Weimar. 
37Verhandlungnen, February 13, 1919, CCCXXVI, 49-51. 
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In reference to the authority of the new government, the chairman of the 
center noted that all authority, whether monarchial or republican, comes from 
God. The Party supported a del.llOcratic type of government such as was provided 
by the october reforms of Prince Mex's government; the revolution had been un-
necessary, bringing "no happiness to the Geman people." A republic was not 
essential for the guarantee of democratic rights, but the Center Party had 
taken its stand on the basis of the existing facts and recognised the full 
consequences of the situation. or8ber alluded to the need of a federated 
basis for the Reich and rejected "unhealthy unitarianism." He anticipated an 
ear~ annexation of German-Austria to the Reich. In conclusion, he called 
down God's blessings and protection upon the new German government.38 
As the centrist leaders surveyed the work of the first days of the 
National Assembly they had reason to look with satisfaction upon their 
achieve_nte. They had rejected their former pollcy of non-participation am 
entered into fruitful cooperation with the Socialists and Democrats. More-
over, one of their own DII!III1bers, Konstantin Fehrenbach, had been duly elected 
. president of the National ASsembly on February 14.39 Fehrenbach had held the 
office of president for a year in the previous Reichstag and was well qualified 
for the new position, but in the opinion of the Party this was not as impor-
tant as the fact that his elsction meant a major strengthening of the Party's 
position and prestige.40 
38Ibid., pp. 51-54. 
-
39Ibid~, February 14, 1919, CCClXVI, 65. 
400erma.n1a, February lS, 1919, 1/75. 
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Once launched, the new government braced itself for the months of hard 
work ahead. In subsequent sessions the National Assembly turned to the myriad 
problems facing it. The outlook was almost overwhelming. There was mob 
social unrest and the economic situation was precarious. Because of the en8JQ" 
blockade there was a perilous shortage of ever,y necessity.41 
That the political parties were keenly aware ot these social and economic 
problems is attested to by column upon column of speeches preserved for pos-
terity in the account of the discussions of the. National Assembly. Proposals 
for solving the varied pressing problems of the day-obtaining sufficient 
nourishment, ra1:sing the blockade, caring for the orphans and other needy, 
the widows, the wounded war veterans-were proferred 1>7 _mbers of the 
National Assembly. In practically all of these proposals could be found 
one or more Centrist signatures. Alre~ on February B Or6ber protested 
before the National Assembq agaill8t the unjust ·Allied retention ot GerJlBll 
war prisoners.42 Criticism. of the severe hunger blockade facing Gel"lDAnY' W88 
4lzeigler, OPe cit., p. SO, gives the following description of the plight 
of the German people Immediately after the warl "Hardly a ton of' provisions 
or a ton ot raw material was allowed the Germans; neither a package of 
chocolate, a sack of flour, a can of lard, nor a bar of soap was permitted 
them •••• There was a shortage of potat.oes, bread, fat, sugar, and _at ••• 
of all necessities of lite, clothes, shoes, stockings, coal, oU, benzene, 
f1re-wood--everytbing neoded for daily living." See also Marion C. Siney, The 
Allied Blockade of Ger~ (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Utlive1'8ity of Michigan Preu, 
1951) J ana sudi LOrena-sane and Ralph Haswell lJ;ltz, ed. The Blockade of' Ge1"lllanl 
after the Armistice, 191B-l9l9: Selected DoclD.ents of the Supreme Econoidc 
~ouncIl, li8riCarl Riner Adi1iii8tratlon (oaIDori'iii: stWora UnIversIty 
Mss, 1942) XVI, 4}O::S1b. 
42Verhandlungen, Februar,y 8, 1919, CCCXlVI, 11. A fEffl dlqs later on 
Karch 1, 1919, lrau Neuhaus _de a s1m1lar protest and asked for government 
assistance for the families of war prisoners, ~., p. 410. 
125 
offered b.Y a Centrist woman delegate, Hedwig Dransfeld, on Februar,y 13.43 
Maria Schmitz protested the plight of the Germans in Alsace and asked for 
goverment assista.."lce.44 Concem for widows and orphans was evidenced in a 
speech by Frau Neuhaus in the Assembly on July 16.45 Throughout the Weimar 
period the Centrist delegates gave witness to their traditional concern for 
Christian social Justice. 
But the importance of these probleD18 was overshadowed by the ;I mm:l nence 
of the pending peace negotiations. The Germans had hoped that tM change of 
regime in their countr.y following upon their defeat would elicit from their 
victorS a favorable attitude, and that their nation would be received as a 
penitent member into the new world community. But the unfriendly Entente 
powers were made of sterner stuff, and the National Assembly, confronted with 
the problem of Qbtaining acceptable peace terms, spent more than half' its 
time on peace prel1m1.naries and discussions of the treaty terms. 
The involvement of the Centrist Party in these peace negotiations was in 
a sense unique'. Their recent victor.y had given them partnership in the coali-
tion goverllll8nt, but besides this one of their own leaders, Matthias Erzberger, 
had the distinction of being head of the armistice commission. Both in nego-
tiating the armistice as well as in implementing successive armistice agree-
43Ibid., F'ebruary 13, 1919, 44. Other Centrist proposals for the food 
and nouri'ifiment for the need1' were made by Gr8ber on March 7, 1919, Ibid., 
p. 540; March 10, 1919, Ibid., 617; and by Peter Schlack on April 14;-I9l9, 
~., CeCmII, 1024. -
44Ibid., February 27, 1919, CCClXVI, 410; on JLq 10, Fr81 Weber deplored 
the pl1gJirof the people in Malmed1' and Eupen, ~., CCCnvII, UOS. 
45Ibid., CCCXXVIII, 1601-1602. 
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ments, Erzberger had worked ind.e:f'atigably'. Among his Centrist colleagues, 
even prior to the November Revolution, he had been pressuring for a peace 
settlement based on the Fourteen POints. As spokesman for the Centrist left-
wing, he had tried to convince dubious &Bsociates that such a peace would be t 
the best interests of Germany. He had appealed to President Wilson's idealism 
as a counter-weight to the demands of Britain and France, and he had emphasized 
the threat of Bolshevism to all of Europe if Germany were weakened by a vindi 
ti va peace. He had pointed out that the Germany of October 1918 was a new 
Germany--democratic, peace-loving, and devoted to the idea or a league of 
nations to which all the states of the world would belong. 46 
Forzbarger's views, on the one hand, were instrumental in winning his 
Party to support acceptance of peace terms (not without a struggle within the 
ranks); the Party, on the other hand, was called upon to defend the actions 
of this vigorous leader. The extent, of its discomfiture over Erzberger can 
be meas,ured by the violence of the Nationalists' attacks on him when the tull 
effect of the armistioe terms was realised. What had been mereq deplored 
by the general press as the harsh conditons to which he had agreed,47 beoame 
after December 16, 1918, the basis for personal attaoks by the m1lit&1"7 and 
the Right who went so far 88 to seek the removal' of Erzberger from the 
armistice commission.48 
46,or Erzberger's activities prior to the Revolution, see Epstein, 
Erzberger, Chapter XI. 
47KV, November 11, 1918, #889; November 13, 1918, 1/897; Germania, 
NoveDlberu, 1918, 1/528; November 12, 1918, 11530, p. 2. For an apology' of 
Erzberger's role, see Ibid., November 17, 1918, #539. 
-4~'or Erzberger's own description, see Er1ebnisse, p. 340. 
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Inseparable from the matter of peace negotiations was the testy business 
of foreign policy. In this area, too, the views of F..rzberger and those of his 
Party coincidad-a circumstance due not so much to the fact that Erzberger 
agreed with the Party as that he dominated and shaped its th1nldng decisively. 
An artiole by Dr. r..o Sohwering published in Germania on February 7, 1919, 
gives a run-down of the Center's policies on foreign affa1rs.49 It; is wortbT 
of a sum.mary glance, sinoe it sets forth the very program for which Er:aberger 
pleaded during the meetings with the Entente. 
Sohwering begins by stating the importanoe of a party's role in defend-
ing foreign policy. He proceeds to point out that a party as committed to the 
interests of Germany as the Center cannot disregard its obligation nor with-
draw in silenoe; it IlIl8t declare itself and stand by its principles. He then 
notes that the Center, in sanctioning Wilson's Fourteen Points, has made a 
deoision whioh it must abide by- Chauvinism and power politios must be re-
nounced in favor of the principle or self-determination for emerging peoples. 
As for the colonies, the article continues, Germany must never let that "most 
terrible peace" ("schlectester Frieda") rob her of them; they must continue to 
be maintained as necessary assets to her economy and her position as a world 
power. It must remain a memorable tribute to the center that in these "dark 
SO 
times" it has come forward with this demand. 
The Center Party enunoiated its foreign policy in the election program 
of Deoember, 1918. It; incorporated many of the ideas of Wilson's Fourteen 
49nThe Center and Foreign Policy," February 7, 1919, #61, Supplement. 
50Ibid. 
-
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Points. The Party wanted the "immediate conclusion of a preliminary peace and 
an agreement and reconciliation of all people." As a Cieterrentto future war, 
it wanted "the establishll8nt of an international law based on Christian 
principles." Among other provisions it called for the return of the German 
colonies and a union between Austria and Germany.51 
Such were the principles on peace and foreign atfairs for which Erzbergar 
fought as he confronted the Allied Powers in three special armistice con-
ferences held at Trier in mid-December, January 15-16 and on February 14-15. 
The conferences dealt with the inability of Germany to fulfill the armistice 
terms on schedule, grievances over harsh Allied policies, the lifting ot the 
blockade, and the establishment of a demarcation line between the Germans md 
the Poles in the East. The Allied Powers were, obviousl1', loath to compromise 
on these stipulations, and the.y continued to"hold the upper hand b,y threatenjQg 
Gel"lZl&IV" with the maintenance of the blockade, the retention of German 
prisoners ot war, and the threat o,t further occupation of German territory.52 
To forestall a resumption of hostilities which Germaqy could ill afford, 
Erzberger was forced to accept the terms of the Allied Powers. When, at the 
National Assembl1' on February 11, 1919, he presented the final draft of the 
armistice,S) both the document and his position as he,ad of the armistice were 
51nr.,eitsltze, dar Deutschen Zentrumspartei vom,30 Dezember 1918," cited 
in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 191-198. 
52The best brief acCO'Wlt of the thr8e Trier conferences is in Erzberger, 
Erlebnisse, Chapter XXIV. Epstein, Erzberger, p. 291, notes that the Allied 
threat to march into unoccupied Germarl1' when·, Germany .. as in no condition to 
resume hostilities hung like a sword of Damocles over Erzberger's head. 
53KV, February 18, 1919, #136, reported Erzberger's speech u..l'lCler the 
title, 1Itfer Eindruck inYleimar." The paper was not too pleased with the 
terms of!:;he armistice and referred to ~"he Pl'8·'t~ .. OU3 dJq' s session in the 
National Aasemb~ as a "sad DIq." 
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bitterly attacked b,y the delegates on the Right in a formal interpellation.54 
Albert V8g1er, an industrialist and member of the Qennan People's Party, de-
nounced the armistice as heralding a violation of Wilson's Fourteen Points in 
the coming peace treaty. He censured Erzberger particularly, for the arrange-
ments affecting the steel industry and shipping, declaring that the Centrist 
leader had negotiated in an autocratic manner without seeking the advice of ex-
perts. VSgler ridiculed Erzberger' s plea that Ge nn~ could not secure better 
terms because she was negotiating from a position of wealmess. Quoting from 
the influential Frankfurter Zeitung, v8gler stateds 
Mr. Erzberger constantly seeks to prove that Gennany cannot secure 
better tenlS. It is, of course, difficult to show ex post facto 
that the presence of experts would have affected tho end rasun. 
But Erzberger is responsible for the fact that the experts were 
not even given a chance. Erzberger, with his habitual delusions 
of gr~deur, believes he can do everything better than anybody 
else. 
Erzberger defended himself against v8g1er's jibes with a length1' rebuttal 
in which he reviewed the history of the armistice negotiations .56 Repeatedly 
he denied the allegations which were distorting the true nature of the shipping 
arrangement, and emphasized what seemed tOo have been nearly forgotten-that 
these arrangements had originally been made to secure badly. needed food stutfs. 
He attested further that he had done everything in his power to lessen the de-
ma.nds on Germany and that he had achieved some amelioration. He also stressed 
that at every step of the negotiations, he had been supported by the government 
54verhandlungen, February 17, 1919, CCCXXVI, 130. The Nationalist, 
A. Graefe, W8.8 most derogatory. 
55~., February 18, 1919, CCCIXVI, ~J2-136, gives V!gler's attack. 
56por Erzberger's lengthy defense, see ~., pp. 137 ... 145. 
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and the mUitary so that he had acted not as an individual or as an expert, 
but merely as an agent of the government. Erzberger accused his assailants 
of failure to understand the difficulties or the situation. "One thread was 
apparent throughout Vaglerls speech. He forgot the inconvenient fact that we 
have unfortunately lost the war."S7 
Despite his skillful arguments which, during the months ahead, aunrered 
his opponents point by point in maDlY hours of debate, Enberger continued to 
be blamed personally for the plight of Germany. The attacks begun in the 
National A.ssembly were taken up by the newspapers of the extreme Right and 
Left.S8 Germania and the Center Party defended Erzberger, contending that 
the major question stUl facing Genna1V' was whether it wanted lIllion or 
Lenin.S9 Graber found the interpellation of the Right aimed at Erzberger's 
labors a "groundless attack." "It was," the chairman of the center announced, 
Ita harsh attack of heavy industry-false in its point of departure, false in 
its weapons, and false in its objective. • • • We are happy to have in our 
midst one who with such extraordinary' ability and with such tremendous 
diligence perfol'DlS for the Fatherland what no other is able to perform.n60 
One of the armistice terms deplored in the outraged s~eches voiced on 
the noor of the National Assembly" concerned the 1088 of German colonies. 
This 188ue presented a unique complication for the Center, since the V1n1atry 
S7~., p. 144. 
S~he Frankfurt Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt frequently" called for 
Erzbergeris removii, see AliDa Luckau, The German Dilega'tion at the Peace Con-
erence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), pp. 9&:lo2J 111-121. 
S9February 19, 1919, H81J February 19, 1919, #82. p. 2. 
6Overhandlungen, February 18, 1919, CCCIXVI, 148-149. 
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of Colonial Aifairs in the government was occupied by a Centrist, Dr. Johannes 
Bell. In his ministerial capacity Bell had to denounce the surrender of Ger-
many' s colonies at the lIame time that his party colleague endorsed the propos-
al. Bell solved his dilemma, howevar, and simultaneously defended Erzberger 
by attributing the objectionable surrender to the Allies' greed. They were 
nothing but thieves and robbers, he ins isted. 61 
In a speech delivered at a Colonial Association meeting, Bell remarked, 
''We must not allow this robbery to go unchallenged. • • • We must offer bum-
ing words of protest that we have merited them [the colonies] not only by' pro-
viding for, but also through establishing a respected culture in these 
areas.n62 He expressed similar sentiments in the National Assembly on March 1 
when he denounced the peace proceedings concerning the loss of colonies and 
the economic hardship which such a loss would impose on Gel'll8.DY'.63 Dr. Bell 
continued to wage an unremitting verbal battle both in the National Assembly 
and out of it for retention ot the colonies, later adding to the economic 
arguments the claim that the defense of national honor depended upon a colonial. 
future. 64 At the Allies' suggestion that the colonies be relinquished as part 
ot the pqment of the war indemnity, he told the Na.tional Assembly that GermSV' 
would have to refuse such an offer since the two questions had nothing in 
61Ibid. 
62A report of this speech is given in Germania, February 20, 1919, #83. 
63verhandlungen, ).{arch 1, 1919, CCCIXVI, 411-416. 
64"Against the Robbery of OUr Colonies," article by Dr. Bell, Germa.'"1ia, 
April 12, 1919, 1168, p. 4. 
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common. "our colonies an part of our national honor, It he stated, "Which 
cannot be sold nor estimated in money.,,65 
Ersberger had also found Article 19 of the armistice terms mandating 
German colonies to England and France "completely offensive and against German 
principles.,,66 In a stirring speech delivered before the Prussian Herrenhaus 
in Berlin on )larch 16, Erzberger spoke out against this and many of the other 
"unjust" restrictions he had been forced to accept in the armistice terms. 
He upheld the idea of a peace based on Wilson' 8 Fourteen Points, but acknowl-
edged that the President of the United states had faced difficulties in view 
of the imperialism of the other strong powers. He regretted that Wilson had 
not favored Germany's entrance into the League of Nations. He saw in the 
expulsion of Germans from .Alsace and the sequestration of their property the 
denial of their right of self-determination. As for Poland's aspirations on 
German territory, he rejected both that country's pretensions to Danzig and 
its maneuvers to obtain a Polish corridor b,y annexation. Although he admitted 
Germa~'s moral obligation to ~ for war damage to Belgium, he balked at the 
idea of placing full responsibility for the war and its indemnities upon Ger-
ma.ny. Germans, he felt, should refuse to allow themselves to be led into eco-
nomic and financial slavery. He insisted that the return of German prisoners 
of war was a sine <faa non condition in the peace proceedings. In conclusion, 
Erzberger appeale1 to the German people and the rest of the people of the 
world not to perpetuate the estranged feelings brought about b,y the war, but 
65See the article "The German Colonies and War Indemnity," ~., 
April 29, 1919, #192, p. 4. 
66Ibid., March 17, 1919, #122, p. 4. 
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to attempt to build a European unity of understanding based upon cultural, 
political, and economic cooperation. He reminded the Allies of a statement 
made by Wilson to the U. S. Congress in January, 1918: "We do not wiBh to do 
an injustice to Germany; we wish to give her an equal position within the 
nations of the world. It What Qermans wanted, Erzberger affirmed, was n justice 
and equality ••• no more, no less.,,67 
The Polish-Qerman relationsldp touched upon earlier in Erzberger'. 
speech was another of the very trying difficulties the German government had 
to contend with and was discussed by the National Assemb~ on March 5, 1919.68 
Erzberger's views on Poland which were shared by his own Centrist colleagues 
were reviewed by Qermania in an article entitled, "Erzberger on the Polish 
Question. "69 The eagerness of the Poles to establish a Polish state 11'88 
described by Erzberger as an attempt to "rush things," and the interests of 
the Allies, particular~ of France were motivated; according to Erzberger, 
not by humanitarian reasons but by the desire to weaken Qel"l'lBll1' by strength-
ening Poland. W11son'. demands regarding the establishment of a new Polish 
Republic, Erzberger was willing to recognize, but he inveighed against 
attempts to take from Germany territory which was rightfully hers. "GsmJmy 
Will not be robbed of its inalienable rights of national unity, n he said. 70 
A peace providing for annexation of the dense~ German-populated city of 
Danzig, part of West Prussia, am a part of Upper S11es14 could not be 
67The complete speech is reprinted in Germania, March 17, 1919, #122, 
pp. 3-4. 
6Bverhandlungen, March 5, 1919, CCCXXVI, 507-509. 
69March 24, 1919, #134, pp. 2-.3. 
70~. See also Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 363-365. 
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accepted by the Qennan people. 71 
During the month of April the delegates at Weimar in vehement speeches 
gave vent to their deep concern over the pending peace terms that were being 
formulated by the Allied powers at the FariB Peace Conference. The C8ntriBt 
secretary-general, Ma:x::imilian Pfeiffer, in one of the more passionate speech .. 
delivered on the floor of the National Assembly on April 10, 1919 protested 
against the "current of power politics" of the day. Spurred on by the whole-
hearted encouragement of his colleagues, he continued: 
The peace which is being concluded ought not to be filled with the 
spirit of power, for if it is fUled with this spirit of power, 
it undeniably contains within itself the germ of a new war •••• 
Therefore, in thiB precise moment, we raise our voice in admoni-
tion, in this moment when fate compels us to decision. And I say 
this in unison with the entire constituent National Assembly, that 
that which we have proclaimed is the anguished cry of a people 
tormented to the extreme. (Loud agreement) •••• It peace is 
given to us, then 118 demand that 118 be allowed to give our opinion 
honorably, and, therefore, we offer three requests without which 
there can be no agreement. The three requests we place before 
the conscience of the world, before friends and foe, are: evacu-
ation of occupied territory immediately at the conclusion of 
peace. (Very rightl Bravol); second, the return 01' our captive 
soldiers (lively agreement and applause); thirdlf, lifting the 
blockade (renewed lively agree_nt and stormy applause) •••• 
In view of these convictions and opinions we look forward to the 
peace discussions and its conclusion. I say emphatically-peace 
discussionsl If this peace be not born of a spirit of justice and 
reconciliation, then it will not fulfill its goal. I warn our 
enemies in all earnestness in this decisive hour of our people: 
the time can come when we will be forced to exclaim, Nol To a 
peace of p<JI!8r and force we will not subscribe. (stOI'IIIY 
applause. ) 72 
This piece of oratory was typical of the sentiments expressed by other 
members of the National Assemblf, and came as the climax of a ~ of emotional 
7loerm.ania, }.{arch 24, 1919, #134, p. 3 
72Verhandlungen, April 10, 1919, CCCXXVII, 916-924. 
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speech-maldng. 
One practical piece of business accomplished at this session (April 10) 
was the passage of a bill requesting the formation of a Committee for Peace 
Negotiations. SUbmitted jointly by Adolf GrSber the Centrist and the Majority 
socialist Paul t8be and representatives of other major parties the bill pro-
posed that "The National Assembly should resolve to fom. a Committee for 
Peace Negotiations and to delegate to it a president and twenty-eight 
members." 1.3 
On April 14, Konstantin Fehrenbach, the Centrist president of the 
National Assembly, was named the cha1rm.an of the peace committee-an indicatio 
of its importance. The Center PartY's six members on the twenty-eight-man 
committee included the Party chairman, Gr~berJ Franz Ehrhardt, a trade-union 
secretary fran Upper Silesia; Georg Heim, spokesman for the Bavarian People's 
Party; Wilhelm __ er from Upper Bavaria; the veteran parliamentarian .Peter 
Spahn; and the Rhenish leader, Karl Trimbom.14 
Jmch of the preliminary work for the Paris Peace Conference had been 
prepared by Count Johann Bernstodt who headed a special section within the 
Foreign atfice created for this purpose. With him, Erzberger collaborated 
in friendly fashion until Mal' when a dispute on policy began to set the two 
men at odds)5 Ersberger and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the foreign minister, 
1.3Ibid., p. 961. 
14Ibid., April 15, 1919, CCCIlVII, 10.30. other members on the committee 
includea-II Majority Socialists, 5 Democrats, .3 Nationalists, 2 Independent 
Socialists, and 1 from the German People t s Party. 
15Erzberger describes this common work in Erlebnisse, pp • .366-.361. 
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were also at variance, but this was due to a clash of persona1ities.76 
The first session of the parl1amentar,y peace committee met at Weimar on 
April lS, 1919, to prepare itself for the peace conference. 77 Count Brock-
dorff-Hantzan himself headed the German peace delegation which left for Paris 
in the\1atter part of April to receive the terms worked out by the European 
powers. The delegation consisted of five members, one of whom was the Cent~ 
Johann Giesberts. 78 Erzberger was not a member, since his controversial han-
dling of the armistice negotiations had made it desirable to leave the delega-
tion uncompromised by his membership. 
In a brief cereJDOl1l' at Versailles on May 7, 19l9, the document of peace 
was handed to the Germans. In a letter to his wite, Walter Simons, the 
comraissioner general of the delegation, described the shocked reaction of 
each ot the members . of the Gennan delegation.79 He depicted the Centrist 
delegate, Giesberts, as staggering into a delegation conference on the 
evening or IIa\Y 7, yelling I 
Gentlemen, I am drunk. That _y be proletarian, but with me 
there was nothing else for it. This shameful treaty has broken 
_, for I had believed in Wilson until today. When I talked 
to him in America that Puritan said to me that the parochial 
schools in America were the best. From that day I believed h1Jn 
to be an honest man, and now that scoundrel Bent us Buch a treaty. 
7f1For an explanation ot the difference in character and views of the two 
men, see Epstein, Erzberger, pp. )00-)0). 
77M1nutes of the meeting of April lS, 1919, as translated in Alma lJ1ckau, 
The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Columbia 
Uhiversity PreBS, 1946, pp. 182-188. For a description of the first session 
of the peace committee see ~., 44-46. 
78rhe German peace delegation included two Majority SOCialists, otto 
Landsberg and Robert LeinartJ one Democrat" Carl MelchiorJ and Walter 
schRcking ot the Peoplers Party. 
79walter Simons to hiB wite, Kay 30, 1919, translated ~., 124-128. 
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Right now if I had those fellows sitting opposite me~ilson, Lloyd 
George, and Clemenceau-they would hit the ceiling so hard that 
theY'd stick to it. But I am telling you this, gentlemen ••• 
if t.'lose fellows think that the OerJllUl laborers are going to l'rOrk 
hard for that capitalist gang, theY're wrong, and when they march 
into the mining district, the few hand grenades that'll be needed 
to nood eve ry mine, will be on hand,80 
Such an outburst was not an untypical reaction. Oennan public opinion 
was angered and surprised by the ftenns of the treaty. 81 President Ebert 
proclaimed a week of mouming during which the state governments were asked 
to suspend public amusements for a week. 82 
On ~ 8, Fehrenbach opened the session of the committee for peace ne-
gotiations with the words, "The incredible has happened; our enemies have 
laid before us a treaty which surpasses by' far the fears of our greatest 
pessimists." The president went on to express consternation at the fact 
that Wilson, who had promised the world a peace of justice and equity, could 
have endured being present when this treaty was accepted. Surely, the treaty 
which meant enslavement of the German people was dictated by hate. Soheide-
mann, voicing the opinion of the oabinet, made a comparison between the Four-
teen Points and those articles of the treaty which he considered irreconci~ 
with President Wilson's peace program. He closed the session with a unanimous 
resolution to the effect that the conditions of peace were "unbearable and un-
fulfillable." He recommended that the government endeavor to seoure genuine 
negotiations, and he called for a plenary session of the National Assembly on 
8oIbid., p. 124. 
81Flags were flown half""'lllast in Cologne as a sign of mournirlg, !!" 
May 10, 1919, #365. 
82Pr1nted in oe~J J&ai' 9, 1919, 1208. 
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May 12 in Berlin. 83 
On ~ 9, Dr. Pfeiffer published a declaration to the members or the 
center Party in which he expressed his tear that the "hate-clenched tist" ot 
a darkened peace would crush out all life. "As pawns of humanity," the German 
people were being abused by the Allied powers and condemned to a lasting ser-
vitude. "OUr earnest desire for peace on the basis of reconciliation and 
justice has been disregarded am trampled upon," he said.84 In this hour of 
need, he urged the Centrists to stand finn and. unite behind their leaders to 
preserve peace and concord. 8S The next. day Pfeiffer explained h18 ideas of 
the peace in an article entitled, "A Blow ("Faustschlag") in the r'ace of Man-
kind," in which he noted: "It is apparent that our enemies hate us and wish 
to see us crushed politically and economically. We w11l not accept such dis-
grace impassively.n86 He criticized the complacent attitude of France and 
England in regard to GorDlBllY"s economic plight, waming that they would feel 
the repercussions, for they "have ldlled tho hen that lays the golden egg. H87 
Everywhere voices were raised in bitter disappointment at having been 
denied a treaty based on Ylilson's Fourteen Points. In a message to all the 
electors ot the Center Party, the Party's board of directors described the 
83,A t-eport of the co.u.ttee waa printed in Gormania, Ma1 9, 1919, #208, 
p. 3; also in!!, ~ 10, 1919, #363. 
84oermania, ibid. In the same issue, oermania carried an editorial highl;p 
critical ot thft treaty. It felt that the Whole proceedings ot the Peace Con-
ference depicted a complete bankruptcy of Wilson's peace offerings, see. p. 1. 
8SIbid.; also KV, JIay ll, 1919, 11366. 
- -
86oerman1a, JIay 10, 1919, 11209, p. 2. 
87 Ibid. 
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" peace terms as "unbearable, unfulfillable, and insincere" ("unertragl1ch, 
h 
unertullbar, und unaufrichtig"). Such a peace meant impoverishment, servitude 
and national dismemberment, for the financial stipulations were "unfulfill-
able," and the territorial demands were "unbearable." Insisting that the 
Allied powers had broken their word about a just peace, the Center demanded 
new peace terma-a peaoe of "reconcU1ation and justice.n88 
The Qeman National .Assembly met on May 12 in special session at Berlin 
to discuss the terms of the treaty. The Chancellor opened the -proceedings 
with a savage attack on the treaty, using the terms that had been on the 
tongues of Germana ever since its publication. It was a "terrible and mrder-
ous 'Hexenhammer t ."; no honorable man would accept these "unbearable, unfultUl 
able, and unacceptable" terms. He W'amed that "the hand should wither which 
signed a treaty plaoing Germany in such intolerable fettellt,,89 For five hours 
speakers from all parties orit1cized the treaty severely. GrSber, speaking 
for the Center, expressed simiJar sentiments against "forced peace" but was 
careful to avoid using the term "unacceptable,,,90 sinoe Erzberger had 
impressed upon hill the importance of avoiding the lIOrd.91 
During this session of the National Assembly, two other Centrists de-
nounced the harsh terms of the treaty in the name of the people of the enemy-
occupied territories. Joseph Bitta It'88 delegated to speak for the people of 
88hAn die Zentrumswahler," ~., May ll, 1919, #211. 
89verhandlungen, MaiY 12, 1919, cCcmII, 1082-1084. Erzberger and 
German1'& criticized Scheidemann' s eJOOtional rejection of the treaty as "unac-
cePEaban as leading the nation into a position from which it would find it 
difficult to retreat. See Erlebnisse, p. 368; Germania, May 13, 1919, #21.3. 
9OIbid., pp. 1087-1089. 
9lErzberger, ~lebnisse, p. 369. 
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upper SUssia and Helene Weber for those in Eupen and Malmedy.92 Atter 
similar protests from delegates speaking in the name of inhabitants of ather 
territories lost to Germany, President Fehrenbaoh olosed the d,y's disoussion 
with a fiery extemporaneous speech.93 He deolared that the power and una-
n1m1ty of the delegates' demonstrations against the treaty was "a great oon-
solation." He summed up the sessj.on' s proceedings in the following words I 
The course of to~, s proceedings is a great oomfort in these 
tr,ying times. It is a powerful, united, solid demonstration 
of the entire representation of the German people against the 
violent peact treaty that they [Allies] wish to diotate to us. 
one can hardly speak of different shades, of different moods; 
no, the mood of all the &peakers was equally ardent, This 
peaoe 1RI oannot accept. 9 
Fehrenbach expressed the hope that the German people in their parliament as 
well as in spontaneous mass meetings throughout Germany might convinoe the 
Allied and Associated powers of the neoessity of a thoroughgoing revision 
of the tems of peace. He thanked all those in neutral countries who had 
raised their voices on behalf of Germany. But, asa devout Catholio, he 
said, he felt surprise that not a single bishop or clergyman in the world 
had oond8Dl1ed this treaty aB, "haVing no part in 8i Christian era.n9S In h1a 
final sentenoe, Fehrenbaoh addressed the Allies and urged them to think of 
92Ibid., pp. 1094-1095; l1OS. 
-
930ustavstresemann praised the speech as being the greatest of t be dq 
in sinoerity and effect. See Oustav Stresemann, Von dar Revolution bis zum 
Frieden von Versailles: Reden und Autsltze. (BerlIn: Staatspoliflischer 
Verag, 1919), pp. 110:171. 
94Verhandlungen, Mq 12, 1919, CCCXXVII, lllq-llll. 
95Cardinal Hartmann, Archbishop of Cologne, later requested Pope ~8nedict 
XV to intervene on behalf of Germany in order to save her from the complete 
foreign breakdown which menaced her. He also addressed the Catholics of the 
world for help, understanding, and justice. See "The Qerman Catholics to the 
Catholics of the World,tt Germania, __ lS, 1919, #217, p. 3. 
I 
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their own children and grandchildren, for the concanitant hardships of this 
treaty would create a generation in German;y in whan "the will to break the 
chain of slavery would be implanted fran chUdhood on ... 96 The dramatic 
session was brooght to a close with all the members rising and singing: 
"Deutschland nber alles'" 97 
The iJDmed1ate response to the DB. n1fold appeals for protest demonstra-
tions .... 8.8 nationwide; it wa-s expressed by means of mass meetings and vindictive 
newspaper articles. The Catholic social unions and associations in Berlin 
and other clities of Germany whose leaders were Centrist delegates staged mass 
demonstrations. Criticism centered generally on the economic restrictions 
placed on Germany and the blockade which 11'88 still in foroe. All demanded a 
new peace baaed on "justice and reconcUiation."98 On.., 11 fifteen prominent 
politiCians, parliamantarians, and representatives of various Catholic sooial 
unions and associations met in Berlin to protest in the name "of justioe, of 
Christian morality, and of oulture" against the "foroed peace.,,99 
On the same dq, Johannes Bell, the Centrist minister of colonies, ad-
dressed a large assembly in Berlin on the subject of Gezmany's foreign colo-
nies. In a stirring speech he reiterated mmy of his previous arguments for 
retention of the German colonies. He stressed the humanistic, cultural, al d 
scientific advantages that had come to the oolonies as a result of Germany's 
96verhandlungen, ~ 12, 1919, CCCIXVII,·llll. 
97Ib1d. 
98oermania, IIay' 13, 1919, #213, Supplement: May 14, 1919, #215; May lS, 
1919, 121(; ~ 20, 1919, #225. 
99Ib.1d., MB¥ 13, 1919, #213, oontained a manifesto drawn up by this 
group. '.l'fiiY also published a second manifesto ~., )fq lS, 1919, #217. 
efforts in the colonial world.1OO The loss of Qeraan colonies was a cause of 
great concern to German Catholic Missionary Societies.10l The Catholic Church 
feared for the fate of the Catholic missions in the German colonies .102 
The last hopes of the Oeman delegation l.q in a caref'ully prepared, 
comprehensive study of the treaty. While this work was being compiled, 
members of the delegation and the government cabinet met on ~ 18 and M~ 22 
at Spa in Belgium to arrive at a concensU8 of opinion on the policy to be 
pursued. Erzberger had arranged the meetings after unsuccessfully attempting 
to 1ntluence the course of negotiations at Versailles through hi. Party 
colleague, Giesberts.10) 
Between the two meetings Enberger ex:perimen ted in a characteristic 
piece of amateur diplomacy and attempted to negotiate with President Wilson 
without the knowledge of Rantsau and the German peace delegation.104 Ersber-
ger's offer secured no repq from President Wilson mo probabq disdained 
engaging in negotiations behind the back of the Allies. Though keenly dia-
appointed at the total failure of his diplomatic efforts Ersberger, neverthe-
less, clung to his fundamental conviction that the treaty IIIIl8t be signed. 105 
lOOaerman1a, May 16, 1919, ,219. 
101See the editorial in Oermania, )lay 20, 1919, 11225.. Erzberger, 
Erlebn1sse, p. 368. 
102Rome hoped to be able to preserve the Catholic German missions and 
sent a papal nuncio to Versailles to intercede in behalf of the Qerman 
missions. See!!, June 10, 1919, #447. 
10JEnberger, Erlebn1sse, pp. 371-375. 
lD4Foran account of the Conger mission, see Frits T. Epstein, "Zwiachen 
Compiegne und Versailles," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgesohiohte, III 
(stuttgart, 19$5), pp. 4l2-42i5. 
10$Ibid., 443-416. Ersberger was later oritioised severely for negotia-
ting wi~ Allies behind the baok of Rantaau. By posing as the leader of 
p 
At the second conference between the cabinet members and the members ot 
the peace delegation held at Spa on lIq 22, Erzberger's proposal that the 
acceptance of the disarmaJll8nt of Gezma.ny ~ made contingent on gene;ral dis-
armament was rejected by Rantzau. other elements of disagreement were also 
evident; nevertheless, many of Ersbergerts proposals won the ~.106 The 
final. drafting of Germany's counterproposals, however, was left to the 
plenipotentiaries at Versailles.107 
The German delegation's last appeal., considered by the Allies between 
May 29 and June 2, was not without effect, so that for a time it appeared 
that an equitable settlement might ultimately be reached. However, the reply 
of the President of the Paris Peace Conference delivered at VersaUles on 
June 16 together with the revised treaty soon dispelled this hope.108 
Erzherger, nonetheless, fearing that Rantzau. and his delegation would 
recOJlUll8nd rejection of the treaty after their return to Ge~, determined 
that the final decision would be undertaken by the cabinet made without the 
pressure of a time limit set by t he Allies. Therefore, on JUne .3 and 4, while 
the Geman delegation was still exchanging notes with the Allies at Versailles, 
he forced a cabinet discussion of the question, "to sign or not to sign." The 
the group for acceptance of the treaty, he exposed the internal dissention of 
the German cabinet. For a valiant defense of Erzberger's actions, see naus 
Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 309-313. 
l06stresemann, in reference to the decisive treatment of the peace terms 
noted that if the history of that period were ever written, it should rightly 
be cal.led "the Erzbergor era." See stresemam, Von der Revolution, pp. 172-
17.5. 
107Erzberger, Erlebn1Bse, pp. 369-370. 
l08Luckau, German Del6!rition, p. 89. The revised treaty was a copy of the 
draft of IfIO" 7 1ri ifiich c.. ges had been made with red ink. 
basis of these discussions was a written memorandum of his own vi81f8 made at 
the request of Scheidemann. It the treaty were signed, Erzberger's notation 
advised, heav,y burdens would be Placed upon Germa~. Taxes, for example, 
would be crushing but business would be opened.109 other advantages would 
be gained: pr1eone1'8 of war would retum. Poland 'WOuld be forced to 
terminate its aggressive designs. The unity of Germany would be preserved. It, 
however, the treaty were not signed, the rejection would result in three major 
catastrophesJ 
1. The dissolution of national unity and the establishment of 
several German states. The hatred of the various states 
against Prussia, which is widely blamed for the present 
catastrophic situation, would make the separation a per-
manent one. 
2. Peace eventually would have to be made, but it would be 
signed by the several diff'erent states separately. They 
would be obligated under imposed terms to pledge them-
selves not to enter into any- future German national state. 
Such a peace would be stillworee than that now proposed. 
). The overthrow of the govemment and its replacement by 
Independent Sooialists and Communists, dissolution of the 
arrq, and anarchy throughout the entire country .llO 
The majority of the cabinet members on June .3-4 were sharply opposed to 
acceptance of the treaty_ Neither were Erzberger's opinions shared by his 
Centrist colleague, Giesberts, in the peace delegation. Nevertheless, the 
adamant leader insisted that there was no alternative to acceptance short of 
a renewal of hostilities and an enem,y invasion in the Southnst.lll To his 
opponent's arguments that the treaty would be dishonorable, Erzberger replied 
that: 
109Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. )71-372. 
110Ibid., pp. 372-37). 
lllIb1d. 
There was no dishonor if we signed under olear duress, provided 
we announce the fact that we were signing under duress. Suppose 
someone tied my arms and placed a loaded pistol against my chest, 
and asked me to sign a paper obligating me to olimb to the moon 
within forty-eight hours. .As a thinking man I would sign to save 
my lite, but would at the same time say openly that the demand 
simply oould not be fulfilled. The moral situation presented by 
the Entente demand to sign the treaty was exaotly of the same 
kind.ll2 
But this argument did not prevail with the cabinet; only three members, namely 
the Majority Sooialists Eduard David, Wolfgang Heiner, and Gustav Noske, agreed. 
with Erzberger. The Democrat ministers were in vehement opposition to ratifi-
oation. Erzberger'8 party colleagues, Giesberts and Bell, also opposed.113 
With the ooalition cabinet divided over the issue, the position to be 
taken by the center Party assumed great importance. As so otten before in 
German history, the center Party's decision would prove to be the act whioh 
would shift the parl1am&ntary balance. A Socialist-center coalition oould 
obtain a majority tor ratifioation, while an anti-treaty majority ooalition 
could reach trom the Center to the Nationalists. Erzberger worked untiringly 
at a series ot Party meetings at Weimar beginning on June 13, to rally the 
center faction to the CAuse for ratification. Erzberger repeated his argument 
that there was no alternative to acceptance short ot a renewal of hostilities 
and an enemy invasion in the Southwest. This was instrumental in winning over 
some or his colleagues, espeoially those who oame from areas whioh wruld sutf'al" 
most from a resumption of hostilities.114 Nearly all agreed that renewed 
112Ibid., p. 314. 
113The cabinet sessions Qf June 3-4 are described in Ibid. ~ pp. 312-375 J 
Scheidemannj }lemoires II, 36tl-312j stresemann, Von dar ReVtJ1'trt,l.on, pp. 112-
115. . 
114Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 315. 
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militar,y resistance was unthinkable, but many of the Centrists felt that they 
could not bring themselves to vote for a treaty which included the dishonorable 
Articles 227 and 231.11.5 On June 14 a "well-known representative" of the 
Party refused to accept the treaty because he felt acceptance would shame the 
honor of the nation for "all eternity.n1l6 GrBber, however, supported 
Erzberger's views on acceptance and declared, "Hay the Party perish, if it 
does not support the Reich.,,117 
On June 16, 1919, the Entente presented Germany with a seven-da."r ultima-
tum either to accept the treaty or to face invasion. Humiliated and embittel1t<i. 
the German delegation lett Versailles determined to rejec.t the treaty. But 
the grim defiance of the delegation was no longer representative of the German 
people. The Allied blockade had been exacting its toll, and the possibility 
of renewed hostilities hung heavily over the German nation. The people were 
disgruntled with the prolonged peace parleys and were interested only in their 
termination. Under the influence of this change in the popular attitude, gov-
ernment proceedings were taking a turn.U8 Erzberger's strenuous efforts to 
organize a majority in favor of acceptance were bearing fruit. The cabinet 
meeting of June 18 indica ted the gains he had made among his colleagues. 
11.5Ibid. 
ll6aermania, June 1.5, 1919, #267, the article reporting the Party caucus 
on June 14 did not name the ~ll-known representative." 
117Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 375. Erzberger does not name GrBber as the 
one who made the statemlht;, but Uors8Y, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923, p. 18.5, 
cites statements from seven Centrists who verified that the statement was 
made by:Gr~ber. 
llBaichard iuenzer, "Die Aussenpolitik des Zentrums," in National. Arbeit, 
p. 86. The author was a prominent Centrist and a contemporary or the period. 
... 
117 
Whereas the vote in early June had been 10 to 4 against ratification, 'it was na 
7 to 7. Two Centrists, Bell and Gieaberts, and one additional Socialist now 
converted to Erzberger's views. The cause tor ratification was further strength 
ened by the virtually unanimous support ot the premiers ot the various German 
states, especially those fram the South who feared the French invasion.1l9 
By June 19 Erzberger was able to muster tour-titths ot the Centrists to 
tavor acceptance it the Articles 221 and 231 were expunged from the treatyJ120 
but sixteen ot their number opposed this compromise despite Erzberger's assur-
ance that the Allies would not insist upon the retention ot the "points ot 
honor. "121 
Since the Center leadership was mot able to rally their entire membership 
it was decided that in view ot the grave responsibility, the Party would not 
require the customary vote en bloc, but would allow each member to vote on the 
treaty and be answerable only "before God, his conscience, and the Gennan 
people. "122 
As a result ot the vote in the various party caususes, Scheidemann re-
signed as chancellor. Centrists and the Majority Socialists agreed 1;0 accept 
the treaty provided Articles 221 and 231 were withdrawn. The Democrats were 
adamant in their complete rejection. This inability to come to tenDs brought 
119Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 376-378. 
l20aerm&nia, June 20, 1919, 1215. 
~emorandUJll ot Wilhelm Mayer and Johann Bell, as cited in A.lma Lackau, 
"Unconditional Acceptance ot the Treaty ot Versailles by the German Government, 
June 22-28, 1919," Journal ot Modern History, VII (September, 1945), pp.218-215 
122Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 315. also Report ot the Meet1ff' June 19, 
1919, a8 c1ted in Kuenzer, "A.ussenpo11t1k des !entrums," p. 86. , June 21, 
1919, #419. --
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the short-lived Weimar coalition to an abrupt end.12J A new government amen-
able to a conditional acceptance of the Versailles Treaty had to be arranged. 
11 In the Center faction meeting held on June 21, Grober emphasized the urgent 
need for the Centrists to cooperate immediately with the Majority Socialists 
in forming such a government: "We have a moral duty, a responsibility before 
God and the German people, for whose destiny we are responsible ••• to save 
what can be saved. Therefore, we must seek to form a government with the 
Majority Socialist alone if others refuse. u124 
The Centrists thought that Scheidemann's successor would be the SPI> 
chairman lIermann Mllner and that perhaps Giesberts would not be able to return 
as minister in the new cabinet.125 But once organized the new government es-
tablished on June 21, 1919, with the SPD Gustav Bauer as chancellor included 
four Centrists in the cabinet. Erzberger was appointed Vice-chancellor as 
well as Minister of Finance. Since the Democrats were against acceptance, 
the ministry was composed onl1' of Centrists am Majority SOCialists.126 The 
other Centrists were Giesberts as Jl1n1ster for Postal Affairs, Bell as )(inistel 
12JSee Eugen Schiffer's speech in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen, 
June 22, 1919, CCCmII, 1118-1120; Enberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 3/9-380; 
Germania, June 22, 1919, #218; also editorial nflaa nun?1i in KV, June 20, 1919, 
#47$. -
l24Report of the meeting, June 21, 1919, as cited in Kuenzer, uAussen-
politik des Zentrums," p. 89. 
125Germania, June 20, 1919, #215. 
l26rhe Democrats resented the role taken by the Centrists and were ex-
tremely oritical. Germania defended the Centrist position and stressed that 
the Center voted for acceptance only under protest. The new organ felt confi-
dent that if despite the heavy difficulties facing Ge~, the people united 
behind the concerted efforts of the government, they wOllld find a wq to 
surmount all obstaoles. See the editorial in June 21, 1919, #216. 
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'for colonial Affairs, and Wilhelm ~r-Kaufbeuren as Minister of Treasury. 
Erzberger 'WOuld have liked to include individual Democrats in the ministry not 
as delegates of their party, but as private individuals; however, his plana di 
not materialize. He had also hoped to head a new ministry of transportation 
in order to effect the great work of railroad nationalization contemplated b.Y 
the National Assembly.127 In this, too, he was disappointed. His position as 
head of the finance ministry he accepted with reluctance knowing how di.:Cficult 
a post it would be.l28 
The goverrment :1.mmediately set to the task of persuading the National. 
Assembly to ratifY the Versailles Treaty. On June 22, just twenty-four hours 
before the expiration of the Allied deadline, Bauer called upon the delegates 
of the National Assembly to rise above party politics in their action on the 
treaty and support; the new gOV81"D1l8Ilt .129 "The government of the German 
Republic is ready to sign the peace treaty," Bauer announced, "but without 
aclmowledg1ng thereby that the German people are the responsible authors of the 
World War, and without accepting Art;icles 227 and 231 ... 130 In the ensuing 
parl1amentar,y debate the centrists and the Majority Socialists stressed the 
necessity for responsible leadership in the period of crisis. The treaty was 
to be accepted cOnditionally only in order to prevent continued suffering and 
to preserve the unity of the nation.131 The Right reiterated its refueal. 
l27Erlebnisse, p. 378. 
12~Ibid., pp. 318-379. 
-
129verhandlungen, June 22, 1919, CCCINII, lll3-1l.l.5. 
l.30Ibid., p. 1115. 
131~., pp. lllS-1l22. G~ber spoke for the center and Paul r,gbe spoke 
for theJliJority Socialists. The Independents consistently supported 
acceptance, see Erlebnisse, pp. 319-380; Germania, June 22, 1919, #278. 
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When the question was put to a vote, 237 deputies voted for the accept-
ance and 1)8 opposed it. The Center's vote was: acceptance, 78; refusal, 9; 
abstaining, 2; absent, 2. Most of those who opposed conditional acceptance 
were from eastern districts which were to become Polish or which would border 
poland. Those Centrists who refused acceptance included Karl Ollmert, an 
editor from Saarbrtlcken; Maria Schmitz, a school teacher from the Rhineland; 
Wilhea Schllimaer, a labor secretary from Danzig; Thomas Szczeponik, a school 
official from Posen; Joseph Bitta, a jurist fram BreslauJ B~holom8W Koss-
marm, a labor secretary from Coblenz; Johannes Herschel, a lawyer from BreslaUl 
Alexander Schneider, a government official from Bavaria; and Herman Colshorn, 
a large landowner and "Hospitant" of the Center Party. 132 
Despite the hopeful expectations of the new coalition government, the 
Allies rejected Qe~'s conditional acceptance and demanded unconditional 
acceptance within twenty-four hours. The ultimatum was received at 9 P.M. on 
June 22; the deadline for acceptance was set for 7 P.M. on June 23, 1919.133 
)(any deputies had already left Weimar convinced that the conditionalterDlll!l 
would be accepted. At 11 P.M., leaders of the Weimar Coalition, including the 
Democratic Party's leaders, met in President Ebert's rooms to discuss the tum 
of events. As the evening wore on, other leaders joined the gathering. By 
1 A.M. of June 23, the two Centrist leaders Trimborn and GrBber, who had rus 
back to Weimar, joined the meeting. At 8 A.M. a cabinet meeting was held. 
GU8tav Noske, Minister of Defense, and General Uaercker informed the members 
that in case of rejection the a~ was too small to maintain order. 
132Verhandlungen, June 22, 1919, CCCXXVII, 1136-1138. 
133&rlebnisse, p. 380. 
5 
JSl 
Aoceptance might bring a military coup or a mass resignation of ~ offioers. 
The leaders retired to hold party caucuses.134 
Erzberger and his Centrist colleagues were shaken by the Entente's reply 
and by rumors of an officers' revolt should Germany sign the treat.y. A Center 
meeting held on the mOrning of June 23 reversed the centrist. previous stand 
and declared, by an overwhelming majority (against o~ fourteen votes), that 
the treaty must be rejected in view of the Allied intransigence.135 The 
Bavarians Georg Heim and Alexander Schneider left the Party as a protest 
against even considering acceptance .136 Erzberger 11'88 forced to acquiesce in 
a decision he felt. powerless t.o ohange.137 
A dilemma was created for the government b.Y the Center's new position, 
for the Center's vote provided a theoretical majority opposed to the rat1fica-
tion of the Versailles terms. The coalition government formed for the purpose 
of accepting the treaty was alread,y dissolving, and an altemat.e govemm.ent 
11'&8 unavailable since both the Center and the Democrats were umrilling to form 
a coalition with the Nationalists against the Socialists.138 The Allies were 
to march into Germany in the early evening if the treaty 11'&8 not uncondition-
ally ratified by that time. A conferenoe of party leaders met at noon with 
134l4eIllOrandum, as cited in Luckau, "Unconditional Acceptance, lip. 218. 
13.5KV, June 23, 1919, #4B4; Germania, June 23, 1919, #279; June 24, 1919, 
#281. -
136oermania, June 23, 1919, #279. A few dq's later Schneider retum.d. 
137Er1ebnisse, p. 380; the best account of the center's meeting is in the 
Memorandum. prepared by __ er and Bell, cited in Luckau, "Uncondi. tional. Accept-
ance,ii p. 218. Later Ersberger remarked, "It seemed to be Germany's fatal 
hour: anarchy by rat.ification, anarctv by rejection." Er1ebnisse, p. 381. 
138lbid., p. 381-383; Payer, Von Revolution, p. 300. 
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President Ebert to resolve the issue. Erzberger asked the opponents of rat1fi 
cation if they were willing to form a new government that would face renewed 
hostilities. The Democrats, the German People's Part;y, and the German 
National People's Party all replied in the negat1ve.139 
Conditions seemed to have reached an impasse when a decision in favor 
of unconditional ratification was promoted by two unexpected developments. 
General Groaner of the Supreme Oommand when asked by Ebert whether the treaty 
should be ratified, replied that he recommended acceptance not as an officer, 
but as a German. He assured Ebert that the officers would remain at their 
post even if the treaty were accepted. l4O Groaner's assurance W88 inatru-
mental in calming one of the two apprehensions that had influenoed the 
Center's cauous vote against unconditional acceptance.141 
The other difficulty concerning the points of honor was solved for the 
Centrists by a proposal Dade by. Karl Heinze, leader of the People's Party. He 
suggested a parliamentary maneuver whereby the authorization given to the 
government the previous dq to sign the treaty conditionalq would' be enlarged 
to convey an authorization to sign unconditionally as well. Heinze also sug-
gested that the parties opposing ratification agree to make deolarations in 
which they would affirm their faith in the national loyalty of the deputies 
who voted for acceptance even though their own parties would reject the 
treaty.l42 
139 Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 383; ~er, Von Revolution, 301-304. 
140 Telegram of Groener to the Reich President Ebert, June 23, 1919, cited 
in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 386. 
141 Erlebnisse, p. 381. 
l42 Ibid., pp. 382-383. 
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The plenar,y session of the National Assembly was opened in the afternoon 
of the same ~ (June 23) b,y Bauer. The chancellor raised his voice in a f~ 
protest: "At the hour of life and death, under the menace of invasions, for 
the last time I raise in free Germany a protest against this mockery of selt-
determination, this enslavement of the German people, this new menace to the 
peace of the world under the mask of a treaty of peace. "143 Bauer, neverthe-
less, realized that protesting was useless since Germany's power of resistance 
was broken and they had no means of averting the treaty. The only gleam of 
hope was "the handle" given b.r the treaty, namely, the Entente's solemn 
praaise of June 16, 1919, that the treaty could be revised from time to time 
and adapted to new conditions. This was one of the few terms in the treaty 
"breathing the real spirit of peace. "l44 
Chancellor Bauer's reading of Clemenceau's rejection of Ge~'s con-
ditional acceptance provoked oonaiderable reaction in the assembly. Fehren-
bach's firm leadership kept the Gerft\Bl\ Nationalists from obstructing action by 
demaIliing a new vote.145 The Demoorats and the German People's Party coopera-
ted to avoid a new vote and, as agreed, publicly reiterated their confidence 
in the patriotism of the government plrties. Ever,yth1ng was carried off 
smoothly. ar8'ber spoke a ffJ'll words pointing out that his Party accepted the 
treaty because tea new war above all JDlSt be avoided." The Party still asserted 
that the proposals were "unbearable" and "unfulfillable," but they had no othel 
l43verhandlungen, June 23, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1139. 
144Ibid. 
145Ibid., p. 1141. 
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alternative. The Party placed the welfare of the natiOl'l, above Party interests. 
In view ot the circumstances, acceptance was an "absolute necessity." There 
would, at least, be some benefits, for the treaty would bring back a hundred 
thousand war prisoners. "Millions of our relatives wait with eagemess for the 
moment their fathers, husbands, and brothers will again be in their midsts. ,,146 
Fehrenbach rose to the occasion with a brief but noble declaration made all the 
more effective by his emotional delivery. In the throes of deep emotion, he 
closed the session with a prayer which recommended "our unfortunate Fatherland 
to the protection of the meroifUl Ood."147 
The Centrist Dr. Bell and Dr. MIDer, a Majority Social Democrat, under-
took the fateful mission to Versailles.148 The treaty waa signed on June 28, 
1919. ~ July 8, 1919, it was ratified despite the bitter denunciations ot 
the delegates trom the extreme Right.149 Spahn speaking far the Center noted 
that his Party accepted only as a last resort to aave Oel'llUlllY from complete 
chaos and destruction.l'O 
The reaction ot the Centrist news organa, Oermania and the K8lni8che 
Volkaseitunl, was moderate cOIlpared to the Rightist newspapers. The Centrist 
146Ibid• 
-147 . 1!?!2.., pp. 1139-1140. 
148Bell was reluctant to become a signer because of a conflict of con-
SCience, and accepted the odious assignment only after repeated supplications 
by Ebert and his cabinet. See Bell's Memorandum, cited in Luckau, "Unoondi-
tional Acoeptance," p. 219. 
149verhandlungen, July 9, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1421-1423. The Center Party 
cast 6$ votes tor acceptance, 10 for refusal. Hone abstained in this vote, but 
there were 13 absent and 3 listed as ill. 
150Ibid., p. 1409; Germania, June 2$, #282. 
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press counseled sober acceptance of the hard realities, a slow process of 
regeneration for Germany, and international understanding. The KV wrote: 
We stand t~ upon the threshold of an historic and signifioant 
event. It matters little when and where the treaty is signed, 
or who plaoes his signature to it. . •• We tinally have received 
a peace for which we have waited since November 11 • • • one for 
which we have waited so long, so painfully as no other people on 
earth, for never has an armistice of such diffioul ty and such 
duration ever been inflicted before.15l 
Qermania considered the event a black period of history, but it stressed that 
it was not the time to waste on useless vindictiveness. A new period had 
opened before the Gennan people. They must work untiringly to surmount the 
obstacles ahead. Germany was now free to take stock of the future and begin 
to look ahead to a period of reconstruction and hard work.152 
The deep nationalist resentment over the treaty discussion, however, 
left a profound mark on the Qennan mentality. The varr not to torget was re-
iterated on all sides.153 The acceptance of the Versailles Treaty spared 
Germany a further Allied invasion, but it brought upon the accepting parties 
the opprobrium of the nationalists. The center Party had accepted the harsh 
terms of the treaty only after serious and responsible consideration of the 
desperate alternative confronting Qermany.154 Erzberger defended the view of 
the parlianentary majority in the National Assembly by stating: "The peace 
l51June 24, 1919, #485. 
l52July 9, 1919, #307. 
lSJVerhandlungen, ~ 9, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1408-1409. 
154centr1st delegates were inspired by "the honorable conviction" that 
they were fultilling their dut;y b;y acceptance. See Braun's speech in the 
National Assembly ibid., ~ 2S, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1892. 
-
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had to be concluded in order to save the unity of' the Reich. "lSS But neither 
Erzberger nor his supporting colleagues had any way of' knowing at the time 
that the consequences of acceptance would be so catastrophic for Germany. The 
conscientious Centrists who had placed love for the Fatherland higher than 
Party interests and personal concern and signed the treaty were now grouped 
with the "November criminals," and placed high on the German Nationalists I 
"black list" as "traitors of the Fatherland. nlS6 
1.5SIbid., p. 1942. 
1.56Lutz, Demokratie 1m Z1I'ielicht, p. 7S. 
CHAPTER IV 
DELIBERATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION 
CENTRIST Vlm~S ON POLITICAL ASP~TS 
While the peace negotiations were being carried on at Versailles, the 
National Allambly gathered at Weimar was engaged in another project of major 
significance, namely, the work of drawing up a constitution for the new re-
public of Germany. Begun in January, deliberations on this 1Ilportant document 
were destined to drag on over a period of nea rl,. seven months. Before the 
final acceptance of the constitution by the Constituent Assembly on July 31, 
1919, there would be endlels proposals and counter-proposals as well as re-
jections and compromises, in all of which the Center Party would be uniquely 
mvolved. 
On February 24, 1919, a draft constitution vas presented to the ASlembly 
by Dr. Hugo PreuII, a diltinguished jurist and mellber ot the Democratic Part,..l 
In eKplaining his propoled document, Preusl touched upon two baSic theoretical 
queltiona of particular concern to the Centristl. the degree of centrali,ation 
Ipreuss' Qnicle, "Volk.ltaat oder verkehrter Obrigkeitsstaat," in the 
Berliner Tageblatt, November 14, 1919, 11583, proposed plans for a democratic 
constitution to be drawn up by a univerlally elected National Alsembl,.. The 
article. attracted IlUCh attention. Ql November lS Ebert entrusted Preuss vi th 
the tasle of formulating such a prelim1riary constitution. This draft vas then 
subdtted to a oonterence ot States' representatives appointed by Ebert which 
met trom January 26 to February 21, 1919, and made several adjustments. See 
Konrad Beyerle, Zehn Jahre Reich8Verfas~J (M6nchenl Verlag Max Hueber, 
1919), pp. 17-18. 
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in the new goyernment structure, and the plan for the dismemberaent of Pruasia.2 
Much of the deliberations in Weimar in the next .onths concerning the political 
aspects of the constitution would revolve around these two questions. The Cen-
ter would be called upon to choose between a republic or IIOnarchy for Ge1'llUlny, 
to select a new nag or retain the old, to support a federal or unitary govern-
ment, to divide Prussia or to continue Pruss1an hegeaony over Gel'll8n affairs, 
to support or to check the separatist lIoveaents in Prussia. These and other 
poll tical issues which Preuss formulated in his original constitutional draft 
were laid before the 'ss.bly. 
Following the first reading of the draft conati tution, there began on 
February 28 a long session of speech-uking which continued on through March 3 
and 4, as spoke.en for the various parties expres.ed their views on the 
liberal, d eaocratic docUllent. Speaking for the Center, Dr. Peter Spahn ac-
cepted the idea of a republic tor the Reich and told of his Party's desire to 
work for a new order that would be "honorablv deaocratic" and "reasonably 
SOCial, II an order with "a Christian character for all Germans.,,3 He spoke of 
the state as an "ethical organi_" which emanated froll the nature of"volunt&ry 
authority." Thts volunta17 authority was the "state power." It was the goverft .. 
ment. Therefore, he challenged Preuss' state.ent that "Die Steatagewalt. liegt 
baill Volk •• ..4 Parroting much of the tradit.ion party line 1n his speech, Spahn 
noted that as traditional advocates of a Bundes.taat, the Center Part,- could 
not accept Preuss' proposal tor an Einheitastaat. The Party would tavor 
2verhandlungen, February 24, 1919, CCCXIVI, 284-294. 
3Ibid., February ~~, 1919, CCCnVI, 379. 
4Ibid• 
'I 
I' 
3 
159 
strengthening the Reich's central authority in sOlIe areas, but it insisted that 
control over relig1oua, educational, and cultural affairs should be retained bT 
the States.5 
Because of the conflicting views on the consU tutional draft expressed in 
the National Assembl7, it was deemed necessary to establish a constitutional 
cOJllllittee drawn trOll members of the Assembly to consider the draft point by 
point. The cOJlllll1 tWe was expected to resolve party dilterences on .. jor pro-
visions before returning the document to the National Assembly tor a second and 
third reading. 6 It cClllprised twenty-eight members selected trOll the live lead-
ing parties in the National Assembly. Six were Centrists,7 ot whoa tour held 
permanent assignaenw: Graber, Spahn, Tr1Jaborn, and a newcomer to parliaaenta17' 
11te, Konrad Beyerle.8 These tour Centrists played prC81nent roles in tONu-
lating difterent sections of the constitution, each man serving as a Berichter-
--
statter for his respective sectiona Spahn on legislation, Gr&ber on Church and 
school affairS, Tn.bom on administration of justice and division on the 
Linder, and Beyerle on the section on "Fundamental Rights." The other two 
'rbid., pp. 376-383. 
6~D!!, March 5, 1919, #10.$. 
7Besides these _bers, there were twelve Socialists, five German Dem-
crats, three aeman Nationalists, and two _embers of the People's Party. For 
an assessment ot the coapetency of these ... bers, see Beyerle, Reicbavertassuns 
pp. 11-1.$, Ziegler, Nationalvers8lllll.ung, pp. lll-1l2J Bachem, !!ntruupartei, 
VIII, 288-289. 
8Konrad Beyerle (1872-1933) studied at. the univereities ilt Munich ar..d 
Heidelberg, receiving his Doctor ot Law degree in 189,3. He taught at the Uni-
verai \y of O&t.tingen in 1906, the Uni versi t.,. of Bonn in 1917, and was prot-
fessor ot history at the universities of heiburg, a8ttingen, Bonn, and Munich. 
He served as vice-president ot the G3rres-Oesellscbatt tor a number of years 
and edited ita SUpplement tor Law and Social Science. 
... ----------------------------------
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appointments were held interchangeably by other prominent Centrist delegates--
the three clerics: Franz Hiue, Heinrich Braune, and Joseph MaU8bach,9 a school 
director, Anton Rheinllnder. a social worker, Frau NeuhausJ and the labor 
leader, Adam. Stegerwald. These members, paired as teau, worked on the sec-
tions in which they were most experienced I Rheiclnder and Mauabach in the area 
ot religion and Christian education; Father Brauns and Frau Neuhaus on the 
social aspecta ot the constitution; and Hitse and Stegerwald on the social-
economic sections ot the constitution.10 
Deliberations b7 the constitutional camaittee began immediately on 
March 4. Proceeding systematically yet not without an occasional digression, 
the coaittee considered the paragraphs and articles ot Preuss' constitution 
in the order of sequence.ll The tirst ot the sections considered had to do 
with the relationship between the Reich and its _ber states ("Das Reich unci 
seine Gl1edstaaten") .12 Since this was a problem ot long-standing in Gel'll8B 
9 Joseph Mausbach (1861-1931) studied at the universities ot Mllilster and 
E1chstltt. From 168h-1889 he served as chaplain in Cologne and teacher of 
religion. In 1889 he bee .. e protessor at the University ot Milnster and an 
active leader ot the aSrres-Gesellschatt. In 1916 he was appointed chairman 
ot a labor cOlllllittee in M-Gnster. His many literary works demonstrate h18 pre-
cision and discernment ot the cultural problema ot the Weimar Constitution. 
See Konrad Beyerle, "Mausbach in Weillar," Hochland, 28/11 (1931), pp. 93-97. 
lOaachem, Zentruraspartei, VIII, 289-290; Beyerle, ReichsvertasslJ!ll, 
pp. 13-lh. 
11 -
The section OIl "Fundaaental Rights" vas set aside tor later delibera-
tion. The debate on the Reich's tlag vas deterred until the second reading. 
See Zeigler, ope Cit., tor a coverage on the work ot the constitutional COR-
mittee. (Since the wri tar ot this paper did not have access to the Protocol 
of the constitutional Committee, the following were used as sources ot lDior-
mationa Reports ot the work of the cOlllDittee published in Germania and KV; 
Be)"8rle, ReiChsvertas" Albert Lauscher, "Die Arbeit an der Webarerver-
tassung" Iii Naflonale 1 eitl Ziegler, Nat10nalversamlungJ Morsey, Zentrwu-
p!rtei 1917-i92J. 
l2}pol'" .ll"'t.ie1 •• 1-17 in Preuss' orirlnal 4ratt. see Urs8chen und Fo12en. 
p 
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Article 2, of Section I concerned the principle of a democratic republi~ 
Little time was needed to deliberate on this provision, for the January electio ~ 
had been certain proof that the overwhelming majority of people favored a re-
public. The Center Party in voting for the acceptance or this provision vas 
simply taking its cue trOll Graber's speech in the Ha tional Aasembly on Febru-
ary 13. In depicting the Party'a desires for the new government, Graber had 
pointed out that under the circUJll8tancea the republic waa the "beat vehicle 
with which to get out ot the chaos of the revolution •• 15 
Not that all the Centrist parliamentarians were contirmed republicans; aa 
a matter of fact, they were only realists who accepted the election results aa 
a mandate tor the establishment of a republican lona ot government.16 Never 
did the m.aoers 01 the Center Party betra¥ More than a aild enthusiasm lor the 
republic, yet neither did they in future co_ittee discussions or on the floor 
ot the National Assembly take an oflicial position for or against the mon-
archy.17 On the other hand, Centrist delegates did giTe full support to the 
III, 429, in the final constitution they are Article. 1-18, ~., pp. 464-468. 
13C01l8idered one of the aost f'undaaental probleu by the c~ttee, it 
was likewise one of the most t1me-eonsuaing, involving not less than seventeen 
days of deliberation. Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 112, Beyerle, ReichsverfassPEl, 
p. 19. 
l4In the tinal docU1l\8nt the provision was embodied in Article 1. 
15verhandlUnsen, February 13, 1919, CCCXlVI, 54. 
16r.auschexo, o~. cit., p. 159, notes that "undoubtedly there were many in 
the Center Party an even if.& its parliamentary representation who were lunda-
mentally and theoretically monarchists," but they refrained trOll expressing 
their views publicly at this time. (Lauscher was a pr<lll1inent member of the 
Rhenish Center and a c ont_ponry of these events.) 
U " An opportunity to do so presented iwelt when on July 2 Hans Delbruck, 
5 
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republican idea once it had been accepted by the National Asseably. The alter-
native discussed by the committee during the first weeks, theretore, was not 
whether the German govermuent should be monarchical or republican, but whether 
the new republic of Geraany should be socialistic or dElllocra tic. 18 The Cen-
trists along vi th the coalition parties in the National Assembly supported 
Preuss' provision for a deaocratic, parl.iallenu17 republiC, as Dr. Spahn indi-
cated when he spoke for a new order that would be "honorab17 deaocratic.,,19 
The Center Party contiraed its accepUnce of a democratic republic by 
voting in favor ot the second sentence of Article 1 which states: "Political 
authority .. nates troa the people.,,20 lest its pOSition be IIdsunderstood, 
however, the Party hastened to point out that sovereignty exercised by the 
people vas not the SUle as an absolute popular sovereipty.21 In an earlier 
session ot the National AS88ab17, Gr8ber had noted that all authority, 'Whether 
22 
exercised by 8 JIlonarch7 or 8 danocratic republic, derived its power trom God. 
DNVP, declared emphatically that he and his colleaguee preferred a constitu-
tional, parliamentary monarchy to a republic govermumtJ eee his speech in 
Verhandlunlen, July 2, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1242. 
18The Independent Socialists strove to establish a dictatorship of the 
proletariat, but thie Ilet with extr8lll8 opposition trom the bourgeois parties a8 
well as the Majority Socialists both in the constitutional cOJllBittee and later 
in the National Ass_bly. See the .. echee on July 21, 1919, ibid., CCCXXVIII, 
1750-1786. -
19Ib1d., February 2), 1919, CeenVI, )79. 
-
20nD1e Deutsche Re1chsvertassl.Ulg vom 11. August 1919," Article 1, "Di.e 
Staatlgewalt geht vom Volke aus." Ursachen und Follen, III, 464. 
21 Joseph Mausbach, Kulturfrasen in der Deutachen Vertassung: Eine Er-
kllrung wichtiger VerfassUnlsariliel (M-Oladbach: Volksvsreinsver1ag, 19~O), 
pp. 23-26. see a180 Spahn' &I speech, Verhandlunlen, February 28, 1919, CceXXVI, 
397. 
22Ibid., February 13, 1919, cccnvr, 54. 
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Article 1, the Centrists emphasized, was not to be construed 8S Rousseau's idea 
of absolute popular sovereignt.y.23 Both in the constitutional cClIIDlittee and on 
the f1o~r of the National A8Sembly,24 the Centrists made special efforts to 
clarify their Party' s position on this point. Despi te precaut.ions, the ques-
tion of sovereignty would be sadly JI11sconat.rued in Can'tr1at circles and among 
the Catholic hierarchy after the adopt.ion of the We1mar Constitution. 
Once it had been established that t.he Reich would have a republican 
government, thw question arose about the position of the monarchy in the indi. 
vidual states. If the Reich was to have a republican const.itut.ion, reasoned 
the Center, ~len aut the constituent states follow that pattern of govel'J11l\ent? 
This question was discussed in t.he second reading ot the cons" tution on Jul.y 2. 
One of the Center's delegates, Joseph Andre, t.old the Asseab17 that it vas "un-
thinkable" to "have a republic in th~Reich and allow the :1ndiTidual states to 
provide for a constitutional JIlonareh7.,,2S At. hiB proposal, Article 17 in 
Section I (Reich and States) which states I "Each state aust. Daye a republican 
CODSt.itution,,,26 was inserted into the const.itut.ion and adopted by the 
A8S8Jllbly.27 
In keeping wi th the country, B "conYeraion" frail monarchy to a democratic 
23 
Mausbach, Kulturt'raaen, p. 26. 
24see Spahn's speech, Verhandlungen, February 26, 1919, cccnvr, 279. 
2S Ibid., July 3, 1919, CCCIXVIl, 1161. 
- j 
26Cited in Uraachen und Folgen, Ill, 464. All further art.icles of the 
'Weimar Constitution are cited frail this source. 
27Verhandlungen, July 3, 1919, CCCnVII, 1261. 
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republic, Preuss proposed a new flag for Gel'lll8Iq. 26 He did not include this in 
his original draft but suggested it in his speech to the National A.sembly on 
February 24.29 Pointing to the parallel between the 1846 and the present 
National As.embly, Preus. proposed reYiving the flag of 1848 to symbolize the 
liberal and democratic spirit of the "new times." Acknowledging that it might 
be difficult for sCIIle to abandon the old national colors, he argued the neces-
sity of having a symbolic banner to signify the establishment of a new repub-
!ican government. He also emphasised the fact that black, red, and gold were 
the colon ot the Orossdeutschlan!. JIOV8l1lent and, therefore, would appeal to the 
Austrians who favored a union with Germany.30 
His suggestion for a black, red, and gold flag aerely evoked a je8ting 
cODlllent trOll Spahn who preferred to retain the present nag for the German 
Reich. 31 But the debate in the A8sembly aroused by the proposition was very 
serious and veheaent, for the delegate8 felt strongly about changing the colors 
of the national nag. When the topic was discussed in the National Assembly 
in July, there ensued a lively dispute arousing deep-seated national feel-
ings.32 
Three alternative nag choices had been set down by the constitutional 
28Ibid., February 24, 191i, cccmI, 285. 
29 Ibid., p. 281. Preuss proposed that the prov1aions be 1naerted in 
Article T;'Dut in the final dratt of the We1M.r ConsU tution a separate article 
(.~ rUcle 3) prOYided tor the new flag. 
30Ibid. 
-
31Sp&hn 8aid the colora reminded hill of a ditty he learnt in childhood: 
~Schwarz i8t das Pulver, rot das Blut, golden flackert die F1a ... ~"~., p.3B3. 
32Ibid., July 2-3, 1919, CCCXZVII, l224-123S. 1244-124S. 
-
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cClllDdttee on June 3 atter it had been unsuccessful in solving the flag ques-
tion, and these vere now eubmitted to the National ASleably for consideration. 
The choice ot the Independent Socialists was a red flag. The Majority Sooi-
alists and Democrats wanted a revival of the black, red, and gold colors as a 
"symbolic expression" of the desire "to complete the unfinished work of the 
Frankfurt Assembly of 1848. n33 The Centrists were in favor ot retaining the 
old black, white, and red flag ot the Bismarckian Reich, tor as Gr~ber pointed 
out there was no purpose in changing flags at a t1me when occupied German ter-
ritory vas under an alien flag. France had retained her flag, he argued, 
despite her change of governments; Germany should not be too hasty now.34 In 
their desire to retain the old tlag the Centrists aidecl w1ththe Right. 
The selection of flags by the Party did not necessarily represent una-
nim1ty of choice. Among the Centrists, tor ~stance, there was a goodly num-
ber who preferred the tag of olt'!Ck, red, and gold. Others, furtheNore, 
though agreeing with the Right tor the retention of the old flag, had not re-
mained insensible to the remarks ot the Austrian representative to the National 
Assembly, Ludo Moritz Hartmann, who had pointed out that the old black, white, 
and red tlag was viewed by Auatr1all8 as an historic symbol ot a lUeiDdeuMCh-
land. The proposed black, red, and gold flag, he had suggested, vas more ac-
a 
ceptable to the Genaan Austrians and its adoption would make it easier for 
Austria to join the German ReiCh)5 Liberal Centrists who had faYOred the 
33pz.otoc#., cited in Lauscher, ~. cit., p. 1.61J Ziegler, Ope cit., 
pp. 1h5-lli6; ,June 4, 1919, l::"32. ~ee also Preuss' speech in th'! National 
Assembly, Verh8nd1unlen, Februar;r 24, 1919, CCCA-XVI, 287. 
34Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 146; !!, June 4, 1919, 1432. 
35 Cited in ~uscher, o~. Cit., p. 162; Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 147. 
a 
black, red, and gold flag trom the start were confirmed in their choice by 
Hartmann's remarks. 36 lupporters ot Gr5ber' 8 views gave the matter second 
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thought so that between June 3 and July 2-3 when the three flag proposals were 
presented to the National Assembly for consideration, nearly two-thirds of the 
center had been won oyer to the Left's viewpoint wh~e only slightly lIOre \haD 
one-third of the Party still sided with the Right. 37 
All parties except the Center delivered nlaerous speeches ot patriotic 
tervor both for and against the three flag proposals during the sessions of the 
National Assembly on July 2 and the day following~.38 The proposal for the red 
nsg was rejected by an overvhela1ng aajorU;y.39 The black, white, and red 
flag also failed to receive a sufficient _3or1ty.40 The acceptance, t1nall7, 
ot the black, red, and gold flag was due to a propoeal sublllltted jointly 01' 
Gr8ber and Majority Socialist Max Quark who suggested that black, red, and gole 
be adopted as the national colors, but that the .erchant flag continue as 
36LaUSCher, Ope cit., p. 162; Ziegler, 21>. Cit., p. 147. 1'bis was a 
strong argmaent for the C81ter Party since a union with Aua'trla had al_18 
been a Centrist desire. Religious ties with Catholic Auatr1a were a deter. 
m1rd.ng factor in the Centrist progrUl. During the early veeks ot the Weimar 
coalition the Centrists worked assiduously toward this union. Shortl,. after 
the opening ot the Na tional Assembly, Pfeitfer, secretar,.-general of the Canta 
vas sent by the gOYer.mt1ent to Vienna to discuss the poe.lbUities of such a 
union. Germania, Februa17 11, 1919, #69, February 13, 1919, 1173J Februa1'711, 
1919, #19 carried special Suppleaente with articles' listing historiC, re1lgiou 
and econClll1c reasons for this union. The Part,. vas keenly disappointed later 
when the union was forbidden by the ter.as ot the Versailles Treaty. 
31 Oe:rmania, Jul7 9, 1919, #301. 
38yerhandl~en, Jul,. 2-3, 1919, cccnm, 1224-124,. 
39Ibld., July 3, 1919, CCClXVII, 124S. 
-
40Ibid • The vote was 110 for and 190 againat with one abstaining. 
-
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black, white, and red with a display of the national colors in the upper left-
hand corner.4l On the strength of this ccmprOIlliae about one-fifth of the Cen-
trists who had voted prniously for the black, white, and red flag, now gave 
42 their consent to the change. 
Of all the proposals submitted to the National Assembly,during the deci-
sive month of July, this one concerning the change of national colors provides 
the most interesting study of the conn1cting torces within the Center Party. 
From the "ry beginning, the Party was divided on the issue--iilie liberal fac-
tion favoring the change, the conservative clinging to the old. The Austrian 
views on this matter induced some of the more realistic Centrists to drop their 
allegiance to the old flag as a matter or expediency, while the compromise pro-
posal enabled others to relinquish their allegiance. Nevertheless, the Party 
had not succeeded in the final show-down to rally its entire membership to the 
acceptance of the new banner. As Table V indicates, the Centrist vote on the 
c01llpromise proposal was sixty-four in favor, tive against,43 and one abstain-
ing.44 More re.ealing still is the record of absence. Twenty-tvo delegates, 
representing one-fifth of the Party's membership, failed to appear. Three of 
these were ill, two were excused, the other seventeen were simply unaccounted 
for. 4S 
41Ibid. 
-
42Ibid• The vote on this proposal was 211 for and 89 against with one 
abstaining. 
43Josef Becker tran Hesse; the cleric, Lud"~g Kaasl the leader of the 
Bavarian People's Party, Georg Heila; the trade union secretary frOlI Posen, 
Robert Sagawe J and Herman Colshom, the Hosp~~ of the Center trom the German 
Hanoverian Party. 
44Heinrich Langworst of tbe German Hanoverian Party. 
45See Table V for the vote on the flag. The information in Table V is 
p 
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Although Oermania published a lengthy article on the change ot the flag, 
it made no comment on the final vote. It observed that it vas difficult for 
patriotic Centrists to give up the old flag, but it agreed that the new colors 
were more symbolic of the change in government. It was highly critical, how-
ever, of the adamant poai tion of the A:ight and their press, ac cusing them ot 
chauvinistic efforts to arouse patriotic sentiments against the flag coapromise 
In order to erect an enduring and stable constitution, Germania stated, it was 
necessary for the majority parties to compromise on some isaues.46 
But the choice of national colors, while it evoked sentiments of patri-
otism and stirred the emotions of loyal Germans, was not as significant in its 
consequences as some of the other hard-core decisions facing the National As-
sembly. Chief 8JI10ng these was the "vielleicht schwierigst.e Verfassungs-
problea,n47 that most difficult problem of deciding whether the new republic of 
Germany should have a federal or unitary system of government. Should the con-
stitution, in other words, abolish the special priTUeges of the individual 
states and centralize power in one unitary type of government similar to that 
of France; or should it retain the federated characteristics of the German 
States as they had existed unaer tha old Bismarckian constitution of 1871? The 
Center Party had noted with apprehension that centrali,ation was becoming in-
creasingly stronger as the forces of liberalism and democracy which had tradi-
tionally espoused strong unitary tendencies became Tictorious over the forces 
taken from the Verhandlunge.!!, July 3, 1919, CCCXXVII, 1244-1245. 
46July 9, 1919, 1307J Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 30, alao noted the dif-
ficulty with which the "greater majorityn of the "Center acquiesced to the 
change. 
47 
Lauscher. 21> ___ cit •• p. 162. 
TABLE V 
VOTE ON THE NEW FLAG, JULY 3, 1919 
Delegates District Vote Delegates District Vote 
Allekotte, Joseph KRblenz Yes Kubetzko, Joseph Oppeln Yes 
Andre, Joseph Wurttemberg Yes Langwost, Heinrich Hanover Abstained 
Astor, Jakob Koblenz Yes Legendre, Peter Koblenz Yes 
Becker, Johannes Arnsberg III Leicht, Johann Franken Yes 
It Becker, Josef Nassau No Lensing, Felix Wsseldorf Absent 
" DUsseldorf Bell, Johannes Dusseldorf Yes Marx, Wilhelm Absent 
Bergmann, Theodore Thisseldorf Absent Mausbach, Josef Mllnster Yes 
Beyerle, Konrad Franken Yes Maxen, Wilhelm Hanover Yes 
Sitts, Joseph Oppeln Absent Mayer, Wilhelm Bavaria Yes 
n Blank, Lorenz Hanover Yes Miiller, Richard Fulda III 
Blum, Johannes Kgln Yes Nacken, Josef K8ln Yes 
Bolz, Eugen Wllrttemberg Yes Neuhaus, Agnes Arnsberg Yes 
Brauns, Heinrich K8ln Yes Neyses, Matthias Koblenz Yes 
von Brentano di Ollmert, Karl Koblenz Yes 
Tremezzo, Otto Nassau Absent Otte, Waldemar Leignitz Absent 
Bur la ge, F.c:iuard Aurich Yes Pfeiffer, Maximilian Berlin Yes 
Colshorn, Herman Hanover No Puschmann, Alois Breslau Yes 
Diez, Carl Baden Yes RheinlHnder, Anton Arnsberg Yes 
Dransfeld,Hedwig ntlsseldorf Excused Richter, Johann Pfalz Absent 
Erhardt, Franz Oppeln Yes Sagawe, Robert Posen No 
Ersing, Joseph Baden Yes 
-
Schefbeck, Josef t Bavaria Yes 
II . " I 
" , Erzberger, Matthias Wurttemberg Yes I. 5- Schiffer, Mattias MUnster Yes 
Farwick, Wilhelm KSln Yes Schirmer, Karl \. .. Bavaria Yes , , 
" Fehrenbach, Konstantin Baden Yes Schlack, Peter ... Dusseldorf Yes 
Fleischer, Paul East Berlin Excused Schmitt, Adam J . Hessen Absent II . 
Frerker, Wilhelm Munster Yes Schmitz , Maria Koblenz Yes 
Gerstenberger,L1bor1.us fl"arucen res oc~eider, Alexander Franken Yes 
Giesberts, Johann DHssel dorf Yes Schummer , Wi lhelm Prussi a ! bsent 
Gilsing, Anton Arnsberg Yes Schwarz, Jean Albert Nassau Yes 
" " Yes Schwarzer, Rudolf Bavaria Yes Grober, Adolf \-Jurt temberg 
Grunau, August Breslau Absent Spahn, Peter K3ln Yes 
Hagemann, Joseph Aurich Absent Stapfer, Michael Bavaria Yes 
Hebel, Benedikt Bavaria Yes Stegerwald, Adam K8ln Absent 
Heim, Georg Bavaria No S trzoda, Franz Oppeln Yes 
Herold, Karl Mllnster Yes Szczeponik , Thomas Oppeln Yes 
Herschel, Johannes Oppeln Absent Tauscher , Eugen Bavaria Yes 
Hi tze , Franz Dllsseldor f Yes Teusch, Christine K8ln Yes 
Hofmann, Hermann Pfalz Absent Tremmel, Pet er Franken Yes 
Imbusch, Heinrich Arnsberg Yes Trimborn, Karl K8ln Yes 
Irl, Martin Bavaria Yes Ulit zka , Karl O~peln Yes 
Jaud , Josef Bavaria Yes Weber, Helene DUsseldorf Yes r'· 
Joos, Josef DUsseldor f Yes Wieber, Franz- D3.sseldorf Absent 
Kaas, Ludwig Koblenz No Wirth, Joseph Baden Absent 
Koch, Johann M.flnster Yes Zawadzki , Konstantin Oppeln Yes 
Kossmann, Bartholomew Koblenz Absent Zehnter, Johann Baden III 
" Kreutz, Franz Munster Yes Zettler, Maria Bavaria Yes 
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at militarism and autocracy at the end at 1918.48 Now it viewed with alara the 
revival in 1919 ot the centuries-old problem of Bundesstaat versus E1nhei~­
staat.h9 
Pruess, as a firm adherent of a centralised and unified state, attellpted 
to embody these unitarian provisions in the constitution.SO Within the ,consti-
tutional cOlllittee itself tbere existed a strong tendenc1 '\ovard an Einheits-
staat which the six Centrist JI8Dlbers tried to check. They were assisted by the 
strong opposition stemming tram the representatives of the South German States 
in the States' Committee. Bavaria, especially, had no intention of surrender-
ing rights and privileges which sbe had enjoyed for so long.51 
Traditionally, the Center Party was federalist, 52 preferring a Bundes-
sta!i..!- type of government that emphasized states' rights. Accordingq, Centrists 
had campaigned in the Januar;y election on a plat.tora advocating tta stronger 
Reich" but one with a "bundessteatlichen Aufbau." Later, on the tloor of the 
National Ass_b11 this same idea was reiterated by one at the Partytl1leJlben.53 
48See Richard Fischer's speech in V8rhandl~8n, Februar;y 28, 1919, 
CCCnVI, 342, "Away with particulari .. and 8s't8buah an 'Einheit.ataat tor 
Germanyl" 
49 See the e di torial, "Bundessteat oder Mnzelsteat," Germania, March 5, 
1919, 1105. 
50verhandl~en, February 24, 1919, CCCIXVI, 28h-286. In Preuss' orig1na 
dratt the uni tartan prOVisions were embodied in Section I (Reich and the Stete .. 
51 
Lauscher, 21'. cit., pp. 167-168. 
52The term "tederalist" does not have the same meaning in Germany as it 
has in the U. S. Our word, "tederalist, tt @TJl)lies to advocates ot a atrong 
tederal government, whereas the German term "FSderalisttl was used tor one who 
opposed all but the weakeat federal government in tavor ot State independence. 
See .Amold Brecht, 'ederali .. and Regionalill1ll in Germanz:: The Division at 
Prussia (New York. Mord University Press, 1945), p. 4. . 
~3se. Beyerle l s speech, Verhandlungen, March 3, 1919, CCCUVI, h64-467. 
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By maintaining this traditional position, the Center Party repudiated any moves 
on the part ot its coalition partners toward a tully unitary state. But here 
again unaniJdty ot Party policies among the Centrists in the Assembly vas not 
apparent. Within the Center's ranks 8 strong tendency toward centralization 
was evident in a minority taction comprising some ot the newly elected labor 
and trade unionists trom southwestern Germany who rallied around Erllberger's 
banner.54 Though this minority group was unable to influence the view ot the 
majority taction, especially the members ot the BayariJn People's Party who 
clung tenaciously to the tederaliBt principle,;; it remained nonetheless a 
divisive tactor in Party deliberations.56 
'WhUe the Party otticiall7 maintained its devotion to tederali8ll, it did 
not repudiate the idea ot strengthening the power ot the Reich in certain areas 
This it de_ad opportune in order to place the Reich in a poei tion where it 
would be able to .. et the ditficult reparations and war indemnities, and to 
prevent the centrifugal torces "which are necessarily present in every tederal 
system" trom becoming overwhelming.;7 St.egerwald pointed this out to the As-
sembly on February 21 when he told the delegates that the industrial power 
ot western German terri tory was necessary to the general weltare ot the whole 
;4See Morsey, !!!!.,.truuJ!!rtei 1917-1923, p. 200. 
S;schwend, Balem, pp. 88, 102-103. 
;6 
F,rzberger' s duties as Armistice Ca.issioner hindered hilft trOll taking 
an active part in the making ot the constitution. Nevertheless, he did advo-
cate a vigorous policy ot centralization within the National Assembly and as a 
member ot the ministry. 'lbe nationalization ot the GC!,rman railroad system and 
the complete reorganiza tion ot Germany' 8 tileal system on a centralised basis 
were largely Enberger' 8 achievements. See Epstein, Erzberger, pp. )27-329. 
;7 Lauscher, Ope cit., p. 167. 
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Reich and that, therefore, every atteapt to weaken the Reich's power in the 
West must be hindered.58 A few days later on February 28, Spahn indicated the 
necessity of a "strong central power in the Reich, It requesting that control 
over the armed forces, cOJ!ll1llunications, and foreign affairs be placed in the 
hands of the Reich.59 Again on March 7, Spahn declared that "an important 
task of the Reich's ada1nlstrative ofticials" was to keep "guard over the 
Reich's unity.n6O 
1I0twi ttlstanding the increase in power which the Centrists were willing 
to concede to the Reich, they refused 'to acknowledge the Reich's power oyer 
certain questions, especially those conceming the privileged position granted 
by the individual states to the Church and Christian education 8S proT1ded for 
in Article 10. The proposal debated in the constitutional ccmm1ttee on 
March 14, 15, and 16, granting the Reich jurisdiction Over the regulation ot 
rel1gioUII associationa and OYer a unitol'll educational system, brought the 
advocates of unitari_ and federali_ to loggerheads. The Centrists, in 
particular, were adamant in their resistance. Beyerle, supported by Qr8ber, 
called for a cancellation of the provisions. The tvo Centrists were not alone 
in their objection, however; the Baden Minister, Dr. Dietrich, protested in 
the names of both the Baden and w~ttemberg lorer.nments.61 In the heat of the 
debate OYer this controversial issue, Gr8ber remonstrated, It ••• as a Catho1.1c 
58verhandlungen, February 21, 1919, CCCxx.VI, 264. 
59Ibid., February 28, 1919, CCCXXVI, 379. 
-60 Protocol, cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923, p. 200. 
6lProtocol, cited in Ziegler, .2£. ill., p. 117. 
p 
I cannot concede competency to the National Assembly to discuss reUgious 
questions. "62 
The Bavarian People's Party, reflecting the age-old particularism of 
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ita native state, we8 much more conservative in its view of federalism than 
the rest of the Center Party. Dr. Georg Be1m, director of the Bavarian People's 
Part;y, exemplified this a tti tude in an address d slivered before the National 
Assembly on July 3 after the const! tution had been returned to the Assembly 
for its second and third reading. Contesting the growth of the paver of the 
Reich at the cost of the states 8S provided in Section I of the constitution, 
especially Article 7, Be1m noted that: Bavarians have always striven "pre-
eminently" against centralisation for it is an "extraordinarily dangerous 
thing." Destroy federaUn in Gel'Wlll7 and you destroy the unique cultural 
particularism for which ael'll8ny is universally known. If government power 
over finance, communications, agriculture, religion, and culture be centralized, 
what autonomy, asked the Bavarian Centrists, will reuin to the constituent 
states? "We don't fear unity itself," he said, "we fear the unity of Berlin 
domination." This all-toe-vast centralization which the Democrat.e and the 
lMajority Socialists advocate will bV its very nature lead to the destruction 
of the "Reichsgedankes~ (the idea of the Reich as a federal structure). It is 
a "dangerous game," he warned, "to assault" the constituent states, for the 
federal principle will survive. "The stronger you promote centralization in 
the Reich, the stronger will be the federalist echo. ,,63 
62lbid. The problem of Church-State relations and education will be 
~ea ted rn-the next chapter. . 
63verhandlungen, July 3, ·1919, CCCXXVII, 1240-1243. Beyerle and FAuard 
Burlage also spoke against the strong centralizing power given to the Reich in 
Section I. See ibid., 12$1-12$4, 1270. 
-
p 
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Closely allied with the strengthening of the power of the Reich was the 
struggle over Preuss' provision for a rearrangement of the German states, the 
.rJ:nder.64 It was not surprising that the Center Party agreed to Preuss' pro-
posal calling for the amalgamation of smaller German principalities into la~r 
'W11ts. Beyerle suggested in the constitutional camdttee that the disappear-
ence of the dynasties presented an opportunity to do away wi th many of the 
smaller states.65 But later Beyerle was not supported by his Bavarian col-
leagues who considered any tendency toward amalgamation as dangerous to feder-
alism.66 
Deliberations on this point of division of linder provoked varying views 
from all parties, to the point of shattering party fronts. Three days' debate 
in the constitutional cODlJllittee (March 17-19) brought no real solution to the 
problem, for any rearrangement of states necessarily involved a partitioning 
of Prussia. Preuss favored the suppression of Prussian domination either by 
voluntary or enfol'ced partition.67 He argued that Prussia was not a nation, 
but an artificial formation resulting fro. political intrigues, purchases, 
marriages, and conquests.66 The Rhenish Centrist leader, Tr1mborn, used this 
same argument in the constitutional committee on March 18. Prussia, he ex-
plained, was merely "an editice ot fortune." Only by suppression of Prussia 
64Articles 1-17 t 
6Sa.port of the constitutional comaittee lV, March 11, 1919, #213; 
Germani8, March 20, 1919, 1127J .Lauscher, .2£. ill., p. 165. 
66see Heim's address of July 3, 1919, Verhandlunlen, CCCXXVI1~1240-1243. 
67See Preuss' speech in the Hational Assembly on February 24, 1919, 
Verhandlungen, CCCXXVI, 284-294. 
68Protocol, cited in Ziegler, .2f. !!!., pp. 118-120. 
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would the people ot the Prussian provinces be able to s.cure equali V. 69 
Sentiment against Prussian hegemony was especially strong in the West 
where the cry "Los von Serlin" had been heard atter the Nov_ber ReTolution. 70 
while the western Centrists had repudiated earlier attempts to establish a 
separate Republic ot the ibine, they did not support in the tirst halt ot 1919 
a moveaent tor the tormation ot a West German Free State within the unity ot 
the German Reich.7l Hence, tor the Rbineland Centrist, the probleJi ot the par-
tition of Prussia was closely linked with the move .. nt tor a West Oerman 
Republic as a member state in the tederation ot the R.ioh. 
When the question ot Prussian hegeaony was discussed at a joint meeting 
ot the constitutional colmlittee and the States Cc;aaittee on March 18, Trimborn 
spoke out emphatically in taTor ot greater auton~ tor the Prusaian prov-
inces.72 Reterring to Pruasia control in Germany, he remarked, "The present 
state ot Prussia gains the greatest profit from Prussian unity •••• But today 
tthe intereat ot the Reich and that ot a true, healthy organi_ require its 
~-
69Ibid., cited in Morsel", Zentrumapartei 1917-l92J, p. 201, also in 
iLauscher-;op. cit., p. 168. 
70The Democrat Walter SChlcking declared to his tellow delegates in the 
National Assembly: "UP to 1867 Prussia was against the Reich, tro. 1867 to 1918 
~L!fia was aboTe the Reich; the Reich must hereafter be above Prussia." 
Verhandlungen, March 4, 1919, ceCIIn, 324. 
7lxv, February 2, 1919, #91 J Februa17 3, 1919, 1195. 
-
72The Centrists in the Pruaaian provinces telt keenly the di8proportion-
ate representation they would receive it Prussia would be given a repre8enta-
tion in the Reichsrat siJlilar to what she had under the old con8titution. On 
~rch 26, TriJlborn told the constitutional comrltteeJ "It i8 unbearable tor us 
Ito be torced to see tbat s .. ll states have influence on legislation trca which 
Ive larger Pruasian province8 are excluded) thia position will becoae even more 
junbearable it the competence ot the Reich is enlarged without tolerating our 
~nteresta. " Protocol, c1 ted in Morsey, Zentrwupartei 1917-1923, p. 205. 
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[Prussia's] alteration.,,7) Trimbom's proposal to establish the westem pr01lf~ 
ince as a separate republic within the Reich brought a stinging retort. trom 
Prussian Minister of Justice, Wolfgang Heine, who "with veh_nee, with wit-
ticism, and with sarca8tic antagonism,n74 accused all Rhinelanders, but. espe-
cially the Centri8ts, of disloyalty and of deserting the Reich in its hour of 
need: "Nov the rats are beginning to desert. the sinking ship. The)" will no 
longer eontribate to the coat of these poor land8 Prussia's eastern prav-
inees , but vill retain all profit for thamaelves.,,1S 
Tr1llborn replied that the arguments ot Prussia were invalid; separation 
of the Rhineland trOll PrUS8ia did not entail separation from the Reich. On 
the contrary, Rhineland would be more 801ldl)" and intimatel)" welded to the 
Reich if it belonged to it direetl;y rather than a8 a part of Prus8ia. Nor 
would Trimborn and hi8 Centri8t eolleague8 accept the argument that Rhineland 
8hould belong to Prussia to supplement economicall;y the relativel)" poor ea.tem 
Prussian prav1nce8. "The old cr:r of the poor East and the rich West i8 dead 
tada)"," he insisted, pOinting out that war and revolution had done more duage 
to the industrial Rhineland than to the rural ea.tem provinc e8. \'Ihile he ad-
mitted that the creation ot a new state in German)" might cause 80M di8turbance 
for a brief time, he a8sured the a888Mbl)" that the confusion would be less 
7)Protocol, cited in Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 120. 
74 Ziegler, Ope ci~., p. 119. 
~ " Ibid., pp. ll9-120J also Cited in Lau8cher, OPe cit., p. 170. GrOber 
'Was so incen8ed by Heine' 8 invectives that he 8houted out, ' "Don't you poi80n 
this situation an)" further. "--a remark, Ziegler noted, "that had no parallel 
in the Protocol of the colllldttee." ~., p. 120. 
harmful than the pem-anent source of trouble which would result from indif-
ference to the Rhineland situation.76 
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The debate over the issue caused conSiderable conflict among the parties 
and at one point even erupted in a personal encounter between the German 
Nationalist delegate Gottfried Traub and the Centrist cleric Ludwig Kaas when 
Traub accused the Centrists of disloyal t:'i to the Reich and termed the movement 
in the West a "Zentrumamacht. ft77 Emotional involvement over the problem of an 
arrangement of the IJInder and the partitioning of Prussia went completely out 
-~-
of hand, splitting not only the Center, but also the parties along regional 
rather than party lines both in the National .Assembly and in the constitutional 
committee. With the groups so divided among themselves it was difficult to 
arrive at any decision. 78 
A compromise proposed by Trimborn was finally placed before the committee 
on June 4. According to ita prOVision a territorial adjustment could be made 
by a simple law it the people in the area concerned voted in tavor of the 
change. The compromise stipulated, however, that no territorial changes could 
be made until a two-year period had elapsed a!'ter the formal adoption ot the 
Constitution.79 On July 22 the National Assembly included this compromise in 
Article 18.80 
76,or a report of 'lr1mborn's speech in the constitutional coDBittee, se 
Gemani!l, March· 20, 1919, 1127; !!" March 20, 1919, #2'22. 
77Protocol, cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-192}, p. 204. 
78See committee reports in KY, March 25, 1919, #236; June 4, 1919, #432, 
German.!!, June 2, 1919, #245. -
79!!, June 4, 1919, #432; Germania, June 4, 1919, #250. 
8OVernandlungen, July 22, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1840-1642. 
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The latter provision of Trimborn's compromise was aimed at the unrest in 
;.he Rhineland. It was deCided, on the one hand, that the Rhineland need a 
period of tranquillity to resolve its problems J on the other hand, it was argued 
that the period of Allied occupation was not a feasible time for making terri-
81 torial adjustments. Thus, in the late spring of 1919 Allied pressure for a 
82 
separate Rhine Republic had inadvertently contributed to the unity at Prussia. 
Pledging their loyalty to the Reich, the Centrist delegates from the West had 
~ted with the other delegates in protesting against Allied designs in the 
83 Rhineland area. Now, following the lead of the Party's directors at Berlin, 
the Rhenish Centrists gave full support to Trimborn's compromise. 84 
The Centrist involvement in the whole problem of the dismemberment of 
tprussia was quite complex. In the first place, opinions within the Center 
Party were divided over these issues. In the eyes of the Centrist leadership 
~t Berlin a division of Prussia posed the danger of greatly weakening the 
Party's strength. The Party recruited about eighty per cent of its electorate 
!from the Prussian provinces. A division of Prussia into difterent states could 
prove detrimental if by such a division the Center should "sink to the status 
pf a regional party," too small in some areas to be effective.8, Besides this 
81 See editorial on Martin Fassbender's pamphlet, "Los von Berlin?" in 
~ermania, April 20, 1919, 11179, Supplement; May 27,1919, #237. 
82lbid., May 29, 1919, #241; June 2, 1919, #24,. This issue called the 
~stablishii1eiit of a separate Rhine Republic a "pol:4.tical swindle" (lflochstapelel."). 
83See editorial, "Pratestbewegung," signed by the Centrist faction in 
~ermania, June 3, 1919, #248; June 4, 1919, #249; !Y, June 4, 1919, #432. 
84The leaders of the Center Party pleaded with all Centrists to maintain 
Party unity in "this hour ot danger." Anyone persisting in entertaining motives 
pf separation would be expelled from the Party. Germania, June 3, 1919, #248. 8, 
Germania, AprU 20, 1919, 1/179; Morsey, Zentrums;eartei 1917-1923, p.201. 
p 
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political problem, there existed a religious danger to Catholicism in the 
"Diaspora," for the privileges enjoyed by the Church under Prussia could well 
be ignored in an area of great Protestant domination once the provinces were 
separated tro. Berlin.86 Concern for its Catholic interests had always been 
one of the strengths ot the Center Party and one which it had no intentions 
ot neglecting in this perilous time. 
CD the other hand, the Party could not remain inditterent to the wishes 
ot its local tactions in the Prussian provinces who were agitating tor more 
autonomY' or tor cOlllplete separation trom Prussia. In Preuss' constitutional 
proviSion tor a new territorial arrangement ot the Reich the Pruss1an provinces 
saw an opportunity to curtail or eYen to crush entirely Pru8san hegemony_ 
The cry; "Los van Berlir.;" was echoed not only in the Rhineland-Westphalian area, 
but a180 in Hanover and in Upper 5iles18. In each ot these provinces the 
Center Party had the backing ot a large percentage ot the electorate, and it 
was therefore obliged to assume the dominant role in separatist movements. 
Hence, the Centrists ot the Pruss1an provinces tound common interests both in 
the cOJIIIIlittee and in the National Assembly in agitating for a division ot 
Prussia" 
There seeu to have been no detini te directive from the Center's head-
quarters in Berlin concerning an official policy or the Party on this que~tion. 
~le defining the Party's views on the direction ot the new government Or!ber 
~n his address to the National Assembly on February 1), avoided taking a deti-
pi te stand on the issue. Vaguely he reterred to the cry, "1oa von Berlin," 
8~orsey, zentrumat:etei 1917-192}, p. 201J !!, June 28, 1919, #498, took 
~sEue with those who cle d a separation of Prussian provinces would be harm-
~ul to the Party. It telt such views were "groundless." 
160 
linich seemed to be leading to "unhealthy unitarism lt and "overwhel.ll1ng central-
ization"--goals which the Center Par\y rejected.67 While recognizing the need 
tor the "StAmme" to develop independent.ly their own cultural characteristics, 
.. Grober stressed the need to subject all development to the weltare ot the 
whole Reich.88 The cry ot "Los von Berlin" vas inopportune because ot the 
danger ot ene~ occupation--_ danger especially evident in borderland areas.89 
Advocates ot separatism were told to recognize the evil designs ot Fra~ce who 
would benetit tram the abeence ot a strong Prussia on her eastern border.90 
The provincials, in anawer, claimed the t they did recognize the danger or 
enemy encroachments upon their territory, but that more autClllallY in their own 
attairs would enable th. to meet the outside danger. 91 The apparent sUence 
ot the Center Party's leadership in Berlin on the impor\ant issue involved in 
IArticle 18 vas interpreted by Prussia I s provincial Centrist factions as the 
!signal to move ahead in their efforts to win a separate status wi thin the Reich 
67Verhandlunsep, February I), 1919, CCCXIVI, 54-55. 
88Protocol, March 17, 1919, as cited in Horsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923, 
IP. 202. 
69Ibid• 
-
90Joaeph Kuckhott, "~ die westdeutsche Republik,· Allegem~ine Rundschau, 
~III, (February, 1919), p. 10). ' 
91Rbinelanders telt that an independent Rhineland would obtain milder 
peace terms for the entire German nation. For a thorough study ot the Centrist 
role in the Rhineland movement, see Morsey, Zentrumsp8rtei 19l7-19i' chap. iY. 
~orse7 challenges statements made by Peter Klein, SeparatIsten an ein und 
R~rl Die konterrevolutionire separatistische Beweguns der deutschen Bour~eoiae 
in derHheinprov1nz und in Westfalen November 1916 bts Jill 1919 J.L!..ll_Berlli: 
Riftten and Loaning, 19(1). Horsey maintains that Klein's work is based on tal-
sified statements of Adam Dorten vhich ~icate Adenauer in the separatist 
movement frail the Reich. While Adenauer favored separation frail Prussia, he 
never supported an independent movement frOll the Reich. 
181 
or, faUing that, to strive for greater autonomy trom Prussia ln regulating 
thelr aftairs. 
In Upper SUesia the Oentrist movement against Pruaslan domlnation was 
led by Father Carll. Ulitzka, a pastor at Ratisborn.92 The political situation 
following the war had placed the cl Usens of Upper S11esia in a precarious sl t-
uat1on, for the Entente powers wanted to annex part ot this area to Poland. 
Under the leadership ot the Center Party the people of Upper S11esla were 
9.3 fighting to remain in the Reich. Al though there was a movement to establish 
Upper SUesla as a separate state in the Reich,94 Ul1tska and the Centrists 
were sat1sfled to agitate tor more local autonomy wlth1n PrusS1a,95 Ulitska 
pointed to the danger ot Polish encroachJlent if the territory vould be glven an 
independent status. In the National As._bly, Ulltaka and the Centrist dele-
gates tram Upper S11es18 joined wi. th the other Prusslan Centrists in supporting 
Traborn's compromise allcw!.r:g fer mon local ~utonomy both within Prussia and 
the Reich. 96 
The autonOlllous moftDlent in Upper Siles1a was merely a local Centrist 
92Carl Ulltzks (187.3- ) attended the Unlverai V of Breslau betore be~ 
coming chaplain at Kreuzburg in 1897. He was pastor tirst at Breslau trom 
1901-1910 and then was appointed pastor at Rat1sborn. In 1918 he was director 
of the Cathollc People's Party in Upper S11esla. He served in the National 
Assembly and the Relchetag. 
93Carl Ulltska, WOer deutache Osten und die Zentruaapartei," in Nationale 
Arbeit, pp. 141-14.3. 
94 ~., p. 14.3. 
95 Ibid., p. 144. 
-
96Ibld., pp. 145-147. See Ulitzka's speech on Article 18 ln the National 
AII8embly on July .31, 1919, Verhandl¥en, cccnvnI, 2142. See a180 the edi-
torial, "Eindruck aua Cberachlesien;tiermanla, May .31, 1919, 1244. The artia.E 
praises the efforts of the Center in fighting to keep Upper SUesia loyal. 
p 
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projectJ 97 the separatist movements in the West were far more extensive and 
involved. The agitation in the Rhineland, for e:napl., was neither cOIIlpletely 
Centrist-inspired nor Centrist-led, especially the movement in the spring ot 
1919 for the establialunent of a West German Republic wi thin the Reich. In this 
movement both Democrats and Majority Socialists were implicated. 98 Neverthe-
less, the strong baclcing received fran. the local Centrist factiona, the leader-
ship of prominent Centrist politicians, and the enthusd.asltd..c support ot the 
electorate (the ~jority of whoa belonged to the Center Party) tended to give 
the lIhole mov_ant a definite Centrist character. !n the constitutional COJl-
m1ttee and in the National Ass_q the separatist movement was looked upon as 
a Centrist "power move, .. 99 and it called forth taunta about the Center Part,.' s 
"disloyalt,." to the Reich tran. the Gerun Nationalists.1OO 
As was noted above, the Rhenish Centrists designs regarding separation 
from Prussia were not given any official sanction frOll the leadership in Ber-
lin. The local Centrists preferred to disassociate thauelves from the Part,. 
in this political movement and to keep it a regional matter. On February 11, 
1919, the secretary-general of the Rhineland Center Part,., Josef J3rg, repudi-
ated an,. "official" connection with the Rhenish separatist lIlO'ftIment. Reterrlng 
97Ulitska, 2P. cit., p. 147. 
98In the "KasinoveraaJlUllung" at Cologne on March 10, a number ot repre-
sentatives tr<Xll the Center, Jlajorit,. SOCialist, and the Democratic parties as-
sembled to pressure lor a West German Republic as a "Friedenrepublik." The 
group published a manifesto signed b,. representatives ot the K8lnische Volk!-
lIeitunJj. Cologne CentriSts, and members of the other parties.-W;r.rch 11, 
1:919, 97. A similar resolution had been passed b,. the Centriits in Orsabr{kk 
on March 7, demandir..g ttu, £stablishment ot a "West State with fl 1'lrm anchorage 
in the unit,. of the Reich." This was published in the same issue of !!. 
99Protocol, cited in Korse,., Zentrllll!partei 19l7-l92l, p. 204. 
lOOIbide; tauscher, Ope cit., p. 170; Ziegler, 91>_. cit., pp. 119-120. 
> 
to one of the first "los von Berlin" proclamations made by the editors of the 
K8lnischa Volkszeitung at a large Center Party convention held in Cologne on 
December 4, 1918, J8rg remarked, "I know full vell that this action, particu-
larly the assembly of December 4, has ruined us among other parties. nlOl In 
his article, "Zur Fraga der Wastdeutschen Republ1k," another leading Centrist, 
Joseph Hess, stated, "Never at any time or under any circumstances has the dis-
cussion over the West German Republic been used by us as a Party interest."102 
He insisted that the whole issue was ". fateful one concerning all Germans" 
and had nothing to do with Party interests.103 ()l another occasion, Tr1JRborn 
explicitly pointed out that he did not represent any political party when he 
104 
spoke about plans for the establisbment ot • West German Republic. 
In their separatiat 140V9' ... n~ I'ram PrusSia, the Rhenish Centrista loyall,-
maintained their allegiance to the Reich. At no tiae did they support the 
simultaneous movement instigated by the French and led by the Wiesbaden otti-
cial, Hans Ada. Dorten, 1.0 establish an .independent Rhine Republic separated 
from the Reich.105 Dortents abortive attempt to establish an independent Rhine 
10llederal Archives ot Coloe!, as cited in Morsel', Zentrusmp!rtei 1917-
1923, p. 251. 
102KV , February 19, 1919, #136. 
-
l03Ibid• A pre'rlous ar1.icle by Leo Schwering entitled: "Zentrwa und 
ReichseinJiiri," sought to prove that the separatist Iloyements had no otficial 
Party backing, see ibid., February 16, 1919, 1131. 
-04 . 
1 At a public 8ssembly of representatives tram the Center, Majority 
SOCialist, and Democratic parties held at Cologne on February 1, 1919. Federal 
Archives ot, Colope, 88 cited in Morsey, Zentrwupartei 1917-192;, p. 252. 
lOSSee Morseyts coverage of the Centrist activities on this issue, 
2entrumspartei 1917-1923, pp. 246-265. 
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Republic on June 1, 1919, aroused bitter criticism trOl'll the Rhenish Centrists 
as vell as trOll the whole Centrist Party.l06 When the Rhenish question ceased 
101 to be a regional issue and became one ot national concern, the Center Party 
came out with an otficial announcement.108 It called upon all Party members to 
unite_.against the traitorous separatist mov81Ilents in the west.109 All Center 
tactions-the Berlin taction as well as all :beal Rhenish Center organi.ationa--
united in their protestations ot loyalty to the Reich and repudiated their 
torm.r design ot establishing a West German Republic vithin the Reich.110 
Despite the bitter struggle exerted b;y the Rhenish Centrist ft..ction tor a 
division ot PrUSSia, the state emerged trom the constitutional contl1ct with 
her territory undiminished. Yet, the Centrists telt that the outcome of their 
struggle vas valuable on at least three counts.lll Firat of all, their efforts 
had provided not only a legal bea1s tor obtaining greater provincial autonc::D.7 
trom PrUSSia,112 but according to a concession won thrcugh Triaborn's ettorts 
.-
l06See editorial, "Hochstapelei," Oermania, June 2, 1919, #24$, June 3, 
1919, #248. 
101M ora ey , Zentrwup!rtei 1911-192l, p. 260. 
1080ermania, June 3, 1919, #248; June 4, 1919, #249. 
l09Ibid ., June 4, 1919, 1/2$0. 
110Ibid• See the speeches of Brauns and Hitze in the constitutional com-
mittee on June S, 1919, Protocol, as cited in Moraey, p. 260; Hess' speech on 
June 21, 1919, in the Pruss1&n landversammlung, Session Report as cited in 
Morsey, Zentrumap!rte1 1911-1923, p. 260. 
l~a 1s the opinion of a Centrist representative trOll Bonn, Professor 
Albert Lauscher, vho had been an act1Ye vorker in the Rhineland movement. See 
his ''WeiJnarer Verfassung, n p. 110. 
112See Article :1.8 of the Weimar ConsU tution. 
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and embodied in Article 6), the Prussian provinces had been given a more direct 
voice in the ReiCh~113 Secondly, by advOcating the establishment of the West 
German Republic within the Reich, the Centrist had "crippled" the ef'forts of 
the "traitorous" separate independence movement instigated by the French, and 
having rallied the citizenry under the Centrist's banner of' loyalty, had pre-
served intact the unity of' the Reich. Thirdly, the hard struggle over A.rticle 
18 proposing the dismemberment of' Prussia provided a danger signal to that 
State, warning her not to ·overstrain" her centralizing efforts in regard to 
the provinces but to allow them "freer elbow ros" than they had enjoyed pre~ 
viously in developing their individual cultural achievements .114 
Throughout the 8eemingly endle8s debates in the constitutional COIIIIII1i ttae 
and in the plenar,y ses8ions of' the lia ti onal Assembly, the delega tes of the 
Center Party had labored assiduously to establish a democratic republic ba8ed 
on a federal structure in accord with the pramises made in their Party prograa 
of' December 30, 1918.115 It was not always possible to attain these goa18, for 
the Party had much oppoei tion to contend within preserving for its constitu-
ents those principles for which it stood. There were times, in tact, when, 
for the maintenance ot prinCiples 80 vi tal to its Christian Weltanschauung, the 
Center Party was forced to vote against policies advocated by its more liberal 
coali tion partners. Ckl the other hand, the Center could not always assume the 
ll3A-rUcle 63 provided that the Pru88un provinces be given halt ot the 
Prussian votes in the Reichsrat. "The States will be represented in thfc Reich .. 
rat by members ot their cabinets. Half ot the Prussian votes, however, will be 
at the disposal of the Prusaian provincial administrations in accordance with 
a State law." 
114LaUBCher, Ope cit., pp. 179-173; Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-192;3, p.~ 
115"Leitsltze der Deutschen Zentrumsparte1," Ursachen und Folgen, III,~ 
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attitude of an obstructionist, and, theretore, when issues of lesser importanc 
allowed for compromise, the Party acquiesced in order to achieve some prin-
ciple more important and more vital to the interests ot the Party. 
In lesser matters the Party offered noticeable resistance only to those 
articles which accorded increased power to the Reich at the expense of the 
States. The Bavarian People's Party spokesman, Heim, indicated such reaistanc 
when the articles dealing with the Reichsrat were read in the Assembly. He 
116 
opposed the decreased power allotted to the Reichsrat by Artic.s 60 to 67. 
At the time of the final reading ot the constitution in the National Assembly, 
Beyerle protested against the stipulation in Article 49 granting the exerei.e 
ot the right of pardon to the President of the Reich.U7 Bavaria, he stated, 
did not wish to concede this right to the ReiCh.118 In some areas Centrist 
intervention was BUccessful in gaining certain desired results. Graber, for 
instance, scored a victory on Article 23 by opposing in the constitutional 
committee the five-year term allotted to the Reichetag and succeeded in having 
the term shortened by a ,..ar.ll9 At the suggestion of Beyerle, furtheNore, 
it was agreed that a religious aff::i.rmation could be added to the preSidential 
oath.120 All other political provisions passed the second and third reading 
without too much comment trOll the Center t'arty. 
116Sectlon IV of the first division of the Weimar Constitution. 
117 10' 4 See Ursachen und &olgen, Ill, 73. 
118See Beyerle's speech of July 5, 1919, Verhandlungen CCClXVII, 1328. 
119Gr3ber in the conlltitutional cOlll1littee on April 5, Frotceol, as cited 
in Morsey, zentrUllSPjrtei 19l7-19!1' p. 231. See also Beyerle's support of 
this article in the ssembiy on J y 4, Vemendl!!!e!, CCCIXVII, 1281. 
120Article 42. See Beyerle's comment on July 5, 1919, ibid, p. 1318. 
-
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The area in which the Center Party offered the greatest opp08i tion in 
dealing with the political aspects of the Weimar Constitution concerned the re-
lation between the Reich and its member States. The Democrats and the Majority 
Socialists both favored an F..1nheitsstaat. But Preuss' constitutional draft 
providing for a unitary type of government WAS vehemently opposed by the Center 
Party, which had always advocated a ~sstaat type of gOYernment. Although 
the Center was successful in hindering the establishment of a unitary govern-
ment, it was not able to check the centralizing tendency. Not without an inch-
by-inch struggle, however, had it conceded to the Reich an increase of the 
121 power at the expense of the member States. But once the question of the 
power of the Reich versus states' rights had been determined, the Center dis-
played ~ a minor interest in the formation of other provisions involving 
such regulations as executive or presidential power, ministerial responsibilit,; 
and the legislative powers of the Reichstag. 
In summing up, therefore, the Center Party can be said to have acquiesced 
in the JIUljor political proTision. of the constitution in all but two important 
areas. Its opposition to the establishment of a unitary state involved its 
traditional cOlllllittment to protect the religious and cultural rights of its 
constituents; hence, its resistance on this point remained adamant. On the 
question of Prussia, the Pa~tyts obligation to stand by its provinCial Prussian 
membership lett no alternative but to press for the curtailment of excessive 
power. 
121_-
"he Center eventually gave in on this issue atter receiving instruc-
tions from the Reich's ministers, Erzberger and Bell, who promised the Party 
would elildnate all hindrance to the cansti tutional draft. See "Session ot thE 
Reich's Ministry, July 10, 1919," in State Archives, as cited in Morsey, 
Zentrumapartei 1917-1923, p. 234. 
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CHAPTER V 
DELIBERATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION 
CENTRIST VIEVIS ON CIVIC, RELIGIOUS 
AND CULTURAL ASPl!X:TS 
In its completed fora the Weillar Cansti tution was divided into two .. in 
divisions, one dealing with political aspects of the Reich, the other defining 
the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of a German. It The formation of the latter 
involved much concentrated effort on the part of the constitutional commi t.t.ee 
and was the product of many pai.nf'ul.. compromises. Originally, Preuss had not 
planned a separate section defining German rights, but at the instigation of 
the govemment.--in fact, at a personal request trOll1 Friederich Ebert-he had 
included in his working draft a short list of traditional axiOll1s.1 It was this 
list which the constitutional committee, regarding very seriously, had judged 
inadequate and had replaced by the introduction of new provisions which would 
include within the constitution those guarantees which each politioal party 
considered essential. 2 
luraachen und Folgen, III, 433-434. During the deliberations with the 
~tate Committee on February 8, Preuss told the state representat.ives that he 
~referred not to include a section on "Fundamental Rights" because he feared 
ithat an expanded and detailed consideration of the axioms would only delay work 
~n the constitution and he hoped "to avoid the mistake of 1848." See also 
~ocol, as cited in Ziegler, Nationalversammlpng, pp. 136-137. 
2Ibid., p. 130. Four drafts were submittea on March 31, 1919. 
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The Center Party's particular concerna included the areas ot Church-5tate 
re~tions, marriage, the family, confessional schools, and the teaching of 
religion. Provisions for these matters, embodied in a draft of rights pre-
sented by Gr&ber to the constitutional committee on March 31, 19l9,3 were sub-
sequentl;r rejected by the comaittee in favor ot the draft presented by the 
Democrat Friedrich Newunn. 
Atter much deliberation on Neumann's draft. the constitutional committee 
indicated what it. considered the essential rights to be included in the con-
stitution. These rights were further defined by a subcommittee consisting of 
nine members chosen trom. the constitutional ccaaittee. Three prominent Cen-
trists, Graber, Beyerle, and Mausbach, were part of this subcOllUllittee.4 
Although no ofticial record was kept of the subcommittee's deliberations, 
their finished docUlllent evidenced the intensive etfort exerted by the meabers 
during their seversllleet.ings.5 In the opinion of the historian Wilhelm. 
Ziegler, none worked more diligently than Konrad Beyerle who is oredited with 
"having saved NeUlll8nn's rather obscure draft ot tundamental rights trOll the 
wastebasket" by fOl"lllulating an acceptable draft ot this second major division 
ot the constitution.6 Ziegler describes Beyerle as laboring "quietly and 
3Johannes Linneborn, "Die Kirchenpolitik des Zentruma," in Nationals 
~rbeit. p. 198. Lausoher, Ope cit., p. 175; Mauabach, Kulturtragen, p. 38. 
40tber members included the two Social Democrats s. Katzenstein and Frau 
PtiUtJ the two Democrats D. Ablas. and E. Koch; P. Heinse of the German Peoplets 
Party; and A. Duringer of the German National People's Party. Beyerle, Reiohs-
~ertassunl, PP. 11-13, Ziegler, OPe cit., PP. 138-140. 
~ember8 _ 9f the subcommittee met on May 2, 
... ~ ___ • _c...;;i ..... t., p. 130. . 
3, 5, 6, and 28. See Ziegler, 
6 Nationalversaal'U!i, p. 190. 
p:z 
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unobtrullively~' at the task of completing the final copy by applying, as he says 
the Itugnifying glass of the lawyer and the pen of the framing and scrutiniz inS 
editor" to the sketchy original text. 7 Thus, by the end of the subcommittee's 
deliberations, the twelve original provisions on rights emerged as sixty 
art.icles, fOl"llling the consti tut.ion' 19 Part. II on "Fundamental Rights and Duties 
at a German." When presented to the full constitutional committee on May 26, 
1919, this schema of Grundrechte was an impressive piece of work subdivided 
into five major areas dealing with t.he rights of individuals, community life, 
6 
religion and religious societies, education and schools, and economic life. 
Discussion of the Grundrecht.e began immediately upon its presentation 
to the constitutional cOllUllit.tee (May 26). Beyerle, report.ing for the sub-
«omm1t.tee, explained t.hat the absence of a declaration of fundamental rights 
had been a major deficiency in t.he Bismarckian Const.itution of 1671 and that an 
enumeration of certain rights was mandatory for the new constitutIon.9 Karl 
Heinze of the German People's Part.yopposed Beyerle and called for a drast.ic 
reduction of the articles anumerated in Part. II of the constit.ution. Heinze 
even suggested the total e11lllination of this second ujor division since he 
7Ibid • ZIegler praises the selt-sacrificing labors or Beyerle in the 
subcOlllllI'ttie. Seldom in the lime-light., he was the "energet.ic spirit." behind 
the constitutional committee; "his scholarliness, thoroughness, and the objec-
tivity of his civic office proved useful to him in his parliamentary function." 
Ibid. Adelbert. Diringer (DNVP) paid a public tribute to the "excellent ser-
~n rendered by Beyerle in the subc~it.tee. See D:lringer's speech in t.he 
National Assembly on July 11, 1919, Verhandlungen, CCCXXVIII, 1495. 
6 HZwei tar Haupt8il: Grundrechte und Grundpflicht.en der Deutschen," in 
Ursachen und Folgen, III, 482 ... 493. All further citations from the constitution 
are taken frOIl this edition. 
9Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 141. 
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saw in it only a collection of "declarations and declamations" supplemented 
10 by legal maxims already present in other laws. In the midst of the heated 
debate, Preuss intervened to remind the cOJ1lmittee members how imperative it was 
that the government "bring the constitution under roof as soon as possible" 
even at tithe cost of the integrity of the Grundrechte.ll en June 2, after .four 
days of further deliberations, it was decided that the Grundrechte should be 
retained. Thereupon the constitutional camnittee began its second reading and 
12 
subsequent discussion of the entire constitutional draft. Chief among con-
troversial issues studied in the forthcoming sessions were the question of the 
Reich's colors, the Church-5tate issue, and the confessional school problem--
the two latter questions of great significance to the Center Party.13 
Though the constitutional coounittee was able to bring its deliberations 
to a conclusion on June 18, work on the constitution was stalled for the next 
~o weeks because of the crisis in the government concerning the acceptance of 
!the Versailles Treaty. Consequently, it was not until July 2 that the plenary 
session of the National Assembly began its deliberations on the second reading 
of the constitutional draft. By July ll, the Assembly was ready to consider 
Part II on "Fundamental Rights and Duties. n Once again this second division 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid• 
12 Ibid., pp. 142-143. The second reading in the constitutional camnittee 
:overed seven days, June 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 11, and 18. 
13Ibid., pp. 144-146; Germenia, June 18, 1919, #212; June 19, 1919, #213; 
~, June2O'; 1919, #415; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 86-88. 
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was severe~ criticized as impractical b.Y the DNVP Heinze and the Demoorat 
14 Erich Koch! But Beyerle's lucid explanation of the subcommittee's arguments 
for retention overcame the opposition and Part II ot the oonstitutional dratt 
was acoepted,lS 
A oloser sorutiny of the Center's involvment with the Grundrechte reveals 
the extent ot the proteotion demanded for the safeguard of personal liberty as 
~ell as the labor and anxiety attendant upon the struggle tor each ot the five 
~as included in the Constitution's Part II. 
Section I, "The Individual, tt enumerated a list of individual liberties 
~hich inoluded such matters as civil equality,16 the right to settle in any 
part ot the Reich or to emigrate to a foreign oountry,11 and guarantees against. 
18 . ~rbitrary arrests, imprisonments, and other penalties. Rights to the invio-
p.abilit.y of the h01ll8,19 to secrecy in mail, telephone, and telegraph coJlllllWlica-
.. ions,20 as well as the right to freely express opinions through all media in-
cluding motion picture tilms 21 were also guaranteed. 
This whole section on "The Individual" was accepted wi thOllt too much 
~ebate once the constit.utional committee had agreed to retain Part. II on 
14verhandlungen, ~ 11, 1919, CCCXAYIII, 
1.5 ~.J p. 1.503. 
·16 
Articlll 109. 
17 Article 111 and Article 112. 
l8Article 114. 
19 Articlll 11.5 • 
20 Article 117. 
21 Article 118. 
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"Fundamental Rights. tt22 Nevertheless, Beyerle did suggest a minor change on 
July 11 when he introduced the revised part to the National Assembly. He ob-
jected to the statement in the first article which read that this section was 
to act "as a guiding principle and a check on legislation, governmental power, 
and the judicial administrat1on. t123 Beyerle thought thatth1s article was 
-.orthless and should be deleted. n24 At the next session of the National As-
sembly, Graber also proposed eliminating the "uselessn article.25 When the 
majority of the delegates indicated by a standing vote their disapproval ot 
26 Article 107, it was deleted from the constitutional draft. 
Only two articles in this section received further attention in the 
National Assemb~. Article 10927 providing for Civil equality and the aboli-
tion of titles ot nobility had alreaqy engendered 80me discussion in the con-
28 
stitutional committee on June 2, but it was not until it reached the tloor 
of the Assemb~ on July 15 that a lively discussion developed. Referring to 
the provision for civil equality of men and women, Christine Teusch, a Centrist 
delegate, praiaed the article as a progressive and democratic step in the new 
RePublic. 29 Her defense of civil equality won the support of the whole 
22 Germania, June 19, 1919, #272; !!, June 20, 1919, #475. 
23 Article 107 of the constitutional draft. Since this article was later 
~eleted, it should not be contused with Article 107 in the official ConstitutiOn. 
2~erhandl~n, July 11, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1503. 
25Ibid., July 15, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1557. 
26 Ibid., p. 1560. 
-
27 This article was referred to as Article 108 in the constitutional dra.t't. 
28Ziegler, ope cit., p. 142. J.4embers of the !tight did not favor tts art:i:le. 
29verb"wut, Julv 1~ 1919 r.r.r.:uv 1~60 
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Assembly. The second provision of Article 109 concerning the abolition ot 
titles of nobility was championed by the Social Democrats. Surprisingly', this 
statement found a sympathetic supporter. in the Bavarian People's Party spokes-
man, Heim. Commonly knOlal as an arch-conservative, Heim amused his fellow 
Centrists and other delegates ot the National Assembly by his vehement speech 
in favor of the proposal made by the Social Democrats.30 
The other article ot Section I which brought a response f'rom the Center 
was Article 11431 which states: "Personal liberty is inviolable. Curtailment 
or deprivation of' personal liberty by a public authority is permissible only 
by authority ot law. tt32 In the National A8stlllbly' on July 15 the Independent 
Socialists proposed that an exception be made in the case of prostitution to 
guarantee that under certain conditions it would not be curt&Ued by law. 33 
This proposal was challenged by the Centrist delegate Agnes Neuhaus, who held 
that the Constitution ~as not the place to legalize prostitution.1I34 Frau 
Neuhaus was supported in her opinion by the majority of' the Assembly and the 
proposal was dropped. 35 
In Section II ot the Orundrechte the constitutional cClQl11ittee dealt with 
30Ibid., p. 1567. Heill's comment, "On this question [abolition of titles 
of nobility] I am more radical than the most radical among yoU," evoked loud 
laughter tram the Social DeJIlOCrats. Ibid. 
-
31aeferred to as Article 113 in the constitutional draft. 
32Article 114. 
33verhandlungen, July 15, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1574. 
34 Ibid., p. 1575. 
35Ibid• 
> 
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matters social. Properly designated "Canmuni ty Life," this section outlined 
the rights and duties or those groups and canmunities which played a particular 
role in society--the family, associations, municipalities, and civil service.36 
Keenly interested in all of these areas, the Center Party evidenced particular 
concern for the institution of marriage and the family. Since constitutional 
guarantees in this matter were as vi tal to the common good as the safeguards 
to education and religion, the Center was not remiss in bringing its influence 
to bear upon this area of the Kulturfragen. Earlier, in its December election 
program, the Party had advocated "the protection and strengthening or the 
religious character of marriage and the family.,,37 Despite "difficult oppo-
sition,,38 from the sm in the committee, the Centrists had again striven to 
secure "cansti tutional protection for monogamous marriage in the Christian 
sense.,,39 When at length, the B,rticle on marriage was ready for discussion 
at the May 28 meeting or the constitutional committee, its Centrist overtones 
were unmistakable. "Marriage," it read, "as the foundation of family life and 
of the maintenance and increase of the nation, 1s under the special protection 
of the Constitution. The maintenance of the purity, the health, and the social 
advancement of the family is the task of the state and of the municipalities. 
Families with numerous children have a claim to equalizing assistance. ltuO 
36section II, Article 119-1.34. 
37"Leits~tze vom Dezember 1918." cr. above, pp. 69-72. 
38Lauscher, .2£. ill., p. 177. 
39Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 38-39. en January 1, 1919, Dr. Sonnenschair 
had told the Berlin Centrists: "The question of divorce should not be one of 
indifference. The marriage bond must be respected." Germania, January 1, 
1919, #2. 
uOArticle 119. 
,I, 
II' 
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Credit for the acceptance of this marriage article by the oonstitutional 
committee was due in particular to the Centrist women delegates41 who, exerting 
every effort, had eventually forced the committee to recognize marriage and the 
fami~ as the basis on 'Which nsocial lile reposes" and. as the ttprimary source 
from which German customs and culture develop.n42 Th1a was not aooeptable to 
the SPD who claimed th18 article discrilll1nated aga1nat un.wed mothers and ille-
gitimate ohildren.4J 
The denunciation of the &rtiole44 by r.he Sooial Democrats did not effect 
its deletion .from the draft, nevertheless, the artiole came under tire again 
when it was read in the National Assembly on Jul¥ 16. This time it was the 
Independents "'0 opposed it.45 The Centrist view, however, was ably defended 
by Frau Neuha).ts and Eduard Burlage. Not only did the)" answer the criticism 
levelled at them by the SPD, but the)" also proposed enlarging the article to 
include other guarantees for the faBily.46 Particular areas treated were the 
needs of arge families, protection of motherhood, and the care of illegitimate 
offspring. In keeping with their traditional concern for human rightd, the 
Center agitated for a constitutional guarantee of state assistance for large 
4l)lausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 39. Frau Neuhaus represented the Center as 
one of its members on the constitutional committee when the Kulturfragen were 
~der discussion. 
42Ibid• 
43 Protocol, as cited in tauscher, OPe oit., p. 176. 
44Article 113 in the cGnstituticnal draft. 
45 See their speeches in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen, July 16, 
~919, CCCIXVIII, 1$98-1600. 
46Ibid., pp. 1601-1603; 1608-1609. 
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families. 47 Through the efforts of Frau Neuhaus and Herr Burlage, the proposal 
"Motherhood has a claim to the protection and care of the state." was affixed 
to Article 119.48 
Closely related to the privileges granted to motherhood and family was 
the prescription of Article 120, stating that "the physical, mental, and moral 
education of their offspring is the highest duty and the natural right of 
parents."49 In his report to the National Assembly on J~ 16 Beyerle acknowl-
edged Graber as the author of the proposal made in Article 120.50 Centrist 
inspired, it, too, was challenged by the SPD who considered education the task 
of society or the State and not primarily of the parents.51 Fearing the ef-
fect on Christian education which could result in areas dominated by the 
Socialists if the state should gain complete control of the education of chil-
dren, the Centrists appealed to the delegates to retain Article 120.52 The 
success of their plea was seen on the following day when Article 120 received 
~ favorable vote in the National Assemb~.53 
The quostioI! of the status of illegitimate children was also brought up 
in the discussion of Articles 119 and 120.54 However, the problem was too 
41Helene Weber, "Kulturpolitik," in Nationale Arbeit, pp. 231-239. 
48 Verhandlungen, J~ 17, 1919, CCCL~III, 1620. 
49Article 120. 
50see Beyerle's speech, Verhandlungen, July 16, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1597. 
51 Ibid. 
52See Burlage's speech, ~., 1608-1609. 
53Ibid., J~ 17, CCCXXVIII, 1627; tauscher, Ope cit., p. 178. See also 
IIhe artirn-in!!, July 11, ·1919, #552. 
54 . 
Verhandlungen, ~ 16 and 11, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1608-1621. 
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heavily fraught with questions of private rights to allow for an easy solution; 
hence the Assembly decided to transfer legislation to a later date.55 For the 
present, it established a guiding principle that illegitimate children would be 
~rovided .... ith the same opportunities for their physical, mental, and moral 
~elopment as legitimate children,"$~ a stipulation accepted by the centrist~ 
Section III and IV conceming the topics, "Religion and Religious 
~ocieties" and ItEducat~on and Schools," involved more controversial discussion 
~han any othar section in the Gruncirechte. In preparing these articles, the 
ielegates t::> the Weimar Assembly refused to l1m1t themselves to any traditional 
ieclaration of rights containing general principles relative to religious 
iberty and the free exercise of belief. The question of Church and St.ate 
Pormed an essential part of the program of both the Center and the Social 
Jemocrats, and neither group was w1l1~; to rush to easy solutions while basic 
iifferences remained to be satisfactorily resolved. 
Adhering to the Erfurt Program of 1891, the Social nEtDlOcrats continued 
~o press for a complete separation of Church and State in the n ... German 
epubl1c. The Social Democrat,. whose anti-clerical program during the past 
ovembar and December had aroused alarm among both Catholics and Protestants 
~ike, considered religion a private matter and, therefore, not the concern of 
tate.58 
5Ssee the proposal of Frau BrSnner 
uly 17, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1620. 
(SPD) in the National Assembly, ibid., 
-. 
56Article 121. 
57 see r'rau Neuhaus t speech on Article 121, ~., pp. 1626-1627. 
5~or a description of and reaction to the anti-clerical program of the 
IOcia1ists regime, cf. above pp. 77-80. 
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em. this issue the Social DeIlocrats stood di.ametrioally opposed to the 
Centrists who considered religion a vital part of German culture ~ich must be 
safeguarded by the State. From the time of its inception, the Center Party 
had been the chief exponent of religious .treedOlI in GermanY'. Already in Novem-
ber 1918, the PartY' had indicated ita intention to retain this role.59 In ita 
political program' of Dec_ber 30, 1918, the Center had stressed among other 
proposals of dcaestic policies, lithe maintenance and strengthening of the 
cultural and educational ideals in the minds of the people," treedOlll of con-
science and of religious exercises with cooperation between Church and State, 
the maintenance of "the confessional public schools," and "sufficient reli-
gious instructions in all achools."60 In ita election campaign the Center 
Party, supported by the Protestants, championed the rights ot religion.61 Up-
holding the federal character ot the ReiCh, the Center had proposed that cer-
tain powers, especially those concerning Church and school, be reserved to the 
62 Bundeestaaten. In so doing, the Party had hoped to secure the privileged 
position granted the Church under the old regtme.63 Fearing the "unhealthy 
59In the Center's manifesto on November 20, 1918, the Party promised to 
maintain ita traditional stand on Cburoh-5tate relations. See Germania, 
November 20, 1918, 154h; !!, November 22, 1918, 11919. 
60ttLeitsitme der Deutschen Zentrumapartei vom 30, Demember 1918, cf. 
pp. 69-72. 
61 On January 7, 1919, a manitesto issued by the Evangelical Churches 
called on all \.hristialUl to join with the Center in ita attacks on the anti-
religious policies of the Social D_ocr!ta. Cited i~ Johannes Linneborn, "Die 
Kirchenpolitik des Zentrums," in Nationale Ar~~!, p. 198. Written by a con-
temporary, this article gives the Centrist views on Church poliCies in the 
Weimar discussions. 
62w1lhelll Marx stressed this at the Centrist d81ll0nstration at Cologne on 
December 4, 1918. See!!, December 5, 1918, #957. 
63Unneborn. ope cit. t p. 198; also Mausbach, Kulturfrajlen, p. $9. 
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mitary element" which vas 1I8.nifesting its "devastating action" in all cultural 
64 lreas, it demanded that these affairs be lett in the hands of the Linder. 
)n February 28, 1918, Spahn as Centrist spolcesman repeated this same idea in 
the National Assembly, adding that every religious society should be allowed 
to manage its affairs autoncaously as had been the case under the Prussian 
~onstitution of 1850.65 
When ~e question of the Reich's caapetency over religious affairs came 
~tore the constitutional committee on March 14, 15, and 16, Graber advised 
against "hasty changes" in the traditional policies and warned that granting 
66 
such jurisdiction to the Reich would bring unrest. Controversy swelled over 
the wording of Article 10 which tended to give the Reich jurisdiction over 
1UIlY' areas formerly superYised by the individual states. Regulation of reli,..-
~i0U8 affairs and the establishment of a uniform educational syatem in Germany 
~ere attempts to turther centralize authority in the Reich, and as such were 
ontr&ry to the Center's federalist policies. 
Doth Beyerle and Gr8ber called for a cancellation of these provisions. 
~As a Catholic," Graber remonstrated, "I cannot concede competency to the 
~atianal Assembly to discuss religious questions. n67 But the Centrists were 
~ot able to check this centralizing torce in the constitutional COlUli twe, for 
640r8ber in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen, February 13, 1919, 
pccnVI, 54. 
65Ibid., February 28, 1919, CCCUVl, 319. 
66 Ki.,cMarch, 1919, #214. See also Ziegler, OPe cit., p. ll7; Linneborn, 
~. cit.-;-p. 191. 
61 Protocol, cited in Ziegler, OPe Cit., p. ll1. 
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the majority of the mabers had decided that the Reich could "prescribe by law 
fundamental principles concerning the rights and duties of religious a8socia-
t1 "68 on8. • • 
On March 1, the co_ittee turned its attention to a consideration of 
69 
religious treedOll as propo8ed in Preuss' dratt. This article, the only one 
in which Preuss dealt wi t.h religious atfairs, prO't'ided for freedom ot con-
science and the tree exercise of onels religious duties. It abolished the 
special privileged posi tion of the Church in the State, guaranteeing religious 
societies the tree exercise ot their atfairs, but subjecting the. to the gen-
70 
eral law ot the land. 
In the ensuing debate over this article, Dr. Mauabach warned the Social 
Democrats that attempts to s eperate Church and State would arouse the otagO-
niD of both Catholics and Protestants alike, He referred to the turor that 
had erupted in Christian circles in reaction to the Independent Socialist 
Hoffmann's anti-religious policies of Nove.ber and December, 1918. The Center 
had always been a champion of states' rights and protector ot religious tree-
dem, he told the Social Democrats, and he insisted that in the new German con-
stitution, guarantees be made to protect liberty ot conscience. To cloud the 
issue with the slogan, "Religion is a private thing, and therefore, no concern 
of the State," was to court trouble, Mausbach declared. To a certain extent, 
he admitted, religion was a private matter, but not entirely, since it was 
68Article 10: "Das Reich kann ill Wege del' Gesetzgebung GrtmdsAtse aat-
stallen tDr die Rechte und Ptlichten dar Religionagesellschatten." 
69Qriginally Article 19 in Preuss' constitutional dratt, cited in 
Ursachen und Folgen, III, 433. 
70Ibid• 
-
pi 
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also a powerful factor of public life and could not be divorced trom it. Dr. 
Mausbach, moreover, advocated State encouragement of "the development ot 
Christianity in the service ot the weltare ot all; a tree world endeavor of 
all religious, educational, and social realities."11 
But the Center's position was becoming precarious. It was while the 
commi ttee was discussing Article 3012 during the latter part of March that 
they began to.question the advisability of adhering to their traditional fed-
eralist view on religious aftairs. Since the revolutionary governments in 
some ot the Linder, especially in PrusSia, Munich, Brunswick, and Gotha, had 
assumed an anti-religious attitude, the Center Party decided that perhaps it 
would be more desirable to choOle a positive approach in order to be able to 
prepare an "acceptable course" regarding Chureh-State relations. The Party 
reasoned that since the Daloerats and the partiea of the Right had guaranteed 
religious tolerance and protection ot Church interests in their election cam-
paign, the Social Democrats would be unable to Muster a majon ty in the 
National Assembly tor their kulturkampferische goals.13 Hence, the Center 
Party revereed its previous negative attitude toward jurisdiction of the Reich 
1l;-or a report of the cOllUllittee meeting, see Germania, March 16, 1919, 
#121. Mauabach had expressed a s1lllUar view in the National Assembly on 
March 11, when he told the delegates", !fAs history has sholm and the culture ot 
the German people has daonstrated, religion is also a powerful element in 
public lite and it does not proceecl trOll economic necessity, but rather frOll. 
the depths of mankind's inner soul. and his natural propensity toward God and 
eternity." Verhandlungen, March ll, 1919, CCClIVII, 619. 
12This article was addod to Preuss' draft to cover the Church-5tate rela-
tions. The subcClllUlittee expanded into several articles by combining the vari-
ous proposals ot the constitutional committee until it became Section III, 
"Religion and Religious Societies," in the Grundrechte. 
7)1auscher, OPe cit~, p. 119. 
203 
.. n religious utters, and along with the other bourgeois parties sought to nan-
~hor" more specifically in the constitution a basic policy ot religious free-
dome 
This reversal ot the Centrist position was first revealed by Beyerle on 
~arch 29 when he told the constitutionsl cOllllittee that the Center Party had 
accepted the initial provision of Article 10 granting the Reich competency over 
religious affairs and education.74 Determined as they were not to "sacrifice" 
their religious goals,75 the six Centrists on the collDlittee16 assisted by 
rlihel.lll Kahl fram the German People' s Party had, however, tormulated their own 
article a8 a counter-proposal to Preuss' article on religion. 11 To the bocial 
Democrats' proposal, ''separation of Church and State," 18 tor example, Gr3ber had 
retaliated with a series ot supplementar" proposals. 
Breedes ot associations in religious societies is guaranteed. 
Every religious society regulates and manages its aftairs treely 
and independently and sppoints its officials without State assist-
ance. Religious societies and spiritual societies obtain legal 
rights after the BGr,erliches Geset~buch. Religious societies 
are entitled to the possession of their cultural institutions 
and endowaente as well as their right of taxation. Religious in-
struction is a school subject under the uswsal direction of re~9-
gious societies. The theological faculties will be continued. 
14protocol, cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 172J Linneborn, Ope cit.,p. 201 
15For the Centrist views on the Church-5tate question, see Alexander von 
~randt, Staat und Kirche. Zur Trennungstrage in Preussen (Flugschrift8n der 
Peutschen Zentrumspartei, Berlin: December, 1918). 
16The Centrists 'Working on this section were Graber, Beyerle, Mausbach, 
~heinl1lnder, Spahn, and Trimbom--pro.11inent parliamentarians on the question 
pf Kulturpoliti!. See Linnebom, 2E.!_cit., p. 200. 
17Called Article 30 on "State and Religion" in the constitutional draft. 
78Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 124; !!, April 3, 1919, 
Germanr~, April 4, 1919, #153. 
19Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., pp. 124-125. 
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The Social Democrats resisted Gr8bert s proposals as contrary to their 
cOJlmlitments and insisted upon a complete separation of Church and State which 
they considered the ncore question. nBO The Centrists, for their part, reasoned 
that cODlplete separation of Church and State would involve a decrease in 
econOlldc protection and support given to the churches by the State and to this 
Bl they would not consent. Because neither side would compromise, the situs-
tionmet a hopeless impasse. 
A few daya later on April 1.4, Majority Socialist Johannes Meerfeld, oall-
ing Grabert s proposals "cODlpletely unacceptable, II stated, nevertheless, that 
the ,members of his party wanted tlno KulturkaJllpf. II Indicating a change in the 
militant anti-religious socialist attitude, Meerfeld conceded, "My party knows 
from experience that one cannot tight against religion and expect 8uccess. n82 
The Socialists, he said, were willing to "recogni.e for the present the imp or-
tance and the influence of religion • • • as an inner need for numerous .en, 
and one must allow for thifi situation. 1I83 Separation of Church and State, he 
pointed out, could be accomplished in an "amicable fashion" and without hara 
to the respective Churches as had already been proved by many governaents. 
"Separation is possible if it is accomplished with the good will of all con-
cerned.,,84 The Majority SOCialists, he announced, hid, therefore, reconsidered 
80 Linnebom, 2P. cit., p. 200. 
81 
ltV, April 8, 1919, #276. 
-82 Protocol, as cited in Linneborn, Ope cit., p. 201. 
83Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 12,. 
B4Ibid.; also cited in Linneborn, 2P. cit., p. 201. 
... 
205 
the religious question and were willing to comprOlllise with the Centrists and 
the parties of the Right. 85 
In lieu ot the change of attitude or the Majority Socialists, Mausbach 
announced, "I think that the opposition between our point of view and that ot 
the Social DElloerate is not incompatible in all parta as (lIle might expect at 
first glance. The idea of a separation ot Church and State ia, 8S J:m". Kehl 
86 has already indicated, many-sided. My Party is now w1lling to go halt-wa,... n 
Seizing upon these initial conceasions, the two Centrist clerics Keas 
and Mausbach worked with Meerteld in forming a compromise on the religious is-
sue. In place ot Meerfeld's propo8al, "There is separation or Church and State] 
Mausbach proposed the negative statement, "There i8 no State Church. n87 Having 
granted this much to the Social Democrats, the Center and the parties ot the 
Right were now in a position to secure favorable concessions regarding religion 
and religious societies. Out ot this spirit ot coaproaise evolved the solu-
tion that there would not be complete separation ot "hurch and State, but 
nei ther would there be a close union between them. The Churches would be 
88 
emancipated trOll the State, but they would enjoy certain privileges. 
"\..-' 
To this end, the principle of liberty ot beliet and conscience and the 
free exercise ot religion were immediately given constitutional guarantees. 
Ever since 1905 the Centri8ts had attempted, albeit unauccesstully, to get the 
5>Protocol, cited in Ziegler, ~2t cit., p. 125. 
86 Protocol, cited in Linneborn, 02. cit., p. 201. 
87 Mausbach, Kulturtrage!,l;, pp. 59-60. also cited in Linneborn, OPe cit., 
p. 202. 
88aermania, April 14, 1919, 1170; !!, April 14, 1919, 1295. 
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Reichstag to pass a toleration act tor the protection ot minority groups. 
They now saw the fulfillaent of their desires in Articles 135 and 136. The 
first article stated: "All inhabitants ••• enjoy complete liberty of beliet 
and conscience. 89 The free eDreise of religion is assured. • • ." In the 
second article, the political status of citizens vas protected regardless ot 
religious aftiliation. Article 136 readl "Civil and political rights are 
neither conditioned nor limited by the exerciae ot religious liberty. The 
enjoyment of civil and political rights as well as eligibility to public otfice 
is independent ot religious beliet. • • • ,,90 
Determined to insure religious associations and societies the right to 
administer their own atfairs independently of the State, Gr8ber proposed: 
"Each religious society regulates and administers its atfairs freely and in-
de}fmdently; espeCially in regard to the appointment of its officials, it is 
~n organisation free to act without interterence freD the State or civic 
~ommunitiesJ the right of private patronage remains undisturbed." (Jede 
Relig10nsgesellschaft ordnet und verwaltet !hre Angelegenheiten frei und selb-
standig, insbe.ondere verleiht sie !hre Kmter ohne Mitwirkung des Steates oder 
~er bDrgerlichen Gemeinde; die Rechte aus dem Privatpatronat bleiben unbertlhrJ' 
~o the Sooial Democrats and Democrats, this proviaion appeared entirely too 
iberal. Some 11lllitation or State superviaion, they felt, was necessary to 
~intain public order and safety. Dr. Kahl then suggested adding to "freely 
89Article 135. 
90Article 136. 
91 Cited in Linneborn, OPe cit., p. 205. 
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and independently" (frei und 8elbst~ndig) the words: "but is subjected to gen-
eral legislation" (bleibt aber den allgemeinen ~taatsgesetzen unterworfen).92 
93 Meerteld insisted upon the phrase "innerhalb der Schranken des Gesetzen." 
The Center, realizing how dangerous a restricting phrase might be in the hands 
or an anti-clerical government, preterred no such limitation, but once again 
the Party was forced to compromise. " Grober, therefore, recommended adding 
tlwi thin the limits of a general law" (innerhalb der Schranken des rllr alle 
geltenden Gesetzes).94 The recommendation was accepted by the committee in 
Aprll. 95 The provision, later to be incorporated in Article 137, read, "Every 
religious society regulates and administers its artairs independently within 
the limits of the general law. It appoints its officers without interference 
by the State or the civil municipality. ,,96 
A further development of this prOVision gave recognition to the social 
force and importance of Churches in public life and accorded to them pri vi-
" leges similar to those extended to public corporations. Grober, Spahn , and 
Mausbach who were active in obtaining these concessions97 not only secured for 
religious societies the privilege of being accorded the rights ot public cor-
porations,98 but also won the constitutional guarantee of "property and other 
----_.---------------------------------------------------------------------
95Ibid., pp. 20"'206. The article, ItRalgion and the Church in the Con-
stitutional Committee," in !I, April 17, 1919, #302, described the struggle. 
96Article 137, par. 3. 
p. 206. 
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rights ot religious bodies and associations tor the maintenance of their cul-
tural, educational, and charitable institutions, their foundations and other 
99 possessions." Nor did the question of taxation escape the Center's notice. 
Under German law public corporations enjoyed both the legal standing that 
private law aftorded and the special protection ot the State. Theirorganiza-
tions were regarded indirectly as public agencies and had,therefore, the right 
to levY taxes. Spahn desired to set constitutional guarantees on this right 
of taxation. He told the const.itutional co_ittee when it was debating the 
issue of separation ot Church and State that many individual States such as 
Saxony, Oldenburg, Saxony-Altenburg, Bavaria, and Baden, had already passed 
legislation in this regard.1OO Gr8ber also emphasised this point 1Ihil~ at the 
101 
same time streSSing the social .function ot religious societies. .As a resul" 
of the support the Center received frail the other bourgeois parties, the con-
stitutional committee accepted in its last reading in June the proposal that 
" ••• religious societies which are recognized by law as corporate bodies are 
entitled on the basis of the civil taxrolls to raise taes according to the 
provisions of the laws of the respective States. nl02 
As a consequence of separation of Church and State, the parties of the 
Left insisted that the obligation of the State, stemming from the days ot 
secularization, to participate financially in the expenses of the Churches no 
99Article 1)8, par. 2. 
lOOThe Social Democrats wanted to prohibit this right, but Spahn was able 
to overcome their opposition when the provision was receiving its second read-
ing in the constitutional comm1.ttee. See Linnebom, OPe ci~., p. 206. 
l°1rbid.J KV, June 2, 1919, #426. 
- -102 Article 137, par. 6. 
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longer existed. The Democrat Naumann declared, "We rio longer wish the State 
to support the Churches finanCially. The Churches must nov say, 'We will pay 
our own expenses. I ,,10) Since the Social De.ocra ta were of the same opinion, 
Meerfeld and Naumann made a joint proposal to the constitutional committee 
which sought the "redemption of State payments" (Ab18sung der Staatsleistungen) 
while guaranteeing at the .ame time the property of the Church.104 The Center 
Party and the German National People's Party were fearful of the implications 
and complications such. propoeal could have. Sp~hn argued that due to the 
post-war economic instability it was not a feaaible time for redemption of 
St.a te payments. 10, Keas demanded more def1n1 te terms from the government be-
fore 106 expecting the Churches to relinquish their legal titles and contracts. 
In the end the committee comprc::m1sed on this pOint.107 It was agreed 
that payments due from the State to the Churches because of same law or legal 
title must be commuted by State legislation on bases fixed by the Reich.10B 
Until then, these payments were to continue.109 
10)Cited in Linn.born, Ope ci~.~ p. 207. 
104Ibid _.
10'Ibid. 
106 Ibid., p. 208. 
-107 !!, June 2, 1919, #426. 
10B"State contributions to religious societies authorized by law, contr~ 
or any special grant, will be co-.uted by State legisle tion. • • • tf Article 
l3B, par. 1. 
109 
"Until the adoption of a national law according to Article l3B, the 
existing state contributions to the religious societies, whether authorized 
by law, con\ract or special grant, will be continued." Article 174. 
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other religious concessions were also incorporated into the constitution 
through the indefatigable ettorts ot the Centrist committee meabers and the 
DVP Kahl.110 Sunday, along with legal holidays, was set aside as "a day of 
rest and spiritual edification_ nlll Theological faculties were to be aain-
112 
tained in the German universities. Government approval ot chaplains "tor 
religious services and spiritual care in hospitals, prisons, and other public 
institutions" was also given a constitutional guarantee.113 
The success of the Center Party in maintaining i ts traditional religious 
goals despite the strong opposition of the Socialists was highly commended. 
A special vote of thanks was given by the Jerman bishops in recognition of the 
"unforgettable, great service" the Centrist had rendered the Church.114 
Germania considered the conclusion of the "penetrating deliberatinns" over 
the question ot Church and State a "principal achievement ot the new govern-
ment" allowing all "to work toward a harmonious whole. 1I It praised "the spirit 
of freedom, conciliation, and understanding" in recognizing the important cul-
tural significance of religion in all states ot lite, and was confident that 
110 
For a commentary ot the Centrist work in the conlti tutional c ODDi 1',t.e 
see Mausbach and Graber's speeches in the National Assembly at the time of th~l 
second reading of the constitutional dratt. Verhandlungen, July 17 1919 
CCClXVIII, 1661-1662. ' , 
III Article 139. 
112 
Article 149, par. 3. 
113 
Article 141. For a cOllUll8ntary on these articles, see Mauabaoh, Kultux '" 
tragen, Pp. $1-$9; Bachem, Zentrwypartei. VIII, 29$-300. 
114 
Cited in Bachem, ZentrUJUpartei. VIII, 303-30$. 
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the final proposal of separation of "'hurch and State would resolve itself with-u, 
out causing financial difficulties to religious communi ties. 
The nati va ease with which the Centriata were able to achieve their 
historic policy of religious toleration allowed them to believe that they would 
meet with siJl1lar success concerning religious education and t.he retention of 
confessional schools in Germany. However, they underestimated the opposition 
of their liberal-minded coalition partners. Perhaps nowhere in the proceedings 
of Weimar was a divergence of opinion so evident as when the members of the 
National Assembly discussed the constitutional basis for a national educa. 
tional system in the new republic. It was the earnest endeavor of Jlost of the 
delegates to establish a liberal democratic system of education--one that 
would lead to physical, mental, and social fitness in the new order. To achUt .. 
this they reali.ed that some marked educational changes vere necessary. 
In the first place, the old educational systeJll was considered undemo-
crat.ic. Although under the Eapire education had been regulated independently 
by the various States, a COlllDlon feature in all States had been ita "two-class" 
syst ... 1l6 There had been no common elementary school system as a basis for 
higher education and adTanced studies. Children of wealthier parents began 
ll'Germania, July 4, 1919, #298. A few years later at the Second Reich,@-
parteital, January 11, 1922, Wilhelm Marx noted, "In the beginning of 1919 • • • 
no one in our group had thought it possible to have achiaTed the rights and 
freedOll of the (,;hurch in such large Jleasure." Ofticia~ Report, as cited in 
Morsey, Zentrumapartei 1911-1923, p. 220. 
U6The objective of education was to produce on the one hand a body of 
intelligent and highly-trained experts, leaders, and officers; and on the other 
hand a vast army of capable, obedient, and well-disciplined followera. See 
John'l'. Cramer and George S. BrOJlIle, Contemporarz Educations A c~rative 
Study of National Systems (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Worla,9~6), p. 434. 
, \ 
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their schooling in the Vorschule, a private preparatory school fraa which they 
could transfer to a higher level of education and eventually qualify for ad-
mittance into the university. Children of the lower classes while receiving 
a sound education in the Volksschule, had no opportunity of continuing into 
the university or protessional studies. Denominational schools under clerical 
117 
supervision were organised under the same system. 
Attempts to break the "two-class" system ot education had been made prior 
118 
to World War I, but they were unsuccesstul. The November Revolutioo with 
1 ts overthrow of the old empire and the establisMent of a new republic had 
set the stage for reforms toward a Jrlore democratic system of education. Under 
the influence ot Socialism the new government 80ught not only to control the 
educational system and centralize it, but also to oust denominationali8ll. In 
the National Assembly the Democrats also tavored a unitora elementary school 
system devoid of denominationali8Jll. Nevertheless, they wished to retain 
religious instructions but under State, not clerical supervision. This attempt 
to divorce public education from Church control aroused the antagoni8ll or all 
Church authorities and religious-minded Germana .119 The Center Party as well 
as the German People's Party and the National People' s iarty had struck out 
against these s eculeristic tendencies. The publication of the Prussian Edicts 
117Ibid., PP. 434-436. 
l18elera Strateme18r, S~rv1sion in German Elementary Education, 1918-
~ (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers eollege, liolombia Universt ty ~9jff, pp. 24-28. ' 
119 . 
Mausbach, speaking in the Assembly on March 11, 1919, declaredr "These 
ttempts ••• met with strong opposition from the Pruasian bishops the Evan-
elical Churches, and t~e mass of Christians." See his speech in the National 
sseably, Verhandlungen, March 11, 1919, CCClXVl, 677. 
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of Education of November 27-29 had brought furious repercU8sions. In the 
election campaign, the Centrists had made these anti-religioU8 reforms the 
target of their Party's criticism. 
~hortly after the convening of the National Assembly, the contrOTersial 
subject of education and religioU8 instruct.ions in public schools had been 
brought. up. On February 24, 1919, an interpellation submitted by the German 
121 National People's Party vas read~ challenging the legality of new Ichool 
122 laWi eltablished by the revolutionary governments in saae of the Linder. 
The docUlllent vas an attempt to initiate a debate on the school question in the 
National AI9emblyJ however, the interpellation was not discussed lD'ltil March ll. 
When the debate actually got under way it quickly beeDe evident that the 
various parties aligned themselves into two opposing camps: those who favored 
secular public schools and thole who demanded the retention of confessional 
public Ichools as well as private scheols. 
Pr'.or to the revolution, the educational system of Germany had been regu-
lated by the individual States. Because of their traditional states' rights, 
the Centrists would have preferred to keep this arrangeraent. However, as in-
dicated in the Church-5tate questiOn, the secularistic attitude exemplified by 
l20Cf• issues of Germania, on November 28, 1918, #556; January 3, 1919, 
#4; January 4, 1919, #6; January 7, 1919, 110; January 15, 1919, #23; January 
18, 1919, #30; KV, December 17, 1918, 1988; December 27, 1918, 11013; January 
4, 1919, Ill; January 13, 1919, 134, January 14, 1919, 137. 
l21Arnstadt and Genossen interpellation, Verhal'ldlungen, February 24,· 1919, 
CCCXXVI, 293. 
l22nContrary to justice and law many individual LInder, such as Saxony, 
Hamburg, and Brunswick have denied the right of religious instruction or will 
do so in the beginning of the new school term after the Easter recess. Does 
the government intend to take a position on the legality of the existing school 
laws to protest such UlJurpation by individual gOTemments?" Ibid. 
-
jiiii'" 
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sau of the revolutionary state governments impelled the Center Party to rever. 
its stand and call for the Reich's protection of public confessional schools 
123 
and the retention of private schools. 
Already in the National Assembly's deliberations on March 11, suggestions 
for three types of educational structures emerged. One was the Socialist pro-
posal for a secular school where no religion was taught. The spokesman for the 
Social Democrats, C. August Hellmann, defended the revolutionary secular eduea-
tional system in Saxony claiming that it was not entirely irreligious. It was 
merel, 8 reform of the old system which had been under clerical control. The 
teaching of religion, he noted, had degenerated to rote recitatton, was there-
fore impractical, and should be el1m1nated.124 
The second proposal, supported by the Center Party and the parti.s of the 
Right, favored a conf.ssional or d .nominational system of education whereby 
the public school would be supervised by religious denominations. Dr. Mausbach 
very ably defended the Center's views in the debate of March ll. In a length7 
address he emphasised the iaportance of the religious issue involved in the 
recent school reforms ot some LInder. B,y way of example, he noted how in 
Bavaria by a "simple stroke ot the pen," without consulting the Churohes, 
clerical supervision ot schools had been revoked and this in direct violation 
ot a governmental guarantee given the various religious groups. While admit-
ting difterences between the Weltanschauung ot the Center Party and the parties 
of the Right, Dr. Mausbach pointed out that they all agreed on the retention 
of conr'8ssional and denominational schools. He detended the idea afmain taining 
l23ziegler, Ope cit., p. 150; Lauscher, Ope Cit., p. 179. 
124verhandlunie~, Ma~ch 11, 1919, CCCIXVI, 673-677. 
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religious instructions as a cOillpulsory part. of the public school cirriculum and 
insisted that the Catholic and hvange1ical instruct.ions must. logically be under 
f" 125 the supervision of the respect.ive "'hurch communit.y. 
He noted further how t.he Center Part.y had placed Christian schools and 
educational ideals at the head of its domestic program. Next to personal lib-
erty of conscience, the Party supported "freedom for religious organisations 
in the education of children ... 126 Dr. Mausbach was highly cri tical of the at-
titude of the new revolutionary governments whose (;hurch and school policies 
followed the pat.tern of Hoftmann' s Prussian reforms. He c orusldered these at-
tacks on libert.y ot conscience as more insidious than t.he assaults ot the old 
Bismarckian Kulturkampf because while the lat.ter were done in the name of power 
and Rea1poli t~k.t the former were performed in the name of "freedom" and the 
127 
"Free People's Republic." Further on in his speech Dr. Mausbach pointed out. 
that the Catholics Who comprised the majority of the citizens along the westerq 
southern, and ,eastern frontiers of Germany had always maintained a line ot de-
fense for the country and. were willing to do the same tor the new Republic of 
Germany. But, he reiterated, assurance of contessional schools and religious 
peace was a valuable proviso for the support of those inhabitants. In conc1ud-
ing his statements, Mausbach advocated a harmonious bridging of the gap forming 
between the Church and State, and proposed that the State encourage the develop 
128 
ment ot Christianity in the service of the general public. 
125Ibid., p. 677. 
-126 ~., p. 678. 
1271bid • 
-
128Ibid., pp. 678-680. 
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A proposal for a third type of school structure was offered the National 
Assembly on March 11 by Dr. Konrad Weiss, spokesman for the German Democrats. 
Agreeing with Mausbach that the relations between Ghurch and State should be 
founded on the basis of friendly religious understanding, Dr. Weiss, nonethe-
less, rejected the "untenable poBi_tionn of the SPD in proposing that the new 
government of the Reich be built solely on economic, political, SOCial, and 
cultural ideals which would neglect the tr~ significance of religious educa-
tion. Complete development of the whole personality, he said, rsquired reli-
gious education, and, therefore, the role that the Church plays in the formati 
of the moral character of the citizen should be recognized. Even trOll a soci 
viewpoint, he argued, religious instruction has an essential place in the 
school. However, the Democrats were not so much concerned with religious in-
, .. 
struction being a special responsibility of the Church, as theY' were in the c 
plete omission of it in the elementary schools. He even agreed with Dr. Maus-
bach that no university should be without a theological faculty taught bY' the 
clergy. His Party favored the retention of religious instruction as a part of 
the school program on all levels, but most especially on the elementary level. 
Nevertheless, he pointed out that the Democrats wished the schools to be eman-
cipated fran Church control, to be secular. He proposed an undenominational 0 
mixed school, the S1lnu.l tanschule in which supervisi on of the schools and the 
regulation of religious instruction would be the task of the individual Statea, 
not of any particular Church. He advocated sweeping "reforms in the teaching 0 
religion, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and a dovetailing of the old 
wi th the new thoughts of pedagogy. Once these reforms would be achieved, Weis 
saw no reason whY' religion as a moral guidance COUl'se could not be considered 
129 
an essential part of tne school curriculum. 
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Like other c~ntroyft'8w. issues, the school question posed too manY' dUfi 
culties to allow for quick solution. It was handed over, instead, to the con-
stitutional cOJlUl'littee whose diverse membership gave no hope for an early settle-
Mnt. Late in March the discussion in the constitutional cOllDli ttee got under 
way_ RepresentatiTes of the Center supported bY' the delegates from the German 
People's PartY' and the German Nationalists demanded a constitutional guarantee 
for denominpt.ional or confessional schools while the Sooial Demoorats and the 
Democrats held to their idea of the secular and unifonR SChools.130 After 
serious deliberations, it appeared that a solution was forthcoming when the 
parties agreed that a uniform school syBtem, Grundschule, be established as tne 
131 basis for elementary education. But on April 2, tensions were increased as 
Gr8ber insisted that religion be considered an "ordentliches Lehrfach" under 
religious auspices and that private schools be allowed to exist alongside the 
public cammon SChools.132 
The question of private schools caused some concern for the Centrists. 
In Protestant areas where Catholics were a minority, private schools allowed 
for the proper Catholic religious instruction. The Center wished to retain the 
right of establishment of such schools. The Social Democrats, on the other 
hand, demanded the abolition of all private schools. On this issue, the 
129Ibid., pp. 681-684. 
130~, March 31, 1919, 1254; Mausbach, Kulturfralen, p. 51. 
1)1 
tauscher, ope cit., p. 183. 
1)2 Germania, April 2, 1919, #152J KV, April 4, 1919, #266; Lauscher, ,ope 
~., p. 18); Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 127;!Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 51. 
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Democrats were willing to concede the right to establish private schools pro-
vided they conformed to the same educational standards as the public schools 
133 
and were under state supervision. This question found no satistactor,y solu-
tion in the constitutional committee since the Centrists and Social Democrats 
could reach no agreement nor would the Centrist.s agree to the Democrats' pro-
134 posal of state supervision. In the end the Centrists were forced to lessen 
their demands regax:ding private schools in order to secure the retention ot re-
ligious instructions in the public schools .13$ The solution to the private 
schools issue was to be finally settled in the canpromise on contessional 
SChools. 
Maintaining contessional public schools in the German educational system 
was ot paramount importance to the Center Part.y and the DNiP. Together they 
worked to gain a constitutional guarantee as proposed by Gr8ber.136 But the . 
Lett refused to accept his proposals, pressing its demand tor Ichools divorced 
from religious elements. For a time it seemed as it neither adversary would 
bend. Four more days of deliberation over the Kulturpolitik ensued. Then a 
compromise was proposed by the Democrat Neum3nn which was accepted b¥ both Cen-
trists and the SPD.137 According to Neumann's proposal to the constitutional 
133Lauscher, Ope cit., p. 182; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 111-112. 
134LaUBcher, loc. cit.; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 112. The Social Demo-
crats spokesman, Quarck, insisted his party woUld never accept a provision tor 
the retention ot private schools. Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 1$0. 
13$ Lauscher, Ope ci~., Mausbach, Kult.urfragen, p. 112. 
136 Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 128J Mausbach, Kulturtrasen, pp. 116-117. 
137 Germania, April 10, 1919, #l64J Lauscher, 22. cit., p. 181J Ziegler, hi. cit., p. 128. KV, April 9, 1919, #281, noted that in the heat of the de-
te Rheinlinder .XCIaimed, "Das deutsche Volk wird ein religiSs gerichtetes 
Volk sein. odBr 9S wird kel.n Kulturvolk sein." 
p 
219 
~ammittee on April h, the teaching of religion either as an "allgemeinen Moral-
unterricht" or "religionsgeschichtlichen Unterricht" was to be included in the 
curriculum of all schools except those which were completely secular.138 To 
this proposal of Neumann's, Graber added that in keeping with freedom of con-
SCience, each teacher be permitted to decide whether or not he wished to teach 
religion so that no teacher would be obliged to do so against his will. This 
concession found a favorable acceptance with the SPD.139 Satisfied with re-
taining religious instructions in the public schools, the Center thought it 
wiser to retrain fran pressuring for any further constitutional guarantees for 
confessional schools and private schools, confident that in the second reading 
of the school articles it could achieve better terma.140 
WhUe the school question was being d1ecuased at Weimar, the Catholic 
electorate was staging deaonstration rallies all over the country to back the 
Centrist efforts. Aroused by the prospect of losing confessional or denomina-
tional schools, Catholics of Germany protested in speech and press. Schools, 
they said, were second hOJl8s and must, therefore, be institutions capable of 
developing the spiritual as well as the mental capacities of youth. Religious 
education was a necessary element in the ccaplete development of the child, the 
Centrist speaker Father Lichtenberg told an assembly of Catholics in Berlin.l41 
An,.ar,t1,cle in Germania told the German Catholics that the choice of the type 
of education was a parental right, not a state right. To allow the state a 
l38aermania, April 10, 1919, #161J !!, April 9, 1919, #281. 
139 Germania, loc. cit.J !!, loc. ci~.J 21egler, Ope cit., p. 128. 
14°Lauacher, Ope cit., p. 184; Mauabach, Kulturfragen, p. 86. 
14laermama, April 10, 1919, #164. 
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monopoly over the school system would be to abrogate the parents' rights to 
choose between confessional or denominational and the secular schools. Not 
142 
only that; the very establishlnent of private SChools would be made impossible. 
Lest the,. should seem iJIlpervious to the demand of' the electorate, 143 
Centrist delega tes Mausbach, Rheinllnder, Marx, and others publisbed articles 
on the school question, reassuring Catholics that the Part,. would seek to ob-
tain constitutional protection of confessional schools and the teaching of 
religion in the common public schools.144 
en June 16 at the second reading of the school articles,145 the Centrists 
attempted to make good their promises. Gr8ber told the cOll\ll\ittee that the Cen-
ter wanted the assurance that religious instructions would be given to Children 
146 b,. teachers of their respective faith. To achieve thiS, he argued, it was 
necessary to retain confessional SChoo1s.147 His arguments gained nothing; the 
142 
~., April 13, 1919, #169. 
143Anton RheinJJnder, Zentrum unci Schulpo1itik seit Weimar (F1ugschriften 
der Deutschen Zentrumapartei, Berlin: 1924), pp. 8-~, claimed it was not "lIBrell' 
the dut,. concerning its program b)lt the driving f'orce of' its responsibilit,. 
to the electorate" which goaded the Centrists on to demand confessional schools. 
144 . 
See article of Mausbach in Germania, March 16, 1919, #121; Dr. Sonnen-
schien, ~., March 22, 1919, #131; liChtenberg, April 10, 1919, #164; April 
13, 1919, #169; June 18, 1919, #273; !I, March 15, 1919, 1210; W. Marx, March 11, 
1919, #214; March 31, 1919, #254; Rheinllnder, April 6, 1919, #281; April 17, 
1919, #302; April 19, 1919, #310; Ma,. 24, 1919, 1404. 
14SAf'ter the committee's deliberation of the various school proposals 
during March and April, the subcommittee fOl'llu1ated them into several articles 
comprising Section IV of' the Grundrechte. This took place during the month of' 
Ma,.. On Ma,. 28 the constitutional commIttee began its deliberations on the 
first reading of the newl,.-formulated Grundrechte. Much of the four-da,. dis-
cussion concerned other sections of the Grundrec6te. The discussion on the 
school issue came onl,. in the second reading. 
146Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 149. 
147Ibid.; see also Lauacher, Ope cit., 184-165. 
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SPD remained ad .. nt in their demands for secular schools devoid of religious 
instructions,148 while the Democrats clamored for mixed or undenOJlinational 
sohools with the teaching of religion under State supervision.149 
Atter three days ot heated debate, the problem seemed no nearer a solu-
ISO tion than betore. Dr. Mausbach offered various arguments supporting the 
~enter's pOSition, but to no avail. Neither the reterence to the "historic 
right" of denominational schools, nor the argument ot religious freedom and 
parental rigbte, nor even the threat ot a loss ot the Catholic support in the 
[border regions of the Reich seemed to lIave the Lett in their position against 
contessional schools. lSI It beealle apparent to the Centrists that they would 
~ave to compromise in order to win at least some concessions for contessional 
schools.152 The Democrats ottered a proposal whereby the public schools would 
[be undenominational or mixed; that is, the same religious instructions would be 
given to all the students regardless ot their religious atfiliation. But con-
~essional or denominational schools would not be entirely excluded, for the law 
~ould allow for the erection of such SChools "upon the wish of the parents ot 
those entitled to education."lS) Unable to obtain a definite "anchorage" ot 
~onfessional schools in the constitution, the Centrists "reluctantly" accepted 
148mey wanted "Ausschaltung des religi8s-konfessionellen Elements in den ~ffentlichen Schulen." See tauscher, ope c!..t., p. 181, 
lh9aermania, June 19, 1919, 1/27), AI, June 20, 1919, 1147,;Ziegler, OPe cit. 
ISO Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 149. 
1,lProtocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., pp. 149-1,1. 
l5~aU8b8ch told the Centrists to cOlllprOl1l1se on "social matters" to pre-
lPare a favorable climate for acceptance of confessional schools. See Rhein-
~Bnder,"Zentrum, p. 10. 
l53Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 151. 
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154 
this coapromise. By June 18 the constitutional cORllllittee had coapleted its 
debate on the second reading of the constitutional draft and it was ready to be 
sent back to the Na tional Assembly .155 
The acceptance of this "totally unsatisfactory compr01lisenl56 by the Cen-
trists Ulustrated the frustrating battle it was waging in the cOJlDlittee. The 
parties were so divided an all questions, especially religious ones that the 
five Democrats held a pon tion which far exceeded their numerical strength in 
the constitutional cOllJllittee. Without difficulty they could control the balance 
of any legislation by playing one party against another. Thus, tor instance, 
by voting with the Socialists, they could negate the proposals of the Centrists 
Under these circumstances, the Center's ettorts to achieve a constitutional 
151 guarantee tor conlessional schools were tutile and wasted. Nevertheless, 
just when the situation laoked the darkest for the Center Party, just when hope 
for its educational demands was about to vanish, a new si ttl8til')n arose which 
proved advantageoua t~ tho Center. 
On June 20 the Democrats withdrew frca the government to demonstrate 
their opposition to the Versailles Treaty. This circumstance presented a "com-
pletely new situation" for the Center. l58 007 the Spn and the Center tomed 
the new coalition government. The politt.1cal climate, nov so tavorable to the 
154Lauscher, OPe cit., p. 185. 
155nue to the crisis over the acce9t~nce ~f the Versailles Treaty the 
conclusion ot the constitutional committee's work received little publicity in 
the newspapers. 
l56aermania, June 18, 1919, #272J !!, June 20, 1919, #475. 
157BaChem, Zentrumapartie, VlII, 289. 
p 
223 
Center Party, was "greatly utilized" by it in the matter of the Kulturpolitik.:' 
There was much to be accomplished. The SPD needed the help of the Center to 
achieve a majority for the acceptance of the treaty and the Center wanted a 
change in the constitutional articles on education. At the suggestion or 
Or8ber, the SPD agreed to cooperate with the Center on the school issue if the 
Center Party would cooperate with the SPD on foreign policy. Although the fun-
damental vieva of the Center and SPD were "diametrically opposed, It the two par-
ties agreed to compromise on the school issue. 
During the first two weeks of July, the Center and the SPD held inter-
party caucuses to formulate a new school proposal. To secure a constitutional 
guarantee for confessional SChools, the Center wished to change the Democrats' 
proposal accepted by the constitutional committee at its last meeting. The 
Centrists Graber, Hitse, Mausbach, RheinlMnder, and Burlage collaborated with 
the SPD to achieve a new school comprollliee acceptable to the Center Party.160 
After "lengthy discussions" which involved consideration of at least sixteen 
different proposals,161 the two parties reached an agreement on July 15 which 
was referred to as the "first Weimar school compromise." According to this 
agreement, the consti tut1an would allow for the erection of three types of 
schools: secular, denominational or confessional, and undenominational or mixed 
All schools had to confol"lll to the scholastic standards set by the State, but 
159MaUSbach, Kulturfragen, p. 88. 
16Ooermania, July 8, 1919, #304. 
161 Later Mausbach in KV, April 28, 1924, #318, described the difficulties 
met with in attempting to reach an lIacceptable ll cCll1promise. The discussion 
covered Articles 146, 147, and 149. A partial coverage of the discussions be-
tween the SPD and the C.ntri~ts was printed in Germania, July 11, 1919, #311. 
This article indicated that a final compromise was rmmInent. 
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parents were free to make their own choice in regard to their children' 8 scHoale 
As a concession to the SPD, the Center agreed that private preparatory schools 
were to be abolished. Private schools as a substitute for public schools would 
require State approval and were to be subject to State supervision.162 
The "first Weimar school canpromise" was presented to the National Assem-
163 b1y on July 18. Graber, as spokesman for the Center, noted that the Center 
164 faction had declared "unanimously" in favor of the compromise. He described 
how the Center had expanded the constitutional section on '~Education and 
Schools" to include both a "pedagogical and social view." He admitted that the 
Party was not c~pletely satisfied with Article 147165 which placed limitations 
on private schools requiring State approval and State supervision, but he felt 
it was balanced by the "victory" of the Center in obtaining a constitutional 
guarantee for the erection of confessional schools in Germany.166 
The general reaction ot the Center to the first Weimar school compromise 
167 
was one of great jo,y. The proposal was looked upon as a "noteworthy success 
and "in view of the circumstances, the beat which could have been achieved. ,;1.& 
Mausbach felt that the "durchaus ertrBg1iche Regelung" was "one of the best 
162Germania, July 15, 1919, #318, gives a r~port of the discussion. 
163 Verhand1unsen, July 18, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1678. 
164 
Ibid., p. 1683J KV, July 19, 1919, #559. 
- -
165/1rtic1e 147. "Pri vate Schulen a1s Ersatz tQr 8ffent1ich Schulen be-
dtlrfen dar Genehmigung des Staates und unterstehen den Landeagesetzen. • • ." 
166 
. ~!nd1unsen, July 18, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1683-1685. 
167KV, July 17, 1919, #552; Germania, July 19, 1919, #324. 
168 
Lauscher in a Party caucus, Janu~ry 16, 1921, as cited in Bachem, 
Z.ntltUJUpartei, VIII, 321. 
22, 
169 formulas" the Center could have won. But despite elation over its success, 
the plenar,y session of the National Assembly on July 18 indicated that the 
other parties, esp~cially the Democrats, did not share the Centrists' enthusia.~ 
As spokesman for the Daocrats, Dr. Weiss indicated his PartY's disap-
proval of the comprcmise. SGIe States, he pointed out, had already introduced 
undenominational schools as their co_on schools and would have to rearrange 
their systeJu to Met the new demands for the three types provided in the caa-
prOlllise. He expressed d1aappointment that the SPD had reneged on ita original 
demands for a uniform secular system.170 The Majority SOCialist Heinrich 
Schulz called the section on education "a step in progress," but noted that it 
did not accomplish what the Socialists had aspired to. Even though the 500ial-
ista would support the Center with a favorable vote, said Schulz, the ccapro-
171 
mise would continue to be entirely unsatisfactory to them. The Independent 
Socialist Fr1 tz Kunert lashed out against the whole section on education. Hill 
Party stood for "Einheitlichkeit, Unentgeltlichkeit, und Weltlichkeit." In 
their rejection of the complete school lIection, the Independents emphasized the 
opposition to the private contessional schools, especially convent SChools.172 
Kunert·s critici_ of the Centrists and Majority Socialists was matched bT the 
Democrat Richard Seyfert who voiced his disapproval of the cOilprom1se and ac-
cused the Majority Socialists of deserting the Democrat. on the issue of secu-
larization of schools.17) The whole temper of the day's discussion indicated 
169 ~~ !!, JulT 17, 1919, #~~2. 
170 Verhandlungen, July 18, 1919, CCCllVIII, 167)-1678. 
171 6 Ibid., pp. 1679-1 8). 
172-..,~., pp. 1627-1700. 1.\. .... ... 1 { 5J;OJ.U.. jf. 170'9 ~ Dr. Ka tzens tein ,,8m J reo11ed that thJi I JAmn~ra t.~ 
F 
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the tenuous position of the school comprollise. 
Although it received a majority of votes in the second reading on July 1& 
the compromise passed by a very narrow margin.114 The Centrists realised that 
it they wanted the constitutional guarantee ot denominational schools, they 
would have to achieve a rapprochement with the Democrats before the third redd-
ing of the school section in the National ASSeJIlbly.11S This gaTe the advantage 
to the Democrats who "utili.ed" their unique position to change the first Wei-
116 
mar school compromise to their liking. 
The greater part ot the controversy unleashed in the last week ot July 
mainly concemed the wording ot Article lh6. The firat paragraph, establish-
ing a common school 8ystem for all, remained unchanged. The constitutional 
cOJUdttee had agreed already in the beginning of June that: 
The public school system shall be systematically organised. 
Upon a foundation ot cOllDlon elementary schools the system of secon-
dary and higher education is erected. The development of secondary 
and higher education shall be determined in accordance with the needs 
ot all kinds of occupations, and the acceptance of a child in a partie-
ular school shall depend upon his qualifications and inclinations, nO!11 
upon the economic and social position or the religion of his parents. 
had no cause for complaint since in the "Fatherland' 8 darkest hour, n the Demo-
crats had deserted the Majority Socialists by retusing to accept the peace 
te!'lll8. Ibid. 
1140ermania, July 19, 1919, #324J Lauscher, 9P. cit., p. 18S, noted that 
this was due to the absenteeism ot the Democrats at this session. By a stroke 
of fortune, many of the Democrats had left for Halle to attend 8 Reichspartei-
~ for their party, and hence were absent for the vote on the second reading 
ol'the Constitution. 
11SRheinlinder, Zentrum, p. 14. 
116Ibid• 
111Article lh6, par. 1. 
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By this provil!lion all parties agreed to break the tvo-class system ot education 
existent under the old government. 
It vas the second paragraph ot this article which the Democrats contested 
so vehemently. This paragraph, containing the so-called "tirst Weimar school 
compromise," provided tor the erection ot the three types ot schools mentioned 
above. The D_ocrate argued that this would iIlpoae a heavy financial responsi-
bility upon the government which the government could 111 afford. Besides, 
those States which had recentlJ' established school systems with 1I11xed or unde-
nominational schools vould be forced to overhaul their educational systells to 
me~t the demand tor the three types of SChools. l78 
The Social Democrats, dissatistied with the first school compromise, 
sided with the Democrats against the Centrists. It was not until the evening 
ot the last da,. before the N,tional Ass_bl,. was to vote on the Constitution 
that the three parties reached a compromise. The so-called "second Weimar 
school cOIlpromise" was toraulated by representatives ot the three parties, the 
Centrist Graber, Majority Socialist Paul L8be, and the Democrat Rugen Schiffer. 
179 According to the "second Weimar school comprCDise" the unden01llination-
al or mixed SChools vere to' be the nora tor all States. Rellgioua instructions 
would be given not by the clergy but by the regular school teachers according 
to the various denominational instructions issued by the govern.ent and ap-
proved by the clergy ot each denardnation. Separate denominational or contes-
sional schools and secular schools could be erected as an exception upon the 
l78Lauacher, OPe cit., p. 185. 
1790ermania, July 30, 19l9, #344. The proposal ot ar8ber-L!be-Schitrer 
was referred to as the "second Weimar school compromise" to distinguish it 
tram the previous compromise presented to the Assembly on July 18. 
r 
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request of parents in a particular locality, but these schools had to conform 
to the regular school standards.180 Paragraph two of Article 146 containing 
the "second Weimar compromise" read as follows: 
Nevertheless, within the municipalities, upon the petition of 
those entitled to instruction cOlllJlon schools shall be established 
of their taith or ethical system, in so tar 8S this does not inter-
fere wi th a system of school administration wi thin the .. anmg of 
paragraph 1. The wishes of those entitled to instruction shall be 
considered as much as possible. Details will be regulated by State 
lawsl~ accordance with prinCiples to be prescribed by a national 
law. 
Article 149, which was included in the compromise, provided tor the in-
plusion of religious instruction in all schools except in secular onesl 
Religious instruction is included in the regular school cur-
riCulum, except in the nonsectarian (secular) 8chools. The impart-
ing of religious instruction is regulated by the school laws. Reli-
gious instruction is imparted in accordance with the principle of 
the religious society concerned, without prejudice to the right of 
supervision ot the State. 
The imparting of religious instruction and the use of 
ecclesiastical ceremonies is optional with the teachers,and the 
participation of the pupils in religious studies and in ecclesills-
tical ceremonies and festivities is left to the decision ot those 182 
who have the right to control the religious education of the child. 
em July 31, the proposal ot Gr8ber, L3be, and Schiffer was presented to 
~e National .Assembly. The change in the school articles was given another 
onsideratian. Various spokesmen tor the different parties presented their 
news. Heinrich Schulz, speaking for the Majority SOCialists, noted that the 
~oal of his party had not been attained. They preferred a uniform secular 
'chool system. Nonetheless, in view of the opposition at lOme parties, the 
l8°.Article 146, par. 2. 
l81Ibid • 
-182 Article 149. 
f 
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Majority Socialists deemed it advisable to compromise on the school issue and, 
therefore, the present proposal was acceptable to their party.183 Hermann 
Hofmann spoke in the name ot those Centrist delegates who were educators, and 
expressed their displeasure at the "second Weimar school c OIIlprOlllise. " "Now, 
as formerl;y, we consider confessional schools as the most ideal form tor an 
educational system," he told the Assembl;y. Due to the moral diSintegration 
concomitant upon four years of warfare, it was imperative that the German 
nation have a sound moral basis for its educational system. This he and his 
fellow Centrist teachers felt, co~ be; ~tta1ned only through confessional 
SChools.184 The DNVP's Dr. Mu.m said his party, atter examining the "various 
aspects tor and against," would accept the (:omprOlllise. But Ferdinand Runkel, 
spokesman tor the German People's Party, expressed his party's dissatistaction 
wi th the provisions and their retusal to accept the agreement. Likewise, the 
Independent Socialist Kunert also rejected the sehool articles as completely 
18S 
contrary to the socialist goal ot unitorm secular schools. 
Graber, otficial spokesman tor the Center, was the last to speak on the 
school section. Emphasizing that Hofmann had expressed an individual opinion 
" . which did not represent the final conclusion of the Center Party, Grober noted 
that the Center was disappointed that the "rirst Weimar school compromise" vas 
supplanted by a new one. Al though the new agreement required a "weakening" of 
their demands, at least confeSSional schools were still given a constitutional 
183verhand1unsen, July 31, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 2161-2163. 
164 ~., p. 2163. 
18SIbid., pp. 2154- 21S6J 2166-2111. 
I I 
I 
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guarantee. Therefore the Center Party, to avoid further conflict, accepted 
186 "b the school articles a8 agreed upon in the second compromise. Gro er's 
speech brought the discussion of the school section to an end. The section, 
article by article, was submitted to vote and accepted by the majority of the 
Assembly. 187 
The Center Party came under sharp criticiam outside of the A8sembly be-
cause of its acceptance of the "second Weimar school compr(ltlise. ,,188 The 
critics were dissatisfied with it; they went 80 far as to ask why the Centrists 
had not fought to retain the first compromise at the price of a rupture in the 
189 government coalition. Mausbach in the name of the Centrist delegates re-
plied by pointing to the fact that at least in a liJIlited sense they bad at-
190 tRine<! a constitutional guarantee for confessional SChools. Germania, on 
the other hand, complimented the Center Party on its efforts to win coneee-
sions for confessional schoo18. Considering the opposition of the liberal 
partie8 and the SPD, thi8 news organ felt that the Centri.sts had contributed 
toward the a ttainment of a "peaceful. solution to the school problem. ,,191 
186Ibid., pp. 2171-2172. 
187 Ibid., pp. 2174-217S. 
-
188KV , August S, 1919, #60S. 
18~ 
Ibid. j Later Lauscher in the Prussian Landtag assembly on December 3, 
1919, expIiIiied that such a rupture W8s"justwhat the Center wanted to avoid. 
SessioD Report VI, as cited in Morse,., Zentrumsp!rtei 1917-1923, p. 21S. 
19~aU8bach in the !I, August 6, 1919, #608. For a defense of the Cen-
trist p08 iti on regarding the school compromi8e, 8ee J08eph Mausbach, Religions-
unterricht und Kirche: J.us den Beratungen des Weimarer Verfassungsausschusses 
(Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder and Co., 1922). 
191 . 
August 1, 1919, #34S. 
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CHAPl'ER VI 
DELmER.ll.TIONS ON THE llEIUAR CONSTITUTION 
CENTRIST VTh"WS ON ECONOMIC A..')ffiCTS 
centrist interests in the Grundrechte extended beyond civic, religious, 
and cultural rights to include social and economic aspects of life as well. 
This was evident in their active participation in the formation of Section V 
on "Economic Lite," which represented a compromise between socialist princi-
ples, to which the .Majority Socialists continued to pay liP-service, and the 
bourgeois ideology of the Centrists and the Democrats. Prior to the Revolut:kn 
GerJll&1'l1 had neither political nor economic autonomy. The upheaval of 1918 had 
resulted in the establishment of a political democracy. But the German people, 
war-wearied, jobless, hungry, and discontented, awaited not only political re-
forms, but the rectifying of economic and 80cial abuses as well.l 
As the i)raditional champions of Social Catholicism, the Center had prom-
ised in its December election cmnpaign to strive for "the development of the 
2 
national econ~ in the service of social justice." AccordinglY, the Party 
promised to strive toward the attainment of an agricultural policy benefiting 
the public welfare. It proposed a "systematic promotion of agricultural pro-
duct10n." As a further incentive to the farmer, the Center favored the 
lLauacher, "Weimarer Verfassung," p. 116. 
2nLe1tsitse vom Dezember 1918," as cited in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 197. 
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"requisition of community lands and partitioning of landed estates, but with 
compensation." It l1kew1se promised "sweeping housing reforms," and coloniz-
ing of interior areas, the protection of "individual professional organizatio 
as necessary members of a healthy economic bo~, especially of an energetio 
middle class." Reflecting its bourgeois mentality, the center Party upheld 
the right of private property and proposed to further a social pollcy for all 
with a strong emphasis upon the individual and the recognition of the human 
dignity. It would work toward a continuation of the "administration of juatic 
in the lense of increased social justioe and increased eoonomio proteotion 
ag.tnat profiteering, unfair competition, cheating, and exploitation of all 
kinds." The Party dananded lithe effective care of all the d1sabled and 
wounded war veterans and their fam1l.1es." Regarding financial atfain the 
Party sought to win the suwort ot the bourgeoia group by c1rcuaventing the 
tlight of oapital abroad, by preventing depreoiation in the value of war loans, 
and by advocating that taxes be apportioned acoording to each citisen's 
ability to pay.3 
Like the Social Democrat. the Center tought againat the evils or capi-
tali8I\J4 unl1lce them, the Centrists rejected Marx1st .ocialism aa a solution 
to the social and economic evils ot the dq. TheT supported 1Dstead a tom or 
'Chriatian Socialism" or "Chr1st1u Solidar1s." as advocated by the Je.uit 
Father He1nr1ch Pesch. His economic and social phUosophy' waa published in a 
Flugschritten issued by the Centrist .ecntariat in Berlin as campaign 
31bid. 
4During the election campaign, the Center daanded a critical revi_ ot 
the leading capitalist spirit of materialism. see QerEna, January 7, 1919, 
(l0. 
~----------------------------~ 2.3.3 
mater1al..' The solution to the social problems of the dq, Pesch stated, .... 
to be found. in a new approach to the socio-economic lite. H18 program at 
"Christian Solidar1sa" .... an alternative to both capitalism and. socialism. 
SOCiety aust be reorganized in such a wq that its institutions rill foster 
1nd.1v1dual liberty while securing the common good. The principles .. hich would 
secure such a result II118t govern social th1nlc1ng if' the world was to be re-
stored to order and peace. Solidarism disavowed absolute freedom in the 
economic spirit just as it rejected. a COllpnlaor;y planned econOJl,1. Unl1lI1ted., 
unrestrained. freedom could. be seriously harmf'uJ. to the attainment of the goal 
of econolD1'. At the same time, Pesch recogn118d. in freedom "a major, atimula-
ting moti ... e 81haating the developllent of abilities. thus it demanda and pro-
tects every freedo.nich is in harmol11' 'With the cCllBllOn weltare and. which can 
turther the moat favorable possible attainment ot the goal ot econcnv .,,6 
Nevertheless, he warned, freedom DWlt postulate justice. 
While recogn1sing the right ot private ownership, he opposed the abaolutAt, 
irresponsible concept of private ownership, just as he rejeoted the soc1al1at1c 
concept ot state ownership of all property. Pesch's central notion or prope 
was that nthe gooda of the earth must serve all mankind." He advocated. maxi-
mising the distribution ot private property, postulating that the State had 
the right and the duty to a ee that the property .. as used for the benefit ot 
the common welfare. As a key to industrial har.mony, he proposed the idea of 
codaterm1nation (f'litbest1mmungsrecht") and or cooperatives, not strictly 
limited to economic and business associatiOns, but applicable to all phases at 
'Heinrich Pesch, Nicht kommun1stiacher, sondern christl1cher Soz1al1s-
mus' (Flugschr1f'ten dar Zentrum&J'.6rtel ,4, Bernnl DizeiDber 2), 1918}. 
6Ibid., pp. 1-6. 
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public lire-lito the relation of one citizen to another and to the state, the 
relation of professional. associations in the state, of international &8soo1&-
tions of peoples in a world cOl!Ullllllity embracilll the whole famiq of God." He 
alao favored proflt-sharing schemes based upon distributing stock among the 
workers, and collective fara:1ng as a stimulus to the agrarian economy. 7 
At the big centriBt electlon rally held in Berlin on January 1, 1919, 
Dr. Anton Hafle, director of the 'rechn1ci81'llJ t Union, dlrelt at SODle length on 
SOllll of" Doo-__ L -~... H3tle expressed the need of a modern "Sozialpolitik" 
ttle for "mutual cooperation" between emplo;yer and employee, 
\lies for laborers to allow for decent living standards.u8 
Its of sociali .. , he spoke in favor of an "equitable distri-
\ He accepted the fact of personal ownership of property and 
iPrivate initiative should be encouraged, but he denounced 
, which he declared IIIWIt be replaced by "cOJllJll.UUll. adm1n1as-
1 \'iT was not a ll8Wooaer to the socio-economic field. It had 
\
' interest in social legialation and fiBcal policies by at-
, an equitalale balance be1rteen the interests ot industry 
,I 
,. the ;years the Party had developed a sound and coherent 
I 
........... &.1. phil080phT which its delegates at the National A8sembl;y hoped to embody 
in the Weimar Constltution. The center was "especialq well prepared" to 
7~., pp. 7-23. 
s'or the text. of this speech, S88 German1a, January 2, 1919, 112. 
9Ibid. 
-
f 
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oppose the economic liberalism ot the day and to tight the cause ot social 
justice.10 Among its outstanding parliamentarians were HitH, Tr1lllbom, and 
Qiesberts, all experienced 80cial politicians well versed in labor relations. 
other8, newcaaers to the parliamentary scene, 11ke BraWlS and stegerwald, also 
had 8pecial protessional experience a8 labor epoke8J118n. 
These Centri8t8 in the National Assembly provided the moderating torce 
neceBeary in checld.ng the more radical requests of the Social Democrats who 
d.anded a complete overhauling of the Qerman economic Ufe. The Socia.li"ts 
as the traditional champion8 ot the worldng man scomed the socio-economic 
proposals ot the Centrists as mere "curative8 tor the aymptOD18 or the social 
and economic evil8 ot 8ociety ... 11 Socialism W&II the Social Democrats. answer 
to these problems of the day. They postulated the aboUt ion of private prop-
erty and the confiscation by the state of all _ans ot capitalist production.12 
AlreadT on November 15, 1918, the Socialist government established by the 
Revolution introduced labor reforma. ItArbeitsgemeinschattenlt or labor boards 
were set up by a joint agl"Hll8nt between labor unions and emp1078r&' associ&!-
tiona whereby the two groups proDliBed to work together for the solution or all 
economic and social questions involving industry and labor.l) 
But these refol"ll8 were cons1dered .erely transitional. Not Batistied 
l0Lauscher, OR. cit., p. 187. 
Ulbid., p. 186. 
12see Ebert's speech ot Dec_ber 1, 1918, as cited in Ursachen und Fo;tgen, 
III, 15.5-156. 
l)1tvereinbarung fftr die &bergangsw1rtschaf't !t1fischen Arbeitgeberbinden 
und Qewerkschatten voa 15. November 1918," as cited ibid., pp. 14-15. 
-
'I, 
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with recognition of workers I organisations and collective bargaining, the 
Social Democrats attempted to establish an economic democracy which would 
secure for the working class the constitutional right of participating active'll 
in the regulation of all economic questions. However, the Socialists differed 
among themselves as to how this was to be atta.ined. The Majority Socialists 
favored the evolutionary socialization of Germany, whereas the Independent 
Socialists demanded the immediate establishJllent of the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat.n14 
The attempts of the ~ocial Democr§ts to establish a socialist society in 
Germany met with opposition from the Centrist and other bourgeois delegates at 
Weimar. On February 21, 1919, Adam Stegerwald, speaking in the National Assem-
bq for the center Party, denounced Marxist Socialism as detrimental to the 
human dignity of man and to the right of private property. Contrasting JIarx-
1st Socialism with Christian Socialism, which he advocated, Stegenrald pointed 
out that the former operated on the principle ''What's yours is mine"; whereas 
the latter supported the notion "what's mine is yours." Secondly, he noted, 
Marxist Socialism held a "perverted notion of the omnipotent power of the State 
over economic life"; but Christian Social1nt advocated a "healthy national 
power" in the sense of cooperative efforts in business and labor. 'l.'h1rdly, 
Christian Socialism tlencouraged and assisted individual initiative"; whereas 
the other form inhibited it. To convert to a state of Socialism as envisioned 
by the Social Democrats would be harmful to the whole German economic struc-
ture.lS 
l~uscher, OPe Cit., pp. 186-181. 
lSVerhandlungen, l<'ebruary 21, 1919, COOmI, 269. 
, 
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Later on in his speech, stegerwald indicated that he disagreed with 
Gr8ber who sai,d that the November Revolution was unnecessary. Stegerwald per-
sanally felt that it was inevitable due to the deplorable conditions at the end 
of october and the beginning of November. Hence, he emphasized, it wu impera-
tive that the government prepare definite economic and social reforms to remedy 
these conditions. As economic goals he proposed that the government build 
better homes, provide for larger families, have more adequate child and mother 
care, social security for the s10k and the aged, care for the war veterans and 
war widows, higher wages for teachers, favorable labor laws and better condi-
tions for the farmers. With the right legislation Germany would be able to 
check the economic evils of the~. He suggested that the government utilize 
t.he "Arbeitsgemeinschart" as a model for the further betterlll!lnt of the economic 
life. "We have agricultural boards, trade boards, commercial and labor &8soci-
i8tions for employers and employees in industry, business, and agriculture," he 
[told the Assembly. "These associations can offer worthwhile preparation for 
proper social legislation.,,16 
Mindful, therefore, of its heterogeneous electorate, the Center Party 
proposed new forms of economic l1te that would "serve the general welfare" as 
~ather Pesch had advocated. It could not remain oblivious to the unrest of 
ithe post-war period. The Revolution had intenSified the conflict between capi-
talism and socialism. From January through April, strikes are reported all 
over Germany. In February a delegation of miners from the Ruhr area came to 
~e1mar to protest against the economic conditions.11 
l6Ibid• 
17 Germania and KV carried numerous accounts of these strikes, especially 
2,38 
On March 7, 1919, the government had hastily introduced two pieces of 
legislation to the National Assembly--one on general socialization of key in-
dustries and another on the regulation of the coal industry. The government I s 
spokesman, Majority Socialist Rudolf Wissel, in a scathing denunciation of 
capitalism, demanded immediate socialization of Germany. He rejected the right 
of private property as detrimental to the economic betterment of Germany and 
insisted upon nationalization of all German industries. The German workers, 
Wissel noted, would not be satisfied until they had a voice in the arrangement 
of affairs. Therefore, he proposed the establishment of workers' councils to 
suparv1Be production, distribution, and the econOJllic lite of the nation, to 
sooialise enterprises, and to contribute towards bringing about nationaliza-
18 
tion. 
By attempting sooialization experiments the government at Weimar hoped 
to "reviVe the sick economy.,,19 Since the socialisation legislation pused by 
the National Assembly was to be used by the constitutional oanm1ttee &8 the 
basis for the eoonomio section in the Gru.ndreohte, a study of the Centrist 
views will be helpful in determining the influenoe they 'exerted on the formu-
lation of the subsequent articles in Section V of the Grundreohte. 
The discussion on sooiali.zation carried on by the National Assembly dur-
ing the month of March indicated the delegates' awareness ot the magnitude of 
during the months of March flnd April, when both papers carried dajJ.y commen-
taries on strikes and "bloody street-fighting" in Berlin, Halle, r!8seldorf, 
Lichtenberg, Middle Gel'mCll\Y, stuttgart, r'r'ankturt, V#O&temberg, Brunswick, 
Saxor.y, Upper ~ilesia, Munich, Hamburg, and practically every industrial area 
in Germany. 
18 
Verhancilungen, March'7, 1919, CCCIXVI, 541. 
19!y, Uarch 7, 1919, #187. 
I 11 
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Germany's post-war problems. Brauns intim~ted on March 7 that the Revolution 
would be incomplete without specific social and economic reforms. Workers had 
been exploited by industry. The masses wanted not only increased wages, but 
also to be recognized as human beings endowed with human dignity. They were 
entitled to certain rights which could not be denied; they sought such guar-
antees as individual Uberty to engage in work, cOlllJDltrce, and industry as well 
as the right of private property. 20 Brauns said he could not accept the whole-
sale socialisation and nationaliBation of all industries advocated by the 
Social Democrats. Moreover, he warned against extreme forms ot s ocialiBation. 
"There are other ways of correoting the economic and social evils, tt he told 
the National Assembly. "We must leave the door open tor various forms of 
socialization and avoid a one-sided program.,,21 
S1m1lar views expressed by Heinrich Imbusoh, another Centrist labor 
leader addressing the National Assembly on the following d~ (March 8), 
indicated that he abhorred the evils ot capitalism as much as the Social Demo-
crats. As director of the Catholic Miners t Association, he demanded that the 
govemment rectify earlier mistakes regarding their lack of re,ponsibilitY' to 
the miners. Too often, Imbusch said, had the worker been thought of merely for 
what he could produce and not tor what he was. Labor should no longer be 
treated as a commodity. Human dignity must be respected; laborars must not be 
exploited. The "unjust and unearned surplus revenue" gained by capitalist pro-
duction must be abolished. Nationalisation of the coal industry would secure 
20verhandlungen, March 7, 1919, CCCIXVI, $$1-$$2. 
21Ib~d., p. $$3. 
certain protection for the minensJtherefore, he favored it. Nevertheless, he 
was not out for c;omplete nationaliaation of all indu.stries.22 
Giesberts, speaking on the same da1', also emphuized his dissatisfaction 
with the economic oonditions existent under the empire and spoke in favor of 
ref'onu. "If' the existing econollG" had been satisf'acto!7, then the desires for 
change would not have been 80 strong.n2.3 Moreover, he pointed out, "the 
changes of the Herrenatandpunkts in industry were too late in coming ••• and 
we nOlf tace a fait accompli, that the temper and demands of the I18Bses DI18t be 
met.,,24 Nonetheless, l1lce the other Centrist. aiesberts rejected the proposals 
of the Socialists tor a complete state-controlled economy-. He agreed to sup-
port a general plan for nationalization ot key industrie. but cautioned that it 
DlWSt be done slowly and that each case JllU8t be sorutinized very carefully be-
fore a decision'A8 reached. He stressed the rules involved in such new social-
istic experiments and for the time being saw no ~d.1ate neoessity for 
further national1sation.2$ 
Throughout the discussion ot the socialization and national1zation laws 
the Centrists upheld the notion of human dignity and the liberty of the 1nd1-
22Ibid., j4arcll.8, 1919, CCCIDI, 583-584. 
2.3roid., p. 591. 
-
24Ibid., p. 592. 
-
2$Ibid., p. 591. Erzberger differed frQll hisi'ellow Centrists on this 
point. -mradvocated a hasty nationalization of all public facil1ties. In the 
cabinet session ot March 19, 1919, Ersberger advised that the gas, waterworks, 
electricity, and street cars be nationalized "as soon as possible." Charles 
Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz, ed. The Political Institutions ot the German 
Revolution, 1918-1919 (New Yorks FredirIck A. Fraeger, PUblishens, 1966), 
p. 266. 
viduaJ., and wanted no limitations placed upon this PrinciPle.26 But the 
Majority Socialist W1asell rejected this notion; individuals had no rights ex-
cept that of serving the 5tate.21 A coalition of all the representatives ot 
the bourgeois parties organised against the Socialist proposal and introduced 
a provision conceming the principle of Uberty of employment which W&8 incor-
pon.ted. into the socialization law passed on March 23, 1919.26 These provi-
sions read a 
Every German has without prejudice to his personal. liberty the 
moral duty so to use his intellectual and physical powers as is 
demanded by the welfare of the community. 
The labor torce as the highest economic good deserves the 
special protection of the government. Every German shall have the 
opportunity to earn his Uving by' economic labor. So long as suit-
able employment can oot be procured for h1m., his aa1ntenanoe will 
be provided for. Details will be regulated by special national 
laws •••• 29 
Where a need existed to banetit the general ecooo.., ot the nation, the 
Center Party took a realistic view as in the case at the legislation tor 
national regulation of the coal industry. Because the mining industry was the 
backbone of German econom;y, it was necessary that the government "C01l8 to the 
aid of the miners" to relieve their pUght.30 Hence, the Party supported the 
Social Democrats in nationalization ot the coal industry. But even while it 
2~'or an appraisal of the Center's vi .. , see ltV, March 1, 1919, #181; 
also March 8, 1919, #190. -
21Verhandlungen, Ilarch 1, 1919, CCCXlVI, S41. 
28!!, March 10, 1919, #193. 
29c1ted in Ursachen und Folen, . III, 261-268. Articles 151 and 163 ot 
the Weimar consti'£ution were to:rmed trOll these provisions. 
JOsurlage'in the National Assembly, JlarCh 12, 1919, Verhandl5en, 
CCCXlVI, 713. 
r 
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did so, the Center explicitly stated that it did not favor State ownership of 
medium and small businesses.31 
The socialization law of Karch 23 and the law for the nationalization of 
the coal industry passed on the same day were utilized by the constitutional 
committee as the basis of discussion on the economic section when the committe 
began its work on it at the end of March. Spahn and GrBber were apprehensive 
about the strong socialization tendencies exhibited by the Social Democrats an 
wished to oheck an)" further efforts towards sooialization or nationalization 0 
industries. The Centrists told the members of the committee that the laws of 
March 23 had sufficient provisions to satisfy the needs of social and economio 
reform. l.'he Centrists also insisted that the regulation of eoonomio life must 
be compatible with the prinoiples of justioe in order to provide deoent living 
32 . 
oondi tions for all. They teared the movement toward SOCialism would become 
too extreme and attempted to moderate the demands ot the Socialists.33 
With the laws of Maroh 23 as their guide, therefore, the constitutional 
oommittee began formulating the articles for the economio section. Article 15 
provided & "The regulation of economic lite must conform to the prinoiples of 
justioe, with the aim of attaining humane conditions of existence tor all." 
The Center cooperated with the Social Democrats in checking the evils ot eco-
3lsee Martin Irl's interpellation in the National Assembl)" on March 27, 
1919, ibid., p. 794. 
-
32Protocol, as oited in Korsey, Zentrumsparte1, 1917-1923, p. 22, • 
.33See lDrenz Zach, 0 Jahre Zentrum: Wirtsohatts-und-50zial olitik iDl 
Reicheta" 1871-1920 (Ber1 : Germania, 192 , p. 2 0 for an eva uation of the 
Centrists' efforts in the oonstitutional committee. See also, Germania, 
"Social Democrats and SOCialism," May 21, 1919, #228, p. 2. 
nomic liberalism by guaranteeing "decent living conditions for all.-34 In ita 
eftorts to safeguard the right of private peoperty, however, the Centrists 
clashed with the Social Democrats over Article 153. Ritze insisted upon re-
taining the provision in Preuss' original constitutional draft which said: 
"The right of private property is guaranteed."35 The Social Democrats, none-
theless, placed limitations upon it by adding, "its nature and limits are 
defined by law."36 They also added a paragraph to this article allowing for 
expropriation of property for "the benefit of the community." Hit.. counter-
balanced this by stipulating that it must be done "b,y due process ot law." 
.... ith just compensation," and -only in case ot extreme necessity.n37 
U a result of this conflict, the constitutional committee formulated 
several articles involving property rights. In the beginning of June atter 
the subcommittee had presented the completed Grundrechte to the constitutional 
committee for approval, Articlea 153, 154, and 156 indicated the cOllProm1ae 
f1nall1' arrived at by the I18mbers. 
The right of' private property ia guarM,teed by the Constitution. 
Its nature and l1m1ts are defined by law. 
Expropriation ot property lIllY take place ••• by due prooeas of 
law. There 8hall be just compensation. • •• The property -of the 
States, municipalities, and &88ociations of public utility -.y be 
taken by the Reich onlY upon p~nt of oompensation. 
Property rights 1m.t>11' property duties.,38Exeroue thereof shall 
at the same time serve the general weLtare_ 
Article lS6 culled almost completel1' from the aocializationla included 
34Lausoher, Ope oit., p. 189. 
35See Preuss' original draft as cited in Unachen und rolgen, III, 
433-434. 
)6Protocol, as cited in Lausoher, op_ cit., p. 190. 
31 Ibid. 
38-
JIitze 1 S proposal "in case of extreme necessity": 
'!'he Reicb ~ by law, without impairment of the right to compen-
sation, and with a proper application of the regulations relating to 
expropriation, transfer to public ownership private business enter-
prises adapted for socialization. The Reich itself, the states, or 
the municipalities may take part in the management of business enter-
prises and associations, or secure a dominating influence tberein in 
~ other~. 
Furthermore, in case of extreme necessity the Reich, if it is 
in the interest of collectivism, IIB1' combine by 1_ business enter-
prises and associations on the basis of administrative autonom.y, in 
order to insure the cooperation of all producing ele_nts of the 
people, to give to eJJployers and employees a share in the manag8Mllt, 
and to regulate the production, preparation, distribution, utilisa-
tion and pecuniary valuation, as well as the iaport and export, of 
economic goods upon collectivistic principles •••• 39 . 
one of the biggest problema confronting the constitutional co-.1ttee was 
the question of the ctouncil system. Long before the November Revolution, the 
Social Democrats had advocated the establ1shlllent within factories of councilJs 
representing the workers and sharing with the employers the power to determine 
working conditions. The idea ot a system of councils acquired a runrd.mpetus 
shortly atter the establishment ot the republ1c.40 But it encountered the opo-
position ot the trade union executives, especially the Christian Trade Union-
ists, who teared that the strong position which was theirs as a Nsult of the 
capital-labor accord of November· lS, 1918, might be jeopardised.41 
Nevertheless, the labor strike crisis in )(arCh convinced the government 
that it must take steps to satisfy the discontented workers. Accordingly, on 
April 6, 1919, the govemment proposed that a specially constructed cOlllllittee 
of economics be appointed to prepare a syatem of labor law based on tbe 
39Article lS6. 
4Q.rhe Reich economic minister Rudolf Wissel suggested it ·to t be National 
A.8sembq on Ma.rch 7, 1919, cf., p. 238. 
-
4lProtocol, Ziegler, ope cit., pp. ,7-58. 
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principles of sooial (iemoorao:r_ The coDmittee was to ooncern itself' nth a 
number of matters _ These included the crea,tion of workers' oouncils in the 
faotories, the establishments of labor oourts, and the formulation of colleo-
tive bargaining contraots. But before the speoial comittee got under wJq, the 
oonstitutional oommitteo took matters into its own hands and outlined provi-
sions embcxtring the gover11lll8nt.s proposals of .April 6 as the basis for Artiole 
16$.42 
While the constitutional comittee was deliberating on the councils' 
system, a change became evident in the view of the Christian Trade Unionists. 
Although the:r teared a dictatorship of the counoils, some ot the more realistio 
members agreed that there was II omething just and legitimate in suoh theories 
and indioated their willingness to consider the possibil1 ties 6f the oounoils' 
system. Qiesberts, who held an important position in the Christian Trades 
Union, wrote near the end or AprU, 
We have not sufticiently appreoiated and, above all, we have realized 
too late the degree ot sO'lUld truth in the idea ot the counoils. The 
reason for this is that this idea has oome to us from Russia as a 
politioalconoeption, and also because it arrived accompanied b:r aU 
the tragio manitestations ot the Russian Revolution. It the system 
of councils assures to the workers the right to participate more 
completely in the organization and developDlmt of economic lite, then 
it cannot help but contribute, it this is done in a reasonable 
manner, to the reawakening of the love ot work and the establishment 
ot a close community ot interests between employers and employees.4.3 
The first big struggle over the councils' system came on June 2 after the 
subcommittee had returned the Orundrechte to the oonstitutional committee tor 
its second and third readings. The Independent Socialist HUgo Haas argued tor 
42Ibid., l42. 
LUDeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 29, 1919, as oited in Brunet, 
OPe cit., p. 243. -
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the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and rejected the notion of the councils' 
systea as not going far enough on the road to the establishment of a social:1at 
republic. He preferred substituting the soviet s;yatem tor the councUa' 
system,1.a4 The Jlajorit)" Socialist Hugo Sinzheimar, on the other hand, dismiss-
ing the idea at party or class dictatorship as too impractical tor the moment, 
pointed to the limitations of democratic forma ot govemment and to the grave 
danger ot tension between the political qstem and the social oonditions. He 
strongly advocated the sTste. of councils as a traditional stage to the attaino 
ment ot a complete socialist state. He argued that political democrac;y re-
quired complementary social and economic institutions with the Reichatag as 
the organ ot political democracy and the councils as the agencies ot economic 
democracy.4S 
Article 16$ as outlined by the committee provided both tor an Economic 
Council which was to be the sUP]!"e_ organ ot the whole Qerman collective econ-
omy, and tor Work CouncUa which were to allow workers the right to partioi-
pate in the shaping and determining ot conditions ot labor. Hit .. , Brauns, 
and stegerwald who represented the Center Party on economic aftairs in the 
constitutional committee ottered to accept the councils B,Yatem &8 provided tor 
in Article 16$ on condition the s)"stem did nothing ot which the unions di8ap-
proved. The)" wanted the assurance that the Work Councils would not replace 
the trade unions and labor aesocis.tions. Ritza proposed that "the district 
economic councils and the National Economic Council shall be so constituted 
that all substantial vocational groups are represented therein according to 
1.a4Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p. l42. 
45 Ibid. 
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their economic and social importance.n46 In this way the centrists gained for 
the trade unionists a constitutional guarantee that they would be given legal 
recognition as the voice of the workers. The cozapleted fona of Artiole 165 
reads as followsl 
Workers and employees shall be called upon to cooperate with 
employers, and on an equal footing, in the regulation of wages and 
world.ng conditions, as well as in the entire field of the economic 
development of the forces of production. • • • 
Workers and employees shall, for t,he purpose of looking atter 
their economic and social interests, be given legal representation 
in factory workers' oouncils, as well as in dietrict workers' councils 
• • • and in a Workers' Council of t he Reich. 
The d1atrict workers t . councils and the Reich Workers' Council 
meet together with the representatives of the employers and with 
other interested classes of people in district economic counci18 
and in a National Economic Council for the purpose of performing 
joint economic tas1cB and cooperating in the e:xacution of the law8 of 
socialization. The district economic councils and the Economic 
Council of the Reich shall be 80 constituted that all substantial 
vocational groups are represented therein according to their econ-
oldc and social importance. 
The national m1n1stI7 shall, before proposing drafts of 
polit1co-soctal and politioo-economic bills of iundaMntal import-
ance, submit them to the Economic Council of the Reich. The Econoriri.c 
Council of the Reich shall itself have the right to initiate drafts 
of such bUls. U the national m1nistr,y fails to aBsent, it shall 
nevertheless present the4ratt to the Reichstag accozapan1ed by m 
expression of its views. 
The complete Section V of the Orundrechte was accepted without .change by 
the majority- parties in the National Assembly when it was presented for delib-
eration on ~ 21, 1919. The Independent Socialists and the conservative 
parties rejected it, but for different reasons. Th~ Right feared the gains 
made in socialisation, while the Independent Socialists felt socialization had 
not gone far enough.48 The Centrist Trade Unionists expressed their 8at1sfac-
4~tocol, as cited in tauscher, OPe cit., p. 190. 
47Article 165. 
48Verhandlungen, ~ 21, 1919, CCCXllVIII, 1155-1757. 
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tion with the provisions because they guaranteed the working class better 
conditions of labor.49 Brauns praised the effort. of the constitutional 
committee in preparing articles which allowed for social and economic changes 
without violating the rights of private peoperty. In the name of the centristl 
he told of his PartY's acceptance of the section as a "tremendous progressive 
step" in labor legislation which would work toward reconstructing the econOJDic 
and social order in Gel'lll&D1".$O 
Like many of the other sections in the Weimar Constitution, the economic 
section reflected the compromise made between the coalition parties. A number 
of prov1BioJUI contained the more moderate views of the centrists and the 
Democrats. Economic liberty of the individual was expl1citq assured.51 Pri-
vate property and the right of ~ritance were guaranteed,52 expropriation 
was to be permiasible onlT it it redounded to the public gooda "The right of 
private property is guaranteed by the Constitution •••• Expropriation of 
property may take place • • • by due process of law. • • f3 
Nevertheless, a number of prov1sioJUI in Section V reflected the doctri-
naire radicalism of the country t s strongest party. The exercise of property 
rights, it was stipulated, must be at the S81118 time serving the public good.$4 
4988e the speeches of Ehrhardt and Brauns, ~., pp. 1784-1789; 179$. 
$OIbid. J p. 1795 
$lA.rt1cle 151. 
$2Article 1$4. 
$3Article 1$.3. 
S4Ibid. 
-
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The distribution and use ot the soil were to be controlled by" the state in 
such a way as "to prevent abuse and to promote the object of usuring to every 
German a healthful habitation •••• nS5 The country's natural resources and 
"all economically uaetul forces ot naturen were to be placed under the super-
vision ot the state.56 The Reich wu authorised to tranSfer to public owner-
ship ·private economic enterprises suitable tor socialization.-'7 It was also 
empowered to combine them "in the interests ot collectivism.1t58 Every German 
wu to be accorded an opportunity to earn a livelihood "by" productive work.-59 
The national government was to exert itself in behalf ot the international 
regulation of labor's legal status "to the end that the entire working claes 
ot the world may enjoy a universal minimum of social rights en60 
Notwithstanding the strong etforts of the Social Democrats to give Ger-
many a socialist republic, the Centrists and the Democrats had managed to 
check any extreme inroads ot SOCialism. )(any ot the Centrist promises made in 
the Januar;y election campaign were fulfilled in the economic section of the 
Qrundrechta.. Later, Father }lite, surveying the accomplishments of the Nation-
al .Assembly, referred to the cooperative idea expressed in the constitution u 
the "final tulfillment" of a long-standing desire of the Center' 8 socio-econ-
55Article 155. 
56Ibid• 
-
57 Article 156. 
58Ibid. 
-
59Article 163. 
60Article 162. 
,I 
I 
2$0 
omic program. 61 
After months of tedious discussion, debate, and struggle the Weimar Con-
stitution had gradual~ emerged in its completed form. It was a document of 
compromises which indicated gains and losses sustained by each party. 62 On 
J~ 31, 1919, it received the final vote of the National A.ssembly.63 The 
final vote for acceptance was far from unanimous. The number of members 
present was 338. Of their votes, 262 were in tavor, 7$ were opposed, and 1 
(centrist Johann Richter's) withheld.64 The centrist vote was almost unani-
mows. Table VI shan that of the 90 Centrists liste~$ 79 cut their vote tor 
acceptance, 7 members were absent (1 because ot illness), 1 was excused, 8ld 1 
abstained. The onq dissenting vote was that of the Bavarian extrem1at, Georg 
lie ill. The other Bavarians, while not too enthusiutic about the centralizing 
tendencies evident in the constitution, voted along with their tellow Centrists 
for acceptance in order not to break the united Party front.66 
In reporting the results or the vote and summarizing the achievements ot 
61!!, Januar,y 8, 1920, #19. 
62At the Parte1t5 of the Rhenish Centrists in Cologne on September 16, 
1919, Joseph Hess announced, "Die Signatur der neuen Zeit ist nun e1nmal daB 
Kompromiss, die Komprom1sspo11t1k gro8sen st1ls." Report, as cited in Korse;y, 
Zentrumsparte1 1917-1923, p. 230. 
63verhandlungen, Julf 31, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 2197-2199. 
64Ibid• The German Jlational People I 15 Party, the German People I 15 Party, 
and the'""'l'fRlependent Social1sts-the extreme Right and the extreme .Lett-voted 
aga1n&t the Weimar constit1ltion. 
6$ Josef ICubet.ka was not on the official llst, although he 'Wu listed 
when votes were taken a f." day's previows to Jul.y 31. 
66schwend, Bayem, pp. 103-104. 
TABLE VI 
CENTER VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTIOO, JULY 31, 1919 
Delegates Distr ict Vote Delegates District Vote 
Allekotte, Joseph Koblenz Yes Langwost, Heinrich Hanover Yes 
Andre, Joseph Wllrttemberg Yes Legendre, Peter Koblenz Yes 
As tor, Jakob Koblenz Yes Leicht, Johann Franken Yes 
Becker, Johannes Arnsberg III Lensing, Felix Dnsseldorf Absent 
Becker, Josef Nassau Absent Marx, Wilhelm ntlsseldorf Yes 
Bell, Johannes Dlli3seldorf Yes Mausbach, Josef M-8nster Yes 
Bergmann, Theodore rhlsseldorf Yes Haxen, Wilhelm Hanover Yes 
Beyerle, Konrad Franken Yes Mayer, Wilhelm Bavaria Yes 
Bitta, Joseph Oppeln Yes . Mllner, Richard Fulda Yes 
Blank, Lorenz Hanover Yes Nacken, Josef K~hn Yes 
Blum, Johannes K8ln Yes Neuhaus , Agnes Arnsber g Yes 
Bolz, Eugen WHrttemberg Yes Neyses, }01atthias Koblenz Yes 
Brauns, Heinrich K8ln Yes Ollmert, Karl Koblenz Yes 
von Brentano di Otte, Wal demar Leignitz Yes 
Tremezzo, Otto Nassau Yes Pfeiffer, Maximilian Berlin Yes 
Burlage, Eduar d Aurich Yes Puschmann, Alois Breslau Yes 
Colshorn, Herman Hanover Yes RheinlHnder, Anton Arnsberg Yes 
Diez, Carl Baden Yes Richter, Johann Pfalz Abstained 
Dransfeld, Hedwig DUsseldorf Yes Sagawe, Robert Posen Yes 
Erhardt, Franz Oppeln Yes Schefbeck, Josef Bavaria Yes 
Ersing~ Joseph Baden Yes i'':--~' Schiffer, Mattias MUnster Absent 
Erzberger, Matthias wBrttemberg Yes . , ) Schirmer, Karl .; ~ Bavaria Yes . 
Farwick, Wilhelm 
-
K8ln Absent Schlack, Peter ;.'> . Dlisseldorf Yes 
Fehrenbach, KonstBntin Baden Yes " .~ Schmitt, Adam J. oJ'.,; Hessen III 
Fleischer, Paul East Berlin Excused SclUJr1 tz, Karia Koblenz Yes 
Frerker, Wilhelm MUnster Yes Schneider, Alexander Franken Yes 
Gerstenberger, Liborius F);anken Yes SchUmmer, Wilhelm -- Prussia Yes 
Giesberts, Johann · Dusseldorf Yes Schwarz , Jean Albert Nassau Yes 
Gilsing, Anton Arnsberg Yes Schwarzer, Rudolf Bavar ia Yes 
II \Ol{h-ttemberg Kgln Grober, Adolf Yes Spahn, Peter Yes 
-·1 Grunau, Augus t Breslau Absent Stapfer, Michael Bavaria Yes 
Hagemann, Joseph Aurich Yes Stegerwald, Adam Klhn Yes 
Hebel, Benedikt Bavaria Yes Strzoda, Franz Oppeln Yes 
Heim, Georg Bavar ia No S~czeponik, Thomas Oppeln Yes 
Herold, Karl MUnster Yes Tauscher, Eugen Bavari a Yes 
Herschel, Johannes ~ln Yes Teusch, Christine Kgln Yes Hitze, Franz D seldorf Yes Tremmel, Peter Franken Yes 
Hofmann, Hennann Pfalz Absent Tr1mborn, Karl K8ln Yes 
Imbusch, Heinrich Arnsberg Yes Ulltzka, Karl 0f.peln . Yes 
Irl, Martin Bavaria Yes Weber, Helene Dllsseldorf Yes 
Jaud, Josef Bavaria Yes Wieber, Franz nU.sseldorf Yes 
II Joos, Josef Dusseldorf Yes Wirth, Joseph Baden Yes 
Kaas, Ludwig Koblenz Yes Zawadzki, Konstantin Oppeln Yes 
Koch, Johann MUnster Yes Zehnter, Johann Baden Yes 
Kossmann, Bartholomew Koblenz Yes Zettler, Maria Bavaria Yes 
Kreutz, Franz MHnster Yes 
---
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the National A88embly, Germania expre88ed some concern about the tuture of 
Germany under the new cOl18titution. It wondered whether the majority parties 
would be influential enough to induce the 1$ opponents to 'the constitution to 
accept or at least to acquie8ce in the future legiBlation needed to supplement 
the basic law ot the" land.61 The Center Party pledged its wholehearted support 
to 8tand by its coalition partners in upholding the Weimar Constitution; tor, 
&II Oermania pointed out, the Center had always been a constitutional. partT and 
intended to remain one.68 
The Center Party had achieved e8sent1al:q what it had 8et out to do at 
the beginning ot the year. It had 8ustained t.he los8 ot so_ ot its .mber-
ship &II a result of its realistic attitude t.owarda the Versailles Treat.y. and 
some ot its conservative _bers. disgusted with the more liberal tendencies 
ot the delegates at Weimar, began leaving the PartT- Moreover, in late ](ay 
and ear:q June there appeared a rift in relationa between the Protestant and 
Catholic members ot t he center Party. The German Nat.ional .People t s PartT 
capitalized upon this rift and began luring the discontented element to their 
ranks. Many ot the prominent Protestant members who had joined the Center 
after the Revolution, deserted to the DNVP. For example, the Prote8tant 
pastor ot Berlin. Theodor Haecker, was quoted &II referring to hi8 support of 
the "ChriBt.liche VollaJparte1" &II a m1stake.69 Germania felt compelled to warn 
its readers to be on their guard against the concerted ettorts ot the DNVP to 
61August 2, 1919, #346. 
68Ibid• 
69!!, June 29, 1919, #$$0. 
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win recruits from the Centrist camp. For all serioua-minded Christiana there 
was onlJr one truly Christian Party based on sound principles and that was the 
oenter Party which oould never "aooept the clear slogans of chauvinistio ex-
travagance and unchristian revengefulness" of the DNVp.70 
True to it. traditions, the Center had striven to inoorporate its Ohria-
tlan Weltanschauung into the deliberations at Weimar. The delegates had oause 
for satisfaction "for they had fulfilled completely their dut.ies and obliga.-
tions." 71 Tokens of gratitude and appreciation were onered the Center Party 
for its role in the Weimar deliberations. At the first Provinsialtag of the 
Berlin Center Part,.. on Sept-ember 21, 1919, Frhr. von Rechenberg gawe a publio 
tribute of "thanks and aoknorlledgementtt to the delegates for their oooperation 
in the oonstitutional work, and approved the PartY's position on "the ques-
tions of constitutional and oultural policies. n72 The bishops of German;r, 
gathered at Fulda on August. 20, 1919, for a Ohurch oonferenoe, issued a publio 
declaration thanld.ng the Oentrist delegates for their arduous work in defending 
Church principles despite strong opposition. Although the bishops spoke 
against a few specifio articles ooncerning Ohurch affairs and education whiob 
they did not favor,7.3 thq nevertheless acknowledged that through the sole 
efforts of tba Centrist delegates, the original draft of the oonstitution re-
garding religious questions had been "improved and supplemented.n74 
70~ 4, 1919, #298. 
7laermania, September 22, 1919, #434. 
72Ibid. 
-
7.3Articles 10/1J 137) l.38) 143-149. 
74eeB1shops' Declaration ot August 20, 1919, n as cited in Bachem, Zentrwu-
f!!tei, VIII, 30.3-304. 
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Later, Kausbach at the first Reichsparteit!l of the Center Party on 
January 22, 1920, referred to a statement he had received froll fta high ChUrch 
digni'tary" which thanked the Centrist delegates of the cOJllJtitutional commit-
tee in the nama of the Church "for their earnest and honorable labor.,,75Tbe 
Centrist delegates themselves spoke with satisfaction of their wcrk. Wllhelll 
Marx in an article describing the Cen~er's position on the Kulturfragen con-
cluded it with the stateDWmt. "The Center can in truth and consci~ntioU8 con-
viction s8l' of itself that it has perf'orEd its entire duty and obligation 
(Pf'llcht unci Schuld.1gkeit)."76 
75Re~rt, January 22, 1920, as cited in ~., p. 304. 
76nHat die Zentrumspartei in Kultur~ragen veraagt?" Westdeutsche Arbeit-
terzei J Ma.Y 29, 1920, 622, as cited in Mora.,., Zentrumspartel1911-192j, 
CHAPl'ER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Center' a record. of political achieveDltnt during the relatively' 
ahort period from November 1918 to August 1919 is an impressive one. In the 
face of difficulties and obatacles, the Party labored to aecure for its 
electorate guarantees for the adequate protection of civil and religious 
rights. Under it left-oriented leadership, it had adjusted realisticalq to 
the chaotic conditions of the ~diate poat-war period in Germany'. 
Prior to the Revolution, cOl18ervatism had alwqs been a basic character-
istic of' the Center. Ita leadership, consisting of bureaucrats, landowners, 
clergymen, and profeasional men, had supplied the political ideas for the 
Party. But a lert-oriented faction within the Party, more cloaely attuned to 
the demands or the masses, gradually began to exert its influence. Assisted 
by the growing discontent, war-weariness, and demoralizing conditions in 
Germany in the last Tears of the war, this group under the leadership of' 
Matthias }<~zberger was able to veer the Party toward a coalition with the 
parties of the Left in July 1917. Conservative, ariatocratic Centrist 
leadera, however, suspicious of' the restless proletarian ele.-nt and fearful 
of the outcome of democratic ideals, disapproved of parliamentary ref01'll8 and 
continued to support the monarcy and the parties of the Right. Later, in 
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October 1918, nevertheless, the lett...-ing faction of the Center Party succeed-
ed in obtaining, albeit reluctant~, the Center Party's cooperation tor con-
stitutional refoms which converted Germal\Y to a constitutional monarchy. 
Unfortunately, these politioal reforms were too late in cCllldng. Disor-
ganized and demoralized, succumbing to riots and radioal agitation, the impe-
rial regime in Germany gave way. within a few.eks the age-old thrones and 
dynasties oams toppling down, and overnight, so to speak, GerJl18l11' witnessed 
the establishment of a soc1al1st republio with workers' and soldiers' 
councils in ascendenc,y. 
Most ot the conservative leaders of the Centrist Reioh's committee were 
unprepared for these revolutionary events of early November 1918. Up to the 
very da1' of the Kaiser·.8 abdication, they had stolidly supported the monarchy. 
Unable to reconoile themselves to the new German Republic this oonservative 
"old-guard" withdrew from Berlin disillusioned and retired to their home 
states. They were no match tor the type of leadership demanded by the 
perilous times. 
In the midst ot this crisis, the democratically oriented faotion ot the 
Center came to the fore, assumed the challenging position of leadership in the 
Party, and prepared for the cOming election of a National Assembly whioh was 
to decide the politioal tate ot Germany. To provide greater cohesiveness for 
the various factions within the Party, a reorganisation of the Center's 
national structure W88 arranged by establishing a general-seoretariat in 
Berlin. Following this, the Centrist leadership prepared to .et the demands 
of the "new times," proposing a reexamination of the Party's fundamental prin-
ciples. Alread1' by the m1ddle of November, several plans for a new party pro-
gram had been submitted to the Cent-ut 'RA,..11n 1.. .... _............ 'fn,.. nnNlitiA'NI+.inn 
..... 
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Divergent shades of conservatism, l1beralum, and radicaiL social reform were 
evidenced in the proposals. The left-oriented Cologne Plan called for a com-
pletely new organization of the Center's program; the more moderate Berlin 
Plan suggested a readjustment of party principles to cope with the changing 
times. Both programs offered similar plans for a democratic :tntercontessional 
party structure. A further suggestion that the Party's name be changed to 
signify its intention to "come out of its tower," met with conflicting opin-
ions within each group. 
Internal tensions already apparent prior to 1918 were accentuated by the 
Revolution. tllls making party solidarity and unanimity d1t'ficult to maintain. 
Due to its heterogeneous composition, the Center Party had to cope with prob-
le.118 in reconc111ng all its socio-economic interests into a single acceptable 
party program. The majority found it hard to relinquish allegiance to the old 
monarchy and accept a republican structure for Germany, but expediency neces-
sitated submersion of emotional. attachment to the old state stru.cture. In 
order to save the Reich's unity and. overcome the radical disruptive foroes 
rampant in Germany-, it 11'88 necessary to recognize the Republic as "the onq 
possible vehicle to get out of the chaos of revoiution." After a month's 
deliberation" a national Centrist committee drew up a list of "guiding prin-
ciples" which 11'88 to serve as the Center's political program in the election 
campaign for the National Assembly. These Leitslt_ of Dec8Jllber 1918 revolu-
tionized the PartY-'s political theories while retaining the basic principles 
of the old SOest Program. Assuming a realistic vin of the ravolutionar,y 
events of November, the Center Party abandoned its traditional allegiance to 
the monarchy. NOW' called the "Christlicbe Volkspartei," the Party- accepted the 
Revolution 811 a fait accompli, and entered the election campaign 88 a 
supporter of a democratic republic. 
2$8 
A. deciding factor in facilitating unanimity among the divergent inter-
ests of the Center was the radical anti-religious actions ot the revolutionar,y 
government. The appointment of the Independent Socialist A.dolf Hoffmann as 
Kiniater of CUlt-tire brought a stream of protest from the catholic electorate. 
The center 811 traditional champion of religious rights 11'811 forced to submerge 
its various social, pOlitical, and economic differences to _et the challenge 
ot Hottmann's new Kulturkampt. Capitalising upon the religious issue, the 
Party had managed to torget local differences and to present a united tront. 
But the 1aage or sol1darit)" 11'88 deceiving; Party unaniaity did not actuall)" 
exist. The right-wing conservatives, content for the time being to remain in 
the background, awaited post-election development •• 
The result. of the National Assembly election were gratifying to the 
Center Party, Despite the recent loss of Gel'll&llY's densely populated Catholic 
frontier area, the "Chrutliched VolkBpartei" emerged from the tirst national 
election ordeal of the new democratic state 88 an important political tactor. 
Receiving the second highest number of votes, the Party obtained ninety-one 
seats in the National A.8se1libly. As in previous election returns, the delegates 
represented a cross-section ot the varied socio-econoJDic composition ot the 
Party. Yet, there was a arked difference in the strength or SOl8 or the 
groups represented. Conspicuous for its abseJlce was the usual representation 
of the conservative wing. On the other band, cl definite gain was noted in the 
represmtation from labor. Nevertheless, despite an increase in liberal repre-
sentation in the Centrist delegates to the Assembly, the Party remained basi-
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call7 a middle class party with a slight. leaning toward the lett in its sooio-
econoll1c viaws. 
It the Party membership displayed little enthusiasm for the republic, it 
was almost with replgn&nOe that it vi81l'8d acceptance of an invitation from. the 
sm who, falling a majority of the election returns, were forced to uk the 
Centrists and DeDlDCrats to join with them. in a coalition gover11lll8nt. The ele 
tion campaign had stressed so forceful.l¥ the dirferenee between the Centrist 
Christian Weltanschauung and JIar.x1Bt Soo1al1s. of the SPD that cooperation 
wi th them seemed Ulogical. But the Centrist delegates could not remain 
imperrious to the seriousness of the times which deanded a strong stable 
governu.nt for GerMlV". Since this could be achieved only through a coalition 
of the three major parties, practical-aa1nded st&tes.n of the Center Party 
advocated that civio responsibility and concern for the ... elfare or Geran7 be 
set above party interests, and that the delegates, despite their repugnance, 
take steps to join the coalition. The decision ... as not an easy one, nor· d.1d 
it win full acceptance; the vote ot the reactiona::y Bavarian partioularist re-
mained negative even when the _jority of delegates agreed to collaborate 
with their eretwhUe enemies. 
A.a an active _m.ber of the first Weimar Coalition, the Cen.t4.'r .Part;y ..... 
faoed ... ith the responsibility of obtaining favorable peace telW tor GermBD1'-
a moat difficult task in view of the truculent attitude of the victora. Al-
though the PartY"s reaction to the harsh peace teras of the Allies ..... 88 ve-
hement as that of the JJlD8t avid Nationalist, the realistic appraisal given b7 
the cctr1sts to the altematives confronting defeated oerm&lV, compel.l8d the 
Party to side ld. th the SPD and vote for acceptance of the Versailles Treaty. 
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accepting the peace te:rJD8, the center holding a pivotal parl1am..nt817 position 
brought about the .nd of the futU. stalest. and saved their countl')'lll8n the 
horrors of further Allied occupation and the hardships of a continued bloo~ 
Another major responsibility assumed by the Centrist delegatea ... as the 
task of cooperating in formulating a democratic constitution for Ge~~ The 
Weimar Constitution, adopted on July .31, 1919, and promulgated on AUguBt ll, 
1919, was a un.1que document 1n many respects. Although the form of gov.rnaent 
was a republic, it was deSignated as the German Reich with all its imperial 
associations. Oonflicting 1nterests represented in the National Ass •• bly .... re 
evident 1n the number of compromis.s upon ... hich the Constitution ... as bas.d. 
One of the issues was that of the centralized state v.rsus the federal state. 
In the end the centrist f.derative prinCiple was retained. However, exponents 
of a unitary solution did not .merge empty-handed for the national gOV8rIB8nt 
gained more power than held by its imperial predecessor. Legislative authoritr' 
vest.d exclusively 1n the Reich was enormous, embracing such things as foreign 
relatiOns, national defense, tariff and moneta1")" polici.s, o1tisenship, md 
coaaun1cation. Koreov.r, the Reich was given unlimited power to deal with a 
great many other matt-.rs, such as civil and -criminal law, judicial proc.dure, 
poor relief, tne press, the protection of mothers and children, public health, 
labor, expropriations and 8ocialisatiol1ll, cOllll8rce, banking, industry, railways 
and 1nternal navigation, and theaters. It could lay down "fundamental princi-
ples" in regard to education, the right ot religious bodies, lllld distribution, 
housing, and the taxing of the tJlnder. 
EDcutive power was vested 1n the president of the Reich who was to be 
.l.cted directly by the people for a term of' seven y.ars with the possibility 
... 
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ot re-election. Arr1' German at least thirty-five years of age was eligible tor 
the office. The eDcuti" W8.8 given power to make treaties and alliances, 
appoint and remove the chancellor and other _bers of the national goyernaent, 
given supreme command of the armed forces, could dissolve the Reichstag, and 
subject &IV' law enacted by parliament to a popular referendUJI. Aboye all, he 
was given broad emergency powers under Article 46. "In the event that the 
public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered, the Reich 
President DUQ" take the measures necess&r.y tor their restoration, intervening, 
it neces8&ry', with the aid ot the armed forces."l For thie purpoae he could 
abrogate temporarily, whollr, or in part, the fundamental rights laid down in 
the Constitution. 
Legislative power wu vested in a bicsneral body. ..bers or the lower 
house, the Reichstag, were to be elected for a lIUlX1mum of four years by secret, 
universal suftrage and according to proportional representation. '!'he Reicha-
tag was the supreme expression of the popular will and the sOTereign legisla-
tive power. It initiated and enacted lan subject to a suspensive veto. The 
cabinet was responsible to the Reichstag. 
The Reichsrat, the upper house, represented the German states (LInder). 
Each state was to haV'fP at leut one member in the Reichsrat. The memor,r ot 
pre .... ar Pl'Ussian control of the Bun<iesrat had led to a stipulation that no one 
state could control more than two-f1£tha of the councU-a prav1sion fully 
supported by the Center Party. The Reicharat could initiate legislation to-
gether with the cabinet. It it disapproved a _asure passed by the Reichstag, 
it could return the b1ll to that ~J the latter could override the veto, by 
lArticle 46. 
i 
'I 
i 
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a two-thirds vote. The Reichsrat was to enjoy less power than it had in the 
Bismarckian Reich. 
The moat un1que feature of the Weimar Constitution and one on Which the 
center eDrted much effort and influence was the second _jor division-the 
Grundrechte. Look1ng back to the days of 1848, the makers ot the conetitution 
incorporated into their document the treedoms that had been sought in that 
revolutionary year. All Germans were declared equal before the law. They 
were free to travel or to emigrate from Germany-. Freedom or speech wa guar-
anteed and there would be no censorship. Communications and the home were 
guaranteed as sacred. The constitution went into detail not only' on the crit 
cal question or civil rights but also on economic, social, and religious mat-
ters. Practioa.J.ly' every facet of German life was treated in the constitution. 
A letter-perfect dOCUJDent, the Weiaar Constitution was too \UDl'1eldl;r to be 
practical. 
Unable to achieTe its goals in all afrairs, the centrists compromised on 
lesser issues in order to gain concessione which the Party oonsidered essential 
to its Christian WeltanschaulUlg-avo1d.ance ot a complete separation of Church 
and state, protection or the Church privileges, a constitutional guarantee or 
cQnfessional schools, and other :fundamental rights which the Party sought over 
the oppoaition or its IIIOre liberal coalition partners. 1I1ch of the Il1ccess or 
the center Party during the nine months under diecussion was due to t he capable 
leadership of 8uch men as, Gr8ber, Ersberger, Trimborn, Fehrenbach, Jlausbaoh, 
Brauns, Spahn, Hit .. , and Marx. Though representing dirferant shades ot 
political thought, these men generally united in a positive policy for the 
Party. Skilled in group diplomacy, ocoasionalq ruthless, zd always nexible, 
li tical realists who never 
26) 
t.he price. 
Despit.e ~ic leadership, unanimity within the Party was never tull,.. 
att.ained. The discont.ented conservative monarchists within the Party subjectad. 
t.he leadership t.o sharp criticism, especially after the accept.ance of the 
Versailles Treaty.2 With the adoption of the Weiar COD8tit.ution on August l.l, 
1919, the stom of criticism broke wit.h sudden fury. In Catholic circles, in 
the Party itselt, everywhere, conflicting views on the Constitution were being 
aired.) A new struggle had emerged, a VertusUDgaatreit, not unlike the 
Zentrwnast.reit of a few )"eara previous. The published document of the Conati-
tution was aubjected to cloa8 scrut.iny', and ever)" new discovery of compromise 
was greeted with the atinging lash of criticism.4 
staunch lIlonarchiat.s found it. dll!icult to :reconoile their fOl"lMr views 
on monarclrlcal power to the new d_oor&tic ideals. The center'. acceptance of 
the compromiae oonceming the national oolors 11'88 t.he focal point of centro-
versy for disappointed monarchist... reproaohes. Theae aeoret supporters of tbt 
1Il0n8rcby a .... t.he last symbol of the old atolid mona.rdW:al regim.e-"tbe proud 
old German flag under which millions of our beat people have gone to nctal)'" 
2,. W. Hopmann, "Das Zentrum von haute," Historisoh-ellt1aohe Blltter 
fur daa kathol1ache Deutsohland, CLXIII (1919), pp. 232-243. See ilso Dii 
Zentrum ad :rrrwegen1 AUCh eIiie Kriegsbilans von einelll rheinisohen ZentrU'ms-
mann {E!'aen: V01.k8ver1.ag, 1.91.9,). Both art1o.L8S . D'( the aane author are 
cEllcal of the Center'a role in the peaoe negottatioll8. 
Jrerdinand Frhr. von r«rstenberg, a contemporar;y and aevere oritio of 
the Center's policiea of 1918-1919, wrote reoentq of t.he difficult,.. COD8erva-
tive Catholios had. in 1918 in accepting the "complete policy of reversal from 
conservative to liberal atand" taken by the centrist leadership in 1918. 
Letter from Ferdinand Frhr. von FUrstenberg to the author, November 10, 1966. 
4Hermann von IJlningk, "~ zentrum am Scheideweg," re}rint from. 
Historisoh-politisohe Blatter fur daa katholisohe Ileutscbland, CLXV (Januar;y, 
1920), 9-17. 
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and to deathll-replaced by' the "flag of the revolution."S The acceptance of 
the n_ flag sign1.t1ed far these conservative critics or the centrists a re-
jection of the traditional fundamental principles of the Old center Party as 
exempl1!1ed in the Soest Program of 1871.6 
A still more important area of the Constitution whioh oame under heav,y 
criticism was the compromise on the school question. Despite the tremendous 
odds against the Center and their efforts to secure constitutional recognition 
of confessional schools, the critics of the Party felt that the Centrist dele-
gates had reneged on their principles. 7 Because of the large number of cen-
trist delegates on the oonstitutional committee (six out of twenty-eight), the 
catholics in GerIlaDT and the member. of the center Party in particular over-
estimated the delegates' strength and expected that they should have been able 
to introduce their political program with ease, espeoially in regard to 
religious and school affairs. 8 
Aocording to Hermann. Freiherr von Illninok, grandson of Hel"ll8lln von 
Mallinckrodt one of the Original founders and leaders ot the Cmter Party, the 
SIbid. , p. 24. 
-
6see Hermarm von 1Jn1nck, Katholiache Politik (K81na Verlag des st. 
Josephs-Vereina, 1921), pp. 3-9. 
7r.!n1nck, "Lentl"Wll am scheid.eweg," pp. 2-9. Jlausbach, especially is 
criticised for "falling to take a definite stand in the constitutional 
committee for Christian ideals and principles •••• • Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
---
Ssee Bach., Zentrumapartei, VIII, 289. )(ausbach, Re~ionsunterricht 
und K1rche, p. 26, wrote that those who raised critioia ag Mt the We1iiir 
constitUEIon for its irreligiOUS aspects would find it difficult to na. a 
single IIOdsm constitution in the world which oontained &8 many significant 
sta.tements on religion as those found in the Weimar Constitution. 
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conservative element 'Wi thin the Party diaapprOYed of the le:tt-oriented Cent 
leaderabip diaplqed at Weimar because of what they considered to be its be-
trqal of the Christian Weltanschauung.9 In their scrutin;y of the Weimar 
Constitution, the critics singled out Article 1, which stated "political 
authority emanates from the people," as an example of the rejection of 
Christian prinCiples and the acceptance of secularistic vi_s on govem.ment.lO 
Criticism of the Center Party in its 'Work at We1mar culminated in the 
assertion that the Centrist leaders had neither identified nor supported the 
catholic principles of the Party in a satisfactory manner.ll The prospect of 
taking the oath to support the Weimar Constitution caused such concem for th 
traditionalists that Mausbach sought to allay their fears by publishing two 
articles in the K8ln1sche Volksseitung in which he showed there was no "moral 
hindrance prohibiting anyone from taking the oath ... l2 
The Verfass'!18sstreit which 1fU tearing the Center Party appeared to 
have been instigated by the d1V81"8ity of opinion on the Weimar Constitution. 
This, however, was not the case. A cleavage ldthin the Party had already 
been Ilowly deYeloping since 1912 when the more liberally inclined left 'Wing 
began its ascendancy to Part;y leaderahip. Unable to reconcile their national 
1st views to the new leadership of the Part;y after 1918, manT ot the tradi-
tional cQD8ervatives telt compelled to "tum their back- on the Center Party 
9Lnmnck, Kathollsche Po1itik, ;vp. 4-8. rllninck recentq reaffirmed 
this vi_. ~ttW trom Hirmann von LUn1nck to the author, September 3, 1966. 
l0tGninck, "Zentrum am Scheideweg,. pp. 9-17. Hopmann, "Das zentrum von 
heute," PP. 28$-292. 
ll.I!Un1nck, OPe cit., p. 2. 
l2October 20, 1919, #824. November 2$, 1919, #923. 
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and to seek refuge with the Right. lJ In January 1920, the Bavarian particu-
larists complAttely dissatisfied with the centralizing tendencies of the new 
govern.nt, broke with the center Party over Ersberger's national finance pro-
gr_ cd went their am wa:r. This W811 a great blow to the Party and weakened . 
it. strength. The lDDl"8 real1stic _l1bers of the Party, on the other hand, 
recognized that the Weimar delAtgates had remained true to the Party'. basic 
pr1nciplu.14 
Unfortunately for the future of the center Party the d1nam1c leadership 
of 1918-1919 was short-lived. Within a fflf( year. lIalllY of the indetatigable 
Centrist delegates of the National Assembly had withdr8ltl1 from political life 
or died. lS The fflf( .eillar leaders who remained .... re unable to cope with the 
strong conservative element which was again colling to the fore. Since a 
majority of the Center Party had never been tully comm:Ltted to the Weimar Con-
stitution and the Republic, the Galter Party slipped back into its cOll8ervati'n 
and ccmplacent roles once its energetic leadership had passed from the scene. 
l.3tf1n1nck, OPe cit., p. 12, "It 18 now necessary to demand that the Cen-
ter Party openlY recognise the superiority of the monarchical system and de-
clare itseU for restoration of the monarclV" as soon 88 political circum-
stances are favorable. It this 18 not done, then all those who Br8
n
for mon-
arclV" are free to tum their backs on the Center. n Agreeing wi tb Liininck was 
the anonymous author of ttber die politische und parteipolit18che SteUung der 
lcathol1schen Deutaohen von e1ri8i iOlchen (Bresau: 'erag von It'Uri I'riCise, 
n. d.), p. 1, who sud, ",or Chr18tliii-conservative Catholic there 18 no 
opportunity nor possibility to participate politically in the Center." 
l4see Giesberts' speech at a Center assembly in nLseldorf on JUl..y 27, 
1919, Germania, Jul¥ 30, 1919, #341. 
15J1aWJbach retumed to his duties of teaghing atter the completion of the 
work of the National. Assembly in Hay 1920; Or8ber died in November 1919) 
Trimborn in July 1921J Enberger was assassinated in August 1921. Hit .. and 
Burlage l1kewise died in 1921. By 1925 Spahn, Fehrenbach, Gerstenberger, and 
~er had also died. 
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Lacldng the realistic v1Enrpoint of an Erzberger, GrBber, or Tr1mborn, 
the new leadership was doa.d to failure. Quic~ it abandoned ita prom1aing 
inter-coni'essional party basis and began to narrow its interest to strictly 
Catholic demands, espec1a~ concerning the partiall1 unsolved school ques-
tion. A,nti-democratic foroes again asserted themselves as the Party veered 
more to the Right, gay from the Centrist's former liberal-democratic 
position.16 It was this alignment with the Right which eventually unde:na1ned 
the canter Part.r.11 
The Centrist leadership in 1918-1919 had made a positive contribution 
toward pacifying and stabilizing the revolutionary elements of the poat-war 
Germany. That the Weimar Republic succumbed after fifteen years of existence 
was not so muoh the result of failure on the part of the center or the other 
bourgeois parties as it was the aocumulation of extenuating circumstances 
during the post-war period. It is a moot question what might have happened 
if the Genter had continued to be led by leaders of the same caliber .. 
Erzberger, Gr8ber, or Tr1mborn. 
1~r8ey, Zentrumapartei 1911-1923, pp. 601-619, Attributes the waning of 
the centrist vlt&llty &lter 192) to fis loss ot adequate leadership and its 
abandoning of its intercontession.al basis. Korstty repeats this same idea in 
his article, "Das Zentl'Wll zwischen den Fronten," in Der Weg in die D1ktatur 
1916 bis 1933 (Mltnchen: R. Piper & Co., 1963), pp. 95-120: See ilso bita, 
Dimoki'atie Ii Zwielicht, pp. 61-11, who holds a sim.1lar view but place. more 
stre8s on ti11ure to retain the Party's tntereonte8sional basis. 
17Edgar Alexander, "Church and Society," in Church and SocietT, pp. 469-
414, claims that the election of the cleric Luciwig kiii as l'iiP;y c'fia.1.ntan in 
1928 deteated the Party's trend ot a realistic intercontossional Center policy 
on a broad tront and steered the Party toward a "clear-cut coalition" with the 
Right. See also Joseph Rovan, 'tAt cathol1cisme Politique en Allemagne," in 
H1stoire de la Demooratie chretienne, II (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956), 
p. 114, Who compares the reilIitic attitude ot the center in 1918 with its 
complacent rightist attitude in 1933 and accuses the center of dealing the 
death blow to political Catholicism by voting tor the Enabling Act which 
delivered Germany to Hitler's terror. 
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From November 1918 to AugWlt 1919, the Center Party under able leader-
ship played a prominent role in the development of the democratic government. 
True to its traditional position in German parliamentary life it exerted a 
moderating influence on the political extremes and strove throughout the 
period to uphold the Center's old slogan of "Truth, Justice, and Freedom'" 
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